In the early 1980s, a group of radical African economists working at the Dakar-based Institut Africain de Développement Economique et de Planification (IDEP) were dismissed. Among them were three Ghanaian economists, Tony Obeng, Cadman Atta Mills, and Kwame Amoa, who applied a neocolonial analysis of global political economy to critique international development policies. Although the precise circumstances of their dismissal remain unclear, it was evident that their revolutionary approach to development clashed fundamentally with IDEP’s methods. Inspired by Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah’s theory of neocolonialism and the Latin American school of dependency theory, these Pan-African scholars refuted the dominant, anti-political, dehistorical, and simplistic Western explanation of Africa’s underdevelopment and urgently searched for better explanations. Drawing on institutional records, working papers, interviews, memos, and published and unpublished papers, this article centers Africans and African institutions engaged in development thinking in the larger history of economic thought in the 1970s and 1980s.

Mao’s violent collectivization and forced labour campaigns during China’s Great Leap Forward (1958–1962) led to as many as 45 million deaths in what is widely regarded as the worst famine in human history. Drawing on a corpus of over 300 interviews with famine survivors, I apply a mixed-methods approach to examine the impact of mass state repression on how such survivors speak about a repressive regime that remains in power. Exploiting variation in county-level mortality rates, I find that interviewees exposed to more intense state violence do not publicly voice more explicitly negative attitudes towards the state, but they do possess more latent negative sentiments. Furthermore, I use the establishment and subsequent dissolution of communal canteens – a key repressive institution through which the state functioned as the sole food distributor during a time of extreme scarcity – as an analytical lever to show that although some survivors may be unwilling to express grievances directly against an enduring regime that perpetrated mass violence, they readily express negativity towards a long-dead institution.

Antiquarian records provide indications that shamanic rituals and practices, though fragmented, were still being actively performed in Wales during the nineteenth century. These antiquarian ethnographic records display striking parallels with global shamanic traditions, especially from the northern hemisphere, suggesting a similar if not shared spiritual framework, supported by archaeological evidence for its origins dating back at least to 12,000 bp. A study of Welsh folklore, magico-religious traditions, place-names, rock art and megalithic structures suggest they might include substantial shamanic influences, warranting more detailed interdisciplinary investigation.

Politicization is one of the most fundamental characteristics of Chinese society, manifested in the direct and comprehensive control of society by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Methods include soft control through ideology and coercive control through campaigns. Based on the varying degrees of the CCP’s social control, the trajectory of China’s regime politicization can be divided into four periods: (1) the politicized regime of 1949–1965, (2) the hyper-politicized regime of 1966–1978, (3) the de-politicized regime of 1979–2012, and (4) the re-politicized regime of 2013–2023. We established an annual politicization index for the years 1949 to 2023 through a content analysis of two million articles in the People’s Daily, validating the trajectory of politicization changes in China. We use a model analysis of CCP membership attainment to demonstrate the applicability of the index in assessing how regime dynamics affect Party membership across the four periods.

This article is an environmental history of Anaconda Copper Company’s disposal of hundreds of thousands of tons of toxic waste from its Potrerillos and El Salvador mines into Chile’s Río Salado and Bahía de Chañaral. First, it uncovers a long history of disputes between copper companies and workers who panned the river for tailings. This early water war in Chile was shaped by competing understandings of water’s legal status. While workers claimed rights under the water law’s definition of water as a bien nacional de uso común, mining companies invoked the mining code and contended that the river’s water and waste were private property under civil law. Mining companies claimed rivers’ water by treating rivers in legal terms as mines and property of the state, bienes fiscales, that could be conceded as private property. They argued that human engineering of rivers in dams and canals, and through pollution, made rivers into a commodity and a form of property akin to subsoil minerals. Second, the article describes how, during the social reformist government of Eduardo Frei (1964–1970) and the revolutionary government of Salvador Allende (1970–1973), the state asserted control over Chile’s waterways while balancing centralized state management of water in the name of development with local users’ claims of long-standing riparian use rights. Third, the article traces the long history of the state and mining companies treating water as an economic commodity, often superseding local use rights, and argues that this history built the foundation for the later privatization of water during the Pinochet dictatorship. The article demonstrates that the privatization of water in Chile under Pinochet had its origins in the resolution of the tension between water and civil law in favor of extending property rights to water and building as a subsidy to transnational mining companies. This meant rolling back state management of rivers and often eroding local users’ water rights. Finally, the article concludes by examining the town of Chañaral’s successful 1987 lawsuit against the El Salvador mine to win an injunction against further pollution of the Salado as part of a moment of broader Latin American “environmental constitutionalism” during the 1980s. While this legal victory reflected a significant change in environmental law and an emergent environmentalist movement in Chile and across Latin America, it struck a blow to hundreds of workers who depended on extracting tailings from the river for their livelihood and who responded with unsuccessful protests.

Elections in many contemporary Latin American democracies unfold in a setting that complicates traditional political communication strategies. Indeed, many countries in the region are characterized by weak political parties, high levels of institutional distrust, and growing disdain for political elites. While a large body of literature has sought to explain which factors weaken parties and increase institutional distrust, less attention has been paid to the question of how these characteristics shape political communication. Drawing on the content of television advertisements created for Chile’s constitutional plebiscite campaigns, and original interviews with the creative and political teams that designed the ads, we explore how each side communicated with voters; the issues they focused on; and to what extent they relied on partisan, policy, generic, or emotional appeals. The analysis identifies important changes in messaging across the three electoral contests and probes an explanation for this variation. We find that in the absence of partisan messages, the constitutional campaigns relied first on policy-based appeals but then transitioned to generic appeals, ultimately opting for “antipolitics” messaging. These changes resulted from the expansion of the electorate and growing distrust in the constitutional convention. The analysis also underscores that pro–status quo plebiscite campaigns are more likely to deploy negative emotional language than campaigns centered on change.