In maintaining the distinction between capital and income first instituted by legislation nearly two centuries ago, the courts have occasionally faced intractable problems where pragmatism has necessarily triumphed over analysis. Sir Owen Dixon's famous Sun Newspapers test for distinguishing between revenue and capital outgoings is one example, where in reality a number of unweighted considerations were suggested, with but vague illustrations for their application. The proper manner of apportioning outgoings, and the role of purpose and intention, are others. Yet a fourth, and the subject of this paper is the characterisation of receipts derived from the sale or loss of intangible rights.

In the past few years, the subject of administrative law remedies has been studied intensively in many common law jurisdictions. In this article, David Mullan examines the various reforms and proposals for reform and concludes that none is completely satisfactory and indeed that some compound previous problems and create new ones as well Nevertheless, he sees some merit in the New South Wales and Nova Scotia solutions which emerged as part of a general reform of the civil procedure rules and not as a separate statutory enactment.

Let $(W,S)$ be a Coxeter system, and write $S=\{s_i:i\in I\}$, where I is a finite index set. Fix a nonempty convex subset $\mathscr {L}$ of W. If W is of type A, then $\mathscr {L}$ is the set of linear extensions of a poset, and there are important Bender–Knuth involutions $\mathrm {BK}_i\colon \mathscr {L}\to \mathscr {L}$ indexed by elements of I. For arbitrary W and for each $i\in I$, we introduce an operator $\tau _i\colon W\to W$ (depending on $\mathscr {L}$) that we call a noninvertible Bender–Knuth toggle; this operator restricts to an involution on $\mathscr {L}$ that coincides with $\mathrm {BK}_i$ in type A. Given a Coxeter element $c=s_{i_n}\cdots s_{i_1}$, we consider the operator $\mathrm {Pro}_c=\tau _{i_n}\cdots \tau _{i_1}$. We say W is futuristic if for every nonempty finite convex set $\mathscr {L}$, every Coxeter element c and every $u\in W$, there exists an integer $K\geq 0$ such that $\mathrm {Pro}_c^K(u)\in \mathscr {L}$. We prove that finite Coxeter groups, right-angled Coxeter groups, rank-3 Coxeter groups, affine Coxeter groups of types $\widetilde A$ and $\widetilde C$, and Coxeter groups whose Coxeter graphs are complete are all futuristic. When W is finite, we actually prove that if $s_{i_N}\cdots s_{i_1}$ is a reduced expression for the long element of W, then $\tau _{i_N}\cdots \tau _{i_1}(W)=\mathscr {L}$; this allows us to determine the smallest integer $\mathrm {M}(c)$ such that $\mathrm {Pro}_c^{{\mathrm {M}}(c)}(W)=\mathscr {L}$ for all $\mathscr {L}$. We also exhibit infinitely many non-futuristic Coxeter groups, including all irreducible affine Coxeter groups that are not of type $\widetilde A$, $\widetilde C$, or $\widetilde G_2$.

Let (K, v) be a valued field and $\phi\in K[x]$ be any key polynomial for a residue-transcendental extension w of v to K(x). In this article, using the ϕ-Newton polygon of a polynomial $f\in K[x]$ (with respect to w), we give a lower bound for the degree of an irreducible factor of f. This generalizes the result given in Jakhar and Srinivas (On the irreducible factors of a polynomial II, J. Algebra 556 (2020), 649–655).

It is often said that the great innovation of America's eighteenth century constitution-makers was not their acceptance of the ideal of constitutionalism but their insistence that legal constraints on government be subject to alteration, breaking free front the hold of divine law and natural right theories. To be sure, the notion of constitutionalism necessarily entails that there be some distinction between how ordinary legal change is effected and how a constitution is changed. A constitution binds and guides ordinary law-making by virtue of itself not being subject to those processes.

The common law has had considerable difficulty in identifying a principle or principles by which to explain the role of the courts in reviewing administrative action. In this article it is argued that that principle is necessarily a constitutional principle and that the starting point for its analysis in Australian law is the Commonwealth Constitution. It is then argued that the Commonwealth Constitution, and in particular the separation of judicial power within it, necessarily limits the extent of permissible judicial review. In particular, the separation of judicial power justifies and requires the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors and the distinction between invalidity and merit review in Australian administrative law. This constitutional basis for judicial review, combined with the discipline of a written Constitution, also explains why recent developments in English and New Zealand common law in relation to judicial review are not appropriate or applicable to Australia.

The opening words of s 3(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (“FOI Act”) state that the object of the Act is “to extend as far as possible the right of the Australian community to access to information in the possession of the Government of the Commonwealth”. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of s 3(1) indicate that this object is to be achieved in two main ways, that stated in s 3(1)(b) being:

[B]y creating a general right of access to information in documentary form in the possession of Ministers, departments and public authorities, limited only by exceptions and exemptions necessary for the protection of essential public interests and the private and business affairs of persons in respect of whom information is collected and held by departments and public authorities.

The new administrative law in Australia dates from the implementation, over a period of more than a decade, of the substance of the proposals advanced by the Kerr Committee and its successors in the early 1970s. The now familiar legislation swept away many of the procedural obscurities associated with the prerogative writs, codified the general principles governing judicial review of administrative action and provided for independent merits review of administrative decisions. These reforms paved the way for the emergence of what commentators have described as a “distinctively Australian jurisprudence in public law”. It is hardly necessary to say that Sir Anthony Mason played a pivotal role in the development of the distinctive jurisprudence, both through his membership of the Kerr Committee and his judgments in the leading administrative law cases of the 1980s and 1990s.

Antitrust policy aims to reduce market concentration and increase competition among firms. Contemporary antitrust is sensitive to both domestic and international considerations. Internationally, the market is dominated by the largest firms, raising questions about the competitiveness of domestic firms and the application of antitrust against foreign firms. Domestically, public support for antitrust is needed for continued enforcement. This paper examines how international markets shape public support for antitrust in the United States. Using media analysis, we find that antitrust is increasingly in the news, and that international competition is referenced in antitrust debates. We theorize that support for antitrust is shaped by concerns for the competitiveness of domestic firms, relative to foreign competition, and that these concerns vary based on individuals’ levels of nationalism. We test our theory using a survey experiment and find that individuals are especially concerned with being placed at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors. Interestingly, we find that using antitrust laws against foreign firms yields divergent reactions—highly nationalistic Americans increase their support for strong antitrust laws, while those with low levels of nationalism decrease support. The paper highlights the importance of global competition in shaping preferences for domestic regulation.

This article shall examine a discrete, though somewhat overlooked, aspect of the relationship between the Commonwealth Parliament and the federal, or ‘Chapter III’, courts which emerges in the scenario where Parliament purports to amend the law that the courts are required to apply in pending cases. This is of particular significance where the Commonwealth is a party to the proceedings, given the obvious advantage to the Commonwealth, as litigant, provided by its power to legislate, and potentially to do so strategically to effect a desirable outcome. This raises the spectre of a significant separation of powers issue. This article will explore the extent to which this principle entrenched as law in the Australian Constitution has been able to limit Parliament's power to protect the independence of the federal courts to interpret and apply the law in an individual adjudication; that is, to protect their ‘decisional independence.’ Its success or otherwise is one measure of the extent to which the separation of powers, as a legal rule, is capable of protecting the independent adjudication of legal disputes by the courts from the vicissitudes of political power and influence.

In an examination of the existing limitations of freedom of assembly and demonstration in the A.C.T., Mr Brown first deals with the common law and various statutory provisions as they stood in 1971. He then examines the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1971 (Cth) in some depth. His conclusion, after a brief discussion of rights of peaceful assembly in the present law, is that the current legal position in the A.C.T. is unsatisfactory in that it does not give sufficient guarantees to civil rights but rather embodies repressive laws to prevent threats of public disorder that may be more imaginary than real.

This article details how Plautus’ Casina has been used in a general education comparative gender history class over multiple semesters. Since Casina was based on an Athenian New Comedy play (The Lot-Castors by Diphilus), it incorporates elements of late fourth/early third century BCE Athenian ideas on gender, gender roles, and sexuality as well as Republican Roman views on these same areas from approximately a century later. For an introductory comparative gender history course which is designed for a wide time span, this play therefore offers the opportunity to look at two related cultures in just one work. The article highlights areas of the play emphasising those cultures’ ideals and values, and also deals with which areas students have most commented on and which ones are often ignored, in terms of characters, gender roles, and sexualities. The role and representation of slaves in those societies and within the play are also remarked upon.

In recent years, scholars worldwide have begun organising and developing a coherent framework and research agenda focused on the emerging field of ‘global administrative law’. This nascent body of law, unlike domestic or national forms of administrative law, does not operate within the bounds of unitary nation states, and unlike traditional accounts of public international law, it does not arise exclusively between nation states. Instead it operates in a transnational or global space occupied by a vast variety of administrative actors responsible for trans-governmental regulation and administration; the field of ‘global governance’. To combat growing concerns that there are crucial legitimacy, accountability and democratic deficiencies inherent in this system of global governance, numerous administrative law type mechanisms and principles have been developed by global administrative bodies. Global administrative law embodies the totality of these various mechanisms and principles.