The Silurian of Podolia, Ukraine, is renowned for its arthropod fauna, including eurypterids and the synziphosurine Pasternakevia. Here, we describe one of several new arthropods recently discovered in the vicinity of the Smotrych River. Smotrychaspis kurtopleurae gen. et sp. nov. is a synziphosurine euchelicerate with semicircular carapace lacking eyes, an unfused opisthosoma with 11 visible segments, the posterior tergites wide and bearing falcate epimera and a relatively long and stout telson. Smotrychaspis resembles pseudoniscid and bunodid synziphosurines but cannot be placed in either of these families.

This study presents data on helminth communities from 93 Hooded Crows (Corvus cornix). The dataset includes historical and contemporary records from three localities in Ukraine with different levels of urbanisation: Kyiv, the Middle Dnipro River, and Polissya. Thirty-two helminth species were identified, including 14 trematodes, six cestodes, 11 nematodes, and one acanthocephalan. The nematodes Eufilariella delicata and Hadjelia truncata are documented in Hooded Crows for the first time. During the statistical analysis, it was revealed that the used dataset is insufficient for robust inference regarding the impact of urbanisation on helminth communities due to its temporal and spatial biases. Despite the limitation, the data offer information for future research on the influence of urbanisation on helminth biodiversity in avian hosts.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine catalysed a shift in the security and defence policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states. Notably, the deployment of the European Peace Facility (EPF) to finance lethal military materiel for Ukraine has been described as a gamechanger for the EU. This article explores to what extent and how the policy shift regarding the EPF signals broader evolution in EU strategic agency. Contributing to the study of European strategic cultures, the article investigates dynamics of change and convergence in the strategic discourses of the EU and selected member states regarding the EPF amid the exogenous shock and policy shift. Specifically, the article first traces the evolution of the EU’s strategic narrative and its use of the EPF before and after the invasion. Second, drawing on interview data, it analyses four member states’ approaches to this instrument. The findings point to a changed strategic narrative and an evolving practice regarding EU military assistance, highlighting the EU institutions’ initiative-making power in crisis. While the member states continue to use the EPF for varying purposes, the joint experience of using the tool contributed to shifting national perspectives and growing consensus on the utility of EU security agency.

Psychosocial programs in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) often omit cognitive strategies due to perceived difficulty for clients and lay providers. We evaluated the benefit of including “cognitive coping” in a brief, online intervention for conflict-affected Ukrainian veterans and family members with mild to moderate psychosocial distress. Participants were randomized to two treatment conditions based on the Common Elements Treatment Approach Psychosocial Program (CPSS). CPSS-Basic (CPSS-B) included a self-assessment, safety screening and psychoeducation. CPSS-Enhanced (CPSS-E) included these as well as cognitive coping. Distress, functional impairment, alcohol use, aggression, social disconnectedness and conflict resolution were assessed after one month. Participants also evaluated program accessibility, acceptability, appropriateness, feasibility and adoption. Of 1,177 study participants, 788 (67%) completed follow-up. Both conditions significantly improved distress, functional impairment, aggression and social disconnectedness; CPSS-E producing a greater reduction in distress than CPSS-B (ES: d = .22, p = .002). Implementation outcomes were positive across conditions, favoring CPSS-E for appropriateness (d = .48, 95% CI: .33, .62), feasibility (d = .15, 95% CI: .00, .29), adoption (d = .34, 95% CI: .19, .48) and acceptability (d = .29, 95% CI: .15, .44). Findings support the feasibility and added value of incorporating cognitive techniques into psychosocial programming in LMIC.

The circular economy has long been regarded as a fundamental strategy for achieving sustainable development. Most recently, it has also been acknowledged as an effective approach to crisis response. This study contributes to this nascent literature by introducing a dual hierarchy of 6Rs strategies as an inspiring framework for circular post-disaster recovery and reconstruction, supporting the “Build Back Better” principle through circular initiatives. The key distinction between the proposed hierarchy and the traditional 6Rs framework lies in the two-vector operationalization of each strategy, addressing both past and future considerations. Also, this article examines the case of war-torn Ukraine as one of the most severe man-made disasters. The study explores Ukraine’s potential for circular recovery within the framework of European Union policies in the construction sector.

Scholarship has identified key determinants of people’s belief in misinformation predominantly from English-language contexts. However, multilingual citizens often consume news media in multiple languages. We study how the language of consumption affects belief in misinformation and true news articles in multilingual environments. We suggest that language may pass on specific cues affecting how bilinguals evaluate information. In a ten-week survey experiment with bilingual adults in Ukraine, we measured if subjects evaluating information in their less-preferred language were less likely to believe it. We find those who prefer Ukrainian are less likely to believe both false and true stories written in Russian by approximately 0.2 standard deviation units. Conversely, those who prefer Russian show increased belief in false stories in Ukrainian, though this effect is less robust. A secondary digital media literacy intervention does not increase discernment as it reduces belief in both true and false stories equally.

Animals routinely suffer violence by humans, especially during war, but it is unclear how much people in conflict environments express concern for animal welfare. Based on a 2,008-person survey in Ukraine in May 2024, we find that respondents are anthropocentric, prioritizing human over animal suffering; biocentric, regarding both as important; or, in a small minority, zoocentric, emphasizing animal over human suffering. Experimental priming on violence against animals during the Russia–Ukraine war has limited effect on changing attitudes toward animal welfare, but it does increase resource allocation to animal relief organizations. A war crimes punishment experiment also shows that while respondents sanction perpetrators of human suffering more severely than perpetrators of animal suffering, violence against animals is still strongly penalized, indicating appreciation for animal rights, justice, and accountability. We reflect on the implications of our findings for speciesist versus posthumanist understandings of suffering during war.

Situated at the intersection of language rights, nation-building processes, and security issues, this article analyzes language policies in Ukraine in the three decades since its independence (1991–2021). It traces the legal evolution and decisions of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, identifying the specific ideological approaches towards language issues that emerge in such a development. We distinguish four periods in the evolution of Ukrainian laws, highlighting how these stages reflect specific ontological and societal (in)securities and related securitization processes, and their intersection with the process of nation-building and the role assigned to the Ukrainian language in such a process. In this way, the article discusses how, in light of the Soviet legacy and Russian kin-state activism and geopolitical agenda, Ukraine has moved to adopt a more assertive nationalizing approach to language issues that aim at promoting Ukrainian as the state language. Russia’s aggressive actions accelerated the ongoing nation-building process, interplaying with the relevance assigned to the Ukrainian language for the Ukrainian nation-state as well as the country’s ontological and societal (in)securities. In this way, our contribution complements our understanding of language policies, bringing to light the connections of their evolution and variations with how security concerns affect nation-building processes.

This article examines the divergent historical views espoused by Russian and Ukrainian societies and their representatives on topics such as the 1932-1933 famine, Stalinism, and the post-World War II Soviet Union. We draw on an original online survey, conducted simultaneously in January 2021 in Ukraine and Russia, to provide an in-depth analysis of views on history in Ukraine and Russia before the 2022 invasion. In Russia, we illustrate how little contestation there is of official narratives. This may signal the existence of an integrated mnemonic community after a decade of state-curated historical narratives, but it might also imply that Russian society is disengaged from history. In pre-2022 Ukraine, meanwhile, we identify persistent fragmentation in the ways in which society perceives history, largely centered along the country’s linguistic divide. However, a central finding is that Russian-speakers in Ukraine differ in their historical views from Russian citizens on key dimensions such as the memory of Stalin and the Holodomor. These results speak to the evolving and politicized nature of societal memory and provide an important baseline for interpreting potential mnemonic shifts that accompanied the full-scale war launched against Ukraine by Russia in February 2022.

Following the large-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, policymakers and humanitarian actors urgently sought to anticipate displacement flows within Ukraine. However, existing internal displacement data systems had not been adapted to contexts as dynamic as a full-fledged war marked by uneven trigger events. A year and a half later, policymakers and practitioners continue to seek forecasts, needing to anticipate how many internally displaced persons (IDPs) can be expected to return to their areas of origin and how many will choose to stay and seek a durable solution in their place of displacement. This article presents a case study of an anticipatory approach deployed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Mission in Ukraine since March 2022, delivering nationwide displacement figures less than 3 weeks following the invasion alongside near real-time data on mobility intentions as well as key data anticipating the timing, direction, and volume of future flows and needs related to IDP return and (re)integration. The authors review pre-existing mobility forecasting approaches, then discuss practical experiences with mobility prediction applications in the Ukraine response using the Ukraine General Population Survey (GPS), including in program and policy design related to facilitating durable solutions to displacement. The authors focus on the usability and ethics of the approach, already considered for replication in other displacement contexts.

The article explores the interplay between imperialism and ethnonationalism, revealing how these seemingly conflicting ideologies coalesced in Russian political thought. The period of 1989–1994 saw a struggle between civic nationalism, which sought to redefine Russia within its existing borders, and imperialist-nationalist currents that viewed Soviet disintegration as a geopolitical catastrophe. Within this ideological conflict, the “time bomb” metaphor emerged as a potent rhetorical device, encapsulating anxieties about territorial fragmentation and national decline. The study identifies Russian émigré intellectual Gleb Rahr as a key figure in introducing the metaphor, later popularized by figures such as Dmitry Rogozin and Vladimir Putin.

To what extent can drones be the primary determinants of victory in warfare? This question is at the heart of the drone revolution debate in security studies. Proponents of a drone revolution argue that drones provide ‘game-changing characteristics’, act as ‘magic bullets’ against adversaries, and even provide the key defence to decide the ‘fate of nations’. Sceptics disagree, arguing that no matter the nuances or contexts of war, drones can never be considered the primary determinant of victory. In this article, we argue that the two sides of the debate rest upon a false dichotomy – that technologies must either be revolutionary or evolutionary. We reappraise country-specific case studies used by both sides of the debate: the Ethiopia–Tigray War, the Houthi–Saudi War, and the Russia–Ukraine War. Our analysis reveals a welcome synthesis; the impact of drone employment depends on the types of war waged, the drone capabilities deployed, and the political objectives sought in each conflict. In this sense, drones can have an impact on war that is sometimes ordinary and sometimes revolutionary. It is only by clarifying the analytical scope of the debate that the impact of drones on the practice of war can be fully understood.

Despite the destruction it inevitably engenders and the opposition it often elicits, war remains a near-human universal. There is almost no society, across time or place, that has not experienced some form of violent conflict, whether internally or against its neighbors or adversaries. The most common explanations for the causes of war and conflict tend to center around social and material factors, such as conflicts over resources, territory, or regime type. Certainly, these factors play a role in many conflicts, but they cannot alone explain every war. Other arguments, however, drawn from evolutionary psychology and biological anthropology, based on fundamental aspects of human nature with regard to male coalitionary psychology, do posit specific sources for conflict that provide an underlying platform for its emergence and can help explain its wide variety across time and space. A comprehensive and accurate understanding of the nature of war must include these considerations.

In this article, we show that the Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a pro-democratic reaction from citizens in liberal democracies, which we term the “rally for democracy.” Unlike the conventional “rally ‘round the flag” effect that boosts government popularity, this involves citizens rallying behind democracy as an international ideal. It includes expressing stronger proximity to democratic powers, stronger approval for democratic leaders abroad, and greater aversion to authoritarian regimes. Through a survey quasi-experiment conducted in six countries between February and May of 2022, we provide evidence that the “rally for democracy” emerged immediately following Russia’s invasion. Exploring this observation further via analysis of data from 55 countries between 2014 and 2023, we find this to be the intensification of a longer-term trend in response to the rise of authoritarian great powers. A new cleavage exists in geopolitical loyalties, based on the degree to which citizens feel attachment to democracy, and this divide runs both between and within countries.

Since Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his support for a plan to recruit fighters from abroad to join the Russian army in early 2022, foreigners have fought in Ukraine as part of Russian forces. Many of these fighters are mercenaries in the commonly understood sense of that term. That is, they are fighters who have gone, intentionally, to fight for Russia in return for significant payment. Although these fighters have often found themselves in Ukraine with little to no training and without their promised salaries, this article is not primarily concerned with them. Instead, it is interested in those fighters who arrived in Russia without knowing that they would be sent to the conflict, or who did not know that they were going to Russia at all. The article argues that such ‘forced fighters’ who are misled or tricked into taking part in an armed conflict should be given protection beyond that given to other combatants, specifically that they should be offered repatriation to their countries of origin. It argues that international humanitarian law is unable to effectively capture the position of these fighters or provide adequate protection to them. It suggests, rather, that the law on modern slavery can provide a way to understand and reconceptualise the position of these fighters—as victims of servitude and human trafficking—and that this body of law can deliver the remedy of repatriation to them.