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In Chapter 13, Lee Drutman asks more generally whether the contemporary Congress can serve the general public interest or merely narrow, particularistic ones. The chapter examines the effects of crucial changes in the contemporary Congress vis-à-vis earlier periods, including increased efforts by incumbents to raise money through campaign donations, a growth in advocacy and lobbying by private special interests, and intense party polarization. Moreover, the chapter considers whether the recent developments invalidate earlier understandings of congressional representation and policymaking. In Drutman’s view, much remains unchanged. Taken together, however, the changes strengthen the hands of special interests and lessen the probability that Congress can rise above the preferences of organized groups to pursue policies that serve the general interests of inattentive citizens.
Several concerns stand to lead policing away from its mandate to protect the full range of citizens in a pluralist democracy. Among them are special interests, coarse majoritarian rule, and populism. Given that policing involves the discretionary allocation of power and resources in a strategic sense, and that the enforcement of a wide range of laws is subject to police discretion in individual encounters, each of these concerns can turn policing toward illiberal ends when they exert undue influence. In this sense, the discretionary nature of police power is most typically turned toward injustice in the pursuit of sectarian or populist goals that may have a veneer of democratic process, but are insufficient to justify the ensuing disparities of privilege, protection, or access to public space. The duty of the police to resist this impulse and only act upon reasons that treat citizens as substantive equals (i.e., by employing Rawlsian public reason) is a critical way to mitigate this hazard. The chapter closes by recounting the failed but valiant struggle of police to prevent populist rioters from seizing the US Capitol on January 6, 2021 as an example of the duty of the police to safeguard democracy from virulent populist interests.
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