Democratic backsliding occurs incrementally, but the empirical study of how citizens respond to undemocratic politicians has been predominantly static. I formulate and test predictions about how different sequences of backsliding shape accountability. Using a novel preregistered experiment ($N = 4,234$) capturing the reality that democratic transgressions are committed by elected officials step by step, I find that a majority of American respondents – against the backdrop of partisan and policy interests – are willing to electorally remove the incumbent as episodes of democratic backsliding unfold. Moreover, incumbents who incrementally decrease the severity of democratic transgressions are held accountable more promptly than incumbents who incrementally increase or sporadically vary the severity. By establishing a new experimental framework to study democratic backsliding, my dynamic approach not only paints a more nuanced picture of Americans’ willingness to defend democracy, but also demonstrates that sequence matters in shaping voter behavior amid incremental transgressions of democracy.

Scholarship on regulatory capture—when businesses lobby regulators to act contrary to the public interest—has thrived since the 1970s. Yet it ignores an important dimension of influence, what we call ideological capture. This occurs when experts design regulatory frameworks that marginalize important public values and produce favorable outcomes for special interests even in the absence of lobbying. We present a theoretical and empirical framework for understanding ideological capture, rooted in expert–public cleavages, and measure its presence in an important policy domain (antitrust review of business mergers) with an original survey of the public and of antitrust lawyers. Our results suggest that the main framework for evaluating anticompetitive conduct, the consumer welfare standard, marginalizes important public concerns but is deeply popular among antitrust lawyers. With prior work showing the standard arose not from conventional processes but from judicial and bureaucratic activism, we conclude that antitrust policy evidences ideological capture.

Public perceptions of immigration are often inaccurate, yet research lacks conceptual clarity and valid measurement of these misperceptions. Prior work focuses mainly on population innumeracy (misestimating immigrant shares) and cannot distinguish genuine misperceptions from mere guessing. We introduce a survey module that captures multiple dimensions of immigration-related perceptions alongside respondents’ confidence in their estimates. Using population survey data from Switzerland, we develop confidence-weighted indicators that separate misperception from guessing. Although inaccurate perceptions are widespread across several immigration domains, they are less prevalent than often assumed; guessing accounts for a substantial share of observed inaccuracy. This measurement strategy enables more precise empirical tests of theories linking perceptions to political attitudes and behavior.

With environmental protests on the rise, we ask: how do they affect support for pro-environment and environment-critical movements? We answer this question using evidence from two studies—a survey experiment and media content analysis—conducted in the Netherlands, a leading country in the green transition. Our experimental findings reveal an asymmetric bias in public support for protests. For the same protest action, public support is higher for environment-critical movements compared to pro-environment ones. This bias is most pronounced among right-leaning individuals with low education and low trust in science and politics. Our content analysis traces the bias back to newspaper reporting. While attention to protest groups is balanced across tabloid and broadsheet newspapers, tabloid reporting is more negative about pro-environment movements. These results highlight an important aspect of the backlash against environmental policies: a bias against pro-environment movements within parts of the public and media.

Following a 2018 FEC ruling, US congressional candidates are increasingly using campaign funds for childcare expenses incurred while campaigning. This policy has the potential to increase descriptive representation, but the policy’s viability is dependent on how voters react to candidates using campaign funds for childcare. Using a national survey experiment, we find that the framing around the use of this policy influences public opinion in meaningful ways. For Democratic respondents, positive framing treatments increase support for a hypothetical woman candidate, and candidate attack frames do not decrease candidate support. For Republican respondents, positive framing treatments do not increase candidate support, while candidate attack frames decrease candidate support. Regarding support for the policy of permitting the use of campaign funds for childcare, results were universally positive. Both positive and negative frames increased support for the policy. This research contributes to multiple literatures by evaluating the public opinion effects of candidates using campaign funds for childcare.

Recent debates over how to address racial injustice in the United States often center on two types of policies: redistributive measures that redress material inequities between groups and symbolic reforms that challenge dominant racial narratives. How do citizens evaluate these differing approaches to advancing racial justice? How do recent removals of Confederate symbols shape support for each of these policy types? In a survey of American adults, we find that support for redistributive and symbolic policies is positively correlated across partisan, racial, and regional lines. However, when pressed, respondents express a stronger preference for redistributive measures, often viewing symbolic reforms as insufficient or distracting. In an experimental framework, we find that informing respondents about recent Confederate statue removals does not significantly alter support for either policy type. Looking at qualitative reactions to the treatment, we identify a plausible explanation for this null finding: most respondents see the removals as a fight over history and less directly relevant to a broader racial justice policy agenda.

A recent wave of survey experiments has advanced scholarly understanding of public attitudes towards the use of nuclear weapons. In this article, we address the central question: can public opinion influence decision-makers’ views on nuclear weapon use? We bridge this critical gap in the literature with a survey experiment conducted on samples of UK parliamentarians and US and UK government employees in official policy roles. We varied public support for nuclear strikes in realistic scenarios to examine participants’ responsiveness to public preferences when considering nuclear first use, nuclear retaliation, and third-party nuclear threats. We show that high public support notably increases willingness to endorse nuclear first use against non-nuclear adversaries. Furthermore, public backing shapes beliefs about national leaders’ willingness to order nuclear strikes. However, the effect of public opinion is weaker in nuclear retaliation contexts, suggesting that different considerations become prominent when the ‘nuclear taboo’ has been breached. Importantly, sympathetic public opinion strongly influences perceptions of the credibility of third-party nuclear threats, carrying implications for the practice of nuclear deterrence. Our findings highlight the role of public opinion as both an enabling and constraining force on nuclear use and provide new theoretical and empirical insights into elite decision-making in nuclear politics.

Strategic messaging can be used to build support for racial equity policies, but most research has found that linking issues to race is ineffective. What if using strategic messages to increase support for racial equity policies is not simply a matter of whether racial appeals are present in a message, but how they are framed? Evidence from an original survey experiment conducted among a highly diverse group of 2,320 randomly sampled voters in Los Angeles County demonstrates that the most effective messages are those that discuss both race and class—with distinct outcomes on message favorability and anti-carceral policy support. In addition, we find the effect is moderated by ethnoracial identity, racial resentment, and personal contact with the criminal legal system. Our findings suggest that how racial appeals are framed—not simply whether racial frames are present—is important in shaping the impact of a message; they also highlight the need for more research innovation with a variety of ways to link issues to racial inequality with the aim of building support for racial equity policies.

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, subnational regions have become increasingly polarized with regard to anti-immigration attitudes. However, the reasons behind geographical changes over time are unclear. We argue that regional labor market risks are a key and overlooked factor driving residential choices and subsequent attitudinal change. We rely on georeferenced panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) in combination with rich regional labor market data from the German microcensus. Our findings confirm that prospects of economic risk reduction drive moving decisions and subsequently reduce anti-immigration sentiment, especially among workers with transferable skills. This has decisive macro-level implications: regions receiving a large share of risk-reducing movers over time show lower levels of anti-immigration sentiment. Our contribution implies that economic motivations matter for residential choices beyond cultural sorting, individual attitudes adjust to the conditions of destination, and geographical patterns are mostly driven by booming regions becoming ever more liberal.

Democratic innovations (DIs), such as deliberative mini-publics and referenda, are gaining traction in Europe, but their legitimacy depends on public support and their ability to address democratic discontent. While prior research focuses on individual-level drivers, structural conditions remain understudied. This study uniquely integrates the regional economic context into the analysis, combining survey data (N = 16,000) with economic indicators from ninety-one regions in thirteen European countries. Findings show that DIs receive slightly more support in poorer regions. Additionally, in these regions, economic hardship fuels demand for DIs by amplifying economic deprivation and political disaffection (‘enraged’ mechanism), whereas in wealthier regions, political interest is the key driver of public support for DIs (‘engaged’ mechanism). By incorporating economic conditions into the study of DIs, this research refines two key theories of DI support and offers a more nuanced understanding of when and why citizens support institutional change, thereby informing more context-sensitive participatory policies.

Public attitudes toward nuclear weapons remain a critical issue in international security, yet the thinking behind individuals’ support or opposition to their use is not well understood. This study examines how the American public reasons about whether to deploy nuclear weapons in a hypothetical war between the United States and Iran. Participants were asked to state their preference between continuing a ground war, deploying a nuclear strike resulting in 100,000 civilian casualties, or deploying a strike killing 2 million civilians. They then provided an open-ended answer where they described the reasons for their decision. Using Structural Topic Modeling, we identified 10 distinct patterns in participants’ thinking. Some responses emphasized concerns about deterrence or saving lives, while others focused on national security, or retaliation, among other reasons. The type of thinking participants employed was found to be related to their preceding choice, as well as to individual characteristics, such as gender, political affiliation, punitive–authoritarian–nationalist attitudes, and the influence of the relative emotional impact of the 2 bombs (i.e., the better bomb effect). These findings highlight the complexity of the thinking underlying nuclear decision making and help shed light on potential avenues for reducing the risk of a nuclear weapon being deployed again.

This paper investigates the conditions under which subnational concerns shape public assessments of international climate governance. In line with existing literature, we maintain that costly policy adjustments fuel negative views of international co-operation in policy-exposed regions. At the same time, we argue that the more resentful relations are with the national center of politics, the more sympathetic these regions are to international institutions and global governance. Based on geographically targeted survey data from the United Kingdom, we find that fossil fuel-intensive regions with strong, institutionalized regional politics have more positive assessments of international climate co-operation than structurally similar regions where regional political institutions are less pronounced. The findings show that regional politics characteristics are key for understanding climate policy beliefs among citizens that bear the brunt of adjustments to international climate agreements.

The dominant view in proliferation research holds that security guarantees from nuclear patrons reduce client states’ incentives to pursue nuclear armament. Yet in South Korea, public support for indigenous nuclear capabilities remains high despite strong trust in US extended deterrence. Drawing on the “better-now-than-later” logic from preventive war theory, we argue that this support reflects public forward-looking pessimism about the security environment, shaped by perceptions of the relative decline of the US and North Korea’s advancing nuclear capabilities. Analysis of the 2023 EAI Public Opinion Poll shows that concerns about systemic power shifts and pessimism about future inter-Korean relations are significantly associated with support for nuclear armament. South Korean public assessments of US extended deterrence and North Korea’s military threat do not align with conventional alliance theory expectations that high trust in extended deterrence should reduce support for nuclear armament. These findings underscore the need for reassurance strategies that address enduring alliance credibility.

European Union (EU) public opinion research is a rich field of study. However, as citizens often have little knowledge of the EU it remains the question to what extent their attitudes are grounded in coherent, ideologically informed belief systems. As survey research is not well equipped to study this question, this paper explores the value of the method of cognitive mapping (CM) for public opinion research by studying the cognitive maps of 504 Dutch citizens regarding the Eurozone crisis. The paper shows that respondents perceive the Eurozone crisis predominantly as a governmental debt crisis. Moreover, the concept bureaucracy unexpectedly plays a key role in their belief systems exerting an ambiguous but overall negative effect on the Eurozone and trust in the EU. In contrast to expectation, the attitudes of the respondents are more solidly grounded in (ordoliberal) ideology than that of the Dutch elite. Finally, the paper introduces new ways to measure ambivalence prompting a reevaluation of the significance of different forms of ambivalence and their impact on political behavior. Overall, the results of this study suggest that CM forms a promising addition to the toolbox of public opinion research.

Minority governments are common across parliamentary systems, and a large body of literature has examined their stability and performance. Meanwhile, we know very little about how voters perceive this government type and whether they understand its political implications. We survey voters in Denmark, Germany, and Sweden, three European countries with varying degrees of exposure to minority governments, about their knowledge and perceptions of minority governments. We find that voters have knowledge levels comparable to those about the role of political parties, and that this is independent of the respective prevalence of minority governments in each country. Informed voters express stronger preferences for majority governments. However, minority governments are associated with specific positive representational traits, specifically with the impression that such governments listen more to the demands of all voters, and general perceptions are stronger for knowledgeable voters. The findings have implications for how elites can formulate arguments in favour or against minority governments that may resonate with voters.