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“Socialist Realism, Socialist Expressionism” examines how Expressionist aesthetics metamorphosed from a radical critique of bourgeois liberalism into full-blown fascism. During his period of involvement with National Socialism, Gottfried Benn treated the Volk as an aesthetic object – as a work of art that could be shaped and refined through direct eugenic interventions. Yet Benn’s staunchest critics on the left did not dismiss his aesthetic definition of the Volk outright. Instead, they appropriated the Volk for a leftist politics. Examining the celebrated Expressionism Debate of 1937–1938, I argue that Marxists like Georg Lukács refrained from a vocabulary of class struggle in order to promote a populist aesthetics that associated the Volk with a distinctly anti-modernist literary mode: the realist novel. Hence the chapter grapples with populist cultural politics from both the radical left and right at the moment when the liberal tradition descending from Kant was reaching its nadir.
“Philosophers of the Cabal” inaugurates a line of inquiry devoted to the Volk (people). A powerful critic of Kantian anthropology, Johann Gottfried Herder argued that the “spirit of a people [Volksgeist]” is grounded in a common structure of sensibility or Sinnlichkeit. This shared sensibility derives in part from the notion of the sensus communis theorized by British empiricists in the early eighteenth century. After tracing the influence of British aesthetics on Herder, the chapter moves forward to consider E. B. Tylor, a towering figure of Victorian anthropology known for the evolutionary theories that displaced Herder’s diversitarian model. I show that Tylor actually retained key Herderian premises regarding collective sensation, which modernists like W. B. Yeats then incorporated into a primitivist style. Hence the communalist aesthetics running from Shaftesbury through Herder and Tylor leads ultimately to modernists who came of age during the fin-de-siècle.
“Prometheus Found” moves back to the German sphere in order to contend with the discourse of the neuer Mensch (new human) developed in German Expressionism, a movement that explicitly rejected Impressionism and fin-de-siècle refinement. For Expressionists like Else Lasker-Schüler, dispensing with the bourgeois pieties they attributed to nineteenth-century liberalism required imagining new anthropological entities, new humans, much in the mold of the Nietzschean Übermensch. In the case of Lasker-Schüler, though, the “new human” became a means for modeling a Volk rather than a Mensch, and in particular, the Jewish Volk at a moment when Zionism was at apogee.
The erosion of democracy has shown itself to be a necessary political precondition for the implementation of neoliberalism. Utopian culture quickly attuned itself to this crisis of democracy, and while there certainly are not many works of utopian culture that uncritically embrace the dominant post-1989 narrative that hails democracy as the universal cure for whatever ailment may exist in the world, we begin to see the emergence of works that foreground the profound danger inherent in the waning of democracy precisely in times of its instrumentalization by Western capitalist nations and the forces of economic globalization. Authors reveal neoliberal utopias as antidemocratic dystopias against which democracy must be defended. Moreover, we also see the emergence of novels that address a second pressing question: how can democracy survive when populations decide to democratically abolish it?
Comprehensive geriatric assessment (CGA) has been one of the cornerstones of geriatric medicine since its introduction by Marjory Warren in 1936. This kind of assessment is defined as a multidimensional and multidisciplinary process related to identifying medical, social, and functional needs and developing an integrated care plan designed to meet the patien’st needs.The practice and applications of CGA have been used to various degrees in mainstream care for older people in the UK and internationally.
Some limitations still exist around the wider implementation of CGA, as its practice relies on members of the multidisciplinary team (MDT) and on an effective communication between them, the patients, and their families. This kind of assessment has been criticised for not adequately acknowledging frailty and for not using patient-reported outcome measures to test its efficacy.
Randomised controlled studies, systematic reviews, and meta-analyses provided considerable evidence for the clinical and financial effectiveness of CGA in various hospital specialties. However, there are still concerns about the generalisability of CGA in community settings. Further research to identify target populations for CGA-led interventions and a consensus on outcome measures are required to realise CGA benefits.
In this chapter we describe required skills and practical tips to deliver CGA across a variety of settings.
Older people are one of the biggest populations requiring hospital care, and the demand is expected to rise. There is a compelling need to transform hospital environments to meet older-people physical, psychological, and emotional needs. In the UK, certain hospital circumstances such as ward configuration, mealtimes, noise levels, and visiting hours can be detrimental to patients admitted with delirium and to those living with dementia. In rehabilitation settings, lack of meaningful activities, isolation, and boredom are additional key challenges.
Models of good hospital practice catering for old people exist, both in the UK and internationally, and there is strong evidence for their clinical effectiveness. Environmental strategies to maintain orientation and enhance safety in hospital are crucial for a positive experience. Arts-based programmes in acute care settinsg can improve the experience of a hospital admission.
A cultural shift is warranted to champion the delivery an elderly-friendly service. Creating the right environment requires a hospital-wide system, a ward-based service, and a specially trained clinical team. In this chapter we will present examples of essential ingredients for hospitals and wards, and desirable qualities in clinicians who work in collaboration to deliver the best outcomes for an older population.
Chapter 5 presents the paradox of national universalism as a theoretical explanation of French republicans’ historical tendency to exclude foreigners and minorities. It retraces the formation of the discourse of “nation” alongside that of “people” as well as the development of nationalism alongside the discourse of universalism. It analyzes the tension caused by the conjunction of two phenomena: the existence (or supposition of) a historical nation, and the declaration of universalism on which the revolution based itself. Finally, the chapter presents education policies and civil religion during the French revolution as two instances of the paradox of national universalism.
This conversation will address the crisis in the concept of constitutional identity, a concept which has been subtly articulated by Gary J Jacobsohn. Conceiving ‘crisis’ as ‘disharmonies’, he speaks of constitutional ‘identity’ in a dialectical relation as a culturally embedded core of varied practices of identification. The preliminary issue is whether, and how, the national and constitutional identity coincide. Second, we consider the matter of identity entrepreneurs and, third, examine the thesis of ‘abuse of constitutional identity’ and the dialectics of robustness and fragility of/in the identity of constitution. Finally, we attend briefly to some questions of related concerns raised by the distinction between ‘We, the people’ and ‘We, the nations’, in relation to the notions of identity.
In this chapter, we examine the almost uniquely powerful position the British prime minister is in compared to heads of government abroad, and the long list of the PM’s powers and resources. With so much in their favour, why is their performance often so underwhelming? Premierships can go by in a blur of frenzied activity. Prime ministers typically only reflect fully on the powers and resources they possessed after their period in office is over, when they are writing their memoirs, ruefully reflecting on what might have been. That doesn’t mean that there aren’t precise powers, some formal, others informal, accumulated over the years, and it is these that we consider in this chapter. The most successful prime ministers, like Thatcher or Attlee, knew, by study or osmosis, how to use them.
I go to the swimming pool and everybody’s body is on show, including my own. I don’t have rippling pecs, and I am in my 60s, an age when you think I wouldn’t care about my body anymore, but I do. Another swimmer, in her 30s, is just getting out of the water. She is ‘a big girl’, and gets looks, of the wrong kind, even though I have watched her plough the lanes and work hard, keeping enough stamina back to sprint her final lap. If I am self-conscious of my body, how self-conscious is she? Every look is a dagger to her self-esteem. I try to put myself in her place, chanting to myself, ‘Don’t put me down, don’t put me down.’ People who say, ‘You’ve got yourself to blame’ have got it wrong. Even though the evidence is that body stigma only contributes to obesity, people stigmatize large body size – especially in the Global North among poorer people, females, and Black and Indigenous peoples. I discuss how obesity stigma comes from the type of moralizing thought that is embedded in present-day Western societies. I go on to consider how obesity stigma is used to develop and maintain social hierarchies in times of food-plenty.
This essay probes two questions about popular sovereignty’s status as a philosophical and governing creed in early America. How did an unprecedented collective ‘people’ – a people of citizens who actively participated in governing and who constituted an abstract legitimating power – get fashioned notwithstanding the remarkable national, cultural, religious, and racial heterogeneity of Britain’s North American colonies and the early United States? Why did this remarkable achievement not last, culminating in rivers of blood? I argue that the constellation of ideas and institutions that had fashioned America’s civic people out of raw materials provided by Hobbes, Locke, and Madison was brought to crisis by how President Andrew Jackson and Vice President John C. Calhoun elaborated extensions to the scope of popular sovereignty in the name of democracy – Jackson regarding the movement of free white people westward; Calhoun concerning slavery and its expansion.
At independence, the institutionalization of popular sovereignty for “We the people” of India had to be achieved for a poor and illiterate society, deeply divided by caste, language, and religion, and while more than 550 sovereign Princely States had yet to be integrated into India. This chapter explores how despite multiple competing sovereignties, and deep pluralities, a unified popular sovereignty consolidated at India’s founding between 1946 and 1950. It suggests that two complementary processes played a key role in fashioning an all-India popular sovereignty by the time India’s constitution came into force in January 1950. First, the making of a unified popular sovereignty in India was driven by efforts to work through the competing visions of popular sovereignty that were asserted at the time. Second, while multiple discussions about unified popular sovereignty were taking place, bureaucrats across the country embarked on the preparation of the first draft electoral roll on the basis of universal adult franchise. I argue that this resulted, in effect, in institutionalizing the edifice for implementing the “rule of the people” on an all-India level.
Why do ordinary citizens believe in an autocratic ideology? Why do people follow their autocratic leader? How can autocrats win the hearts and minds of their people, securing their support? This chapter seeks to absorb the manifold responses that have been given to these questions in the last decades. It theorizes the role of ordinary citizens in autocratic regimes, illuminating the legitimacy claims of autocratic rulers on the one hand and the popular beliefs in these legitimacy claims on the other hand. Drawing on a rich repository of previous research, it highlights the two strategies of autocracies to deal with their people. Autocracies might either overwhelm their citizens through mass-level political indoctrination or systematically underwhelm them, keeping them satisfied and apolitical. While the former relies on ideational legitimation, the latter refers to socioeconomic performance and a managerial, technocratic style of rule. Both strategies share the goal of thwarting the risk of public protest.
In contrast to the small-scale we of shared action, this chapter analyses the large-scale and temporally prolonged we’s of communities governed by social norms. Drawing on Heidegger’s analysis of the Anyone and of historicity, I distinguish between anonymous social normativity and historical social normativity. Anonymous social normativity provides a set of social norms in the form of a relatively stable, socially inflected comportmental pattern that we assume to be a universal default. However, this kind of social normativity comes with only a minimal awareness of its own nature, extent, and origin. Historical social normativity, on the other hand, implies a historical awareness in which social norms are disclosed as historical and hence as fragile and contestable. For Heidegger, this leads to the proto-political possibility of what I call communal commitments—roughly, commitments in which a group of people commit themselves to sustain a particular set of social norms across generations.
The chapter reconstructs Jacob Grimm’s political thought in the 1840s when he emerged as a leader of the new association of Germanists and a prominent delegate in the first German national parliament. Speaking in different venues, Grimm declared his commitment to national unity and claimed it was supported by disciplinary knowledge of language, literature, law, and myth. In particular, he asserted that the linguistic scholar could demarcate national collectives on the basis of verifiable grammatical knowledge and by so doing provide states with a sound, even scientific foundation. The chapter analyzes how Grimm used research findings about the distinctiveness of different Germanic languages to suggest authoritative answers to questions about units of legitimate rule in the post-revolutionary era. Grimm was not a radical and did not wish to subvert monarchy, but he insisted on the coincidence of royal rule with a national homeland, the outlines of which were best traced by the philologist.
This chapter will first discuss the main subjects of international law and explain their principal features. Second, this chapter will zoom in on states, the traditional and principal actors in the international legal system. It will discuss the criteria for statehood under international law, the role that recognition plays in this respect, and explain how new states emerge. Finally, this chapter will turn to an analysis of the right to self-determination, a notion that plays an important role in the creation of states and is considered to be the most prominent right of one of the subjects of international law: peoples.
This chapter will first discuss the main subjects of international law and explain their principal features. Second, this chapter will zoom in on states, the traditional and principal actors in the international legal system. It will discuss the criteria for statehood under international law, the role that recognition plays in this respect, and explain how new states emerge. Finally, this chapter will turn to an analysis of the right to self-determination, a notion that plays an important role in the creation of states and is considered to be the most prominent right of one of the subjects of international law: peoples.
Describes the ACEP Geriatric ED Accreditation Program and how this guide can be used if preparing for it. Emphasizes that the scope of change may be small or large; pace may be gradual over years; or dramatic over a year. No wrong place to start; no wrong choices to make. Be bold.
This paper argues that, in terms of their view of the ‘people’, leaderistic plebiscitarism and corporative organicism are two sides of the same coin, which resulted in aspirational fascist totalitarian democracy. The binary – and intrinsically ambiguous – view of the ‘people’ is examined first in the passive and indeterminate qualities attributed to the Italian population, then in the institutional device designed to lead it. The resulting twofold paradigm of corporative populism is reviewed with reference to the model put together and popularised by Giuseppe Bottai, which is presented in three different forms.