The book concludes by emphasising that HEL emerges as a reaction and response of the power holders to address challenges in their pursuit of economic growth and capital accumulation posed by environmental defenders without risking their legitimacy. In addition, it will also point out how the literature on environmental law is implicated by the findings discussed in the book. Finally, the book’s conclusion closes by providing insights for future research agenda on HEL.

This chapter compares HEL in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines while interrogating the two strategic dimensions of geographies and weaponry. The geographical dimension encompasses three forms of jurisdiction: (1) subject-matter jurisdictions, that is, the legal procedures mobilised to silence, intimidate, or attack environmental defenders (criminal, civil, and administrative law); (2) territorial jurisdictions (legal institutions’ geographical scope of competence); and (3) sectoral jurisdictions (economic sectors where HEL is exercised). The weaponry dimension explains the legal provisions, including criminal offences, mobilised by state and private attackers to intimidate and punish environmental defenders. It reveals how environmental defenders in three countries are harassed through legal means, mainly the criminal justice system in resource-rich or industrialised regions.

Chapter 4 identifies one of the most troubling developments in copyright law over the past generation: the surprising and remarkable story of how its exemption from First Amendment scrutiny has enabled powerful interests to cynically weaponize copyright as a forceful, state-backed vehicle of censorship to silence critics and suppress dissent. Thus, copyright has a growing free speech problem – one that threatens to undermine both the vitality of our regime governing the use of creative works and our most basic free speech rights. After surveying the growing use of copyright law to stifle legitimate discourse on issues of racism, religious discrimination, reproductive rights, gay rights, corruption, torture, and police brutality, the chapter examines the conditions empowering such lawfare and considers how we might better ensure that copyright law stops serving as a transparent censorial proxy enabling the powerful to silence the powerless and, instead, returns its focus to vindicating the appropriate economic interests of rightsholders.

This case study provides a comprehensive analysis of the intricate political risks faced by TikTok, the Chinese social media giant, within the complex US political landscape. Beginning with an exploration of the security concerns articulated by the US government, the discussion centers on TikTok’s data collection practices and their perceived impact on US national security. The narrative unfolds by elucidating the multifaceted strategies employed by TikTok and its parent company, ByteDance, to address these challenges, including litigation, endeavors toward Americanization, and technological adaptations. It also examines the evolution in the US government’s stance as well as TikTok’s adaptive strategies aimed at sustaining and expanding its presence in the US market. The study depicts the responses of the Chinese government to US policies, unraveling the broader implications of these developments on the global political-economic landscape, exploring the dynamics involved in US-China relations, and providing a deeper understanding of the complexities inherent in such interactions. Finally, this case study invites readers to engage in contemplation on the broader themes of political risks faced by multinational corporations, the challenges inherent in navigating global legal frontiers, and the intricate nature of US-China relations.

Whistleblower protection laws are growing in strength and number across the globe. Whistleblowing workers enjoy stronger legal rights than ever before. But there are dangers. Laws can be undermined by powerful employers with deep pockets intent on exploiting loopholes to suppress public whistleblowing. Lawfare is one such tactic. Whistleblowers can find themselves exposed, and in extreme cases, prosecuted for speaking up. The high-profile story of Theranos’s Erika Cheung illustrates this chapter. As a twenty-three-year-old graduate, Erika blew the whistle on the most famous white-collar crime of recent years. After whistleblowing, she was aggressively pursued by her former employer’s legal counsel: a nationally renowned firm. Along with other whistleblowers, Erika’s testimony would prove pivotal in convicting senior executives. This chapter introduces the new world of whistleblower reprisal, including lawfare tactics ranging from NDAs to SLAPPs and over-reaching trade secrets laws. It points to the vulnerability faced by individual whistleblowers whose rights to protection ‘on paper’ offer scant help in practice. It shows how good lawyers are important, but in the end, they are often not enough.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of Rwandas daring experiment in transitional justice – and of the many misconceptions surrounding it. This introductory chapter describes the countrys pursuit of accountability in the wake of the 1994 genocide as a justice facade and the final institutional design of the countrys so-called gacaca courts as an instantiation of “extremist institutionalism,” one that turned legalism into lawfare.

Chapter 2 introduces and configures the concept of lawfare. This framework chapter sets the theoretical scene for what is to come. Whereas both legalism and lawfare, in the books conception, serve the standard functions of regulation in a given polity, the author demonstrates that only lawfare is intended qua system to also serve a function otherwise considered the hallmark of warfare. The chapter elaborates defining attributes of – and pathways to – lawfare. It also situates the books theoretical argument about lawfare in existing work on the rule of violence.

Chapter 12 concludes the book and ties its different strands together. It explains why, and when, lawfare came to be seen by leading RPF cadres as a functional equivalent to warfare. The chapter further explains why Rwanda’s present resembles its past to a remarkable degree. More specifically, the analysis demonstrates that the government of threat and care in the twenty-first century was informed by a raison d’état that has driven the imposition of grand institutional designs ever since the precolony. What this concluding chapter offers is a path-dependent argument about the rise of lawfare in post-genocide Rwanda. As such, it illustrate the analytic payoff of taking the study of the country’s gacaca courts out of the context of transitional justice.

Chapter 1 sets the historical and theoretical background of the book. It starts by describing the regulatory battles that took place from the 1970s to adopt more stringent tobacco control measures. Then, it illustrates how the negotiations of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the subsequent WTO and international investment disputes can be considered the internationalisation of the tobacco wars. In this context, the concept of ‘lawfare’ is introduced as a descriptive device and analytical tool for the analysis of the book. The second part of the introduction introduces the second fil rouge of the book: evidence. It begins by defining the notion of evidence and by showing how, in the context of tobacco control, it can refer to different bodies of evidence that pertain both to the risk assessment and risk management dimension of tobacco control measures. This second part, moreover, shows how evidence has always been one of the key points of contention in the tobacco wars and has continued to be so in the international tobacco control lawfare. The introduction concludes with an explanation of the methodology employed, a reflection on its limits, and an outline of the content of the book.

In addition to summarising the main findings of the book, this final chapter offers some reflections on the lessons that emerge from the history of the international tobacco control lawfare. The reflections are organised around the two main themes of the book: lawfare (Section 5.1) and evidence (Section 5.2). The first part offers some thoughts on the value of using ‘lawfare’ as an analytical tool, zooming in on the role of business actors in international regulation (Section 5.1.1) and on a reflexive account on one’s research (Section 5.1.2). The second part summarises the main topics related to evidence that have emerged in the book: the different types of evidence in risk assessment and risk management (Section 5.2.1), international law’s overreliance on evidence (Section 5.2.2), evidence as a weapon (Section 5.2.3), and evidence as an ideological battleground (Section 5.2.4).

Political technology' is not a term much used in the West. But spin and political consulting are outdated labels. Spin doctors and political consultants do more than spin or consult; they also meet the definition of engineers of the political system. Particularly in the United States, where a different type of political universe has been constructed: Political Action Committees, dark money and astroturfing.

In this and the following chapters I analyse the history of abyssal exclusions brought about by modern state law. I define lawfare as any performance in the name of law (a declaration, norm, sentence, official action or omission) premised on the extreme strangeness of the addressee or target, either because the latter is not fully human (the stranger as a subhuman being) or because its actions must be sanctioned without the normative constraints of the rule of law (the stranger as an internal or external enemy). The long journey of lawfare is the long journey of capitalism, colonialism and patriarchy. It has undergone multiple metamorphoses and reincarnations since the sixteenth century. From colonial law to imperial law, from the penal law of the enemy to the criminalisation of protest, and from the war on corruption to the war on migration, the abyssal exclusion of targeted social groups has been carried out by lawfare. In every instance, modern domination has found ways of separating humanity from subhumanity, friend from enemy, and non-abyssal social exclusion from abyssal exclusion. There is no reason to believe that new metamorphoses will not appear. The abyssal line is the most resilient and most fundamental structure of Western domination. Only successful struggles against capitalism, colonialism and patriarchy will bring about the progressive dislocation of the abyssal line through sustained interruptions of the institutions upon which Western domination reproduces itself, namely the state and the law.