Following the 2020 Karabakh War, the emerging geopolitical realities compelled Iran to recalibrate its South Caucasus policy, prompting a shift away from its longstanding posture of neutrality. Despite the potential for Tehran to engage in cooperation through proposed regionalist projects by other actors, a significant shift towards regionalism in Iran’s approach to the South Caucasus remains elusive. This article delves into two primary sets of factors to understand the reasons behind this absence of regionalism in Iran’s foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. The first set encompasses general approaches in Iran’s foreign policy and the impact of domestic political dynamics on their development. It discusses Iran’s perceived impossibility of aligning with the South Caucasus states, the absence of a robust neighborhood policy, and Iran’s strategic isolation in the region, attributed to its unique political system and the ideological stance of its ruling elite. The second set examines external dynamics, including constant international pressure on the Islamic Republic, Iran’s deep-seated ideological and security attachment to the Arab Middle East, and the fluctuating nature of Tehran’s relations with the West. Collectively, these factors significantly limit Iran’s capacity to craft a coherent strategy for regional integration in the South Caucasus.

The study of populism has started to permeate international relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA). This literature is still characterised by a frequent focus on individual states’ foreign policies, (therefore) dearth of generalisable findings, and lack of integration with existing IR/FPA theory. This means that it struggles to explain recent findings that, in contrast to earlier assumptions that populist governments consistently disrupt international order, some populist governments are quite willing to compromise internationally and may switch between confrontation and compromise vis-à-vis those trappings of international order they perceive as representing a corrupt liberal elite. I suggest that a neoclassical realist model of populist foreign policy can help address both the larger theoretical as well as the particular empirical challenge. It explains the foreign policy of populist governments primarily by the permissiveness and threat level characterising the respective state’s international environment. However, the effect of these systemic constraints is mediated by the degree to which populist politics capture the state. Such capture is dependent on (1) decision-makers’ depth of commitment to populist ideas and their ability to (2) transform state institutions to remove checks on executive power.

States were again unable to reach consensus on the text of a plastics treaty during negotiations in Geneva in 2025. The majority of states stood firm against petrochemical interests and demanded a “high-ambition” treaty with binding global obligations across the full life cycle of plastics. What these states specifically support, however, varies considerably, as does the strength of their commitment. The case of South Korea offers insights into how changes in political leadership, industry lobbying, shifting narratives and competing foreign policy goals can shape the nature of ambition. Early in the negotiations, South Korea called for ambitious measures and was chosen to host the final round of talks set for late 2024. Yet, this did not translate into meaningful action or strong advocacy in later stages. Some South Korean policymakers may have been sincerely committed to global controls. South Korea’s early signaling of high ambition, however, was primarily motivated by strategic calculations to influence the treaty and become a “global pivotal state.” Its support for ambition, moreover, grew increasingly ambiguous as leadership changed and as states describing themselves as “ambitious” pushed for binding controls on plastics production and supply. South Korea’s foreign policy strategy, we further argue, failed to enhance the country’s diplomatic standing, as its ambiguous ambition came to light, and as industry recalcitrance, bureaucratic infighting and political turmoil undermined its capacity for effective leadership.

How do secular and religious national role conceptions (NRCs) influence interstate rivalry? To explore this, we examine the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, two theocratic states. Drawing on scholarship that integrates power politics and religion, we examine how instrumental motivations shape religion-based policymaking. Using semantic network and regression analyses on data from eight official Twitter/X accounts of Iranian and Saudi foreign policy officials (2015–2021), we find that both states’ officials strategically use secular and religious NRCs in response to foreign policy roles adopted by their rival. Our findings underscore the coexistence of these NRCs and their selective application in managing rivalry. Methodologically, the study contributes to foreign policy analysis research by employing quantitative semantic analysis of social media data. It also offers a novel lens for understanding Iran-Saudi competition and the broader intersection of religion and foreign policy.

Moments of heightened violence and war in Palestine have often elicited extraordinary regime and opposition reactions in Arab states, including large-scale popular protests that are otherwise rare in such authoritarian contexts. This article examines how foreign policy influences domestic political opposition under authoritarianism. We approach this relationship combining classical insights from foreign policy analysis (FPA) with our own theorization of opposition as a tri-dimensional political space – as the dynamic product of intersecting institutional, practical and discursive spaces. Empirically, we capture such complexity through an exploratory, in-depth case study focusing on Morocco and, specifically, on the expressions and reconfigurations of its opposition movements in response to Israel’s wars on Gaza (2008–2009 and 2023–2025). Drawing on interviews conducted between 2007 and 2024 as well as official statements and press releases, these two episodes shed light on the consequences of both time-bound foreign policy shocks and more gradual, structural foreign policy transformations.

Despite ongoing affective polarization in the United States, support for Taiwan has somehow remained unscathed; Democrats and Republicans unanimously endorse US-Taiwan foreign policy. This is reflected both in public opinion surveys of American voters and support for Taiwan from elected officials. Theories of foreign policy and public opinion suggest that whether voters take top-down or bottom-up cues on foreign policy, we should expect some level of polarization on a salient issue like Taiwan. Utilizing two preregistered survey experiments in the United States, this study tests how robust bipartisan support for Taiwan persists when Taiwan is framed as either a Republican or Democratic issue. When presented as a partisan issue, do American voters still support Taiwan? Contrary to theoretical expectations, Taiwan presents a complex reality. Some foreign policy issues related to Taiwan can become partisan when framed along party lines while others remain bipartisan. Specifically, support for diplomatic and military policy may be affected by partisan framing, but support for economic policy remains bipartisan. This study contributes to theories of public opinion and foreign policy, particularly for scholars focused on US-Taiwan and US-China relations.

This article contributes to the literature on religious soft power by considering how non-Muslim-majority great powers – China, Russia, and the US – use Islam as a foreign policy resource in their soft power strategies. We argue that these states have deployed Islam to present positive self-images on the international stage, at the same time as using negative-other strategies via soft disempowerment to construct competitor states as unfriendly and/or dangerous to Muslims. We conclude by arguing that the use of Islam by non-Muslim great powers is a potentially dangerous game. While instrumentalising Islam may provide immediate benefits, it also opens the possibility for critique, particularly around perceived inconsistencies between domestic religious practices of a state and its internationally promoted narratives. These tensions can invite accusations of illegitimacy and hypocrisy, especially when leveraged by competitors or transnational religious actors.

This article explores the role of ideology in shaping Russia’s foreign and security policies, addressing whether it serves as a genuine guiding principle for the ruling elite or merely functions as a strategic tool to legitimise authoritarian rule and challenge the international order. Rather than focusing solely on Vladimir Putin, this study highlights the plurality of elite groups engaged in the production and contestation of strategic ideas. It highlights two key dimensions of ideology’s influence: first, its structural role in shaping elite networks and defining their internal power struggles, particularly among hawkish groups seeking policy influence; second, its instrumental function as a resource exchanged between ideological actors and policymakers, where ruling elites actively promote or demote ideological groups to justify strategic shifts in foreign and security policy. By analysing both the bottom-up diffusion of ideological narratives and the top-down mechanisms of state sponsorship, this research advances a nuanced understanding of how ideology interacts with domestic power dynamics, social environments, and international constraints to shape policy outcomes.