Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Russian regime pursued engagement with Ukraine to resolve the Donbas conflict through the Minsk agreements, thereby departing from the most hawkish elites’ calls for full-scale invasion and integration of Donbas into Russia. However, Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine on 24 February 2022 signalled a pivotal shift in strategic thinking, whereby the preference went from diplomatic negotiations to an unrestrained, revisionist use of force. How can we explain this major change in the Russian regime’s foreign and defence policies?
Scholars and commentators have emphasised the influence of conservative and imperialist ideas on Russian foreign policy, often portraying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the outcome of President Vladimir Putin’s ideological radicalisation. This article challenges two dominant assumptions in this literature: first, it shifts the focus away from unitary actors such as ‘Putin’, the ‘Russian regime’, or the ‘Kremlin’ and instead examines the role of hawkish elites as a lobby group actively seeking to shape state policies. Second, rather than depicting the Russian state as a cohesive actor with fixed preferences, it highlights the dynamic and variable processes through which ruling elites manage competition between ideological networks advocating divergent strategic visions.Footnote 1
Conceptualising ideology in foreign and security policies
The focus of this article on ideology contrasts with realist perspectives that primarily emphasise material factors as explanatory variables of policy choices. Scholars using this approach have interpreted Russia’s foreign policy choices as driven by interests shaped by global power dynamics, including power balancing, the relative distribution of capabilities among major powers, and the pursuit of status recognition within the international system.Footnote 2 Some recent policy reports outside academia have also dismissed ideology as a relevant factor in Russia’s military interventions, instead underscoring concerns about status and regional power dynamics.Footnote 3 Realist approaches, by emphasising the enduring nature of the international system as shaped by the distribution of material resources, tend to stress continuity over change when analysing foreign policy. A prominent example is John Mearsheimer’s consistent argument that Russia’s expansionist foreign policies, including the annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, were primarily reactive measures to NATO’s enlargement policy.Footnote 4 However, this explanation struggles to account for the significant evolution in Russia’s strategy over time from diplomatic efforts to resolve the Donbas conflict in 2014 to a fully revisionist war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022.
Structural conditions likely influenced Russia’s shift from diplomatic engagement to revisionism. Previous military operations, notably the Syria campaign, may have bolstered confidence in its armed forces, while financial reserves and a stronger partnership with China helped sustain operations and mitigate sanctions.Footnote 5 However, structural factors alone do not determine policy outcomes. In this respect, the constructivist literature offers a more effective framework for explaining policy change by stressing how these factors are perceived and interpreted differently within domestic policy circles, depending on their beliefs, norms, and historical experiences.Footnote 6 As Richard Lebow argues, the same variables can lead to diverse policy choices, as different value systems drive varying strategies and risk assessments.Footnote 7
In this article, I build upon the field of research that has underscored the explanatory relevance of ideology in securitising issues and determining strategic behaviours spanning from cooperation to violent conflict and military intervention.Footnote 8 An extensive literature has already examined the ideological foundations of the Russian regime’s authoritarian consolidation and ‘conservative turn’ identified in 2012.Footnote 9 However, there is ongoing debate regarding the causal force of ideology in Russian policymaking. Some scholars argue that ideology is merely an instrument, used cynically to cover interests such as legitimising authoritarian state power and garnering international support from conservative audiences.Footnote 10 Others, instead, emphasise the ruling elites’ genuine commitment to ideological values. Often centered on Vladimir Putin, these analyses point to his personal adherence to authoritarianism, conservatism, and imperialism.Footnote 11 Such a narrow focus on Putin’s individual beliefs, however, presents an oversimplified picture of the Russian state as a unitary actor. Despite the centralised and patrimonial nature of the political system under Putin’s rule, research has emphasised the persistence of a moderately pluralist, policy-consequential competition between states institutions and elite groups.Footnote 12 This analysis resonates with studies of other authoritarian regimes, such as China and Iran, where elite factions advocate differing policy agendas, even under strict regime control.Footnote 13 Moreover, studies based on Putin’s rhetoric neglect its ideological inconsistencies and variations across policy sectors and contexts, which combines the promotion of neoliberal principles in specific domestic policiesFootnote 14 with a rejection of liberal norms on the international stage.Footnote 15 Other scholars have extended the analysis beyond Putin, exploring how ideological concepts and narratives flow from the discourse of intellectuals into official policy documents.Footnote 16 In particular, Damian Strycharz, drawing on Harley Balzer’s concept of ‘managed pluralism’, illustrates the range of actors – including state media and the Duma – involved in generating ideas that shape Russia’s foreign policy.Footnote 17
While I align with these studies in their efforts to explore the relationship between idea producers and policy orientations, much of the existing research relies on discourse analysis, often drawing direct connections between intellectual sources and official policy without clearly tracing dissemination processes. In doing so, they demonstrate that ‘ideas matter’ in foreign and security policies but fall short of explaining how they matter exactly, specifically how they are formulated, circulated, legitimised, and ultimately used to orient strategic decisions. This article aims to address this gap by shedding light on the concrete processes, mechanisms and transactions through which ideas flow from intellectuals to policy circles.
In this endeavour, I draw upon recent works that have conceptualised the ideological role in foreign policy by bridging the gap between security studies and recent developments in ideology research.Footnote 18 A key insight from this literature is that the binary distinction between culturalist views, which see ideology as a value commitment to a rigid set of beliefs, and positivist perspectives, which treat it as a mere tool for masking pragmatic interests, is misleading. Recent theories of ideology, informed by Karl Mannheim’s relational approach, conceptualise it as a form of collective language that constitutes and defines social groups. Rooted in the concrete experiences of these groups, ideology shapes their interpretation of the world and informs their actions, thereby serving as a key criterion for group membership.Footnote 19 More recently, Michael Freeden has described ideologies as ‘systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended, through which individuals and groups construct an understanding of the political world they, or those who preoccupy their thoughts, inhabit, and then act on that understanding’.Footnote 20 Beyond the dichotomy between ideology as either value-based or instrumental, ideology is understood as a group’s collection of shared meanings that gains significance in relation to the ideology of other groups.
Building on this conceptualisation, Jonathan Leader Maynard’s research on mass killing shows that ideological effects are embedded in both ideational and structural features such as norms, discourses, and institutions, which shape behaviour through various causal mechanisms, including commitment, adoption, conformity, and instrumentalisation.Footnote 21 Besides, Mark Haas has examined the relational nature of ideological meaning by exploring internal ideological polarisation within a political system and its effects on threat perceptions and balancing strategies.Footnote 22 While Haas’s framework is valuable for representing the dynamic and contested aspects of ideology production, my analysis shifts the focus from a macro-level assessment of ideological polarisation to a meso-level investigation of the specific mechanisms through which one ideological group, the ‘Russian hawks’, compete for influence over Russian foreign and security policymaking.
Although existing literature on Russian conservative ideology often highlights the role of individuals such as Aleksandr Dugin,Footnote 23 this article’s emphasis on the ‘hawks’ underscores the importance of understanding ideology as the collective language of a social group. By analysing the hawks’ ideological entrepreneurship, I draw on scholarship studying the role of advocacy coalitions and policy entrepreneurs.Footnote 24 However, instead of concentrating on ruling circles, I focus on ‘policy intellectuals’Footnote 25 to identify the processes through which non-state actors’ ideas are produced, disseminated, and integrated into state policies.
Russian hawks
The term ‘hawks’, originally coined during the Cold War in the American context, refers to those who advocate a competitive approach to international politics, emphasising military strength as a means of deterrence and strategic advantage.Footnote 26 Hawks frame military build-up as essential to safeguarding national interests and provide intellectual justification for the use of force in foreign policy decision-making.
In post-Soviet Russia, the term has occasionally been applied to members of the ‘party of war’ within the political and military elite, who promoted the use of military force against Chechen secessionists in 1994.Footnote 27 It has also been used to describe ideologues advocating for the restoration of a Russian empire.Footnote 28
This article seeks to further theorise the concept within the Russian context. Here, ‘hawks’ refer to intellectuals and policymakers who frame Russia’s relationship with the West as one of enduring geopolitical confrontation and advocate the use of armed force to reinforce Russia’s status as a great power on the global stage. Although Russian hawks share a common positional role with their counterparts in other states as supporters of military engagement and proponents of confrontational rather than cooperative international politics, this does not imply that they subscribe to the same set of ideological tenets. As this article will demonstrate, their political visions and strategic priorities are shaped by the distinct historical, ideological, and institutional conditions of the Russian political landscape. Alternative terms native to Russian political discourse, such as ‘national-patriots’ or gosudarstvenniki (partisans of the state), could offer greater specificity. However, despite the inherent reductionism of the ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ terminology, it serves as an accessible designation for situating these actors within the broader field of foreign policy expertise, allowing for clearer parallels with similar groups in other strategic contexts.
Moreover, a pronounced bipolarisation, akin to the hawks-versus-doves dynamic, has been a defining feature of post-Soviet Russia’s intellectual and political landscape. Analysts often describe the key split within the ‘Putin Court’ as one between the siloviki – figures from the security services advocating for great power confrontation – and the so-called 'liberals'.Footnote 29 It is important to note, however, that the term ‘liberal’ in the Russian context is relative and should not be conflated with its meaning in Western political discourse. Russian ‘liberals’ within the ruling elite typically accept the primacy of a strong state. What distinguishes them from more hardline factions, such as the siloviki, is their emphasis on economic modernisation through engagement with the West and integration into the global economy. Until 2022, this partial diversity facilitated a flexible policy agenda, combining neoliberal economic reforms leading to Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2012, with foreign and security policies challenging liberal international norms.
This article explores the role of ideologues in reinforcing Russia’s hawkish policy orientation, ultimately enabling it to dominate and displace more dovish perspectives. Numerous groups and individuals exhibit hawkish tendencies. I focus on one prominent organisation: the Izborskii Klub, founded in 2012. Self-defined as a ‘patriotic and imperial front opposing the liberal-globalizing ideology’,Footnote 30 the Izborskii Klub is named after an ancient fortress city near the Estonian border. It is Russia’s largest coalition of hawkish ideologues, consisting of over 60 members from diverse professional backgrounds, including intellectuals, economists, journalists, entrepreneurs, clerics, and members of security forces. Prominent figures within the group include the writer Aleksandr Prokhanov, the philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, the economist Sergei Glazev (Putin’s adviser on the development of Eurasian economic integration from 2012 to 2019), the journalist Mikhail Leontev (1958–) and Metropolitan Tikhon Shevkunov, often referred to as Putin’s personal confessor.Footnote 31
Beyond the group’s size and visibility, the decision to focus on the Izborskii Klub is based on two defining characteristics. First, unlike other hawkish actors – such as foreign policy expert Sergei Karaganov, who gradually shifted from a cooperative to a confrontational stance on Russia–West relations – members of the Izborskii Klub have consistently maintained and lobbied hawkish positions since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before the club’s establishment in 2012, its key figures were already engaged in shaping imperialist discourse through various platforms and organisations, including the newspaper Zavtra and the Institute of Dynamic Conservatism. The Izborskii Klub thus emerged as a culmination of these earlier efforts, coalescing various initiatives into a single platform to influence state policy.
Second, unlike groups operating within state institutions – such as the Institute of Socio-economic and Political Research (ISEPI) linked to the presidential administration – the Izborskii Klub functions as an external organisation. Although the club’s members express support for Putin’s regime, they maintain a degree of critical distance, using their platform to advocate for what they view as a more coherent and assertive state ideology. This lobbying aspect reveals a dual approach: they balance loyalty to the regime with criticism, particularly when advocating for a more aggressive and ideologically grounded policy direction. By analysing how the Izborskii Klub alternatively aligns with and challenges official policies, I seek to study the agency of non-state hawkish ideologues and their evolving influence over state policies. Ultimately, the club’s career reflects an ongoing negotiation over the scope and direction of Russia’s ideological trajectory. Moreover, the Izborskii Klub’s policy influence is shaped not only by its evolving relationship with the state but also by its competition with other ideological groups vying for influence within Russia’s policymaking landscape. It operates in a contested and dynamic environment, facing competition from both other hawkish factions and from more moderate, liberal-leaning groups advocating for alternative policy directions.
Research method
Rather than treating ideological concepts as fixed and unchanged throughout history,Footnote 32 a relational understanding views ideologies as both theoretical and social constructs, whose meanings evolve and are contested through interactions with other groups. This conceptualisation calls for a methodological approach that combines discourse analysis with socio-empirical research, examining how ideas are formed and circulated within a competitive public space, and how they influence policy choices in interaction with other ideological currents. Accordingly, my analysis explores the range of symbolic and material resources – such as generational backgrounds, education, professional roles, institutional affiliations, publication venues, and funding – that enabled the hawks to gain recognition, legitimacy, and visibility within this competitive environment. Additionally, I assess the political performativity of their ideas, not only by identifying parallels between their discourse and official rhetoric, but also by tracing the material circulation of their ideas through interactions between intellectual circles and ruling elites.Footnote 33
The primary sources for this analysis include the online archives of the Izborskii Klub’s website, which contains records of all publications since its founding in 2012, including all issues of its monthly journal, Izborskii Klub: Russkie Strategii.Footnote 34 In addition to textual content, the archives document the institution’s activities and member interactions, such as participant lists, photographs from roundtables and conferences, and records of meetings between the Izborskii Klub and political, economic, or religious figures.Footnote 35 Analysing these materials provides valuable insights into the audience and social networks of the club, allowing me to trace its connections with ruling circles by identifying references to their interactions with policymakers or state institutions. Biographical information about the club’s members, available on their profile pages on the website, was used for a prosopographic analysis of their professional backgrounds and affiliations. This includes their ties to universities, media, partisan organisations, state institutions, and religious entities. However, these details could not be systematically verified and are presented as provided on the site.
My analysis also draws on fieldwork conducted in Russia from 2017 to 2019, which included 41 semi-structured interviews in Russian. The first set focused on Izborskii Klub members, exploring the social context of their publications, the group’s formation, and factors influencing their intellectual trajectories. I aimed to understand the institutions and networks shaping their careers, the motivations behind their ideological engagement, their interactions with political elites, and their routine practices within the club.
This fieldwork presented several challenges. The first was gaining access to Izborskii Klub members. I initially contacted those working in academia or research institutes, leveraging their familiarity with research methods. From there, I received recommendations to set up further interviews with members in the network. This strategy proved effective in navigating the interconnected social milieu and revealing the links between club members. A second challenge stemmed from my status as a Western researcher in the politically sensitive context following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. While being a young woman and PhD student may have helped me seem less threatening,Footnote 36 some suspicion remained. Interviewees sometimes questioned whether I had chosen my research topic or if it had been suggested to me, implying external influence. Additionally, conducting research in this extreme ideological environment created challenges for empathy and interpersonal rapport.Footnote 37 The cultural distance and my status as a foreigner helped maintain a professional ethnographic stance, but it still generated discomfort and required limits on my engagement. A third challenge was the reliance on interview-based evidence. To mitigate this, I triangulated data from various sources. Alongside archival and documentary research, I compared interviews with Izborskii Klub members to those with other political and intellectual elites. Conversations with more liberal interlocutors and with members of other conservative groups helped contextualise the broader ideological landscape, while also cross-checking the public image presented by club members. Interviews with political figures connected to the club explored the influence of their ideas on policy, although responses were often limited to scripted talking points. Finally, I supplemented interview materials with ethnographic observations. I attended conferences and book launches featuring Izborskii Klub authors to observe their reception and the type of audience they attracted. These events offered insights into the personal dynamics among club members, their intellectual sociability, and their group habits.
Dual dynamics of ideological influence: Bottom-up entrepreneurship and top-down co-optation
This article advances two central arguments regarding the dynamics of ideological entrepreneurship in Russia and its impact on foreign and security policymaking. The first section shows how ideological entrepreneurship operates in an authoritarian context through bottom-up mechanisms. Gathered within the Izborskii Klub, the hawks have functioned as a lobbying force with their own distinct agenda, seeking to shape policy decisions from outside formal political institutions. Their influence stemmed from their efforts to gain recognition and legitimacy in the public space by strategically deploying relational, discursive, and institutional resources. By aggregating members from diverse professional fields and maintaining ties with domestic and international policy networks, the Izborskii Klub has played a crucial role in organising collective doctrinal work and professionalising the practice of ideology production. This institutional foundation enabled the hawks to compete with liberal-leaning groups for public visibility and influence, positioning them as key contributors to shaping policy expertise and debate.
The second section highlights the top-down dynamics of state co-optation of ideology production through symbolic recognition, financial backing, and government partnerships. Analysis of the distribution of state-sponsored resources from 2012 to 2024 shows that the Russian regime has alternated its support among various ideological factions depending on the political and strategic context. While the Izborskii Klub rose to prominence between 2012 and 2014, particularly as contributors to the regime’s authoritarian consolidation and expansionist foreign policy, they were later sidelined in favour of moderately liberal groups advocating economic development and normalisation of relations with the West. However, since the onset of the war, the regime has reinvigorated the hawks’ ideas and narrowed domestic ideological polarisation. While wartime bureaucratic efforts have sought to increase the consistency and rigidity of the regime’s ideological foundations, a cohesive institutionalised state apparatus has yet to fully emerge. Instead, the regime continues to rely on adaptable doctrinal frameworks, sustained through transactional relationships with non-state ideological actors such as the Izborskii Klub.
The final section discusses the findings of this research. It highlights the increasing contribution of the hawks’ ideology as a set of actionable ideas used by the Russian regime to frame and legitimise foreign and security policy decisions. However, the state’s selective and fluctuating support for the Izborskii Klub shows the inconsistencies and variations in the ruling elites’ sponsorship of ideological production. Instead of committing to a single ideological framework, the regime has maintained a certain degree of ideological pluralism among elite groups, using transactional mechanisms to ensure a flexible course of action and a variety of sources of support through changing strategic environments.
The hawks’ ideological entrepreneurship
Foundations
The establishment of the Izborskii Klub occurred amid heightened political polarisation following the mass protests of 2011–12. The ‘castling’ move, in which Putin replaced Dmitrii Medvedev as the party’s candidate for the 2012 presidential elections, along with the December 2011 legislative elections, marred by widespread allegations of fraud, sparked the largest demonstrations in Russia since the 1990s.Footnote 38 In response, hawkish ideologues like Aleksandr Prokhanov and Aleksandr Dugin led a massive ideological counteroffensive against the protest movement. On 4 February 2012, they organised a rally of about 140,000 participants to oppose calls for liberalising reforms.
These polarised demonstrations also exposed significant divisions within the ruling elite, particularly between liberal reformers and the siloviki, or security elites.Footnote 39 Aleksei Kudrin, a prominent figure among the the liberal-leaning ruling elites and long-serving finance minister since 2000, publicly supported the demands for fair elections. In contrast, the siloviki strengthened their influence within the presidential administration, exemplified by the December 2011 appointment of Sergei Ivanov, a former Soviet KGB officer and defence minister, as head of the presidential administration.
Simultaneously, as the ruling party’s popularity declined, Vladimir Putin, then candidate for the March 2012 presidential election, sought to broaden his support base by reaching beyond formal political structures. His strategy involved engaging civil society actors and non-party organisations. Viacheslav Volodin’s appointment as first deputy head of the presidential administration underscored this shift. Volodin had previously led the All-Russian Popular Front, which had rallied support for elections by mobilising key civil society organisations.Footnote 40 In a similar move, Putin convened a group of political analysts, including several conservative thinkers, in early 2012 to discuss his campaign, signalling his intent to draw upon conservative ideologues to consolidate support.Footnote 41
The founding of the Izborskii Klub by Prokhanov in September 2012 capitalised on this momentum, offering a structured, institutionalised platform for hawks to influence state policy and counter liberal reformist pressures.
Membership
Initially formed as a collective of ‘like-minded individuals’ (‘edinomyshlenniki’), the majority of the Izborskii Klub’s founding members were personal acquaintances of Aleksandr Prokhanov. An analysis of the biographies, affiliations, and activities of these founding members reveals several key characteristics of the group during its inception in 2012–13.Footnote 42 One notable asset they shared was their membership in various social spheres, including academia, the media, political parties, state institutions, and religious organisations. These diverse connections allowed them to leverage three critical resources. Firstly, they possessed substantial intellectual capital, evidenced by advanced academic credentials, such as doctorate degrees, affiliations with the Russian Academy of Sciences, numerous publications in scholarly journals, and teaching positions at prominent universities. Secondly, they enjoyed an established public reputation and visibility. Nearly all founding members were prolific authors of articles, essays, or novels. They regularly contributed to a wide range of newspapers and journals and frequently appeared on major television and radio channels. Finally, many had held positions within state institutions, lending them legitimacy within the ruling elite. They had offered expertise and consulting services and were often recipients of prestigious state honours.
Beyond this initial recruitment wave, the club’s membership expanded from 25 to 61 members between 2012 and 2024. Unlike the founding group, these new members were not necessarily connected to Prokhanov personally; rather, they were selected for their individual expertise and resources. According to a founding member, a common pathway to membership involved producing significant and intellectually engaging work while actively participating in club events as experts.Footnote 43 Recruitment strategies typically focused on analytical skills, advocacy, or public outreach, particularly for younger members joining the organisation. For instance, Dmitrii Egorchenkov (1980–), who initially served as an affiliated expert from 2016 to 2018, ascended to full membership shortly after assuming the role of director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Forecasts at the People’s Friendship University of Russia (RUDN) in 2017, a position that endowed him with analytical resources and regular media access. At the same time, the club showcased its appeal through the inclusion of established figures possessing valuable resources such as public recognition, financial capital, and connections to influential political circles. This is exemplified by the membership of Nobel laureate physician Zhores Alferov (1930–), renowned filmmaker Karen Shakhnazarov (1952–), and Viacheslav Shtyrov (1953–), former deputy chairman from 2010 to 2014 of the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian Federal Assembly. The trajectory of businessman Oleg Rozanov, who progressed from a regular member to vice-president of the club, also underscores the growing importance of financial resources in shaping the club’s internal hierarchy.
Generations
A distinctive aspect of the Izborskii Klub is its intergenerational dimension, exemplified by the association between Prokhanov (born in 1938), the club’s chairman, and Vitalii Averianov (born in 1973), the deputy chairman. As illustrated in Table 1 below, the club’s membership can be categorised into three generational groups:
Table 1. Distribution of the Izborskii Klub’s members by generational groups.
The first generational group consists of the club’s ‘tutelary figures’, who have enjoyed prestigious careers in their fields and received official state honors. Prominent members include writer Iurii Poliakov (1954–), a recipient of several state orders; historian Andrei Fursov (1951–), a department head in the Russian Academy of Sciences; historian Nataliia Narochnitskaia (1948–), the former executive director of the Paris-based European Institute for Democracy and Cooperation; and Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov (1943–), who concluded his military career in 2001 as head of the main directorate of international military cooperation at the Ministry of Defence.
The second generational group, forming the core of the club, comprises individuals at the peak of their careers, holding influential positions with access to the highest echelons of the ruling elite. This group features economists such as Sergei Glazev (1961–), Mikhail Deliagin (1968–), and Mikhail Khazin (1962–), the philosopher Aleksandr Dugin (1962–), journalist Mikhail Leontev, and Orthodox Metropolitan Tikhon (Shevkunov).
Finally, the third group comprises younger emerging opinion-makers, such as Valerii Korovin (1977–), a disciple of Dugin and deputy head of the International Eurasian Movement, and Nikolai Starikov (1970–), a well-known essayist and blogger whose works garnered significant circulation.
A wartime ideology
While the group is united by a common belief in the necessity of a revitalised state ideology to mobilise the nation for military and cultural confrontation with the West, its members exhibit significant ideological diversity. The club’s website articulates its ideological programme as a ‘synthesis’ of perspectives from various ‘Russian statesmen’, encompassing a wide array of views ‘from socialists and Soviet patriots to monarchists and Orthodox conservatives’.Footnote 44 This approach seeks to address the challenges faced by Russian conservative intellectuals in achieving cohesion as a unified group. This unity has historically been challenged by two long-standing controversies within conservative ranks: the debate between proponents and critics of technological modernity, and the dispute between Soviet imperialists and Orthodox conservatives, commonly referred to as the ‘Reds and Whites’.Footnote 45
To promote group cohesion, the club has strategically minimised these divides. Two foundational programmatic documents aimed at emphasising the synthesis of ideologies over strict ideological consistency. The first document, titled ‘Strategy of the “Big Breakthrough”’ (Strategiia ‘Bolshogo ryvka’), advocates for Russia’s modernisation based on both advanced technological progress and the preservation of spiritual values.Footnote 46 The second document, ‘Beyond the “Reds” and “Whites”’ (Po tu storonu ‘krasnykh’ i ‘belykh’) calls for a ‘strategic alliance’ merging the Soviet ideal of ‘social justice’ with Orthodox ‘traditionalist values’.Footnote 47 A key rhetorical strategy employed in these documents to justify the coalition of divergent views is the insistence on addressing a pressing ‘wartime’ context, positing that Russia faces an imminent existential crisis. The ‘Strategy of the “Big Breakthrough”’ is framed as a ‘mobilisation ideology’ designed to respond to a ‘global systemic crisis’. The document highlights three critical factors – the 2008 global financial crisis, escalating economic competition between China and the United States, and climate change – that could lead to a ‘world war’, risking scenarios of ‘disintegration’, ‘absorption by competitors’, or a ‘revolution led by a counter-elite’. To avert such outcomes, the document advocates for a ‘national strategy’ that emphasises both ‘spiritual mobilisation’ and rapid technological advancement as essential for ensuring Russia’s ‘national survival’.Footnote 48 The club’s report on the Reds and Whites further reinforces this narrative, presenting their unification as a necessary coalition to prevent the ‘dismemberment of [the] state’. This coalition is justified on the grounds that both groups share a common adversary: the ‘liberal-globalising ideology and its proponents, who serve the interests of our geopolitical enemies’.Footnote 49
Despite ideological diversity among its members, the club’s programmatic doctrines highlight core tenets:Footnote 50
• Rejection of Western influence: The club advocates for distancing Russia from Western ideals, particularly Roman legal traditions, and promotes ‘spiritual sovereignty’ and ‘social truth’ as foundational values. These concepts are presented as essential for preserving Russia’s unique civilisational identity and cultural distinctiveness. In particular, the notion of ‘spiritual sovereignty’ extends national sovereignty beyond territorial defence to include the protection of Russia’s cultural and spiritual distinctiveness.
• Imperialism: The club advances a continuity-based view of Russian history, rejecting any notion of a break with the Russian Empire in 1917 or the Soviet Union in 1991. It frames contemporary Russia as the direct successor of medieval Muscovy. In this framework, Russia’s imperial identity is seen as permanent and essential, not contingent upon specific political regimes.
• Messianism: The club envisions Russia as the katechon, a Christian concept referring to the force that restrains the arrival of the Antichrist. In this role, Russia is seen as a global saviour, countering what the club views as the ‘new paganism of the West’ and the ‘new barbarism of the South’. It positions Russia as a leader of a multipolar world, opposing Western-dominated global order and advocating for an alternative globalisation based on regional alliances.
• Alternative economic order: The club calls for the creation of a Eurasian alliance with countries like Iran, India, and China, focused on collective security, economic cooperation, and cultural exchange, offering a counterbalance to Western economic and political influence.
• Authoritarianism: The club supports a model of governance centred on authoritarianism and a repressive domestic order. This system is viewed as necessary for maintaining the stability of the state and ensuring the continued strength of Russia as a global power.
• Militarism: The military is seen as central to realising the Russian national idea, blending technological advancement with religious conservatism to serve the purpose of a strong, imperial state. The club emphasises the importance of developing Russian weaponry and advancing the defence industry as crucial to fulfilling Russia’s ‘religious mission’.Footnote 51
The club’s vision is therefore underpinned by the belief that Russia’s survival and resurgence depend on a cohesive, militarised, and ideologically distinct state that rejects Western influence, embraces its imperial heritage, and positions itself as the defender of a unique, multipolar world order.
The club’s position within a competitive sphere of policy expertise
Many of the club’s founding members had been active in partisan politics during the 2000s, but their shift to a ‘club’ format was driven by disillusionment with Russia’s electoral system, where administrative obstacles had hindered their political parties’ participation. In an interview, one club member explained that his experience in electoral politics led him to realise that gaining a position as a deputy depended less on winning elections and more on following directives from the presidential administration, which stifled dissenting ideas.Footnote 52 While shifting to the club format indicated the members’ decision not to compete directly with the ruling party, it also signalled a strategic attempt to carve out a space for ideological influence within decision-making circles. The club thus represented an alternative model for organising ideological coalitions outside the formal party structures tightly controlled by the regime. This strategic transition was articulated by Aleksandr Dugin in the inaugural issue of the Izborskii Klub’s journal. He emphasised that while the club supported Putin’s reaction against ‘Western liberal influences’, it also sought to fill what he saw as Putin’s lack of a cohesive ideological framework with their own agenda.Footnote 53
In its pursuit of influence, the Izborskii Klub operated within a competitive environment where other networks and institutions were also vying for policymaking power. To solidify its public identity and distinguish itself from rivals, the club’s leaders actively framed their organisation in relation to others.
The club explicitly contrasted its ‘state-patriotic’ stance with that of the ‘liberal community’.Footnote 54 From its inception, the Izborskii Klub positioned itself as a direct challenger to the liberal policy circles that had gained prominence during Dmitrii Medvedev’s presidency. More specifically, the club sought to fill the space previously occupied by influential consultancy groups such as Gleb Pavlovskii’s Foundation for Effective Politics (FEP) and Igor Iurgens’s Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR).Footnote 55 The latter, in particular, had advocated for Russia’s full integration into the West through extensive democratisation reforms and cooperation with Western powers, including NATO membership.Footnote 56
However, the club also met significant competition within conservative circles, most notably from the Institute of Socio-economic and Political Research (ISEPI). Founded around the same time as the Izborskii Klub and led by Dmitrii Badovskii, deputy head of the presidential administration’s domestic politics department, ISEPI emerged as a key analytical centre for promoting conservative thought, particularly through its publication of the journal Tetradi po konservatizmu (Notes on Conservatism). Unlike the Izborskii Klub, which was dominated by older ideologues who championed an imperial vision of Russian statehood and identity, ISEPI was composed primarily of younger conservatives such as Mikhail Remizov and Boris Mezhuev, who were more inclined toward secular nationalism.Footnote 57 Moreover, in contrast to the ISEPI, which was integrated into the presidential administration, the Izborskii Klub operated outside state institutions.
The club’s strategy of policy influence
The Izborskii Klub established itself in the public space as a collective ideological entrepreneur by building three types of group capital: enhancing the group’s visibility and cohesion, professionalising its ideological discourse into policy expertise, and disseminating ideas within ruling elite networks.Footnote 58
A key strength of the club is its ability to enhance the visibility and coherence of the group it represents. Through its offices, particularly the one near the Kremlin, it serves as a hub for political networking and sociability, facilitating the construction of a unified group identity. The club further strengthened group cohesion through regular activities that promote member engagement and collective mobilisation around current issues, including roundtable discussions, the publication of a monthly journal, and delegation trips both within Russia and internationally.
The second significant asset of the Izborskii Klub lies in its professionalisation of ideological discourse, allowing it to position itself as a competitor to liberal experts by adopting a similarly authoritative rhetorical style. The club established the structural framework and operational practices of a think-tank, aiming to contribute to state policymaking. Its activities include organising expert meetings, seminars, and roundtables, as well as producing analytical reports on concrete policy issues. The club produces detailed policy analyses covering areas such as military reform, information warfare, scientific innovation, cybersecurity, Eurasian integration, food security, and agricultural policy. These reports embed its ideological stance – militaristic, imperialist, and anti-Western – within a sophisticated analytical format that incorporates data visualisations, charts, and statistics. Moreover, the club seeks to integrate ideological production with external technical expertise, reinforcing its claims to policy relevance. For instance, in January 2013, it organised a roundtable discussion on the ‘problems and prospects of the Russian space industry’ at the Rosobshchemash Corporation, an aircraft and spacecraft factory, which featured contributions from leading specialists in the domestic space sector.Footnote 59 The club’s growing professionalisation is evident through its participation in prominent forums, including the Moscow Economic Forum, the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum, and the Valdai Club, where members present their ideas alongside policymakers and experts.
The club’s third strategy for influence focuses on establishing relationships with both regional and international ruling elites. The club has particularly targeted regional elites by establishing around 20 local branches across the country, thereby demonstrating its national presence.Footnote 60 In an interview, a club member noted that these branches often receive support from regional entrepreneurs who take on primary financial responsibilities, viewing the club as a strategic avenue to gain administrative resources and lobby their interests to the federal political establishment.Footnote 61 In return, these offices enable the club to engage regional governors and local elites in roundtable discussions on topics that align with its ideological agenda, such as ‘Orthodoxy as a Stimulus for National Development’ in Kursk, ‘Spiritual Mobilisation’ in Orel, and ‘The Imperialism of Modern Russia’ in the Chechen Republic. Moreover, the club has expanded its presence beyond Russia by establishing similar branches in the Donbas (in 2014), Latvia (in 2015), and Moldova (in 2016), thereby gaining representatives to integrate into the policy debate and expertise of these countries.Footnote 62 The club also connected with a network of policymakers globally, forming partnerships with think-tanks and political representatives from China, Japan, Iran, Syria, and North Korea.Footnote 63 This strategy aims to create a worldwide alternative axis to ‘Americanism’ and ‘globalism’.Footnote 64
The fluctuating state sponsorship of the hawks’ ideology
A state-sponsored think-tank (2012–14)
In the aftermath of the colour revolutions, the Arab Spring, and the 2011–12 protest movement in Russia, the Russian threat narrative perceived popular uprisings as techniques used by outside forces to instigate chaos and fulfil their interests.Footnote 65 In response, key policy documents in the foreign and security domains redefined Russia’s security to include a strong ideological dimension to Russia’s confrontation with the West. As noted by Maria Engström, the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept emphasised the need for Russia to launch an ‘ideological offensive’ against the West’s use of ‘soft power’.Footnote 66 Similarly, the 2014 Military Doctrine highlighted new threats that involve the combined use of military force and ‘non-military measures’, including the exploitation of domestic protest movements.Footnote 67 In this context, the Izborskii Klub’s promotion of patriotic, anti-Western narratives became strategically valuable, leading the regime to support the club through various forms of state sponsorship.
The most significant indicator of the club’s status as a state-backed organisation was its strong connections with key figures within the presidential administration and policy circles. A symbolic example of this support was the participation of culture minister Vladimir Medinskii and Pskov governor Andrei Turchak in the club’s inaugural ceremony in Pskov on 8 September 2012. Funded by the regional administration, this event underscored the political backing the club received from within the ruling elite.Footnote 68 In an interview, a club member also identified Viacheslav Volodin, the newly appointed deputy head of the presidential administration at the time, as one of the club’s key allies within the government.Footnote 69 Additionally, Aleksandr Vladimirov, a retired major-general and president of the College of Military Experts, served as a vital intermediary between the club and the security policy community.Footnote 70 Vladimirov contributed to the development of major state documents, including Russia’s military doctrines and security strategies, and played an active role in the Izborskii Klub’s 2013 report on military reform,Footnote 71 which, as claimed by Averianov, was presented directly to defence minister Sergei Shoigu.Footnote 72 Further evidence of the club’s connections within the defence sector is found in its leader Prokhanov’s long-time connections with members of the former Soviet military-industrial complex.Footnote 73 These ties are demonstrated by the club’s meetings being hosted at major defence companies, such as the aircraft manufacturer Aviastar and the rocket engine producer Energomash.
The club’s strategic role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea
In the wake of Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution in 2014, which led to the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia’s annexation of Crimea was achieved through a blend of military, political, informational, and psychological measures commonly described as ‘hybrid warfare’.Footnote 74 The Izborskii Klub played a key role in shaping narratives that supported this annexation. In February 2014, the club issued a memorandum framing the Maidan protests as an act of ‘civilisational aggression’ orchestrated by the United States to turn Ukraine into an anti-Russian state.Footnote 75 Shortly thereafter, Prokhanov argued in an article that Crimea was the spiritual and political heart of Russia, referencing the baptism of Prince Vladimir in Chersonesus and the Christianisation of Kievan Rus.Footnote 76 These narratives were later echoed in President Vladimir Putin’s speeches to the Federal Assembly in March and December, where he characterised the revolution as a Western-backed coup and highlighted Crimea’s historical and ‘sacral’ significance to Russia.Footnote 77 The annexation of Crimea also served as a platform for Putin to endorse long-standing imperialist views promoted by the Izborskii Klub and other hawkish factions since the 1990s. These views included the notion of Crimea as ‘historically Russian land’ and the broader idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union had unjustly divided the Russian nation.Footnote 78 By framing the annexation as a rectification of this ‘historical injustice’, Putin sanctioned the club’s ideological stance, which calls for the reintegration of territories with significant Russian populations.Footnote 79
Beyond its role in producing discourse, the Izborskii Klub actively supported the annexation through public events and direct actions. Club members participated in efforts to legitimise the 16 March referendum on Crimea’s reunification with Russia. Figures like writer Nikolai Starikov took part in conferences in Crimea, where they publicly endorsed the referendum results as a valid foundation for Crimea’s integration into Russia.Footnote 80 The government of the newly established Republic of Crimea acknowledged the club’s contributions, with Dmitrii Polonskii, the new minister of internal policy, expressing gratitude for the club’s support during the ‘Crimean Spring’.Footnote 81 The club’s involvement was further recognised by the Russian military, which symbolically named a strategic bomber, the Tupolev Tu-95, after the city of Izborsk and adorned it with the club’s emblem.Footnote 82
Novorossiia or the collapse of consensus between the hawks and the state
Following the annexation of Crimea, the Izborskii Klub became a key supporter of separatist insurgent groups in Donetsk and Luhansk, in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. The club played a central role in legitimising the insurgency by promoting the concept of ‘Novorossiia’ (New Russia), a historical term originally referring to the territories north of the Black Sea, including Donbas, that were acquired by the Russian Empire from the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century.Footnote 83 In the spring of 2014, Donbas insurgents revived this term to justify their independence claims from Ukraine. As one of the most vocal advocates for Novorossiia, the Izborskii Klub increasingly diverged from Russia’s official foreign policy. While President Putin briefly mentioned Novorossiia in April 2014,Footnote 84 by May, the Kremlin had distanced itself from the separatist cause, declining to recognise the referenda proclaiming the independence of Luhansk and Donetsk. Instead, Putin called for negotiations between Ukraine and Donbas, avoiding further use of the term ‘Novorossiia’.Footnote 85
Despite this, the Izborskii Klub continued supporting the separatists through both ideological and practical means. In collaboration with the Eurasianist Union of Youth, the club facilitated the deployment of volunteers to the conflict zone and maintained close connections with the leadership of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), including Pavel Gubarev, Aleksandr Borodai, and Igor Strelkov.Footnote 86 Additionally, the club played a role in drafting the DPR’s constitution and established a local branch in Donetsk, providing policy recommendations and proposing educational initiatives, such as the development of a textbook on the history of Novorossiia.Footnote 87
However, by autumn 2014, the Kremlin had replaced the separatist leadership with figures more aligned with Moscow. As scholars have noted, this newly appointed leadership functioned as a proxy for the Kremlin, which offered political and military support in exchange for ensuring their dependence on Moscow.Footnote 88 The signing of the Minsk Protocol in September 2014, which outlined the reintegration of Donbas into Ukraine with special local autonomy, effectively ended the Novorossiia campaign.
This shift towards diplomatic engagement rather than expanded military action underscored the limitations of hawkish ideological influence on strategic decision-making, as domestic constraints and the structure of the international order played a decisive role. One possible explanation for the Kremlin’s push-back against the Izborskii Klub lies in the increasingly antagonistic relationship between the group and the regime following the Novorossiia campaign. The club’s advocacy for radical measures, including sharp criticism of domestic policies and calls for political transformation within Russia, may have been perceived as overreaching. As Marlène Laruelle has highlighted, Aleksandr Dugin’s stance on Novorossiia raised concerns due to its potential repercussions inside Russia.Footnote 89 In May 2014, Dugin had called for the expansion of the Novorossiia movement within Russia itself, framing it as part of a broader ‘Russian Revolution’ against ‘Atlanticism’, Western influence, and oligarchic control.Footnote 90 While Dugin insisted that this revolutionary movement was in support of both Russia and President Putin, his rhetoric may have been viewed as excessively radical and destabilising. His role as a key ideologue of the Novorossiia project and a proponent of insurgent warfare in Ukraine ultimately led to his dismissal from his academic position at Moscow State University’s Faculty of Sociology.Footnote 91
Beyond domestic considerations, the constraints of the international order also potentially shaped the Kremlin’s decision to sideline the Izborskii Klub. The rising reputational and economic burdens associated with the club’s preferred policy of expanded military engagement in Donbas rendered such an approach increasingly costly. As an expert report has suggested, the combination of mounting Western sanctions and the deteriorating position of the separatist movement on the ground likely influenced Putin’s decision to limit direct military intervention.Footnote 92 Against this backdrop, the Kremlin’s restriction of the Izborskii Klub’s influence can be seen as part of a broader objective to reassert control over non-state actors’ agency.
After the signing of the Minsk Protocol, relations between the Izborskii Klub and the presidential administration became increasingly strained as club members criticised Vladislav Surkov, the president’s advisor on Ukraine, for his management of the conflict in Donbas.Footnote 93 Advocating for a ‘Stalinian’ approach, members like Aleksandr Nagornii called for a ‘total military operation’ involving a ‘liberation army’ composed of volunteers from private military corporations, supported by missile strikes on strategic targets.Footnote 94 By the end of 2014, the club’s push for full-scale military confrontation diverged sharply from Putin’s more measured stance, asserting that Russia would not sever ties with Europe or America.Footnote 95 In contrast, the Izborskii Klub published two reports, ‘Prevent War – Win the War’ and ‘Cold War 2.0’, which underscored an ‘inevitable’ strategic confrontation with the West and called for mobilising resources to develop asymmetric deterrence against perceived enemies.Footnote 96 The club continued to advocate for Novorossiia, organising rallies in Russia and celebrating Donbas military commanders.Footnote 97 Members regularly travelled to Donbas to foster relationships with local politicians and militias, attending conferences and book presentations organised by their local branch.Footnote 98 Among them, the writer Zakhar Prilepin played an active role in delivering humanitarian aid and eventually enlisting in the DPR Armed Forces, where he later became a political instructor and deputy commander of a battalion.Footnote 99
Renewed ideological polarisation
During the latter part of Putin’s third term, from 2015 to 2018, heightened competition among various ideological groups within the think-tank industry led to a reduced policy prominence of the Izborskii Klub’s discourse. The club received its last official state grant of 10 million rubles (approximately €150,000) in December 2015, aimed at advancing its work on the concept of the ‘Russian world’, which seeks to define an expanded Russian civilisation beyond its territorial limits.Footnote 100
This funding facilitated the club’s publication of The Russian World Doctrine in September 2016, which proposed a ‘new offensive strategy’ aimed at reconstructing Russia as an imperial state. The doctrine outlined key objectives, including the establishment of Russian spheres of influence in the Balkans and the Black Sea region, the assertion of ethnic Russians’ rights in Ukraine, and the strengthening of ties with Russian-speaking communities abroad.Footnote 101 Although the state did not implement this strategy at the time, its funding through state channels demonstrated the cultivation of a range of strategic narratives within a flexible and partially pluralistic policy framework.
However, by late 2016, the Izborskii Klub’s agenda had notably lost influence within the presidential administration. A key signal of this change was the management overhaul of the presidential administration following the September 2016 legislative elections. Viacheslav Volodin, an informal supporter of the Izborskii Klub, was moved from his influential role as first deputy chief of staff to a less significant position as chairman of the State Duma. His successor, Sergei Kirienko, a figure at the time affiliated with the liberal technocratic elite,Footnote 102 supervised a new funding scheme for civil society organisations via the Russian Presidential Grant Fund. This restructuring resulted in the repeated rejection of all three of the Izborskii Klub’s subsequent funding applications.Footnote 103
In contrast, the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), headed by Aleksei Kudrin and previously inactive from 2011 to 2016, emerged as the leading policy platform. Appointed as co-chair of the presidential working group on economic affairs in May 2016, Kudrin linked the CSR directly to the presidential administration.Footnote 104 The CSR’s agenda, emphasising socio-economic issues and the normalisation of relations with the West, stood in stark contrast to the Izborskii Klub’s focus on Russia’s imperial ambitions and confrontational stance.
From 2016 to 2020, the Izborskii Klub was only selectively mobilised by ruling elites to support the Ministry of Education’s patriotic education initiatives. Minister Olga Vasileva, a historian with a background in relations between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church, collaborated with the club on the ‘Patriotic Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation 2016–2020’ programme.Footnote 105 This collaboration included drafting patriotic education programmes for secondary schools and forming agreements with regional administrations in Saint Petersburg and the Khanty-Mansiiskii district.
The 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the new hegemony of hawkish ideas
The sequence of Russian policies in 2022 – beginning with the recognition of the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics on 22 February, followed by the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, and culminating in the annexation of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions on 21 September – represented a significant strategic shift in the Kremlin’s foreign and security policies towards the ideas advocated by the Izborskii Klub. The appointment of former culture minister Vladimir Medinskii, a founding supporter of the Izborskii Klub, as the head of the Russian delegation for negotiations with Ukraine in February 2022, highlighted the Kremlin’s intention to assign significant policy influence to the most conservative elite groups in the management of war-related policies.
Vladimir Putin’s justification for the use of military force and his rejection of the international order drew heavily on arguments long promoted by the Izborskii Klub. Putin’s July 2021 article, ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’, endorsed the Izborskii Klub’s portrayal of Ukraine as a failed state created by the Soviet Union, ruled by ‘neo-Nazis’ and pursuing ‘Russophobic’ policies.Footnote 106 On the day of the invasion, Putin reiterated these claims, asserting that the military operation aimed to protect Russian citizens from the ‘humiliation and genocide’ inflicted by the Kyiv regime and to ‘demilitarise and denazify Ukraine’.Footnote 107
Moreover, while Putin had initially sanctioned the Izborskii Klub’s Novorossiia campaign in 2014, his 2021 article officially normalised the term, emphasising the significance of Novorossiia as a region historically linked to Russia and incorporated into the Russian Empire in the 18th century.Footnote 108 Following the signing of treaties on 21 September 2022, which annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, Putin asserted the importance of these regions to Russia’s strategic interests, claiming that defending them equated to defending Russia itself. He has since abundantly referred to Donbas and Novorossiia as ‘liberated, historical regions’Footnote 109 and ‘primordial Russian lands’,Footnote 110 framing these areas within a narrative of territorial restoration. This rhetoric has been accompanied by concrete policy actions aimed at integrating these regions into Russia’s economic, legal, and administrative systems. Putin’s discourse thus extends beyond historical justification to the practical task of administrative normalisation, positioning the integration of Donbas and Novorossiia into Russia’s national framework as a central policy priority.Footnote 111
In addition to his confrontational foreign policy, Putin has pursued a repressive authoritarian agenda domestically, also aligning with the rhetoric long advocated by the Izborskii Klub. The groundwork for this shift was laid by the 2020 constitutional amendments, which lifted restrictions on presidential term limits, coupled with two years of Covid-related isolation from international exchanges that facilitated the implementation of authoritarian measures. The intensification of repression, particularly the imprisonment of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in 2021, further consolidated internal control and diminished dissent. A few weeks after the invasion of Ukraine, Putin emphasised a stark divide between ‘true patriots’ and ‘scum and traitors’, calling for the expulsion of the so-called ‘fifth column’ of ‘national traitors’. He underscored the necessity of ‘detoxifying society’ by purging dissenters ‘like an insect in [the] mouth’.Footnote 112 This rhetoric culminated in the adoption of a series of repressive laws, criminalising anti-war protests and leading to the closure of critical media outlets.Footnote 113
Moreover, Putin has implemented a series of decrees aimed at enhancing the consistency and rigidity of the conservative ideological foundations of Russia’s state policies. A notable example of this is the 2022 presidential decree titled ‘Fundamentals of State Policy to Preserve and Strengthen Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values’, which establishes policy goals aimed at ensuring national security through the preservation of traditional values.Footnote 114 The integration of these values into Russia’s foreign and security policies is further reflected in two key documents. The first, the September 2022 presidential decree ‘On the Validation of the Concept of Russia’s Humanitarian Policy Abroad’ presents a comprehensive framework for Russia’s role on the international stage as a guardian of traditional spiritual and moral values, countering the perceived threat of globalisation to cultural identity.Footnote 115 Additionally, the 2023 Concept of Foreign Policy emphasises the promotion and protection of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values as vital components of Russia’s national interests.Footnote 116
The swift consolidation of elite support for an aggressive foreign policy represents a significant departure from the previously moderate ideological polarisation, shifting towards a unified embrace of anti-Western, conservative imperialism as the dominant narrative. Indeed, since the start of the war, defections from the elite have been rare, with only a few notable exceptions.Footnote 117 Journalist Andrei Pertsev identifies two alternative elite factions – the ‘party of peace’ and the ‘party of silence’ – but emphasises the overwhelming influence of the ‘party of war’, highlighting the remarkable cohesion and uniformity within the ruling class.Footnote 118 Figures once viewed as relatively liberal, such as Dmitrii Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council, and Sergei Kirienko have emerged as some of the most vocal advocates for the war. Medvedev, in particular, has drawn attention for his incendiary rhetoric on social media, where he has referred to Ukrainians as ‘bastards and degenerates’,Footnote 119 framed the conflict as a holy war against Satan,Footnote 120 and called for Ukraine’s annihilation while issuing nuclear threats against NATO.Footnote 121
The hawks as (too) radical ideologues of the war
In this reshaped public discourse, members of the Izborskii Klub hold a prominent position as key ideologues of the war. Vitalii Averianov has hailed 24 February as a decisive step toward the realisation of Russia’s ‘fifth empire’, a concept that frames the war within a historical and divine continuum of Russia’s imperial legacy.Footnote 122 These ideas were consolidated in the club’s September 2022 manifesto, ‘Wartime: Disaster of Victory’, which portrays the war as a defensive struggle against a ‘monstrous’ Western enemy and as a crucial moment of ideological unity, bringing together monarchists and communists under a common cause. The killing of Daria Dugina in August 2022,Footnote 123 reportedly targeting her father Aleksandr Dugin, and the attempted assassination of Zakhar Prilepin in May 2023Footnote 124 underscore the prominent role of the Izborskii Klub members in legitimising the war, making them notable targets.
Within this context, the Izborskii Klub has gained significant recognition and state sponsorship, enhancing its legitimacy and influence. This support manifests through symbolic recognition, exemplified by the direct interactions between the club’s leadership and ruling elites. According to journalist Andrei Pertsev, as of November 2022, figures like Dugin and Prokhanov had become ‘frequent visitors’ to the Kremlin, consulting with high-ranking officials such as Kirienko on the development of a ‘new ideology’.Footnote 125 Additionally, Putin has conferred honorific status on Prokhanov, awarding him the Order of Alexander Nevsky on 10 July 2023, in recognition of his public activities.Footnote 126 Moreover, the state has renewed significant financial support for the Izborskii Klub. In October 2022, the club acknowledged that its publications received funding from the Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives, enabling projects like ‘Russian Dream: Donbas’, which aims to promote the concept of ‘Novorossiia’ in the occupied territories of Ukraine. This initiative aligns with Putin’s vision of integrating these territories into a ‘common cultural and civilisational space’.Footnote 127
The Izborskii Klub also significantly contributes to state-led ideological initiatives, such as the ‘Russia DNA’ project, which aims to reshape university curricula in the humanities and social sciences. Club members, including Averianov, participated in developing the course ‘Foundations of Russian Statehood’ and consulted on its content at various universities.Footnote 128 The club’s new influence in the academia is further evidenced by Dugin’s leadership of the Higher Political School named after Ivan Ilin, established in 2024 at the Russian State University for the Humanities. Additionally, Metropolitan Tikhon Shevkunov chairs the expert council for a project at the Higher School of Economics dedicated to producing a seven-volume publication showcasing historical figures committed to serving the ‘Fatherland’.Footnote 129 Thus, the wartime period has coincided with the Izborskii Klub’s attainment of official expert status contributing the formulation of the state’s ideological frameworks.
Despite this role, however, members of the Izborskii Klub have also voiced criticism of the regime’s management of the conflict, raising several concerns. First, they have called for a more radical mobilisation effort and improved execution of the war. Following the invasion, Averianov noted that while ‘revolutionary’ changes were initiated, significant transformations had yet to materialise. He warned against the regime’s potential compromises and the influence of a ‘hidden fifth column’ within the elite.Footnote 130 Similarly, Prokhanov, in a July 2022 analysis, criticised the disconnection of Russian society from the war’s realities, accusing state leadership of viewing the conflict as a localised issue rather than a national crisis. Contradicting the regime’s framing of the intervention as a ‘special military operation’, Prokhanov called it a ‘war’, advocating for its evolution into a ‘holy’ ‘people’s war’ to defend Russian existence and territory.Footnote 131 Dugin also criticised the conduct of the war, specifically blaming the leadership for Russia’s retreat from Kherson in the autumn of 2022, and echoed the need for a comprehensive national mobilisation.Footnote 132 In a 2024 article, he reiterated the necessity of ‘total militarisation’ across cultural, educational, informational, and psychological domains.Footnote 133
As they view it, a critical step towards achieving full national mobilisation is the establishment of a state ideology. In particular, Dugin asserted that ‘a military ideology, an ideology of victory, must be established in the country. It is impossible to fight without an idea.’Footnote 134 However, the adoption of a state ideology remains contentious among the ruling elites. As Marlène Laruelle noted, discussions about abolishing Article 13 of the Constitution – which prohibits the adoption of a state ideology – emerged during the 11th Saint Petersburg International Legal Forum in May 2023.Footnote 135 While justice minister Konstantin Chuychenko and other hawkish figures like Medvedev and Medinskii advocated for repealing Article 13, Valerii Zorkin, president of the Constitutional Court, maintained a legalistic stance against altering the Constitution.Footnote 136
In their call for a state ideology, members of the Izborskii Klub framed the conflict in Ukraine as part of a larger, systemic struggle against the West that spans military, cultural, economic, and psychological dimensions. In this respect, they sought to shift the focus from Ukraine to the confrontation between Russia and the West. Averianov claimed that while Ukraine acted as a ‘tactical platform for Western aggression’, the primary battle extends beyond its borders. In his view, Putin’s term ‘denazification’ serves as an effective ‘operational-tactical, propaganda, and potentially legal concept’, but he urged a broader understanding of the ideological adversary, positioning Ukraine as one manifestation of ‘American and Western European liberal fascism’.Footnote 137 Dugin echoed this argument, asserting that the military operation targets ‘not only Nazism’ but also ‘liberalism and globalism’, effectively denying Ukraine’s sovereignty and depicting it as a ‘battleground of civilizations’.Footnote 138 For the Izborskii Klub, the war transcends mere territorial disputes; it embodies a struggle for Russia’s identity and place in the world as the leader of a global resistance to Western hegemony. Beyond the battlefield in Ukraine, Averianov has underscored Russia’s imperative to liberate itself from what he characterises as its ‘quasi-colonial dependence’ on the West and establish itself as an independent civilisation.Footnote 139 In his vision, Russia should endeavour to systematically disrupt the principal ‘strongholds’ of globalisation, including the ‘gender agenda’ and ‘Western environmentalism’, among other things, and establish a new world order. In pursuing this objective, Russia should forge alliances with countries along a ‘trans-Caspian axis’, including China, India, and Iran, to establish a ‘self-sufficient economic space’.Footnote 140 Thus, the war in Ukraine is framed as a pivotal moment in a broader ideological struggle – one that will shape Russia’s role in a new, multipolar world order.
Finally, the Izborskii Klub’s radical positions have been coupled with calls for drastic domestic repression, viewing the wartime context as an opportunity for elite change in Russia. These views have gained traction alongside Putin’s rhetoric that divides patriots from a supposed ‘fifth column’ of traitors. However, club members advocate for even more severe measures, including tactics of terror. Averianov stated that achieving ‘victory over the internal enemy’ requires the ‘purification of the state’ through the ‘purge of subversive forces’ within the elite, regardless of the potential cruelty involved. He specifically targeted entities like the Yeltsin Center and various human rights organisations, denouncing them as products of ‘liberal fascism’.Footnote 141 In November 2022, the club hosted a roundtable titled ‘The crisis of the elites and mechanisms of cadres revolution’, producing a journal issue endorsing repressive policies reminiscent of the eras of Ivan the Terrible and Stalin.Footnote 142 The club particularly aims to eliminate perceived liberal forces within economic elites to establish a ‘patriotic Russian intelligentsia’.Footnote 143 Sergei Glazev specifically condemned the Central Bank, claiming its leadership serves foreign interests, thereby hindering Russia’s economic independence and ability to respond to sanctions effectively.Footnote 144
The criticisms articulated by the Izborskii Klub highlight the ambivalent stance of the broader ‘Z’ space, which encompasses a diverse array of pro-war opinion leaders and bloggers.Footnote 145 Despite its proclaimed patriotism, this space has emerged as a crucial forum for political dissent within contemporary Russia, advocating for more radical military actions and increased repression.Footnote 146 This shift is exemplified by Evgenii Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner military company, who transitioned from a prominent figure in the war effort to a vocal critic of the government’s handling of the conflict, culminating in his leadership of an armed rebellion on 24 June 2023.Footnote 147
By contrast, the Izborskii Klub has maintained a nuanced position – balancing critical perspectives with loyalty to the regime – allowing it to play a significant role in state-sponsored wartime ideological production while simultaneously advancing its own ideological agenda.
Discussion
This article has shown that the Kremlin has revived Soviet-era practices of sponsoring ideology production. However, unlike the Soviet period, the current regime does not rely on a state ideological apparatus, but on transactional relationships with clubs and think-tanks outside party institutions. Even amid authoritarian repression and wartime conditions, the involvement of both state and non-state actors in ideology production sustains a certain degree of ideological diversity. Rather than fixing a single state ideology, the Kremlin selectively promotes or demotes different ideological groups through distribution of state resources, thus maintaining policy flexibility. An illustrative case of this approach is the evolving political career of Novorossiia, a concept originally promoted by hawks’ circles. Its fluctuating prominence in state discourse – alternating between rejection and endorsement – reveals that the hawks’ policy influence is neither monolithic nor static but subject to a fluid, negotiated process within the regime’s broader ideological framework.
This framework offers a specific perspective on the role of ideology in shaping public policies. It shifts the focus away from evaluating a regime’s endorsement of ideology as abstract doctrine or a fixed set of beliefs, and towards analysing how the regime manages a sphere of ideological production shaped by multiple actors. Within this sphere, I identify two key dimensions through which ideology influences policy outcomes.
First, ideology serves as the common language and collective identity that define elite groups, such as the hawks and, more specifically, the Izborskii Klub. In this context, ideology structures elite groups, shapes their power struggles, and determines the polarisation of the competitive space for policy influence. This focus on the socio-intellectual structuring of the domestic political environment and its influence on decision-making is often underrepresented in the realist literature.
The second dimension of ideology’s effect is its role as a resource traded between ideological networks and policymakers. My study highlights the competitive and interactive process by which ruling elites seek out ideologues, sponsor their ideological production, and integrate their ideas as justifications for foreign and security policies. In particular, I have shown that the regime’s manipulation of ideological pluralism – sometimes fostering domestic polarisation and at other times tempering it – directly supports its strategic choices, shifting between engagement and deterrence. This aligns more with the realist view of ideology as an instrument used by the regime to achieve specific policy goals.
By tracing the bottom-up mechanisms of idea diffusion from ideological groups to policy circles, as well as the top-down practices of state-sponsored ideology production, I demonstrate how ideas can flow from ideological networks through policy elites to strategic documents and policies. I therefore conceptualise the emergence of ideas’ causal effects on policies as a process in which ideas evolve through various levels of diffusion, thickening from discursive to more institutional and performative forms. This approach underscores the importance of looking beyond the conventional focus on official strategic documents, which often depict policies as emanating from a unified state entity. Instead, this article has contributed to efforts to emphasise the role of a diverse array of actors involved in idea production and diffusion and of the specific contexts that determine when certain ideas become more salient to policy choices.
The findings carry significant implications for understanding Russia’s role in the international system, moving away from its perception as a unitary actor with fixed preferences. It reveals that Russia’s foreign policy is influenced by a heterogeneous and fluid array of ideological sources, which are not static but evolve over time through competitive and collaborative processes. This internal competition makes Russian state identity more flexible and unpredictable, as different ideas may gain prominence or fade depending on the shifting balance of power among competing elites and the broader international environment. This research therefore invites scholars and policymakers to consider the diverse sources and pathways through which Russia’s state preferences are formed and reformed.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the interviewees for their time. In writing this article, I have benefited from comments and insights from Jean-Vincent Holeindre, Kathy Rousselet, Chiara Ruffa, and Olivier Schmitt. Portions of this article draw from my book The Rise of the Russian Hawks: Ideology and Politics from the Late Soviet Union to Putin’s Russia (Cambridge University Press, 2025).
Funding declaration
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/ or publication of this article: this research was possible thanks to a ‘fieldwork’ research grant from the Centre d’étude franco-russe, delivered in 2019.
Competing interests declaration
The author declares none.
Juliette Faure is Professor of Political Science at the University of Lille (France). She is the author of The Rise of the Russian Hawks: Ideology and Politics from the Late Soviet Union to Putin’s Russia (Cambridge University Press, 2025) and co-editor of the Routledge Handbook of Ideology Analysis (Routledge, 2025).
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