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This article highlights the challenges of external reactions to authoritarian higher education governance in certain Central and Eastern European countries, especially Hungary and Poland. It interprets the political change in these countries as an authoritarian cultural backlash, which is not just a legal or political problem, but a kind of post-fascist cultural revolution contesting the liberal script. First, the article explains the framework of authoritarian policing in academia based on the more general works of Bob Altemeyer and Zeev Sternhell. Second, it tries to answer the question: What tools could counter these tendencies from the perspective of the European Union? As the article interprets the rise of authoritarianism as a phenomenon rooted in the cultural deficit of the countries concerned, it argues that a programme for a democratic and pluralist cultural counter-revolution should be implemented. However, no nation can be democratized solely by external actors, and the basics of democratic thinking should be developed from the grassroots level. If the crisis in academia is rooted in a value-crisis within the societies concerned, then measures countering this phenomenon should also include promoting Enlightened pluralism at all levels of these societies.
While historical narratives of the communist legitimation of power in Yugoslavia have often marginalized perspectives of lesser-known civil servants, this study highlights the crucial role of Dr. Rudolf Bićanić, a renowned Yugoslav economist. Departing from the diplomatic, foreign political, and military perspectives when investigating the Yugoslav émigré government actions, this article explores the ideas espoused, networks created, and actions performed by Bićanić across diverse transnational settings. Bićanić’s lens as a vice-governor of the Yugoslav National Bank demonstrates that the debates regarding the future social and economic policies shaped the transition process between the two Yugoslav states. Driven by a mission to enhance peasant living conditions in Yugoslavia, Bićanić embarked on a brief yet impactful governmental career from 1941 to 1945. The article posits that Bićanić’s anti-government propaganda disseminated through the United Committee of South Slavs and his financial malversations led to the transfer of economic and political legitimacy over Yugoslavia in April 1944 to the National Liberation Council. With this action, Bićanić accelerated the signing of the Tito-Šubašić agreement in June 1944, which empowered him to negotiate the post-war reconstruction aid and loans in Washington, DC, carving a unique path for Yugoslavia between socialism and capitalism.
Georgia represents an interesting case to study the agency of small states in reshaping their regional identity and external environment. Although much of the world has considered Georgia as politically part of the South Caucasus region, the country’s political elites themselves have long attempted to escape the geographic boundaries of the South Caucasus region and relocate their country into Eastern Europe. We argue that Georgian elites were partially successful in their quest for foreign political identity change. Although they did not manage to entirely change the international perception about Georgia’s geographic belonging, the country has politically moved closer to Eastern Europe and is considered to be part of “Associated Trio” together with Ukraine and Moldova—and recently became an EU candidate. From a theoretical perspective, we argue that Georgia’s quest for foreign policy identity recalibration fits the constructivist paradigm of international relations well. It can be argued that Georgia’s political elites were partially driven by ideational factors and were ignorant of the balance of power in their external environment, which cost the country the lost wars and compromised territorial sovereignty.
This book examines the mutual interplay of climate and energy policies in eleven Central and Eastern European countries in the context of the EU's energy transition. Energy security has long been prioritised in the region and has shaped not only national climate and energy policy, but also EU-level policy-making and implementation. Whilst the region shares economic, institutional and historical energy supplier commonalities it is not homogenous, and the book considers the significant differences between the preferences and policies of these member states. Chapters also explore the effect of the EU on member states that have joined since 2004 and their influence on the EU's energy and climate policies and their role in highlighting the importance of the concepts of security and solidarity. The book highlights the challenges to, and drivers of, energy transitions in the region and compares these with those in global energy transitions.
The relationship between Australia and the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe has been characterised by considerable distrust. The isolation and fear of the danger posed by hostile powers was a recurrent theme in the consciousness of colonial Australians, a fear which took a precise Russian focus at the time of the Crimean War, the British–Russian tensions in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the establishment of a Russian Pacific fleet based at Vladivostok. A whole infrastructure of distrust stemming from the 1917 revolution and the perceived expansionist aims of the Bolshevik government was built upon this historical basis. This feeling, shared by much of the Western world, was stimulated enormously by the Cold War and by the effect on public debate in Australia of the large number of articulate refugees from both the Soviet Union and those states of Eastern Europe which were part of the Soviet orbit. This prevailing sense of distrust has structured the Australian approach to the Soviet Union and its allies throughout the postwar period.
This is the first time that a chapter on an Australian relationship with Eastern Europe has been included in the series Australia in World Affairs. The decision to break such new ground is surely a reflection of change in the world situation. The immensity of overall change needs no documentation but whether it has materially affected an Australian–East European connection has to be investigated. Is there, in other words, sufficient evidence to indicate a complementarity of interest, of resources, and of a perceived capability and need to cause a clearly identifiable, meaningful relationship to develop? Or are these two areas not only geographically distant but also still too unconnected, extraneous and aloof to make this chapter no more than a rather sterile chronicle of unrelated attitudes and opinions?
Three decades after the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe, where should a history of post-socialist social justice start from? This chapter explores how questions of social justice in Eastern Europe after 1989 emerged against the background of policies of privatization – the transfer of state assets to private hands – in public rhetoric and expert commentary. Taking a longer historical perspective, the chapter shows how the notion of a ‘popular’ or ‘people’s capitalism’ came to be instrumental in framing debates about wealth redistribution and mass entrepreneurship after decades of dictatorship in virtually all countries of the former Communist Bloc. The chapter concludes with some remarks on the wider implications of this regional experience for a history of social justice in the European twentieth century and beyond.
Explanations for the emergence and abandonment of the Chalcolithic Trypillia mega-sites have long been debated. Here, the authors use Gini coefficients based on the sizes of approximately 7000 houses at 38 Trypillia sites to assess inequality between households as a factor in the rise and/or demise of these settlements. The results indicate temporarily reduced social inequality at mega-sites. It was only after several generations that increased social differentiation re-emerged and this may explain the subsequent abandonment of the mega-sites. The results indicate that increases in social complexity need not be associated with greater social stratification and that large aggregations of population can, for a time at least, find mechanisms to reduce inequality.
Throughout history, dictators have constructed secret police agencies to neutralize rivals and enforce social order. But the same agencies can become disloyal and threatening. This book explores how eight communist regimes in Cold War Europe confronted this dilemma. Divergent strategies caused differences in regimes of repression, with consequences for social order and political stability. Surviving the shock of Josef Stalin's death, elites in East Germany and Romania retained control over the secret police. They grew their coercive institutions to effectively suppress dissent via surveillance and targeted repression. Elsewhere, ruling coalitions were thrown into turmoil after Stalin's death, changing personnel and losing control of the security apparatus. Post-Stalinist transitions led elites to restrict the capacity of the secret police and risk social disorder. Using original empirical analysis that is both rigorous and rich in fascinating detail, Henry Thomson brings new insights into the darkest corners of authoritarian regimes.
The deposition of intentionally damaged metal artefacts within burials and hoards is a phenomenon attested in areas as disparate as Ireland and the Caucasus during the Bronze and Iron Ages. While ritual significance is often attributed to such damage in burial contexts, the intentions behind the inclusion of damaged objects in hoards remain enigmatic. This article synthesises evidence for the intentional destruction of metal artefacts from 70 sites in the territory of modern Georgia and analyses patterns of deliberate damage over time and space. The study of these damaged artefacts enhances our understanding of ritual practice at a local level and locates the south Caucasus within the wider networks of this phenomenon.
This chapter documents the restrictive conditions under which rightwing, traditionalist populism managed to destroy democracy in Europe. Only Victor Orban of Hungary (2010-present) and Recep Erdogan of Turkey (2003-present) have accomplished this feat because they benefited from the institutional openness of parliamentary systems and faced an acute, severe crisis in the economy. This massive problem discredited the established parties, so the two populist leaders won clear parliamentary majorities, succeeded in dismantling the remaining checks and balances, and established authoritarianism. In the absence of a crisis and a reliable parliamentary majority, by contrast, Polish populists have tried to push aside institutional constraints through para-legal maneuvers, but have provoked substantial domestic and international pushback, which has defended democracy. Moreover, several populists in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, who did not encounter conjunctural, resolvable economic crises, did not manage to still their power hunger and asphyxiate democracy. Facing similar conditions, Silvio Berlusconi in Italy (1994, 2001–2006, 2008–2011) left democracy intact as well.
In 2023, prospection of a dried-out lake near Papowo Biskupie in north-central Poland identified substantial deposits of bronze artefacts. Excavation revealed further deposits and dozens of human skeletons that date from 1000–400 BC, suggesting that the site held particular significance as a place for sacrificial offerings in the Lusatian culture.
How did the homesteads and reservations of the Prairies of Western North America influence German colonization, ethnic cleansing and genocide in Eastern Europe? Max Sering, a world-famous agrarian settlement expert, stood on the Great Plains in 1883 and saw Germany's future in Eastern Europe: a grand scheme of frontier settlement. Sering was a key figure in the evolution of Germany's relationship with its eastern frontier, as well as in the overall transformation of the German Right from the Bismarckian 1880s to the Hitlerian 1930s. 'Inner colonization' was the settlement of farmers in threatened borderland areas within the nation's boundaries. Focusing on this phenomenon, Frontiers of Empire complicates the standard thesis of separation between the colonizing country and the colonized space, and blurs the typical boundaries between colonizer and colonized subjects. This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be available Open Access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details.
The processes of post-socialist transformation, especially large-scale migration from Eastern Europe to the Western hemisphere, are creating an ‘expansion of space’ from the local to the supra-local. This process involves the expansion of personal-, familial- and friendship-based networking practices which acquire significance as transnational mobile livelihoods and as significant dimensions of urban dynamics in global cities like Chicago. What are the networks, attachments and social bonds of Eastern European migrants in Chicago? Ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Chicago in 2013 among recent Lithuanian immigrants brought out the importance of a cultural identity of East European-ness involving contested loyalties and limited integration. While living locally, Lithuanian immigrants are expected both to be bound to the ethnic community and to be immersed in the multicultural life-style of the mega city. However the research has shown that livelihoods and social relations among ‘one's own people’ are involved in trans-ethnic networks and that the bonds of intimacy and the alliances among ‘one's own people’ run through homeland roots and patrimonial linkages rather than through the citizenship loyalties of the state (the United States and/or Lithuania). The circle of ‘one's own people’ implies extensive reciprocity and social networking among ‘friends’ and co-workers based on ‘one's own resourcefulness’ a kind of social capital. Thus, ‘sharing important acquaintances’ ought to involve ‘doing favours’ and livelihood experiences transplanted from oversees are practised in Chicago as ‘local’ life-styles and are used for transnational networking, securing in the process the social status of those involved.
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Part III
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Intersections: National(ist) Synergies and Tensions with Other Social, Economic, Political, and Cultural Categories, Identities, and Practices
Developing “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” is one of the purposes of the United Nations Organization, as stated in the founding charter of 1945. The principle of self-determination has even become a right through the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (December 1960). The Declaration states that: “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” Self-determination has thus entered international law. Strangely enough, however, nowhere are the bearers of this right defined: who are the peoples entitled to claim self-determination? This omission is not there by chance. Indeed, the definition of peoplehood is far from evident. Should a people be defined on a territorial basis, i.e. include all the population living within a given territory delimited by given boundaries?
We analyze financial literacy regarding interest rates, inflation, and risk diversification in nine Eastern European countries based on survey data collected in the fall 2022. The percentage of individuals with an understanding of all three concepts is generally low but varies strongly among countries, from 13 percent in Romania to 47 percent in the Czech Republic. Financial illiteracy is particularly acute among those with primary or lower secondary education. Among the three concepts, inflation is what people know best in eight out of nine countries – a pattern which has emerged recently and is in contrast to other countries, where interest rate literacy is highest. Differences in lifetime inflation experience, in particular experience of high or hyperinflation, affect inflation literacy. Higher financial literacy is associated with a higher propensity to save and a lower propensity to be financially vulnerable in six out of nine countries.
Scholars frequently portray the end of the Habsburg Monarchy as driven by nationalist revolutions in the provinces. The experience of the Jiu Valley, Transylvania’s largest coal basin, demonstrates that nationalism was neither the only basis for revolution nor the most popular in all parts of the province. The multiethnic working class of Jiu embraced revolution as a response to state failures to provide basic services in a worsening wartime economy, even as state demand for coal rose. The miners created the Black Diamond Republic in October 1918 as Austro-Hungarian armies collapsed in an effort to actively negotiate their status after the war. The miners embraced revolution not as a bid for independence or ethnic secession but as a means to maintain local union power and negotiate the conditions of their inclusion in either Romania or Hungary. While “Romanian” and “Hungarian” councils were formed, such identities in Jiu were also linked to occupation (worker, peasant, or intellectual) rather than clear definitions of ethnicity.
In the 1990s, three Scandinavian news media companies, Bonnier, Kinnevik, and Schibsted, internationalized their newspapers. Despite doing this during the same period, competing in the same industry and institutional environment, being exposed to the same opportunities by the opening of the Eastern European markets, and all belonging to a smaller language area, they differed in their internationalization models as well as in their outcomes. Despite initial successes, Bonnier and Kinnevik eventually discontinued their newspapers in the new markets, in many cases following significant losses, while Schibsted fared better. The main explanation for using different internationalization models was differences in business models, basically striving to do business internationally in a similar way as domestically. That is, they did not choose a specific internationalization model but sought to simply expand their business models internationally. Consequently, this article finds that when researching internationalization, more focus should be placed on business models.
While many international lawyers are familiar with Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546), very few have even heard of Paulus Vladimiri (1370–1435) – a Polish priest and jurist who made striking similar arguments to Vitoria on legal universality and the rights of non-Christians a full century before Vitoria. This divergence of consciousness, I argue, provides a unique opportunity to explore questions of canon, reception, and the role of ‘founding fathers’ within international legal thought. Centring Vladimiri as an ‘Eastern European’ figure, I argue that his non-reception is largely the result of how Eastern Europe implicitly functions as a distinctly liminal space within international legal thought that makes any possible ‘founding father’ from this region immensely difficult to imagine. I examine this dynamic through the differing postwar efforts of the Polish jurists Kazimierz Grzybowski and C. H. Alexandrowicz to include Vladimiri within the international legal canon. In examining the background structures of twentieth-century international law, I conclude that, in a manner directly connected to the liminality of Eastern Europe, neither Soviet nor Third World nor Western imaginations could easily receive Vladimiri within their fundamentally political narratives of normative order that shaped their international legal approaches. However, despite this historic non-reception, I argue that Vladimiri, and the question of Eastern Europe more generally, holds great promise in our current global moment. Particularly, engaging Eastern Europe’s liminal character offers a more sociologically grounded alternative to the reductionist Schmittian view of international law as a product of inescapable conflict in a world of exclusionary ‘greater spaces’.
Declines in rents do not always lead to civil war but may facilitate a pathway towards democracy in societies that tend to have a stock of preexisting institutions that more equitably share government resources with opposition groups. This chapter probes the effect of increases and decreases on patterns of democracy, dictatorship, and civil war in non-Muslim societies, primarily in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Countries in these regions tend to exhibit institutions that share resources more equitably relative to Muslim societies. Using case studies and corroborative statistical analysis, the chapter shows that increases in rents in Latin America and Eastern Europe strengthened authoritarian governance, but when rents decline these societies experience relatively peaceful transitions to democracy. The analysis in this chapter provides an important set of “negative cases” (relative to Muslim societies that experienced conquest) that a decline in rents do not necessarily lead to violence.