Finally, Chapter 6 reads the main findings about trilogues in the light of the democratic principles set out in the Treaties. In particular, the chapter argues that trilogues offer an important democratic contribution because they put compromise at the very heart of the European legislative process. Compromise, through its practice of mutual concessions, is arguably the best means to approximate two constitutional requirements: equality and representation – or, better put, the aspiration to democratic equality in a system of representative institutions. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the existence and prevalence of trilogues reveal the EU’s structural closeness to those polities that belong to the model of “negotiation democracy.” This model was developed by Gerhard Lehmbruch with special reference to Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. The chapter argues that Lehmbruch’s model provides a fruitful basis for comparative research and a solid foundation for understanding the EU.

This chapter discusses the study’s main findings and their broader theoretical implications for how we understand the role of parties and partisanship in democratic accountability and representation. It contributes to ongoing debates about the various functions that parties serve, the changing relationship between parties and voters, and the development of partisanship in new democracies. The chapter concludes by illustrating the theory’s relevance and plausibility in other new democracies as well as for new parties in more established democracies.

In this chapter, I argue that international criminal law institutions must satisfy two criteria to justify their claim to legitimate authority. First, they need to ensure fair trials. But while fairness is a necessary condition for the legitimate authority of the international exercise of criminal justice, it is not a sufficient condition. Institutions need to answer the subordination complaint: When some rule, others are subordinated to their rule – and the point of legitimate institutions is to address how this fact can be reconciled with the equal status of persons. An adequate way to respond to the subordination complaint is to vest institutions with democratic procedures that ensure equal control over the coercive rule of an institution. In the final part of chapter five, I highlight two strategies that enable states and individuals to exercise equal control over the court. The first strategy involves a legislative assembly that deliberates and decides on questions of criminal justice and institutional design. The second strategy seeks to make judicial lawmaking, where it is inevitable, more accountable to the public.

In the context of current environmental crises, which threaten to seriously harm living conditions for future generations, liberal–capitalist democracies have been accused of inherent short-termism, that is, of favouring the currently living at the expense of mid- to long-term sustainability. This chapter reviews some of the reasons for this short-termism as well as proposals as to how best to represent future people in today’s democratic decision-making. It then presents some ideas of the author as to how to reconceive the idea of democracy and the responsibilities of citizenship in the face of increasing obligations to sustain both the environment and democratic institutions for future people. The chapter argues that taking turns between governing and governed is a key dimension of democracy, and that it implies in-principle consent to others governing after our turn, including future generations. Thus, future people must be better represented than they generally are today, in particular when democratic institutions find themselves squeezed between an overburdened environment in which they are embedded, and a fast-paced and short-termist globalising economy.

There is currently a resurgence of interest in political parties. This resurgent interest embraces a minimalist definition of political party, according to which any group that competes in elections and receives a handful of votes qualifies as a party. Parties, however, are expected to contribute to democratic representation, and the party politics literature has extensively shown that many “parties” do not fulfill this expectation. Entities that exhibit some but not all of the features that define political parties can be considered diminished subtypes of the category. A thorough conceptualization of diminished subtypes could improve the analytical value of the study of political parties and of other forms of electoral political organizations. In this introduction to the edited volume, we propose a new political party typology that includes diminished subtypes. The typology is based on the presence or absence of two primary attributes: horizontal coordination of ambitious politicians during electoral campaigns and while in office and vertical aggregation to electorally mobilize collective interests and to intermediate and channel collective demands.

This final chapter of the edited volume summarizes each case study’s main contributions. It also provides comparative insights concerning the determinants of the presence or absence of a given type of electoral vehicle. Finally, the chapter discusses how the volume’s conceptual framework can advance our understanding of the processes of party building, institutionalization, decay, and collapse.