Jan KlabbersThis epilogue takes stock of the volume and sketches some of the ramifications: if the vacuum assumption (i.e. international organizations only interact with their member states) no longer holds, assuming it ever did, then what? The author proposes that international organizations are better seen as political and economic actors in their own right. They may be given a function upon establishment, but usually develop a certain autonomy. This renders them closer to administrative agencies and offers a more realistic foundation on which to build further legal thought – and thus might be able to take third parties into account.

This chapter explores the role of law in organizational interaction. In contrast with recent work on international institutional law that seeks to overcome functionalism and make legal sense of interaction, this chapter argues that interaction among international organizations is a legally constituted phenomenon, in two specific senses. First, law constitutes the space of the interaction (that is, the ‘organizational ecosystem’). Second, law provides the background norms for organizational autonomy and the vocabulary for the decoupling of the organization’s practice and its formal goals. Such a decoupling through institutional law allows international organizations to flexibly interact with each other and adapt to external pressures. Thus, in its dual role, international law provides the building blocks of interaction, playing a crucial role before the need to ‘regulate’ interaction even appears.

This chapter lays out the ways in which Hans Christian Ørsted (1777–1851) influenced the development of the concept of thought experiment. Ernst Mach (1838–1916) is currently more often credited with laying the foundations of contemporary views, and he is sometimes thought to have been little (if at all) influenced by Ørsted. Against these standard accounts, I will show that Ørsted’s and Mach’s descriptions have key features in common. Both thinkers hold that thought experiments: (1) are a method of variation, (2) require the experimenter’s free activity, and (3) are useful in educational contexts for guiding students to arrive at certain conclusions on their own (i.e., to genuinely appropriate new concepts). The process of variation is guided by the search for invariants, some of which do not directly appear in experience. Since it is important that teachers and students be able to bring the same ideal objects to mind, thought experiments play a key role for both Ørsted and Mach in math education. While Ørsted’s emphasis on the role of thought experiments in math has been proposed as a reason why his descriptions are not relevant for contemporary use of thought experiments, I will show how their role in mathematical thinking – stemming from Kant’s descriptions of the method of construction in geometry – are part of a wider account of thought experiments that encompasses their role in the sciences and also philosophy.

Kierkegaard and Ørsted were not just contemporaries but personally knew each other. In this chapter, I argue that Kierkegaard probably learned the term Tankeexperiment from Ørsted. This chapter contextualizes Kierkegaard’s use of “imaginary construction” (Experiment) in his work as a whole, including his well-known uses of paradoxes. I will show how the core elements of Ørsted’s account – thought experiment as a method of variation, the need for free and active constitution, and the use of thought experiments for facilitating genuine thought – are echoed in Kierkegaard’s discussions. Along the way, I will describe some decisions on how to translate Experiment and Tankeexperiment that are unfortunate in some ways and fortuitous in others, as I will explain. In these ways, Kierkegaard indirectly takes up Kant’s proposal that “construction” (i.e., Experiment in Danish) is a means of achieving cognition.

Traditional pastoral practices have maintained Alpine grasslands over thousands of years, and Alpine biodiversity now depends on these practices. Grasslands are also central to the identity of pastoral communities: They are biocultural landscapes. Across the Alps, these landscapes are now threatened by high rates of agricultural land abandonment as traditional, labor-intensive agricultural methods become uneconomic, and small-scale development increases. The Autonomous Province of Bozen/Bolzano-South Tyrol, Italy, experiences some of the lowest rates of land abandonment and high rates of grassland retention. The case study explores the functions of regulatory intervention and coordination, two of the regulatory functions advanced by this book’s CIRCle Framework of regulatory functions for addressing cumulative environmental problems. It investigates how a diverse set of regulatory interventions provides for maintaining and restoring grasslands in South Tyrol, and how diverse forms of coordination – links between areas of laws, coordinating institutions, and dispute resolution processes – facilitate implementation in a context of deep multilevel governance.

The Feyerabend lectures on natural right is Kant’s first clear statement of a view on punishment that balances retributivist and deterrence concerns. Kant’s earlier views, shown by other course lectures on ethics, were largely focused on deterrence. As Kant developed his view of human autonomy, he shifted his reasoning about punishment to include concern for the honor and dignity of the victim as well as the criminal, including right of criminals to be treated no worse than they treated others.

This chapter introduces the vision of contract law adopted in this book, based on two concentric spheres: an inner sphere encompasses an economic realm rooted in values such as freedom and sanctity of contract, reflecting a non-interventionist approach that can accommodate imbalanced transactions and an outer sphere shaped by public policy concerns, which embodies social values such as the protection of relational autonomy and human dignity. The chapter justifies the structure of the book, the choice of legal frameworks examined, as well as the relevance of this study for disability equality and contract legal research.

This chapter highlights the interconnection between economic and social values in the contractual realm, rooted in a perception of people as holder of rights and a broad interpretation of autonomy and human dignity that looks beyond individualistic values. With a focus on grossly asymmetrical contracts, it promotes an understanding of vulnerability in the contractual context based on the circumstances of the transaction, rather than on people’s medical conditions. The chapter reflects on the merits and drawbacks of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) as a potential benchmark for promoting a vision of contract law that responds to both economic and social concerns and recognises the equality of all human beings. The second part considers how English contract law could be brought closer to the equality vision promoted by the UNCRPD, proposing an understanding of the contractual realm based on concentric economic and social spheres, shaped by fluid boundaries, and reflecting on the relevance of contract law as part of a broader set of measures to ensure a fairer society.

This chapter brings together the idea of bridges between economic and social concerns. The discussion reinforces the need to recognise the outer sphere of contracting in holding these connections together, recognising the role of contract law in protecting both economic values (including freedom and sanctity of contract) and social values (including relational autonomy and human dignity). A suggested path to succeed in these endeavours is to embrace the idea of complementarity in contract law, which enables us to accept the coexistence of ideas that may appear, initially, to be mutually exclusive. The idea of complementarity in contract law enables us to see economic and social values not as antagonistic, but as coexisting parts of interconnected spheres.

The human being is freely ‘self-determined’ rather than determined through some external authority (whether theological or teleological). This dichotomy conveniently expresses the usual understanding of modern political thought’s divergence from preceding tradition. By comparison, pre-modernity is teleological, anthropomorphic, realist; in a word, naïve – with its substantively rational nature, dictating essential ends to which we are subject. These received truths are past due for a re-examination. Just how naïve or dogmatic was the Greek understanding of freedom and nature? In this chapter, I argue that Plato’s view of man as naturally political is more complex and multivalent than our historical categorizations allow. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which, for him, politics does indeed depend upon a natural model. That model, however, is the Idea of the Good. And here, where Plato seems furthest from us, lies his greatest challenge to contemporary understandings of nature and freedom.

In this chapter, I argue that a comprehensive picture of Platonic autonomy must be balanced by attention to mutual interdependence and the ways that ideas arise through interpersonal dialogue. Philosophical ideas arise in a social context, and to this degree, even ideas that are now ‘my own’ have come to be mine in part through the reasoning of other persons. Moreover, as a result of human fallibility, even the fully developed Platonic philosopher still requires conversational partners to both learn and to test out ideas. Rather than overvaluing self-sufficiency, a philosophical life includes being open to challenges to one’s ideas, tolerating a state of not knowing fully, and learning that one needs others due to the limits of individual reasoners.

This chapter analyzes the Republic’s theory of the tripartite soul regarding the question of self-rule and autonomy. Only when the soul is in the ideal position of having reason positioned as sovereign ruler can a person be seen as acting autonomously. But it is not clear that when reason rules, it also motivates actions. Christine M. Korsgaard has argued that personal decision-making should be seen as analogous to political decision-making. She conceives of political decisions as a process where requests for action spring from the people, while rulers suffice to say yes or no. This chapter claims that this analysis is inadequate as a theory of how Plato portrays the relationship between the parts of the soul and of decision-making in general, and offers an alterantive interpreation in terms of what is called the Complex Model of Decision-Making.

The third bridge is explored in chapter five and focuses on the connection between constitutional values and private law. The analysis concentrates on the values of autonomy and human dignity and their interplay with the principle of freedom of contract in English contract law. The discussion also reflects on the link between the UNCRPD, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, and English contract law, and suggests that rather than looking for a seamless bridge that links the UNCRPD directly with English contract law, we should look for steppingstones connecting the UNCRPD, the ECHR, the HRA and domestic private law. This chapter also discusses the values of participation and inclusion, with a focus on the idea of influence vulnerability explored in the previous chapter, and reflects on the need to enhance the influence of persons with disabilities and DDPOs in shaping legislative developments in English law, including consumer contract law.