Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 November 2025
This is an account of Kant’s understanding of the conditions of the possibility of willing in general. Kant’s definition of the will as “a capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws” is analyzed at length, and I argue that this capacity is present not only in maxim-making but also in the making of judgments regarding how the world works imbedded in hypothetical imperatives. I provide a discussion of the nature of hypothetical imperatives, their relation to maxims, and their relation to the categorical imperative. The chapter concludes with a defense of Kant’s derivation of the categorical imperative from its mere concept, highlighting the central role played by the concept of autonomy in it. The upshot of this chapter is that the use of the higher faculty of intelligence must be present if the will is to operative at all.
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