This chapter establishes that the Gospel and Epistles of John do not share a common author, highlighting differences in their reception histories, linguistic features, and ideas.

If we go by editions of the Annales, Ennius included a series of striking self-references in his epic. These lines’ nature, number (or rate of survival), and their proximity to self-referential comments made by prose historians make them extraordinary in the context of epic. Thus, they shape our sense of the ambitions the Annales housed and the sorts of generic experimentation its author was prepared to engage in. Ennius’ reference to his advanced age, unparalleled in the epic tradition as we know it, is securely attested for one of the later books of the epic. But often, Ennian self-referential lines are not attributed to a specific work by their sources. Like other lines now conventionally assigned to the Annales, these lines could plausibly have originated in a different Ennian work. In particular, the Saturae present themselves as the most likely candidate. This chapter explores the range of possibilities allowable for Ennian self-references beyond the Annales and sketches the difference that reading this subset of lines in non-epic Ennian contexts would make.

This chapter examines the moral foundations of personality-based justifications for intellectual property, emphasizing the alignment of intellectual works with individual autonomy and self-expression. Unlike utilitarian or labor-desert arguments, the personality-based approach views intellectual property as an extension of the creator’s personality, granting moral claims over divulgation, attribution, integrity, and withdrawal. A central wrong-making feature of violating the rights of attribution and integrity is that, in the typical case, a form of misrepresentation or fraud occurs. Additionally, it is argued that creators have a justified right to control downstream uses of their intellectual works, rooted in autonomy, free speech, and the prevention of misrepresentation or fraud. Along with considering various challenges, a contractarian framework is adopted that promotes legislative protections safeguarding the dignity, autonomy, and expressive freedoms of creators.

How we use dialogue to develop character and advance plot. Overcoming anxiety about dialogue; the dangers of avoiding dialogue. Reported speech lacks energy; dialogue enlivens a scene. Dialogue reveals character, indicates relationship and conveys information, but has to appear authentic. Strong dialogue combines multiple functions. Punctuating and attributing dialogue; adverbs qualifying tone.

Covers interpersonal interaction, attribution, arousal, social contagion, and retrieval-induced forgetting.

Syntactic phrases can be used as the base in word-formation, and can be used attributively in a construction which is usually taken to be a compound. While the syntactic phrases are often familiar or citations, neither is necessary. The syntax appears to be subject to some restrictions, which suggest that word-formation is involved rather than pure syntax.

A number of factors must be considered when reflecting on State responsibility and they are assessed in this chapter. First, what constitutes an internationally wrongful act for which a State may be responsible? Second, what conduct may be attributed to the State? Third, what reparation must a State make in the event it is held responsible for a wrongful act? Fourth, what defences might be available to a State that would preclude a finding of wrongfulness? Related issues such as diplomatic protection, nationality of claims, and the exhaustion of local remedies are also considered in this chapter.

Chapter 17 delves into one of the most challenging aspects of climate litigation: attributing climate change impacts to specific actors or actions. The author explores how courts and quasi-judicial bodies grapple with the scientific complexities of attribution. In particular, she analyses how these legal bodies assess and weigh the scientific evidence, navigate the inherent uncertainties, and determine the legal relevance of attribution findings in climate cases. Through a detailed review of key climate cases from around the world, the author uncovers a variety of approaches to the issue of attribution. These cases highlight the diverse legal strategies employed by litigants to establish the causal links necessary for liability and the evolving understanding of courts in grappling with scientific complexities. In distilling emerging best practice, the author identifies instances where courts have acknowledged the collective and cumulative nature of climate harms, accepted partial attribution as a basis for liability, and applied innovative legal doctrines to overcome attribution-related challenges.

If, at the beginning of the twentieth century, thanks also to the influential works of Triepel and Anzilotti, the law of state responsibility came to be regarded as a distinct field, it was only in the period between the two world wars that this area of international law became the object of an intense scientific debate. The present contribution aims to assess the development of the law of state responsibility until 1945 by focusing on the events that provided a major impulse for this development, on the attempt at codification, on the case law of international courts and tribunals, and on the new general theories developed by authors such as Strupp, Kelsen, Lauterpacht, Eagleton and Ago. While the contribution aims to deal comprehensively with the law of state responsibility and its development in the period under consideration, particular emphasis will be placed on three issues: the problems associated with attribution of wrongful conduct; the consequences of international responsibility, and in particular the debate over the role of sanctions against wrongful conduct – the early signs of the emergence of a multilateral dimension of state responsibility.

This chapter asks two questions, although it is the second which is crucial. You may be tempted to scratch your head: after all, the theme of this book is Our Changing Climate, and we have referred to the rise in atmospheric CO2 content over the past century, and the rise in temperature over the past 75 years, multiple times. So, aren’t these self-answering questions? No. Firstly, scientists do not stop at self-answering questions: they delve deeper. But the key reason is that global average surface temperature is only the most reported evidence of a changing climate. In this chapter we will dive into AR6 in order to find many more indicators of a changing climate. We will also interrogate our CMIP6 simulations to see if we really do understand the science behind such changes. That is to say, how much of the change(s) can we attribute to human actions?

This chapter reveals the gap between the legal assumption that corporations and governments are formally separated and the reality of deep interdependence between governments and corporations in colonial settings, analyzing how this situation provided private business corporations with the legal infrastructure they needed to leverage their position to thrive in the colonization of Africa. It then explores related doctrines of international law – —diplomatic protection, human rights, and investment protection – —as additional aspects of the the international legal infrastructure that protected corporate actors from responsibilities while granting them significant benefits as individual rights bearers. This chapter chronicles the lingering presence and influence of international law on the regulatory options available for corporations operating both within and outside state borders.

This Chapter focuses on governmental use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) to evade the law of state responsibility, using offering as a case study of Russia’s deployment of a shadowy corporation known as the Wagner Group as a case study. The cChapter then suggests ways in which we might rethink the law of state responsibility in order to respond to the increasing threat of this sort of hybrid warfare. Drawing from scholarship on global legal pluralism, the cChapter argues for a less formalist and more functionalist analysis of the law of state responsibility. I I n the context of hybrid war, formalist conceptions of the state allow governments such as Russia to skirt state responsibility solely because there may be no formal contract between Russia and a PMSC such as the Wagner Group. One possible response then is to reinterpret Article 8 of the Articles of State Responsibility so that it looks at the real functional ties between a state actor and a PMSC, along with the “governmentality” of the function the PMSC performs.

As state ownership of private firms grows, morphs, and globalizes, states increasingly channel their influence through the financialized markets. The ensuing merger of the state’s commercial and sovereign roles suggests that state ownership is, again, becoming a vector of sovereign authority. This chapter analyzes the international legal system that has developed around surging state ownership. It suggests that the legal construction of distinctive “shareholder identities” in international economic law plays a key role in this complex regulatory matrix. Specifically, the chapter focuses on how arbitral tribunals adjudicating claims arising from international investment treaties use attribution, a doctrine of customary international law, in creating, maintaining, and disciplining state shareholders. Arbitral tribunals use the analytical category of the state shareholder in order to delineate and construct state and company identities and to understand the economic, political, and legal implications of those identities in the the global economy. Accordingly, the interactions between substantive international economic law and the law of state responsibility form important, but underappreciated, elements of this constitutive process, which comes to affect the institutional design of state shareholding and disincentivize hands-on control over state-owned entities.

This volume offers a new point of entry into enduring questions about how the law conceives of states and firms. Because states and firms are fictitious constructs rather than products of evolutionary biology, the law dictates which acts should be attributed to each entity, and by which actors. Those legal decisions construct firms and states by attributing identity and consequences to them. As the volume shows, these legal decisions are often products of path dependence or conceptual metaphors like “personhood” that have expanded beyond their original uses. Focusing on attribution allows the volume to consider together an array of questions about artificial entities that are usually divided into doctrinal siloes. These include questions about attribution of international legal responsibility to states and state-owned entities, transnational attribution of liabilities to firms, and attribution of identity rights to corporations. Taken together, the book highlights the artificiality of doctrines that construct firms and states, and therefore their susceptibility to change.