This section draws on previous chapters to compare Zimbabwe to other resource-wealthy states in Southern Africa, particularly Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia. In all these states, resource sector policy has been essential to these states’ historical and institutional development. However, this chapter looks at how, even given many advantages and a level of development that was once ahead of these states regarding state capacity and democratization, Zimbabwe has fallen distinctly behind these other states. An overview of the resource sector shows that timing matters as other resource sectors are far more institutionalized than Zimbabwe and, while often leaving much to be desired, have not led to the same level of institutional and political decline. While these other states have had many of the same challenges and have had extreme difficulties, Zimbabwe has nonetheless been at the far end of the bell curve when it comes to resource curse dynamics.

This chapter introduces the central puzzle of this study: why, in contrast to other states in Southern Africa, have Zimbabwean democratic institutions stagnated or even declined since independence in 1980? To begin to answer this question, an overview of the resource sector in Zimbabwe, particularly the large diamond found in 2006, and the development of institutions since Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, is given. Furthermore, an institutional analysis, a brief overview of past studies, and a research design are outlined. In terms of case selection, Zimbabwe is placed in the overall population of cases when it comes to resource curse dynamics, and the concept of the “opaque” state is defined. Furthermore, Zimbabwe is defined in terms of democratization and state capacity, concepts that will be used throughout the study.

This chapter draws on past theories of ownership structure in the oil sector and applies them to the alluvial diamond sector in Zimbabwe. The alluvial diamond sector in Zimbabwe presents a natural experiment for understanding ownership structure in that the state and ruling party have been the same since 2006. Still, at least six different ownership regimes have been attempted. This chapter traces each of these and examines how the unpredictability of ownership in the diamond sector has often led to large-scale diamond smuggling and a regulatory framework reflective of political dynamics. The unpredictability of ownership has, in and of itself, caused difficulty in the Zimbabwean diamond sector and has reflected the unpredictability of state institutions. Thus, this chapter argues that past approaches that have been developed to examine the oil sector of states have some relevance for states that have a large amount of alluvial diamond wealth. However, the unique ability for a large amount of diamond wealth to be smuggled into a small space has made the significant increase in diamond wealth since 2006 a challenge for the formal economy and state capacity.

This chapter focuses on past literature on resource-wealthy countries and examines how alluvial diamond wealth may present unique challenges for states. State theory is discussed, and the “opaque” state concept is compared and contrasted with these. Then, an overview of different arguments that have been made to explain the relative decline of Zimbabwean institutions is given. Most of these can fall into three central categories: the psychology of leaders in ZANU-PF, the failure of economic policy, and external sanctions. The large diamond find in eastern Zimbabwe in 2006 is presented as a “critical juncture” for Zimbabwean institutions. Thus, this chapter places Zimbabwe in the overall population of cases when it comes to resource wealth and compares and contrasts how past approaches to resource politics, which have heavily focused on the oil sector, provide a roadmap for examining alluvial diamond wealth. However, this research must also be built upon as different resources, particularly a rapid increase in alluvial diamond wealth in the case of Zimbabwe, bring various challenges to state capacity and democratization.

The chapter seeks to understand how the 2030 Agenda expressed through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate urbanism reconfigure urban planning and related processes in Zimbabwe. As discourses of climate change and sustainability have gained traction, urban planning plays a critical role in achieving carbon-free societies. Through the case study of three Zimbabwean cities (Harare, Bulawayo and Gweru), the chapter aims to highlight opportunities and challenges presented to urban planning by Agenda 2030. The chapter employs primary and secondary data sources to understand how urban planning in Africa, and particularly in Zimbabwe, is being shaped by the climate discourse. As such, the chapter contends that there is a seemingly discernible paradigm shift in terms of urban planning processes in Zimbabwe, which seems to be drifting towards a multilateral planning vision dominated by climate-centred urban planning policies. It must be noted that climate-centred urbanisation will be useful in future in curbing and dealing with pandemics like COVID-19. However, it should be noted that climate-centred urban planning processes seem to be more abstract thinking than operationalisation. Finally, the chapter suggests ways to promote a pragmatic shift from abstract thinking to operationalisation of climate-friendly urban planning.

The anti-colonial struggle staged in Zimbabwe against repressive British colonial rule depicted a liberation for equality, freedom and democracy. If Zimbabwe regularly held elections to choose alternative leaders from different political parties in different elections, allowing winners of a free and fair election to assume office; and in turn the winners of one election did not prevent the same competitive uncertainty from prevailing in the next election, the country would be democratic. However, there is no equivalence between elections and democracy. The minimalist conception of democracy is the indispensable institutional characteristic of electoral competition and its uncertainty. The maximalist notion requires extra-electoral imperatives for democracy to fully flourish, incorporating a wide range of types of institutions, processes and conditions to be present for a nation to be called a full democracy. Widespread election violence in 1980 dented Zimbabwe’s opportunity to develop ideal democratic cultures that embrace electoral democracy, government accountability and the rule of law. Post-war political, dissident and election violence proved to be Zimbabwe’s greatest political problem early on. Election and political violence, mhirizhonga or udlakela, largely amongst the Ndebele and Shona was a major concern characterised by intimidation, harassment, vandalism and murders.