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This Element reviews the varieties of capitalism approach (VoC) first developed by Hall and Soskice and subsequent extensions to emerging markets. The author suggests that by reinvigorating existing ideal types and creating new ones through an analysis of its five variables in a variety of countries VoC can be used to evaluate the viability of economic reforms across a wide range of countries. He argues that governments should base changes on lessons from other countries belonging to their ideal type. This Element illustrates the utility of VoC in understanding how reforms will differ across countries by examining how the future of work is likely to differ across nations depending on the degree to which the five institutions explored in this approach promote the standardization of tasks. It analyzes how these institutions shape degrees of standardization in the United States, Germany, and Brazil, offering suggestions for reforms in each of them.
The experience of industry policy in the wider Asian region contrasts significantly with many of the neoliberal policy prescriptions prevalent in Australia today. Using the automotive industry as a comparative case study, this article compares industry policy in three demographic and geographic giants of the region: China, India and Indonesia. China’s dominant position has benefited from a highly ‘interventionist’ industry policy which places strict conditions on foreign carmakers in joint ventures. This policy has also influenced the emergence of a thriving domestic industry, with state-owned enterprises leading the way. While India has also emerged as a major auto producer, its industry policy has moved away from the joint venture model since the 1990s, with fully foreign-owned operations now playing a much bigger role. In contrast, Indonesia retains a version of the joint venture model while local industry is dominated by Japanese capital. The record of industry policy in these countries challenges the idea that more ‘liberal’ economic systems lead to stronger domestic industries or firms.
This Element argues that the low dynamism of low- to mid-income Arab economies is explained with a set of inter-connected factors constituting a 'segmented market economy'. These include an over-committed and interventionist state with limited fiscal and institutional resources; deep insider-outsider divides among firms and workers that result from and reinforce wide-ranging state intervention; and an equilibrium of low skills and low productivity that results from and reinforces insider-outsider divides. These mutually reinforcing features undermine encompassing cooperation between state, business and labor. While some of these features are generic to developing countries, others are regionally specific, including the relative importance and historical ambition of the state in the economy and, closely related, the relative size and rigidity of the insider coalitions created through government intervention. Insiders and outsiders exist everywhere, but the divisions are particularly stark, immovable and consequential in the Arab world.
This Chapter demonstrates that institutional investors have become an important vector in China’s autochthonous corporate governance model, which can no longer be ignored. To accurately understand the role of institutional investors in Chinese corporate governance and how effective they are in improving corporate governance in China, these developments must be understood on their own terms – in China’s unique political-economic context in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has ultimate control. The same is true for understanding how Chinese companies and institutional investors fit into the CCP’s broad-based campaigns to address social inequality and improve the environment. The Chapter concludes that to see these developments as part of a UK-inspired ‘global shareholder stewardship’ movement, would make Western pundits seem like the proverbial woman who only has a hammer and sees everything as a nail. In arriving at this conclusion this Chapter reveals how the CCP has actively and gradually promoted the growth of domestic institutional investors, in terms of types and size, through relaxation of policies and law reforms to improve corporate governance and stabilize the stock market, while limiting the influence of foreign institutional investors. It further analyzes all the Activist Campaigns undertaken by institutional investors in China and maps the network of government bodies, regulations, and tactics that the CCP has developed to directly and indirectly control State-Owned Institutional Investors (SOIIs) and Private-Owned Institutional Investors (POIIs) for the purpose of policy channelling.
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands have different historical patterns of industrialization, but developed similar patterns of industrial coordination and cooperation. Theories accounting for industrial relations systems (economic structure, power resources, and party/electoral systems) have difficulty accounting for the similarities among these cases. Therefore, we explore the historical depictions of labor appearing in literature to evaluate whether cross-national distinctions in cultural conceptions of labor have some correspondence to distinctions between coordinated and liberal industrial relations systems. We hypothesize that historical literary depictions of labor are associated with the evolution of industrial systems, and apply computational text analyses to large corpora of literary texts. We find that countries (Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands) with coordinated, corporatist industrial relations in the 20th century share similar cultural constructions about labor relations dating back to at least 1770. Literary depictions found in modern coordinated/corporatist countries are significantly different from those found in Britain, a country with liberal/pluralist industrial relations systems. The research has significance for our understanding of the role of culture in the evolution of modern political economies.
This paper looks at the position of CEOs in Dutch listed companies in the context of institutional change. Following up on discussions on Varieties of Capitalism and the contrasts between coordinated and liberal market economies, we explore the position of the CEO in the Netherlands in the second half of the twentieth century. On the basis of our database of Dutch CEOs, as well as an analysis of articles and published interviews, we show that the move toward a more liberal market economy had a clear impact on the position of CEOs and on the way their role was perceived. This paper highlights the importance of studying leaders in their historical context, with implications for the selection of future CEOs as they face increasing pressure on issues such as inequality and climate change.
Between 1985 and 2018, Brazilian economic well-being stagnated, with lackluster growth and regressive public policies destroying citizens’ life opportunities. There is considerable consensus about the sources of this low-level economic equilibrium, including low savings, low investment, and modest human capital improvements. Despite this consensus, and despite decades of reform, however, the overall institutional equilibrium changed only marginally. Drawing on the study of varieties of capitalism, this chapter describes how institutional complementarities drove actors’ incentives toward a collectively suboptimal equilibrium. Complementarities within and across five domains sustained the equilibrium: 1) the macroeconomy of a middle-income developmental state, 2) the microeconomy of firm organization; 3) the coalitional presidential political system; 4) the weak control mechanisms this political system set in place; and 5) an autonomous bureaucracy that permitted incremental reform but in consequence, may have moderated demands for more dramatic reforms while deepening fiscal constraints and impelling policymakers to preserve the tool kit of the developmental state.
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical contribution of the argument: Successful organizers rely on an understudied and remarkably effective approach – experiential tools – activities designed to attract participants by offering transformative experiences. Often wielded by politically mobilized creatives, experiential tools come in four types – events, social archives, neighbourhood tours, and performances – with the goal of making the protest site the place to be.The chapter sets experiential tools in the context of the literature on social movements. It also discusses the role of networks and prior protest experience in effective mobilization. The chapter moves on to discuss the second outcome of interest: protest impact. It argues that when protestors have allies in city council and competition between local and higher level executives, mobilization has policy impact. The legal system and the variety of capitalismin each country influences the strategies of protest organizers, with important differences between liberal and coordinate market economies.
Asian welfare capitalisms as well as advanced economies face the risks associated with globalization. In order to understand how Asian welfare capitalisms respond to globalization, it is essential to describe the institutional diversity of Asian welfare capitalisms and the welfare–risk nexus. This paper defines four types of Asian welfare capitalisms based on social spending data and investigates the welfare–risk nexus by focusing on globalization risks, such as a globalized production process, trade openness, and financial integration. The empirical results based on multiple factor analysis and cluster analysis clearly show that Asian welfare capitalisms are heterogeneous and that four clusters can be found in the welfare–risk nexus based on the dimensions present in Asian economies in the 2000s. This analysis stresses that globalization has different effects on these types of Asian welfare capitalisms according to their welfare–risk nexuses.
The economic decline of Italy between the mid-1990s and the outset of the financial crisis is a critical case in European political economy because its model of capitalism was deeply reformed at the time when its decline commenced. This paper argues that the Italian economic stagnation cannot be attributed to the lack of market-friendly reforms in a globalized economic context, as argued by previous literature. Instead, Italian economic decline is a consequence of institutional change which on the one hand has destroyed previous institutional complementarities, and on the other hand has led to an incoherent, or ‘hybrid,’ capitalist setting. Under the lenses of the Varieties of Capitalism approach, this paper reviews the main reforms in the fields of corporate governance and finance as well as in the labor market. It shows that such reforms established new institutions alternatively apt to support both strategic coordination and market coordination, resulting in institutional incoherence, and mixed incentives. In the short-run, incoherent reforms have reduced the availability of capital to SMEs; in the longer-run, they failed to give actors incentives to pursue innovation. This paper contributes theories of economic growth/decline focused on the supply-side of the economy and it is compatible with other – non-rival – explanations focused on the demand-side.
How do political economic institutions and different types of institutional complementarity in particular influence firm behavior? Existing studies do not offer much help in answering this question. In this research, we systematically connect institutional complementarity and its two distinct logics (the logic of reinforcement and the logic of compensation) to firm performance. Using a sample of more than fourteen thousand firms from twenty advanced industrial democracies, our empirical analysis finds that institutional complementarity is related to firm performance in a distinct way. That is, the different logics of institutional complementarity apply only to specific segments of the economy. While the logic of reinforcement works for small firms and labor-intensive firms, the logic of compensation favors large firms and capital-intensive firms. The empirical novelty of our research lies in offering a cross-national, firm-level and large-n analysis of institutional complementarity. Theoretically, our finding of firm heterogeneity helps in establishing the boundary conditions of institutional complementarity and hence advances the general understanding of the subject.
Business has been involved in cooperation with multilateral organizations through public-private partnerships (PPPs) since the late 1990s. With their adoption of the sustainable development goals (SDGs), multilateral institutions increasingly consider partnerships as a means to achieve their goals given their own limited implementation capacity. However, the global economic order has changed significantly since the first expansion of PPPs, particularly due to growing participation by non-western states and companies. This article asks how this shift has changed the eagerness to form partnerships, as well as their qualitative content. It analyzes the 3964 partnerships in the SDG partnership registry, focusing on the subset of them that includes business partners. We divide these into five groups: local implementation, resource mobilization, advocacy, policy, and operational partnerships. We study PPPs involving companies from different varieties of capitalism—private, market based forms, and state-led forms of capitalism. We find that PPPs are still dominated by companies and other actors from Western countries. Moreover, business participate more in U.S.- and Canadian-led partnerships than others. We also find strong differences regarding what category of PPPs that companies from different backgrounds engage in, and discuss the linkages between varieties of capitalism and PPP participation.
This article analyzes the prospects for globalizing the varieties of capitalism (voc) debate. It identifies and compares firm-centered, governance-centered, and state-centered approaches to extending the debate on capitalist diversity, and discusses the distinctive contributions of each approach as well as the trade-offs between them. The author draws on three agenda-setting volumes that engage with the voc framework and study capitalist diversity in three regions not usually covered by this literature: Latin America, East and Southeast Asia, and East Central Europe. As these regions play an increasingly important role in the world economy, this article examines what the books imply about the current state of knowledge about global voc. The author argues that the extension of the voc debate to these parts of the world is important for advancing the understanding of economic institutions; the approach can reinvigorate research on capitalist diversity and the institutional foundations of economic development in the current era of globalization.
The article traces the remains of the theory of “comparative institutional advantage”, which was crucial during the early development of the “varieties of capitalism” approach to economics but fell into oblivion quickly afterwards. It follows the discussions of the concept over time and works out possible reasons – theoretical, methodological, and discursive – for the theory's decay. In conclusion, many arguments of the theory seem outdated today but it is a great witness to the zeitgeist of comparative political economy and institutional theory of the millennium.
The auto industry is usually considered to be a global industry. Yet the majority of passenger cars are still manufactured and sold in industrialised states where its largest firms are headquartered. The central claim made is that despite the auto industry being comprised of multinational corporations, there are clear national differences in the motivations firms cite for environmental initiatives. US firms are more focused on traditional material factors, especially market forces. However, German and Japanese firms are more focused on social concerns and internally-driven strategies. They have more normative, non-market rationales for their environmental initiatives. By analysing what firms themselves say motivates them to improve the environmental performance of their products, via a qualitative analysis of recent environmental reports by German, US and Japanese firms, as well as interviews conducted with key personnel, the conclusion reached is as follows. While the question of ‘greenwashing’ versus real commitment to reduce the environmental impact of the industry's products remains relevant, the institutional basis of capitalist relations in their home state (i.e. their home state's variety of capitalism) suggests different nationally appropriate and conducive paths to environmental commitments.
This investigation of accounting standard setting as a case of business power in global governance links together three facets of power. First we examine the discursive power of international accounting standards in the ongoing process of financialization, which we break into two dynamics centered on profit and control. We argue that the selection of accounting paradigms does not concern measurement accuracy but is rather a choice of perspectives between finance and production when presenting economic reality as numbers. Drawing on evidence from the contestation between Rhenish capitalism and the financial perspective, we then explain why, despite the overwhelming structural power of finance, instrumental power exercised in political lobbying over accounting standards can still have considerable success.
The extant literature on cross-national differences in approaches to corporate social responsibility (CSR) has mostly focused on developed countries. Instead, we offer two inter-related studies into corporate codes of conduct issued by developing country multinational enterprises (DMNEs). First, we analyse code adoption rates and code content through a mixed methods design. Second, we use multilevel analyses to examine country-level drivers of differences in code content—specifically, elements of a country’s National Business System (NBS). We find that DMNEs are much more likely to adopt a code of conduct than their domestic counterparts; however, this does not translate into greater code comprehensiveness. We also find support for the ‘substitute view’ of CSR in developing countries, i.e. that MNEs from poorer countries and from countries with lower governance effectiveness tend to express more comprehensive commitments. However, this dynamic does not extend to a country’s labour system; instead, CSR appears here to match the efficiency of a country’s labour market, thus reflecting the ‘mirror view’ of CSR.
Despite having the fifth highest per capita GDP in the world (according to IMF PPP statistics for 2007), and despite numerous government efforts to spur innovation, Singapore has faced difficulties in establishing a durable base of entrepreneurial activity. Many ascribe this failure to the city-state's policies, which are often portrayed as generating a culture of risk aversion and a lack of creativity. In contrast to this conventional view, this article argues that the city-state's institutional arrangements generate conflicting innovation incentives and ultimately undermine innovative activity. Statistical tests across twenty-three countries offer evidence that is consistent with this argument.
With the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (TWWC) Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) intended to provide a comprehensive typology covering welfare regimes as well as their effects on the economy. However, the initial TWWC-framework fell short of its promises as it ignored welfare services and the industrial sector of the economy. In the last twenty-five years many studies have analysed these previously overlooked aspects. In this article we review this research. We find that most empirical studies on welfare services, as well as on the economy, confirm the validity of the TWWC typology. However, insufficient attention has been paid to exposing the interplay between the different areas. In the second part of the article we provide two alternative explanations for the linkage between welfare regime and capitalism typologies. There is evidence for a functionalist explanation as proposed by the Varieties-of-Capitalism (VoC) framework, as well as for a political explanation delivered by the power resources approach.
The article reviews the “Varieties of Capitalism” (VoC) approach and its large impact on the field of comparative political economy. It situates the approach within the field, and stresses its specificities. The article argues that VoC's firm-centeredness, parsimony, and reliance on conceptual tools borrowed from economics, fit better than other approaches to a Zeitgeist formed in the context of the demise of Western capitalism's alternatives, and the globalization-induced shift of societies’ center of gravity away from politics towards firms and markets. The article then revisits major debates that have followed the publication of the seminal Hall-Soskice book. The debates have revealed that VoC's greatest strengths, in the end, turn out to be obstacles when it comes to analyzing problems of contemporary capitalism.