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The chapter examines the development of agriculture and rural society, the crisis of agriculture in the late nineteenth century, and the political mobilization of German farmers.
This chapter focuses on the new gas directive and regulation (the Gas Package) from the perspective of the hydrogen ‘revolution’, and the importance allocated to its future role in the ongoing energy transition and in the achievement of the ambitious net zero target by 2050. Particular attention is given to key regulatory concepts and pillars in the new Gas Package, aimed at creating the conditions for a more cost-effective transition and creating an internal market in hydrogen and low carbon gases: these are unbundling, tariff regulation and third-party access. The chapter first describes these concepts as developed by the new measures and questions whether these concepts, which have been effectively transposed from natural gas regulation to hydrogen regulation, are suitable to achieve a cost-effective transition to a decarbonised gas market. In particular, the chapter will examine whether the proposed terminology, although fundamental, is sufficiently clearly and comprehensively defined in the new measures. Second, the chapter questions whether the new Gas Package establishes the necessary stable regulatory framework for incentivising hydrogen investment, by highlighting where the Gas Package could have been more comprehensive but also flexible in its treatment of concepts such as unbundling, on the tariff regime and third-party access provisions. It also queries whether the challenges of regulatory balancing can be adequately dealt with by way of the ‘regulatory holiday regime’ as proposed in the Gas Package.
Recent years have seen an increased focus on the implementation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). While the number of PTAs has risen remarkably since early 2000, data on the utilization of preferential tariffs under these agreements point out that some businesses have not gained access to all the benefits that PTAs can provide. When utilization rates are low, the impact of the agreement will likely differ from what was anticipated by ex-ante economic research. This paper conducts a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) analysis of the expected impact of the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and compares a scenario that includes realistic preference utilization data with a standard scenario where all tariff liberalization is assumed to be fully utilized by businesses. The results show considerable differences between the two scenarios and illustrate the need to make the inclusion of credible utilization data standard practice in the modelling of international trade.
The U.S. is losing the competition for good jobs and high-value industries because most of Washington believes trade should be free, the dollar should float, and that innovation comes exclusively from the private sector. In this book, the authors make the bold case that these laissez-faire ideas have failed and that a robust industrial policy is the only way for America to remain prosperous and secure. Trump and Biden have enacted some of its elements, but it needs to be made systematic and comprehensive, including tariffs to protect key industries, a competitive exchange rate, and federal support for commercialization—not just invention—of new technologies. Timely, meticulously researched, and bipartisan, this impressive analysis replaces misunderstandings about industrial policy with lucid explanations of its underlying economic theory, the tools that implement it, and its successes (and failures) in America and abroad. It examines key industries of the past and future – steel, automobiles, television, semiconductors, space, aviation, robotics, and nanotechnology. It concludes with a realistic, actionable policy roadmap. A work of rigor and ambition, Industrial Policy for the United States is essential reading.
The WTO is founded on commitments that governments make to each other in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. These rules provide a structure for international trade in which governments are generally restricted in when they can raise tariffs on imports and whether they can discriminate among their trading partners. This chapter examines the contemporary framework for international trade and its main rules, including national treatment, bound tariffs, and most-favored nation, as well as the WTO’s dispute settlement process. The Shrimp-Turtle case provides an illustration of how these rules interact with international politics to create new political dynamics.
This chapter discusses Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace as a matrix for understanding the changing institutional landscape of international trade. In 1919, Keynes highlighted the perils of German participation and US non-participation in international politics, twin problems that continued to frame trade debates in the League of Nations for the remainder of the 1920s. Generally, German leaders supported the construction of an open and regulated world economy. Many internationalists were eager to lock Germany into a system of multilateral norms but also feared that integrating Germany into global markets would reinforce its dominance in key strategic sectors. In contrast, the United States remained aloof from League trade negotiations in the 1920s. Europeans were divided over whether to respond with universal trade rules that the United States might eventually be persuaded to follow or with a regionalist approach that would enable Europeans to negotiate directly with their Atlantic neighbour on a more equal footing. As Keynes saw clearly, both sets of concerns were exacerbated by the financial imbalances stemming from war debts and reparations.
This chapter investigates the degree of pass-through from import prices and tariffs to wholesale prices in interwar Britain using a new high-frequency micro data set. The main results are: (i) Pass-through from import prices and tariffs to wholesale prices was economically and statistically significant. (ii) Despite devaluation, import prices exacerbated deflation in the early 1930s because of the global slump in export prices. (iii) Rising protection, however, was a mild stimulus to prices during the shift to inflation.
This paper explores American tariff politics and the embrace of protectionism within the Ohio Valley in the two decades following the War of 1812. During these years, residents of the western states navigated the emergence of steam transportation, a growing number of state-chartered banks, and intense population growth. This fueled an economic boom that went bust during the Panic of 1819. Western farmers, merchants, and manufacturers blamed harmful patterns of trade for this economic crisis, which bolstered a distinct regional identity that embraced a properly constructed restrictive tariff as a “western” measure. Consequently, the decade of the 1820s featured the most sustained period of conflict over the tariff issue in the antebellum era. This article examines western participation in conflicts over commerce and roots the political economy of trade policy in changing economic conditions that inspired distinct northern, southern, and western perspectives on trade and economic development. I conclude that both protectionist claims to economic nationalism and free trade embrace of international exchange overlook the individual assessments of local and regional markets that set the terms on which participants in the tariff debates of the early republic imagined future development.
Chapter Two identifies the current legal and regulatory arrangements related to China’s electricity sector by examining the institutions and governing authority, pricing and tariff regulations, and investment approval. These regulatory aspects often determine the market features and characteristics of an electricity system. This chapter provides the foundation for understanding the design of critical supporting mechanisms adopted by the Renewable Energy Law and their implementation, which are discussed in the subsequent chapter.
This chapter focuses in particular on import restrictions and export controls as weapons of economic warfare as used against Russia, as opposed to the sanctions measures that are the focus of much of the book. These tools supplement the sanctions measures and help promote the same foreign policy ends through alternative means. For example, the chapter examines changes to Russia’s “most favored nation” status, and the resulting effect on imports into the U.S. from Russia. Import bans were also implemented on many items from Russia in multiple jurisdictions. Export controls of high-tech items are also discussed.
Chapter 7 delves into the reformers often-futile attempts to solicit potential non-official allies such as the Lancashire textile manufacturers and Anglo-Indian planters who sought access to raw cotton and land freeholds. While it initially seemed that the mobilization of the mill owners might deter arbitrary colonial governance, they failed to back the reformers’ radical efforts to alter India’s bureaucratic apparatus after the Uprising of 1857. Disappointed on a second front, reformers were also compelled to condemn the European planters whose exploitative tactics resulted in agrarian disturbances. As Manchester cotton lords in the 1870s continued to harp on the inequity of the colonial import duties levied on their textiles, reformers accused them of weaponizing free trade and stifling Indian competition. Recurrent famines also brought the efficacy of laissez-faire governance into question, which in turn led a faction within the East India Association to espouse a racialized variant of conservationism.
At the heart of the multilateral trading system is the commitment to nondiscrimination, the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle, mandating that all nations participate on equal terms. Added to this are a series of obligations to limit government interventions in trade. To give assurance that the system will deliver what it promises, transparency is required, making clear to all the measures that affect trade. Reality diverges from the ideal.
In the decades before the First World War, Europeans developed new institutions and information networks to try to understand and manage a rapidly changing world economy. This was a diffuse organizational web without a clear institutional centre, but it was grounded in an increasingly standardized and professionalized set of treaty practices. This chapter traces Lucien Coquet, Hubert Llewellyn Smith, Bernhard Harms, and Richard Riedl as they began to build careers in a globalizing economy that was marked by sharp social and political tensions.
The United States was one of the world’s first modern nations and one of the first to break free from colonial rule. It therefore stands at the beginning of the history of economic nationalism. This chapter analyses how nationalist thinking on the economy evolved in the USA from the Revolution to the Civil War. During this era, nationalists shifted from an outward-focused system aiming for economic development to an inward-focussed system based on protection. Developmental ideas were first championed by Alexander Hamilton, but his elitist conception of economic policy did not sit easily with the democratising ethos of the new nation. Economic nationalism became a mass movement as intellectuals like Daniel Raymond, politicians such as Henry Clay and activists in the mould of Mathew Carey jostled over questions of trade, manufacturing and banking. Instead of Hamilton’s close relationship between government and capitalists, the new movement put the everyday American producer at the centre. As it did so, isolationist ideas came to dominate. The intellectual capstone of this strand was provided by Henry Carey, whose influence would entrench a distinctly protectionist ‘American System’.
This Chapter examines the ongoing challenges of using regulation to manage plastic pollution. Specifically, the Chapter identifies the problem of ’thin law’ where laws exist that do not directly address the problem at hand or when they do address the problem at hand are engulfed in exceptions that allow for operations to continue according to the existing status quo. The Chapter highlights several examples of ’thin law’ that are incapable of addressing the scale of plastic pollution. The Chapter proposes the need for ’thick law’ intervention in the form of a regional or global waste tariff on single-use plastics and plastic fishing gear designed to reduce production of new plastics and increase reuse.
This Article critically analyzes seven elements of the Biden administration trade policy: (1) buy American; (2) tariffs; (3) World Trade Organization; (4) free trade agreements; (5) China; (6) technology; and (7) Russia. Although President Biden has made a clean break from Trump policies in many areas, this is not the case when it comes to international trade. Regretfully, Biden has chosen to keep in place most of the failed trade policies of his predecessor—the Trump tariffs and the China trade war. It is not too late to shift ground, to negotiate mutual abolition of the Trump tariffs, to open free trade negotiations with the EU and UK, to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, to adopt a multilateral strategy with allies to check Chinese trade excesses, and to reengage with the World Trade Organization. Topping the list of needed reforms of the multilateral trading system are: (1) subsidies; (2) state-owned enterprises; and (3) forced technology transfer. These are best addressed through a WTO plurilateral agreement and/or preferential trade agreements. The Biden administration should prioritize these urgent reforms. Rather than promoting “free” trade and multilateral trade reforms, the Biden administration continues its predecessor’s nationalistic policies so that trade serves domestic political ends. Such state intervention in trade policy consists of the strategic use of tariffs, subsidies, “buy American” rules, and regional trade arrangements without regard to the rules of the multilateral trading system. These new policies represent a decisive retreat from globalization and openness to trade.
The Congress, directed by the Biden administration, has adopted a far-reaching industrial policy in the form of four laws that subsidize key sectors of the U.S. economy: American Rescue Plan Act ($40 billion); Infrastructure and Jobs Act ($1.2 trillion); Inflation Reduction Act ($369 billion); and Chips Act ($252.7 billion). This subsidization coupled with “buy American” protectionism constitute a departure from the free trade ideal that has characterized U.S. policy since the end of World War II.
Chapter 1 provides a general overview of Qing fiscal policy, focusing on major changes in the early eighteenth and later nineteenth century. After an attempt to reform the agricultural tax apparatus in the early eighteenth century lost steam amid accusations of “snatching profit from the people,” the central government made no further attempts to modify it until the mid-nineteenth century. In the meantime, nonagricultural taxes grew, but remained comparatively insignificant in total volume. As the economy grew, formal government revenue as a share of total economic output plunged from around 4 percent to barely 1 percent prior to the Opium War. Following a wave of mid-century political and financial crises, the government finally swung into action, implementing a number of major fiscal reforms, most notably the creation of a new commercial tax. The agricultural tax, however, remained stagnant at eighteenth century levels until the early twentieth century, when the Qing state was on the verge of total collapse. This stagnation had particularly crippling consequences for the Qing’s industrialization drive in the later nineteenth century.
The dispute over the Tariff of 1828 marked a turning point for interposition. State legislatures passed resolutions declaring protective tariffs unconstitutional, increasingly using more threatening language that echoed the doctrine of nullification John C. Calhoun advanced in the South Carolina Exposition of 1828. Calhoun’s arguments distorted Madison’s views and transformed traditional sounding the alarm interposition into an option for each state to nullify acts of the national government that it considered unconstitutional. Nullification prompted a national discussion about the nature of the Union, notably in the Webster–Hayne debate in the United States Senate in 1830.Nullifiers quoted the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and Madison’s Report of 1800 to justify their constitutional theory, but misunderstood Madison’s theoretical right of the people to interpose in the final resort and overlooked the sounding the alarm interposition of the resolutions. Madison rejected both nullification and secession and tried to explain what he meant by a complex federalism based on divided sovereignty, ultimately failing to correct misconceptions about his resolutions.