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This chapter looks specifically at neural circuits, assemblies of neurons that influence sensory, motor and cognitive functions. I discuss the conventional criteria for understanding these circuits, which are reductionist in their approach, and highlight various caveats in experimental and conceptual approaches that are routinely followed. I also consider the use of motifs, arrangements of component parts of a circuit that serve specific functions like electronic components. I follow others in highlighting the utility of appealing to motifs, but again highlight caveats of these motifs that mean we cannot assume their presence or the function when we know they are present. I finish by discussing aspects that have been identified over the last few decades that may add to the aspects we need to study, including plasticity, glial cells, variability and ephaptic signals.
This chapter considers reductionism, a major aspect of neuroscience research. I consider reductionist claims that we can only understand nervous systems from knowledge of their component parts. I then consider reductionist approaches and what we have learnt by following them, highlighting that a complete reductionist account of any nervous system region hasn’t been and is probably impossible to achieve. I then discuss decomposable hierarchical and non-decomposable heterarchical systems, and how relational aspects suggest we cannot understand the latter systems from cataloguing their individual components. I then discuss two effects that have received little attention despite being known for decades – volume transmission and ephaptic signalling – that highlight the need to consider component parts in relation to the whole system. I finish by discussing non-reductionist views, equipotentiality, cybernetics, the holonomic brain and embodied cognition, highlighting, as many have in the past, that debating between reductionist and non-reductionist approaches is a false dichotomy.
This article explores the ‘rationality wars’, contemporary debates about the nature and scope of rationality across economics, psychology, behavioral public policy and philosophy. It traces the evolution of the concept from classical thinkers and shows how modern disagreements – such as Daniel Kahneman’s logical model versus Gerd Gigerenzer’s ecological approach – restate long-standing philosophical tensions. These divergences arise from the distinct epistemological demands of each discipline. Using Gustavo Bueno’s distinction between concepts (discipline-specific) and ideas (transdisciplinary), the article critiques reductionist attempts to impose one framework as definitive. Instead, it argues for a pluralistic, scientifically grounded understanding of rationality that respects diverse aims, methods and standards.
This chapter discusses the broader role and impact of analytics science in improving various aspects of society. It introduces what the book is about, and what the reader should expect to learn from reading this book. It also discusses the analytics revolution in the private and public sector, and introduces a key element of the book — insight-driven problem solving — by highlighting its vital role in addressing various societal problems.
What are the categories: fundamental entities or concepts? Suárez answers this question by rejecting strong realism as well as conceptualism. On his view, the distinction of ten categories marks a conceptual distinction that is grounded in reality, but without there being a one-to-one relation between concepts and entities. Rather, the distinction is grounded in different things (res) as well as modes (modi) and in combinations of these two building blocks of reality. The chapter examines this grounding relation by first analyzing Suárez’s account of things and modes and the way they are related to each other. It then focuses on the categories of substance and quality and explains in what sense the concepts of substance and quality are grounded in things and modes. Finally, it argues that Suárez subscribes to a distinctive form of reductionism that differs from the standard nominalist approach to the categories.
This Element offers a fresh treatment of the two cycles of reduction-emergence debates in the sciences and their 'reductionist' and 'emergentist' positions. It suggests philosophers have neglected the compositional models/explanations, and 'endogenous' kind of metaphysics, central to these debates. It highlights how such endogenous metaphysics underpins what is termed the 'Dynamic Cycle,' by which scientists develop novel ontological concepts to underwrite new models/explanations to solve scientific problems. And it subsequently shows that the 'reductionist' and 'emergentist' views in the scientific debates follow the Dynamic Cycle. In the first cycle of debates, in the early twentieth century, the Element outlines how 'everyday reductionism' pioneered a novel family of compositional models/explanations in one of the most successful research movements in twentieth-century science. And, in present debates, it frames contemporary emergentist positions offering ontological innovations, underwriting new families of models, to address problems at the cutting-edge of twenty-first-century science.
There is a connection between the habits of thinking in science, economics, and diplomacy that are hindering our response to climate change. Western science since the Enlightenment has built its success on reductionism. This has left us less good than we need to be at thinking holistically, and at understanding the potential for systemic change in our environment, economy, and international relations. New ways of thinking can take generations to spread through society and displace their predecessors. In our present crisis, we must accelerate this process deliberately – we cannot afford to wait.
● Darwin invented the concept of group selection to explain the evolution of traits that lead individuals to improve the fitnesses of others at a fitness cost to self. Such traits are now called “altruistic.” ● Understanding Simpson’s paradox is key to understanding how natural selection can cause altruism to increase in frequency in a meta-population. ● A criterion is derived for when altruism is fitter than selfishness in a meta-population in which there are groups of size 2. The relevance of correlation and genealogical relatedness to the evolution of altruism is discussed, as is the question of whether reciprocal altruism is really a form of selfishness. ● The concepts of cultural group selection and species selection require further refinements in how group fitness needs to be understood. ● In addition to individual selection and group selection, there is a third unit of selection – intragenomic conflict. Meiotic drive is a classic example. ● The reductionist thesis that group and individual selection reduce to selection on genes is criticized, as are conventionalist theses that assert that it is a matter of convenience, not biological fact, whether group selection occurs in a population.
The life sciences and social sciences typically study “complex adaptive systems:” nonlinear, self-organizing, adaptive, multilevel, multicomponent systems in which dense interconnections between elements produce irreducible/emergent systems effects. Systems and their components are partially (in)separable: they can be fully understood neither solely in terms of their parts (some outcomes are emergent) nor solely in terms of the whole (the character of the parts is essential to the nature of the whole). Important implications of a complex adaptive systems perspective for IR include a new view of international systems and their structures; a distinctive understanding of social continuity and social change; new perspectives on levels, theory, and explanation; new tools for comparative analysis; renewed attention to hierarchy; and a distinctive understanding of globalization.
There is a connection between the habits of thinking in science, economics and diplomacy that are hindering our response to climate change. Western science since the Enlightenment has built its success on reductionism. This has left us less good than we need to be at thinking holistically, and at understanding the potential for systemic change in our environment, economy, and international relations. New ways of thinking can take generations to spread through society and displace their predecessors. In our present crisis, we must accelerate this process deliberately – we cannot afford to wait.
The ‘microfoundations’ metaphor had been used by mainstream macroeconomists with the intention of explaining macroeconomics in terms of microeconomics, or more precisely in terms of statements about individuals, viewed as representative agents with rational expectations who maximise lifetime utility, subject to shocks within a general equilibrium framework. Of the three reasons for rejecting this explanatory strategy, the focus here is on downward causation. Although individuals are heavily influenced by society, their decisions and behaviour are not sufficient as the explanatory foundations for a macrotheory.
This chapter exposes the received dyadic model of communication and then critically analyzes the presumptions of the model. This reductive model, which views communication as evolving from a basic unit of face-to-face dialogue between two people, has dominated understanding of communication from ancient dialectic to today’s speech act theory, conversation analysis, and argumentation theory – the disciplines discussed in the chapter. While the dyadic reduction has a long, important history in theorizing argumentation and communication – a history that is briefly recounted, going back to the dialectical roots of argumentation theory – the principle of reduction becomes unjustified reductionism that bypasses polylogical realities of argumentation and communication.
This study aimed to critically analyse Australia’s current and proposed policy actions to reduce added sugar consumption. Over-consumption of added sugar is a significant public health nutrition issue. The competing interests, values and beliefs among stakeholders mean they have disparate views regarding which policy actions are preferable to reduce added sugar consumption.
Design:
Semi-structured interviews using purposive, snowball sampling and policy mapping. Policy actions were classified by two frameworks: NOURISHING (e.g. behaviour change communication, food environment and food system) and the Orders of Change (e.g. first order: technical adjustments, second order: reforming the system, third order: transforming the system).
Setting:
Australia.
Participants:
Twenty-two stakeholders from the food industry, food regulation, government, public health groups and academia.
Results:
All proposed and existing policy actions targeted the food environment/behaviour change; most were assessed as first-order changes, and reductionist (nutrient specific) in nature. Influences on policy actions included industry power, stakeholder fragmentation, government ideology/political will and public pressure. Few stakeholders considered potential risks of policy actions, particularly of non-nutritive sweetener substitution or opportunity costs for other policies.
Conclusions:
Most of Australia’s policy actions to reduce added sugar consumption are reductionist. Preferencing nutrient specific, first-order policy actions could reflect the influence of vested interests, a historically dominant reductionist orientation to nutrition science and policy, and the perceived difficulty of pursuing second- or third-order changes. Pursuing only first-order policy actions could lead to ‘regrettable’ substitutions and creates an opportunity cost for more comprehensive policy aimed at adjusting the broader food system.
Chapter 8 presents the main positions in economics and in the social sciences regarding the agent/structure problem, and explores some contributions that can be made from artificial economics. First, it presents and discusses the individualist/reductionist, structuralist/holistic, and intermediate positions, regarding the agent/structure problem. Then presents simple artificial economics examples of the generation of endogenous preferences, agents' behavioral changes derived from their economic interaction, and of the demographic effects of the introduction of a market institution into an artificial economy.
The Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) is a pioneering institution in the field of climate modeling. Its founding director, Joseph Smagorinsky, was a member of the Princeton Meteorology Group. He hired a Japanese scientist, Syukuro Manabe, who formulated a one-dimensional model of climate, known as the radiative–convective model, that was able to calculate the amplifying climate feedback due to water vapor. This model provided one of the first reliable estimates of global warming. Manabe worked with other scientists to build three-dimensional climate models, including the first model that coupled an atmospheric model to an ocean model. The concepts of reductionism and emergentism, which provide the philosophical context for these scientific developments, are introduced.
Debates on dualism continue to plague psychiatry. I suggest that these debates are based on false dichotomies. According to metaphysical physicalism, reality is ultimately physical. Although this view excludes the idea of entities distinct from physical reality, it does not compel us to favour neural over psychological interventions. According to methodological dualism, both physical and mental interventions on the world can be deemed effective, and both perspectives can therefore be thought to be equally ‘real’.
Our practices of pursuing the truth and engaging in ethical or existential commitments, analyzed from a pragmatist perspective in the previous chapters, are inherently normative. This chapter considers the transcendental question concerning the very possibility of normativity - that is, the possibility of our engaging in the normative practices we do engage in, including practices of truth-seeking presupposing individual ethical sincerity - from the point of view of a pragmatist transcendental philosophy (as developed in the earlier chapters). It is suggested that such a transcendental question about normativity belongs to philosophical anthropology, as it examines the most basic aspects of the human condition. It is argued that no contingent and naturalizable matters of fact, such as psychological acts of recognition, can adequately ground the possibility of normativity in the transcendental sense. A pragmatist commitment to sincerity thus also entails a commitment to irreducible (but not therefore mystical or supernatural) normativity. A pragmatic and transcendental form of humanism emerges as the only way of making sense of normativity in our lives and practices.
The chapter discusses the impact of materialistic and reductionist perspectives on peace analysis and examines how they affect understanding human nature.
The chapter discusses the impact of materialistic and reductionist perspectives on peace analysis and examines how they affect understanding human nature.