The two crises in this chapter share three main characteristics. They involve territorial (border) conflict that relates to the independence of Ukraine (or, relatedly, the breakup of the Soviet Union), feature an East–West tension, and (as of this writing) do not escalate to a war among the major states. In 2014, after Ukraine attempted to move closer to Europe (i.e., it contemplated an EU agreement and the pro-Russian government fell), Putin annexed Crimea to secure the long-held naval base there. Although done forcefully, there were no military fatalities. In 2022, amidst a fear that Ukraine was again moving closer to Europe (i.e., it looked to be closer to joining NATO and its government became less pro-Russian), Russia invaded Ukraine. It failed to take Kyiv, even though it heavily bombed Ukraine. Russia then withdrew to the east, where a majority of Russian speakers had sought to separate from Ukraine. The United States and the European Union gave weapons and aid that expanded as the war continued. Deaths mounted on both sides. The Russians successfully created a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea. After his election, Trump attempted to negotiate a settlement that would end the war.

This chapter situates contemporary Russian war memory in its twentieth-century historical context, exploring how and why the war victory gained such prominence and drawing out certain continuities and discontinuities across the Soviet/post-Soviet divide. Given the immense scale of Soviet wartime losses and the unusually heavy-handed instrumentalization of history under Putin, the Second World War was bound to play a prominent role in Russian memory culture. Yet, as the chapter will show, the precise character of Russian war memory and its utility for the Kremlin derive overwhelmingly from decades of Soviet-era commemorative practices. The chapter does not attempt to rectify distortions of historical truth but rather to elucidate the mechanisms by which states repurpose the past in the service of the present. Soviet war memory, as elsewhere, was the product of internal debate and deliberation as the leadership wrestled with what were often pan-European issues of representation. The chapter therefore approaches the myth and memory of the Great Patriotic War as a particular manifestation of a universal impulse to ‘make sense’ of war in the modern world.

This chapter examines how the Council of Europe sought to promote the rule of law in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev’s ambition to construct a “common European home,” to be pursued in concert with European states and international organizations, was advanced by Russian president Boris Yeltsin and, at least initially, by his successor as president, Vladimir Putin. But after roughly a decade of concrete reforms, that effort foundered, reversed, and then collapsed. Russia descended again into authoritarianism and, shortly after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe. Thus, this story now has a beginning, a middle, and an end. This chapter explores that story and how the dynamics of Russia’s pursuit and rocky course of membership in the Council of Europe affected both the Russian state and the international organization that sought to admit it to membership.

Chapter 4 focuses on labor migration from Central Asia to Russia as the first exclusionary migration cycle. Growing migration after 2000 made Russia one of the world’s major migrant-receiving states. The chapter explains why Putin retained a visa-free regime with the much poorer former Soviet states of CA, allowing millions of their citizens free entry to Russia, where most stayed and worked with undocumented status. As the numbers of the ethnically distant Muslim migrants rose, welfare nationalist grievances emerged in the cities and regions where migrants were concentrated. Citing public opinion surveys, speeches by mayors and governors, election and party platforms, and mass media, the chapter shows how politicians framed and used welfare nationalist discourses to placate citizens and scapegoat migrants for declines in popular welfare. It highlights the role of sub-national officials in mobilizing anti-immigrant politics and channeling pressures for exclusionary policies to Putin. These pressures produced legislative and normative changes that progressively excluded migrant families from social sectors and subjected workers to increasing abuses, including deportations and other forms of exclusion. A sub-set of migrants who contributed to Russia’s national security were treated as more deserving.

Chapter 7 turns to ethnic return migrations, Russia’s Compatriot Resettlement Program and the Poland’s Karta Polaka (Pole’s Card) program. In these cases migrants entered ‘virtuous inclusionary cycles’ : societies were receptive to them as co- ethnics, political elites sponsored and financed their resettlement and media, mostly state-controlled in both states, lauded their contributions. The chapter analyzes the motives of the Polish and Russian governments in sponsoring re-settlers, including demographic replacement for declining populations, workers to fill labor shortages, and symbolic nationalist political agendas. It shows that welfare nationalist grievances did emerge over the resetlers’ social privileges and nationals’ competition with them for scare social resources. There were also disputes over the boundaries of national belonging. In sharp contrast to the exclusionary migrations, Russian and Polish political elites managed and mitigated grievances rather than mobilizing them for political gain. Resettlers confronted obstacles to integration: severe restrictions on residence and job rights in Russia, limited language fluency in Poland. Still, inclusionary policies gave resettlers social, economic and civil rights denied to those in exclusionary migrations.

This chapter traces developments in the energy sector from the systemic crisis under Gorbachev, through Russia’s difficult start after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to the consolidation of Russia under Putin.

Chapter 5 traces the relationship between participatory technologies and information management in Russia. It argues that the Direct Line acts as a barometer of public opinion, a forum through which authorities can disseminate information to the public, and a tool to monitor and selectively punish officials. Moreover, this chapter explains how participatory technologies help authorities create the impression of effective governance and act as a means of public image making.

This chapter discusses corruption in Russia. It proposes a view that recognizes the ambiguity between the apparent anarchy of the observed conflicts in Russia’s society and the centrality of the State, the Kremlin, and President Putin. Background information on Russia’s economy since the collapse of the Soviet Union is presented first, with a focus on distributional issues. A series of existential struggles that the state has faced and examined what is known about corruption in Russia is then discussed. For the Russian state, corruption has been a crucial tool in addressing its existential struggles and a highly contested political arena. The theme of anti-corruption has been utilized by both reformers and the Kremlin for their own purposes.

This chapter describes the first week of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the immediate sanctions and export control measures that followed. While focusing on the U.S. response, it describes key steps taken by the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Australia, and others. The chapter links developments in the ground war to the key economic responses by the forces aligned against Russia. As the extent of the Russian invasion became clear, sanctions were announced and subsequently ratcheted up extremely rapidly. The chapter also highlights the extraordinarily coordinated nature of the sanctions response.

This chapter discusses Putin’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions in September 2022. It also describes the sanctions imposed against Russia in response.

This chapter examines a key aspect of the worldwide sanctions response: sanctioning individuals personally, including wealthy oligarchs holding vast, often-hidden wealth. This chapter explores how and why certain individuals were sanctioned, like Putin’s daughters and prominent Russian government and business figures. Lesser-known sanctioned figures are also discussed. It also discusses the difficulties of linking assets to sanctioned individuals once wealth is laundered and converted into certain types of assets. The chapter discusses measures taken by various jurisdictions to improve the effectiveness of sanctions by promoting financial transparency.

Describes the facts of Donald Trump’s effort to extort Ukraine into announcing investigations of his presidential rival Joseph Biden and how exposure of that effort led to a renewed effort to impeach him.