This chapter addresses the question of the interpretation of fictions. Traditional views on this topic run the full gamut from straightforward versions of intentionalism – on which correct interpretations track what authors meant with the works they have created – to more or less extreme versions of conventionalism – on which correct interpretations instead track what the social practices of fiction determine to be the meanings of fictional works. I assume that interpretations are advanced as the paratextual uses of fictional discourse, as examined in Chapter 1 while discussing Lewis’s (1978) account. They may range from utterly commonplace, modest accounts of the core content of a fiction made for the benefit of those unfamiliar with it, to highly ambitious critical pursuits that ascribe unobvious deep meanings to a work; and it is a pragmatic issue whether they should be understood as playing one or another of these roles. Dedicated Representation accounts of fictionality, like the one promoted here, presuppose that fictions have contents, and hence have their own semantics. Such accounts are thus in a better position to offer a theoretical understanding of interpretive undertakings than Mere Pretense views, which forgo this advantage. The issue can then be used for abductive appraisal. A semantics requires a metasemantics for its justification, i.e., an account of the nature of fictions that can determine which semantic ascriptions are correct. Previous chapters have contrasted psychologically expressive accounts, such as the Gricean proposals made by Currie, Stock and others, with social-normative views like Walton’s, Abell’s, or the one favored here. Prima facie, psychological views fit intentionalist accounts better, while social views go with conventionalism. But the issue is more complex. While Stock does defend intentionalism, Currie instead endorses a rather conventionalist view; and while Abell supports conventionalism, the view I’ll advance here is intentionalist. The chapter also engages with Friend’s influential work. While assuming a form of conventionalism, Friend has articulated and defended a rather skeptical view of fictionality, and of the fiction vs. nonfiction divide, which I’ll critically discuss.

This chapter is, for the most part, devoted to an appraisal of Greek art as a school of humanity. Herder applies the model of nature’s force to the work of art. The force that produces the human form in the work of art also conditions the possibilities for viewing and understanding art. Art grounds visible categories of humankind and it renders visible the ideas that make these categories intelligible. Greek statuary is seen as a formalization of timeless categories of human life, but these categories are subject to the contingencies of interpretation. He discusses the Greek idealization of childhood, heroism, the gods, fauns, satyrs, and centaurs. He then concludes that there is no such thing as formless goodness and truth. This is followed by an appraisal of allegory. A text by Johann Christoph Berens is cited as an example of practical moral enlightenment. In this connection, the question of public morals is raised with respect to Homer and Montesquieu. Kant’s pursuit of truth is praised. The chapter closes with thoughts on freedom of thought and the state.

We have seen how imagination can plausibly be taken to be part of a perceptual referential apparatus. Sensory imaginations therefore contribute to the fulfillment of an empirical intuition’s cognitive roles. The aim of the analysis in this chapter is three-fold: (1) to throw more light upon what is added by imagination to empirical cognition of objects, in the form of perceptual memories and quasi-perceptual anticipations – this is lower order objectification that goes beyond mere perceptual objectification in its own right but which may also be part of higher order objectification through concepts; (2) to show how imagination that mixes with perceptions may also lead to false perceptual judgments – misperception is a topic of this chapter, whereas hallucination is discussed in Chapter 9; (3) to bring out the lack of reality-character of fictional imaginations, even when these imitate perceptions, so as to throw more light upon the nature of perceptions.

This chapter lays out the metatheoretic approach of the book. The focus is on how scientists use experimental work to support compositional hypotheses. It sets aside questions of how scientists might reason in the lab or how scientists might support hypotheses in review articles or textbooks. It brackets questions of the warrant of scientific reasoning. It addresses some of the challenges facing the use of case studies.

This chapter argues against an interpretation of scientism according to which science determines the limits of objective thinking. Central to the argument is Kuhn’s distinction between normal and extraordinary science. Understanding science as normal science makes science the plausible basis for an “ism” that delimits what counts as objective thinking because normal science has epistemologically and sociologically attractive features. But understanding science this way undermines the idea that a fundamental part of science, extraordinary science, involves objective thinking. Understanding science in a way that includes extraordinary science vindicates extraordinary science. But science understood this way no longer possesses the attractive epistemological and sociological features which made science understood as normal science the plausible basis of an “ism.” So, science cannot constitute an “ism” that determines the limits of objective thinking without undermining a fundamental aspect of itself. The argument is placed within a larger frame, about how to understand the connection between science and humanism. The view that humanism should take the form of scientism is rejected in favor of a view of humanism that takes the presence of interpretation and criticism as fundamental but that embraces science by finding interpretation and criticism within science itself.

The rapid development of international law post-World War II also coincided with greater reliance upon treaties as a source of international law. Treaties had always been recognised as a source of international law, and their status was confirmed in art 38 of the ICJ Statute. It was the development of the UN, with its emphasis upon international law and focus upon treaty-making as a means of not only peaceful resolution of disputes but also multilateral agreement between States on matters of common concern, that was the catalyst for a greater reliance upon treaties in the conduct of international relations. This chapter begins by examining the growth of treaty-making, before considering what a treaty is, including the nature of 'instruments of less than treaty status'. It then covers treaty negotiation, creation and entry into force; reservations, objections and declarations to treaties; and legal obligations arising once a treaty has entered into force. The chapter then turns to treaty interpretation, and then examines how treaties are voided or ended through invalidity, suspension or termination. The chapter concludes with a discussion of amendment and modification of treaties.

This chapter explores Jewish iconography in Late Antiquity, focusing on the evolution of visual representations in synagogue art and everyday objects. Drawing on archaeological remains from ancient Palestine and the Diaspora, it examines architectural decorations, mosaics, wall paintings and interior furnishings. Analysis of these remains reveals that Jewish iconography was not static but evolved dynamically in response to broader Graeco-Roman and early Christian artistic traditions. The chapter illustrates this by demonstrating how synagogue ornamentation combined traditional Jewish symbols – such as the menorah, Torah shrine and ritual objects – with motifs borrowed from surrounding cultures, including mythological figures and zodiac imagery. It also engages with the long-standing debate on aniconism in Judaism, arguing that figurative art was more prevalent than previously assumed. Emphasising that Jewish art served both religious and communal functions, the chapter highlights how it reinforced Jewish identity during a period of cultural transition.

Should judges and other legal decision-makers follow the literal meaning of applicable legal rules even if there are compelling reasons to do otherwise? The question of the primacy of plain meaning in legal interpretation is one of the oldest and most persistent problems in the philosophy of law. In this chapter, we argue that new arguments are available in this debate, emerging from recent developments in experimental jurisprudence. We posit that legal interpretation is, to some extent, an exercise in coordination: Judges seek to interpret rules in a way that would match interpretations of their peers, of other legal officials, and of society at large. In such a strategic context, the plain meaning of law often constitutes a focal point around which different legal actors can coordinate – allowing them to promote the uniformity and predictability of law and, ultimately, to sustain the rule of law.

The US Supreme Court routinely purports to resolve statutory interpretation disputes by deferring to the enactment-era “ordinary,” “public” meaning of the statute’s terms (their “OPM”). In recent years, scholars have begun using surveys and experiments to test judges’ claims about OPM in particular cases, and to critique modern textualist theory and practice more generally. This chapter argues that surveys and experiments can provide highly probative evidence of OPM, whether one favors the more populist conception of OPM on which the modern Supreme Court frequently purports to rely, or the more thoroughly stylized conception that some scholars favor. Drawing on the handful of published survey-experimental efforts to date, and responding to scholarly criticisms of them, the chapter suggests that surveys and experiments may prove too probative for comfort. If modern textualists were to spell out ex ante their conception of OPM with sufficient precision to render it capable, even in theory, of resolving the hard cases they claim it resolves, then survey-experimental data might reveal that the theory produces disappointing results – not just in discrete cases, but across the board.

Legal language is often ambiguous. Consider: “Only cars and trucks with permits are allowed.” Does [PP with permits] have “wide scope” over the entire series [NP cars and trucks] or “narrow scope” over only the closest noun, [trucks]? Judges often choose narrow scope, citing a legal canon, the “Last Antecedent Rule.” But they sometimes choose wide scope, referencing the “Series Qualifier Canon,” which assigns modifiers to a series. Though judges claim to want to use “most people’s” interpretations, these conflicting choices led us to ask “What WOULD most people say?” We ran three experiments to find out.

Overall, wide scope was preferred. With biased PPs, the preference dropped slightly when the bias matched the last noun, “[NP cars and trucks] [PP with trailers],” but not the first, “[NP trucks and cars] [PP with trailers],” where a universal syntactic “No Crossing Branches principle” limits the PP’s domain. With temporal PPs, “People may park [NP cars and trucks] [PP on weekends],” the preference was also uniformly wide scope, not surprisingly, since these PPs can only modify verbs, not nouns. Taken together, our experiments show how experimental psycholinguistics can offer powerful evidence about how “most people” understand legal language, important information for judges and lawmakers alike.

This chapter explores the nature of the legislature and its relationship to constitutional government, focusing in particular on the importance of legislative agency and the dynamics that frame its exercise. The chapter begins by reflecting on the objects of legislative action, arguing that authorising a legislative assembly to legislate changes who legislates but not what it is to legislate. The object of legislative deliberation and action should be the common good and securing this end requires agency. The assembly faces many challenges in exercising agency, which it is structured to overcome, partly by way of its relationship to government, a relationship that goes well beyond acts of legislation. The relationship between legislature and government shapes the character of a constitutional order and bears on the relationship between legislature and the people. The legislature’s duty is to represent the people, which makes self-government possible. The legislature should deliberate and act for the people and be accountable to the people, with legislative deliberation taking its place in a wider public conversation. The legislature’s capacity for agency informs how legislative acts should be understood to change the law and helps explain the moral importance of legislative freedom and the limits on that freedom.

Legal activity in the third quarter-century of the life of the Convention has greatly surpassed that of the first two quarter-centuries. This can be measured in terms of case law and scholarly writing. The interpretation of the Convention’s definition of genocide has remained quite narrow, and is essentially confined to physical genocide, destruction and extermination. There is potential for this to change in such a way as to extend the scope of the Convention to situations where groups are attacked with view to being driven from the territory where they have lived. This would require a degree of judicial activism. Care must be taken because of the danger of uncontrolled expansion of the definition. The phenomenon of politicized allegations of genocide is significant. Although there has been some resistance to the idea of a hierarchy of international crimes, genocide should remain ’the crime of crimes’.

Several provisions of the Convention deal with technical matters under treaty law, including signature, ratification and accession to the Convention, entry into force, denunciation of the Convention, the role of the Secretary-General as depositary of the treaty, and revision of the treaty. There is no provision for reservations but they have been deemed to be acceptable to the extent that they are not contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention. The official languages of the Convention are Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. The Chinese language version has been changed due to dissatisfaction to the original text, prompting protests from Lemkin and others. The status of the official Chinese text remains somewhat uncertain. The Convention also contains a ’colonial clause’, something that is today an anachronism but one that apparently permits States to avoid the application of the Convention in non-self-governing territories over which they exercise control.