This chapter addresses the question of the interpretation of fictions. Traditional views on this topic run the full gamut from straightforward versions of intentionalism – on which correct interpretations track what authors meant with the works they have created – to more or less extreme versions of conventionalism – on which correct interpretations instead track what the social practices of fiction determine to be the meanings of fictional works. I assume that interpretations are advanced as the paratextual uses of fictional discourse, as examined in Chapter 1 while discussing Lewis’s (1978) account. They may range from utterly commonplace, modest accounts of the core content of a fiction made for the benefit of those unfamiliar with it, to highly ambitious critical pursuits that ascribe unobvious deep meanings to a work; and it is a pragmatic issue whether they should be understood as playing one or another of these roles. Dedicated Representation accounts of fictionality, like the one promoted here, presuppose that fictions have contents, and hence have their own semantics. Such accounts are thus in a better position to offer a theoretical understanding of interpretive undertakings than Mere Pretense views, which forgo this advantage. The issue can then be used for abductive appraisal. A semantics requires a metasemantics for its justification, i.e., an account of the nature of fictions that can determine which semantic ascriptions are correct. Previous chapters have contrasted psychologically expressive accounts, such as the Gricean proposals made by Currie, Stock and others, with social-normative views like Walton’s, Abell’s, or the one favored here. Prima facie, psychological views fit intentionalist accounts better, while social views go with conventionalism. But the issue is more complex. While Stock does defend intentionalism, Currie instead endorses a rather conventionalist view; and while Abell supports conventionalism, the view I’ll advance here is intentionalist. The chapter also engages with Friend’s influential work. While assuming a form of conventionalism, Friend has articulated and defended a rather skeptical view of fictionality, and of the fiction vs. nonfiction divide, which I’ll critically discuss.