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In a period of rising threats to constitutional government within countries and among them, it is a crucial time to study the rule of law in transnational context. This framework chapter defines core concepts, analyzes the relation between national and international law and institutions from a rule-of-law perspective, and assesses the extent to which rule-of-law practices are shifting at the domestic and international levels in parallel. Part I explains our conceptualization of the rule of law, necessary for the orientation of empirical study and policy responses. Following Martin Krygier, we formulate a teleological conception of the rule of law in terms of goals and practices, which, in turn, calls for an assessment of institutional mechanisms to advance these goals, given varying social conditions and contexts. Part II sets forth the ways in which international law and institutions are important for rule-of-law ends, as well as their pathologies, since power is also exercised beyond the state in an interconnected world. Part III examines empirical indicators of the decline of the rule of law at the national and international levels. It notes factors that could explain such decline, and why such factors appear to be transnationally linked. Part IV discusses what might be done given these shifts in rule-of-law protections. In conclusion, we note the implications of viewing the rule of law in transnational context for conceptual theory, empirical study, and policy response.
A dozen years ago, Jeremy Waldron published an influential article arguing that sovereign states are not entitled to the benefits of the international rule of law. His conclusion follows from his assertions that the purpose of the rule of law is to protect individual liberty, and the purpose of international law is to protect individuals. This chapter critically responds to his position. International law is based on the notion that states are autonomous and equal members of the international society ordered through legal relations. The legal relations of the international community of states, I argue, constitute the horizontal dimension of the rule of law, which Waldron overlooked. Focusing on horizontal rule-of-law functions, I provide descriptive, theoretical, and normative reasons why states are, and should be, entitled to the benefits of the rule of law. In the course of this critical engagement with Waldron’s position, I lay out a broad understanding of the rule of law that applies within states and the international community.
International organizations have issued recommendations and prescriptions on constitution-making and reform, especially since 1989. However, such constitution-shaping activities by European and universal organizations, notably the UN, have for the most part not led to a better operation of the rule of law on the ground. Besides these problems of effectiveness, normative concerns against constitutional assistance and advice by international organizations have been raised. It is suggested that, in order to become more legitimate (which might then also improve effectiveness), constitution-shaping by international organizations needs to absorb postcolonial concerns. This includes respect for local rule-of-law cultures flowing from non-European constitutional thought and the inclusion of a much deeper social agenda with a global ambition. Thus revamped, international organizations’ constitution-shaping role could be reinvigorated so as to sustain the rule of law on the domestic level, thereby contributing to transnational ordering and global constitutionalism.
This important contribution to children's rights scholarship brings fresh eyes to the complicated relationship between domestic law and international law in the practice of domestic courts. Through a critical assessment of the judicial application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in four jurisdictions (Australia, France, South Africa and the United Kingdom), the book demonstrates that the traditional rules of reception remain an essential starting point in understanding how national courts apply the Convention but are unable to explain all forms of judicial engagement therewith. The book shows that regardless of the legal system (monist, dualist, hybrid), courts can apply the Convention meaningfully especially when the domestic structure of reception converges with it. The comparative international law perspective used in the book and the heterogenous sample of jurisdictions analysed enabled the author to distil insights valid for other jurisdictions.
The Conclusion describes how, while the handbook started with the main technological and legal challenges regarding collection of digital evidence, the research shows that even though the challenges are shared by legal systems across the globe, the answers are not. Legal solutions to similar problems are fragmented, disparate and often unsatisfactory. Even if technology-neutral solutions are preferable to make sure hard-fought EU legislation and international agreements can stand the test of time, the legal reality appears to be quite different. Despite positive recent legal developments at EU and international levels, future approximation of national approaches seems highly desirable to enable LEAs to conduct effective criminal investigations to protect society and its citizens from new criminal phenomena. At the same time, protection of citizens’ fundamental rights should be reinforced, not just at the national level but in a cross-border context, considering that many criminal investigations now reach beyond national borders. Global initiatives are, however, hampered by tensions between democratic and non-democratic states, making a one-size-fits-all solution inadequate.
Mapping of human rights abuses and international crimes is an increasingly common tool to evidence, preserve and visualise information. This paper asks, what does rights-informed mapping in the context of mass graves look like? What are the rights concerned and allied goals, and how might these practicably apply during a pilot study? The study offers an analysis of the goals and benefits espoused to accrue to mapping and documentation efforts, as well as an explication of rights arising when engaging with mass graves. Our findings underscore the imperative of understanding the full ramifications of the applicable context, in our case the life-cycle of mass graves. This will bring to the fore the rights engaged with the subject as well as the challenges with data points, collation and reporting as experienced in a pilot (Ukraine) where realities on the ground are not static but remain in flux.
Histories of harbour development at Cochin have assumed that the Cochin Harbor Project was motivated by the colonial state’s economic interests and that it provides yet another illustration of the technological hubris associated with high modernism. Through a close analysis of the debates and discussions preceding the execution of the project however, this chapter shows that both of these assessments are inaccurate. Unlike what such accounts suggest, every stage of the Cochin Harbor Project was mired in doubt – with senior officials conceding that the project was likely to have an adverse impact on the port and its surroundings. Why then was this project executed despite such concerns? I argue that far from representing the colonial state’s confident mobilization of technology to meet its economic and strategic needs, as commonly assumed, the Cochin Harbor Project was in fact an uneasy compromise between the divergent and often competing political and economic interests of the colonial state and the princely states of Malabar. At a time of increasing environmental and political instability, a development project, this chapter shows, offered the best possibility of not only meeting the criterion of ‘productive works’ that was so central to colonial finance but also securing the cooperation of the princely states of Malabar that were becoming increasingly assertive.
An (ongoing) interrogation of colonial wrongdoing is important for debates on decolonisation, restorative justice, racial and gender equality and global political and socio-economic equality. This article presents a theoretical study of colonialism’s legal-political injustices and aims to (re)turn the discussion on colonialism to the field’s most powerful insight, i.e. that of of epistemic violence and injustice. This article also suggests that the reach of this historical injustice went much further than the politics of autonomy, usurpation of territorial rights, political disenfranchisement and resource appropriation. To address the question of colonialism’s distinctiveness as a political mission, which has been discussed in recent debates within analytic philosophy, it argues that colonialism’s epistemic injustice, which denied the very existence and the traditions of the colonised, is the foundational and distinctive feature of colonialism as a political system and which drives its continued impact to this day.
Does the situation in Afghanistan amount to persecution due to the accumulation of repressive measures enacted against women and is it sufficient that women are affected by such measures merely on the basis of their gender? While these two questions remain in front of the Court of Justice of the EU, several EU member states have moved to grant asylum to women and girls from Afghanistan on general risks of gender-based persecution. This dynamism in asylum regulations across the EU has occurred alongside renewed discussions around gender-based persecution and gender apartheid in international criminal law in light of the ongoing process for a Crimes Against Humanity Treaty. In this article, I put these developments into conversation through case study method and legal-institutional analysis, and argue that the historical link between international refugee law and international criminal law provides a space to envision an integrated system of protection around gender-related claims. To this end, I offer three outlooks for establishing general risks of gender-based persecution in international refugee law and the relationship between gender apartheid and asylum.
The introduction offers a historical overview of terrorism through the ages and describes the development of international counterterrorism law. It discusses the interplay between terrorism and international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity. It also introduces some of the controversy surrounding terrorism as a term.
This chapter starts from the premise that secondary sanctions are invariably adopted to exert pressure upon foreign economic or financial actors operating in third states, with the intention to modify their conduct in alignment with the primary sanctions already imposed by the sanctioning state against the target state. As follows, due to their extraterritorial scope and their exceptional capacity to encroach upon the sovereignty of other countries, the legal status of secondary sanctions under international law is controversial. This contribution seeks to elucidate if secondary sanctions may amount to economic coercion and whether as a result these measures could constitute a breach to the principle of non-intervention. The chapter closes by exploring the potential avenues for regime interaction between the rules governing the exercise of jurisdiction by states and the principle of non-intervention in the context of secondary sanctions.
The growing range and changing nature of unilateral sanctions have seen the emergence of a new label of so-called ‘secondary’ sanctions, as opposed to the more traditional ‘primary’ sanctions. While there is no accepted legal definition of secondary sanctions, in essence, secondary sanctions restrict economic transactions between third countries which may be entirely lawful under the law of these countries. Their extraterritorial character gives secondary sanctions their distinctive and particularly controversial character. Secondary sanctions create inter-State tension and may possibly violate a number of public international law regimes. They may harm the politico-economic interests of third States and cause headaches for private economic operators, whose potential exposure to secondary sanctions complicates the already complex web of multi-jurisdictional norms governing their international business transactions.
Water-mediated claims in both international law and domestic law are often framed around, or adjudicated based on land-centred principles. In Canada, too, such claims tend to be judicially assessed through land-centric concepts. This approach has significant implications for Indigenous law and related claims to water-mediated spaces. It also has consequences for both international law and domestic law, particularly with respect to how aqua nullius and similar Eurocentric concepts are disguised and used in settler-colonial states like Canada. Accordingly, this article urges a critical engagement with Indigenous law and similar cosmologies on water in a manner that foregrounds the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and in re-reading how the UNDRIP is incorporated and implemented in Canada.
Volume I of The Cambridge History of International Law introduces the historiography of international law as a field of scholarship. After a general introduction to the purposes and design of the series, Part 1 of this volume highlights the diversity of the field in terms of methodologies, disciplinary approaches, and perspectives that have informed both older and newer historiographies in the recent three decades of its rapid expansion. Part 2 surveys the history of international legal history writing from different regions of the world, spanning roughly the past two centuries. The book therefore offers the most complete treatment of the historical development and current state of international law history writing, using both a global and an interdisciplinary perspective.
The idea of human rights has been much criticized from a historical perspective but curiously enough its theoretical and practical contributions to the study of time, memory, and history have never been systematically explored. How is it to look at the past from a human rights perspective? How can historical writing benefit from applying human rights logic? In tackling these questions, the book first clarifies what a human rights view of the past is. The constituent dimensions of the past – time, memory, and history – are then reviewed, indicating what a human rights perspective can add to the study of each. Finally, the benefits accruing from a human rights view of the past to historical theory and practice are highlighted.
This chapter offers a synthetic overview of the range of international law issues that arose during the course of the Vietnam War, especially as Americans took over from the French after Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and moved towards massive escalation between 1964 and 1973. The chapter begins with the debate about what law applied to the conflict, which turned on the legal status of South Vietnam. The chapter then asks what claims were possible and plausible when it came to the legality of American intervention in the war. Next, the chapter addresses the different kinds of warfare in which the United States engaged, from its bombing campaigns over North Vietnamese territory and waters to the changing forms of its counterinsurgency in the South and, later, across the Cambodian border. Finally, the chapter concludes by examining the legal legacy of Vietnam: not only how it led to the most significant substantive development of the laws of war since the Geneva Conventions, the First and Second Additional Protocols, but also, and equally importantly, how it ensured that international law would play (for good or ill) a central role in debate over and analysis of all future conflicts.
Chapter 3 addresses the suggestion that for a special regime to exist, there must be a mutual engagement of community members. As the chapter argues, in the context of international law, a mutual engagement among a group of international law specialists can be inferred from their participation in a distinct legal discourse, and from their further specialization and distinct way of ascribing functions to legal agents. More specifically, it can be inferred from: the publication of specialized international law journals; the way of organization of conferences and workshops; the creation of inter-governmental organization; the work of NGOs; the specialized research profile of international scholars and description of chairs; their separation of tasks and division of labour; and the function that they ascribe to the judiciary and to the international legal scholar.
This chapter addresses the suggestion that for a special regime to exist, community members must be engaged in a joint enterprise. In the context of international law, to claim that a group of international law specialists is engaged in a joint enterprise is to assert that they do what they do based on the idea that some certain state of affairs is desirable. As Chapter 4 argues, in the context of international law, the existence of such a presupposition can be inferred from the actual pursuit of those specialists of a distinct state of affairs, and the way in which they perform assignments.
This empirical study examines the potential and the obstacles of transitional justice in addressing the denial of the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar (also known as Burma). It utilizes a qualitative research approach, drawing on relevant scholarship of truth-seeking as a transitional justice mechanism, criminology and international law. Empirical data were collected through in-depth interviews with victims of the Rohingya community and key informants in two separate stages between 2022 and 2023. This study presents an interdisciplinary approach to assess the role of a truth commission – a truth-seeking tool – in confronting Myanmar’s denial of this crime. It suggests that examining amnesties, as well as disarmament, reintegration and rehabilitation programmes for the individual perpetrators within the framework of a truth commission can provide a more nuanced discourse of addressing the decades-long denial of the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar.
Edited by
Randall Lesaffer, KU Leuven & Tilburg University,Anne Peters, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg
This chapter focuses on the recent (re)turn to history in scholarship of international relations (IR) on international law. We argue that two interrelated trends explain this development. The first is primarily internal to the field, where historically sensitive approaches have gained ground over the past thirty years. The second is external and the result of IR scholars’ productive engagement with debates in other fields, including global history, intellectual history and legal history. Although the new historical IR work on international law remains heavily indebted to histories produced outside the confines of the discipline, IR scholars at the vanguard of this movement are increasingly comfortable with writing histories themselves. New IR historical accounts have thus emerged, spanning broad subjects of international society, order and transformation, as well as specific areas of international law, including human rights, humanitarian law and international organisations. We review the history of the disciplinary divide between IR and legal history, outline how IR theoretical approaches have made use of history, highlight some of the thematic areas of the new IR historical work, and lay out possible future research directions.