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Chapter 5 is comparative in nature and explores the enactment of legislation in two federal polities, namely the United States and Germany. The objective of this chapter is to highlight that while national legislative processes are dominated by party politics, the European legislative process is dominated by trilogues – to some extent, trilogues make up for the absence of a genuine party system at EU level. It is within and between political parties and trilogues, respectively, that positions are discussed, coalitions cemented, institutional interdependences managed, political differences solved, and compromise brokered. When legislative files eventually reach the floor of the competent legislative institutions, their fate is – most of the time – already sealed. This chapter aims at highlighting that leaving legislative and interchamber coordination to party structures is no more – and possibly less – democratically accountable than entrusting it to trilogues, especially in times of strong partisanship and grand coalitions.
This chapter traces the ways in which Hume’s ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’ responds not only to Harrington’s Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) but also to Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1748). The large federal constitution that Hume proposed at the end of his Political Discourses turns out to have as much in common with Montesquieu’s understanding of modern monarchy as it does with Harrington’s vision for an equal republic. Indeed, there is reason to suspect that Montesquieu’s criticism of Oceana in his chapter ‘On the English Constitution’ prompted Hume to devise his alternative version of Harrington’s commonwealth. Hume adapted Oceana’s framework for uniform electoral districts and tiers of representation to the spirit of commerce and competition that he and Montesquieu associated with modern Britain. The result was a state with ‘all the advantages of both a great and little commonwealth’.
Abolishing states would not be the end of the matter; the country’s leaders would have to make a number of fundamental secondary decisions. Someone would ultimately have to decide which of the essential functions currently performed by state government should be nationalized, which ones should be localized, and, as to the latter, how the various local functions are to be further distributed among the many different species of local governments – municipalities, counties, townships, special purpose districts, and unincorporated areas. Who should select the decision-maker? Decisions would also be needed as to the processes and responsibilities for replacing the states’ current roles in national elections, in supplying the bulk of the country’s judges, and in the constitutional amendment process. This chapter considers the options for filling those voids. In the process, it offers a portrait of what a unitary American republic might look like without state government.
This introductory chapter articulates the main thesis and summarizes the arguments that support it. It lays out the reasons that the thesis is important, describes what the book adds to the existing literature, explains some critical terms and concepts, and adds necessary disclaimers.
Reimagining the American Union challenges readers to imagine an America without state government. No longer a union of arbitrarily constructed states, the country would become a union of its people. The first book ever to argue for abolishing state government in the US, it exposes state government as the root cause of the gravest threats to American democracy. Some of those threats are baked into the Constitution; others are the product of state legislatures abusing their already-constitutionally-outsized powers through gerrymanders, voter suppression schemes, and other less-publicized manipulations that all too often purposefully target African-American and other minority voters. Reimagining the American Union goes on to demonstrate how having three levels of legislative bodies (national, state, and local) – and three levels of taxation, bureaucracy, and regulation – wastes taxpayer money and pointlessly burdens the citizenry. Two levels of government – national and local – would do just fine. After debunking the offsetting benefits typically claimed for state government, the book concludes with a portrait of what a new, unitary American republic might look like.
This chapter examines popular appeal to local Heimat as a site of political renewal in Cologne. It shows how democratically engaged localists advanced narratives of “Cologne democracy” and “openness to the world,” while replacing nationalist narrative of their region as a “Watch on the Rhine” with that of the Rhineland as a “bridge” to the West. Democratically engaged localists further argued that Heimat should be about promoting European unity and post-nationalist ideas of nation. Such groups constructed these narratives by pulling on useable local histories and reinventing local traditions. Such early democratic identifications, however, existed alongside major failures in democratic practice and frequent depictions of the Eastern bloc as an “anti-Heimat.” Emphasis on democratic local histories also aggravated failures to confront guilt for the Nazi past. Exclusion of newcomers also represented a significant challenge. More inclusively minded Cologners attempted to combat persistent exclusionary practices by arguing for “Cologne tolerance” as a local value and by insisting that a correctly understood Heimat concept should generate sympathy for the displaced.
This introduction outlines the main questions and debates which the book addresses, followed by an overview of the history of the Heimat idea and the study’s methodological approach. While scholars have looked at post-war cinematic and literary Heimat tropes, the book argues for more attention to Heimat as specific sites of home. On the question of the concept’s Germanness, it steers a middle path that recognizes how the history of German-speaking Europe has shaped the concept, while acknowledging its connection to broader questions about place attachment. Rather than positing a single “German” understanding across time and space, the work approaches discussions about Heimat as an evolving and contested discourse about place attachments and their relationship to diverse political and social issues. The introduction continues by outlining the book’s contribution to debates about West German democratization, reconstruction, post-war confrontation with dissonant lives, and expellee history. It concludes by outlining the book’s findings on the history of efforts to eliminate the concept in the 1960s and left-wing attempts to re-engage with Heimat in the 1970s and 1980s.
The term 'Heimat', referring to a local sense of home and belonging, has been the subject of much scholarly and popular debate following the fall of the Third Reich. Countering the persistent myth that Heimat was a taboo and unusable term immediately after 1945, Geographies of Renewal uncovers overlooked efforts in the aftermath of the Second World War to conceive of Heimat in more democratic, inclusive, and pro-European modes. It revises persistent misconceptions of Heimat as either tainted or as a largely reactionary idea, revealing some surprisingly early identifications between home and democracy. Jeremy DeWaal further traces the history of efforts to eliminate the concept, which first emerged during the Cold War crisis of the early 1960s and reassesses why so many on the political left sought to re-engage with Heimat in the 1970s and 1980s. This revisionist history intervenes in larger contemporary debates, asking compelling questions surrounding the role of the local, the value of community, and the politics of place attachments.
Is there an alternative to EU dual decision-making regimes? The chapter advances the alternative model of federal union as distinct from the federal state.
The rise of populist parties in Europe has generated an enormous amount of academic literature. Previous research has thoroughly examined the factors contributing to the electoral success of populist parties. Surprisingly, very little attention has been paid to the role of decentralization, one of the most widespread forms of governance in the world. This paper aims to fill this gap by presenting a theoretical and empirical account of the effect of decentralization on the electoral fortunes of populist parties in Europe. Using aggregated data from election results in 30 European countries, this paper puts competing hypotheses to the test. I argue that the mechanism linking decentralization and populist parties’ national election results is, in fact, indirect and depends on the existence of a regional tier of government. Results suggest that having representation in subnational parliaments plays a significant role in the national success of populist parties, and this effect is contingent on the degree of regional authority.
This chapter addresses symmetry’s implications for separation of powers and federalism. It suggests that some major structural questions, such as the long-running debate over the president’s authority to fire or “remove” executive officers, hold an intensity out of step with their current political stakes. By contrast, other recent decisions, particularly those limiting agency authority over “major” policy questions and intensively reviewing the reasoned justification for certain policies, threaten to enable selective judicial disapproval of policies favored by progressives rather than conservatives. A preference for symmetry should support limiting or reconsidering these decisions. With respect to federalism, symmetry should likewise encourage the development of doctrines that grant parallel opportunities and protections to rival “red” and “blue” states dominated by either the Democratic or Republican Party.
Since 2017, Republican lawmakers in a growing number of US states have formed ideological intraparty organizations, modeled after the US House Freedom Caucus, that seek to move state policy further rightward. What explains the appearance of these state freedom caucuses, and what kinds of lawmakers are more likely to join them? We show that the creation of these caucuses was initially motivated by concerns that state-level legislative Republican parties are too ideologically heterogeneous but has since been driven by conservative entrepreneurs seeking to spread freedom caucuses nationally. We also provide evidence that conservative legislators are more likely to join a new state freedom caucus, as one would expect, but also that, in a few states, lawmakers who are more electorally vulnerable lawmakers or lack internal influence have also been more likely to join. These findings underscore how state-level ideological caucuses can appeal to members’ multiple goals and serve as instruments of vertical polarization in a federal system.
John Stuart Mill is central to parallel debates in mainstream contemporary political epistemology and philosophy of federalism concerning the epistemic dimension(s) of legitimate authority. Many scholars invoke Mill to support epistemic arguments for democratic decision-making and decentralized federalism as a means of conferring democratic legitimacy. This article argues that Millian considerations instead provide reason to reject common epistemic arguments for decentralized federalism. Combining Mill's own insights about the epistemic costs of decentralization and recent work in philosophy, politics, and economics undermines purportedly Millian arguments for federalism focused on political experimentation, diversity and participation. Contrary to many interpretations, Millian considerations weaken, rather than strengthen, arguments for federalism. Any valid justification for federalism must instead rest on non-epistemic considerations. This conclusion is notable regardless of how one interprets Mill. But it also supports Mill's stated preference for local decisions subject to central oversight.
Chapter 5 is the second of three chapters laying a basic foundation in German law and politics. The chapter presents the key institutions of German politics and law. It starts with a presentation of the German states and federalism. It then focuses on the strength of the chancellor in governance, including law-making and executive power. The chapter then presents the German judicial system, presenting the decentralized and specialized nature of the German judicial framework.
This chapter examines the origins of the police power in the American constitutional system. In the beginning, the framers of the early state constitutions were engaged in two struggles: how to create effective frameworks of government, and how to define the relationship between national and state government. The police power was one the key reserved powers the states possessed viz. the Tenth Amendment. This chapter illuminates how the state police power emerged and developed in the nineteenth century and, in particular, how it evolved from a notion of sic utere (righting specific wrongs) to salus populi (promoting the public good). It ends at the end of Reconstruction, with key cases illuminating the scope of state regulatory discretion under the police power.
This chapter considers the impact of expanding national power and the configuration of the federal government’s constitutional power in the exercise of the police power by state governments. It considers (and rejects) the claim of a national police power. It proceeds to discuss the ways in which the nature and scope of the police power does contribute to a dynamic federalism, thereby augmenting not supplanting federal power, all in the service of a successful and basically progressive approach to regulation and regulatory power generally.
In political science, federalism is often treated as an “antithesis” to empire. While Canadian Politics has recently become more attentive to the importance of ongoing settler colonialism as conditioning Canadian political life writ large, this has yet to induce a paradigm shift in understanding how the institutional logics of the state were established by, and in order to advance, colonial and imperial ends. This article contributes to this broader understanding by exploring how, in Canada, the federal arrangement congeals a constitutionalized whiteness that facilitates both the internal coherence of a settler class and its subsequent continental expansion. Attentive to the importance of this constitutional development within a world-spanning imperial context, this article also suggests that the simultaneous innovation of Dominion status contoured the early twentieth-century's global colour line, as self-determination was increasingly devolved to other white settler polities. The contradictory realities of these processes are also noted.
The characterisation, legal status and future of islands are increasingly prominent in international and legal affairs. This emerging ‘legal era of islands’ demands a clearer understanding of the multiple distinctive legal issues that islands, whether as sub-national political units or as the territory of continental or mainland States, raise. This article conducts the first contemporary study of these issues by examining the international and constitutional legal status of island territories. It finds that although the relationship between islands and mainland States is characterised by incredible diversity, island territories are pursuing a range of innovative strategies to preserve and protect their autonomy.
Chapter 3 outlines our three conceptual innovations for the study of European integration and EU interventions in the socioeconomic field. First, we shift from the classical distinction of negative and positive integration to one that distinguishes horizontal and vertical integration modes. Second, we propose to go beyond the classical, state-centred (intergovernmental or federal) paradigms of EU law and political science, as we have found that the EU’s new economic governance (NEG) regime mimics the corporate governance regime that transnational corporations use to steer the activities of their subsidiaries and their workforce. Finally, we pursue an analytical approach that complements existing EU politicisation studies, which assess the salience of Eurosceptic views in media debates, opinion polls, elections, and referenda, as we must study EU politicisation also at the meso-level of interest politics. After all, the political cleavages that structure national politics have neither been created in individuals’ minds at the micro-level nor are they simply an outcome of systemic macro-level changes.
Using a unique dataset of legislators' electoral and biographical data in the Canadian provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and the federal parliament, this article analyses the extent to which family dynasties affected the career development of legislators since the mid-18th century. We find that the prevalence of dynasties was higher in provincial legislatures than it was in the federal parliament, that the number of dynasties in the Senate increased until the mid-20th century, and that the proportion of dynastic legislators at the subnational level was similar to the numbers seen in the United Kingdom during the early 19th century. Our results confirm the existence of a clear career benefit in terms of cabinet and senate appointments. In contrast to the American case and in line with the United Kingdom experience, we find no causal relationship between a legislator's tenure length and the presence of a dynasty.