This chapter situates the Declaration of Independence in relation to another founding document of the United States, the federal Constitution. It assesses the Declaration’s role in debates over the Constitution, first during the latter’s framing in 1787, then in the struggle for ratification, and then later as political actors sought to interpret each document in light of the other. From the outset, debate over the Constitution highlighted the Declaration’s multivalence as well as its rhetorical power. Both defenders and opponents of the Constitution have sought to show how their cause best aligned with the ideals and aspirations expressed in the Declaration. Anti-federalists and their successors constructed a powerful narrative which juxtaposed the Declaration’s call to liberty with the Constitution’s blueprint for authority. Yet there was from the beginning an equally strong tradition that saw the Constitution as a consummation of the Declaration’s promise. Either way, this chapter argues, the Declaration continues to help shape the meaning of the Constitution – and to have its own meaning remolded in turn.

Chapter 5 introduces readers to India’s regional diversity. The top-down and the bottom-up political changes in India discussed in Chapters 1 to 4 of this book are present more sharply in some parts of India than in others. In order to capture some of this variation, this chapter first provides some systematic comparisons of India’s states, including the context of Indian federalism and how that shapes center–state relations in India.

The book ends by tracking the legacy of the Minorities Commission. The commission set a precedent for managing minority anxieties as Nigeria entered nation-statehood in 1960. It also failed to resolve the political tension these anxieties caused, leaving the newly independent Nigerian state with a crisis of citizenship that lingers to this day. This crisis of citizenship informed the national breakdown that led to the devastating civil war (also known as the Biafran War, 1967–70) and the ongoing fragmentation of Nigeria into smaller and more numerous states. Because certain Niger Delta peoples have been fixed as minorities in Nigeria, the needs and well-being of Niger Delta communities are not priorities, especially as they are construed as being at odds with national needs and priorities. It is in this context that their status as minorities has had the most devastating implications. The book closes by exploring the various ways these communities have used their minority status to simultaneously challenge and insist upon inclusion within the Nigerian state, asking what might be possible for their future as Nigerian citizens.

The Minorities Commission of 1957-58 demonstrated the degree to which people had aligned their ethnic affiliation with the newly articulated political identities by the late 1950s. Even though each region contained significant heterogeneous populations, each of the major political parties aligned with the numerically major ethnic group, which also conformed to colonially construed majorities (i.e., Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo). This further exacerbated the growing sense of alienation minorities felt amid nationalist fervor during this period. In the end, the Minorities Commission recommended that Nigeria enter independence with the existing tripartite regional structure. However, it did recommend the new Nigerian state set up “special areas” or “minority areas” in the Western and Eastern Regions under the jurisdiction of the federal government; the idea was that these would receive special consideration for further development. Addressing the minority question would have required more time and resources than the British government was willing to give to this colony.

Dealing with cumulative environmental problems unavoidably requires repeated interactions (coordination) among multiple and often many actors relevant to the other three CIRCle functions (conceptualization, information, and regulatory intervention). Coordination can promote effective approaches, avoid policy drift, and resolve disputes. Key actors may include multiple agencies and levels of government, quasi-governmental organizations, supranational and international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations representing stakeholders of different kinds. Rules can help overcome significant cost, time, and political disincentives to establishing and maintaining coordination. Two broad types of formal rules for coordination emerge in mechanisms for coordinating conceptualization, information, and intervention: those that establish an institution, and those that provide for interaction in other ways, such as duties to notify or cooperate or undertake joint planning. Legal mechanisms can also expressly provide for dealing with policy drift and resolving disputes between regulatory actors. Real-world examples are provided of legal mechanisms to support these forms of coordination.

This chapter explores the overlooked constitutional reforms and the constitution-making process in the over 550 princely states spread across 45 per cent of the subcontinent’s territory that were not part of British India. We argue that the constitutional processes in the princely states were fundamental to the subsequent successful merger of the states and to the making of the Indian Union. Constitutionalism in the princely states was an insistent refrain to India’s constitution making and became the standard language through which to think about and act on political aspirations for democratic government. The numerous parallel constitution-making processes in the states produced comparable constitutional templates that could ultimately be assembled into the new Indian constitution. The chapter analyses constitutionalism within the states, among different states and between the states and the Constituent Assembly. It examines the understudied constitution making process in Rewa and Ratlam states, the formations of unions of states, and finally looks at Manipur state in the north-eastern frontier of India to show the limits of the constitutional process of integration.

The Indian constitution was poised to create a new map of power, transforming the relationship between existing state agencies and new authorities. This chapter demonstrates how the individuals staffing the state apparatus were not mere spectators, passively following the constitution-making process, but actors who actively sought to influence, change, or resist the emerging constitutional order through both public and private channels. The success of the future constitution of India required a smooth transition of the organs of the colonial state to the postcolonial order. Turning their loyalty and ambitions to the new state and its constitutional order was not an obvious outcome in 1947. The chapter examines how provincial legislators sought to guard their autonomy; how the higher judiciary endeavoured to protect their judicial independence; the contested constitutional status of Delhi; and finally, how the ‘neutral’ bureaucracy who were managing the process of constitution making actively sought to defend their own jurisdiction and interests at the time. This process, which paralleled the integration of territories, led to the functional integration of the units of the state.

This chapter details the fragmented nature of the last sixty years of Aboriginal land repossession across Australia, both in terms of the nature of the rights and the level of restitution. Exploring the limited and uneven national Aboriginal land rights picture in 2024, we argue for an appreciation of the federal dimension of land rights policymaking. Uneven land restitution has resulted not just from spatially varying degrees of land commodification and the differing trajectories of land rights movements, although these were crucial. We aim to demonstrate that shifting state–Commonwealth (or Federal) relations within the Australian federation – crosscut against differing support from states and Commonwealth governments over time, and differing Commonwealth Government attitudes to federalism – led to a spatially uneven set of legislative land rights regimes across Australia. To do so, we narrate the varied responses to the Aboriginal land rights movement across the country in the wake of the Woodward Royal Commission in 1973 with an eye to the federal dimension. We argue that while the Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke governments from 1972 to 1991 all failed to legislate national land rights, they did so for very different reasons, leaving the land rights agenda to the states. Ultimately, it was the centralizing power of the High Court that brought about a national but inadequate and partial resolution to the Aboriginal land question. Finally, we provide a series of maps and tables describing the jurisdictional variation in rights and interests in land restored to Indigenous Peoples at present.

David Freeman Engstrom (Stanford) and Daniel B. Rodriguez (Northwestern) argue that current structure of American legal services regulation, known as “Our Bar Federalism,” is outdated. Fifty states maintain their own rules and regulatory apparatus for a legal profession and industry that are now national and multinational. This fragmented system is a key factor in the American civil justice system’s access-to-justice crisis, where restrictive state rules support the lawyers’ monopoly. With new legal services delivery models and AI, this scheme will seem increasingly provincial and retrograde. This chapter argues it’s time to rethink "Our Bar Federalism," and explore hybrid state-federal regulatory system.

Chapter One presents a normative theory of judicial review that relies on distinctions among strong, weak, and deferential judicial review. In a system of strong review, judicial decisions applying the Constitution are not subject to legislative override. In a system of weak review, judicial decisions are subject to legislative override. The chapter defends three main normative arguments. First, courts should apply strong judicial review in election-law cases to enhance the quality of representative democracy and ensure that every citizen has an equally effective voice in choosing our elected legislators. Second, courts should apply weak judicial review for most individual rights claims. Courts can provide robust protection for individual rights by applying federal statutes and international human rights treaties, instead of applying the Constitution, as the primary source of protection for individual rights. Third, courts should apply deferential review for claims involving federalism-based limits on Congress’s legislative powers. To protect state autonomy, the Court should exercise self-restraint to curb judicial violations of the Tenth Amendment.

Chapter Seven presents a critique of the Court’s so-called “federalism” doctrines. Those doctrines have had very little practical effect in protecting state autonomy from unwarranted federal interference. Under the banner of federalism, the Court has engaged in illegitimate judicial lawmaking by creating a set of judge-made rules that have no basis in the Constitution’s text. Moreover, when the Court speaks of federalism, it conveniently ignores the fact that the Supreme Court itself is part of the federal government. If the Court truly wants to protect state autonomy from unwarranted federal interference, it should exercise self-restraint by limiting the reach of judge-made law that interferes with state autonomy. In particular, the Court should repudiate incorporation doctrine – a judge-made doctrine invented by the Warren Court that has no basis in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a practical matter, incorporation doctrine imposes much more severe restrictions on state autonomy than all of the federal statutes (viewed in the aggregate) that the Court has invalidated under various federalism doctrines.