Most large real-world organizations contain multiple smaller groups, such as working groups within firms. However, can this sort of nested groups be used to alleviate coordination failures in the larger group? We report on a multi-player Stag Hunt experiment wherein we hierarchically structure a large group into mutually exclusive small groups. We offer varying incentive payments if efficient coordination is achieved at a large or small group level. The novelty of our design is that we hold the total payment size constant between treatments. In our nested incentive treatment, we reduce the reward for achieving large-group coordination by a small amount and reallocate the same amount to successful small-group coordination. The results reveal that incentive reallocations privileging small groups facilitate efficient large-group coordination in the nested group structure.

An intriguing study concluded that political conservatives exhibited enhanced self-control using the Stroop task [Clarkson et al.: The self-control consequences of political ideology. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A, 112(27): 8250–8253 (2015)]. We preregistered our plans to re-examine this finding using a larger, representative, incentivized, and ideologically balanced sample (n = 476). Across a variety of specifications, we report a consistent null effect of ideology on Stroop response latencies and the Stroop interference effect. These findings suggest that the previously reported result may not generalize. We conclude that there is no causal relationship between political ideology and self-control, as measured by the Stroop task.

While laboratory and field experiments are the major items in the toolbox of behavioral economists, household panel studies can complement them and expand their research potential. We introduce the German Socio-Economic Panel’s Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS), which offers researchers detailed panel data and the possibility to collect personalized experimental and survey data for free. We discuss what SOEP-IS can offer to behavioral economists and illustrate a set of design ideas with examples. Although we build our discussion on SOEP-IS, our purpose is to provide a guide that can be generalized to other household panel studies as well.

Statistical power is an important detail to consider in the design phase of any experiment. This paper serves as a reference for experimental economists on power calculations. We synthesize many of the questions and issues frequently brought up regarding power calculations and the literature that surrounds that. We provide practical coded examples and tools available for calculating power, and suggest when and how to report power calculations in published studies.

Expectations-based reference dependence has been shown to be important across a variety of contexts in Psychology and Economics. Do expectations play a role in moral judgment? The higher our beliefs are relative to an outcome, do we punish more harshly? This paper reports a series of experiments investigating the hypothesis that expectations as reference points per se affect punishment. The experimental design varies the expectation the Punisher holds just before she learns what actually occurred. In tandem with the manipulation, expectations are shown to vary significantly and substantially. However, punishment does not respond to these exogenous changes in expectations. After 17 sessions, 295 Punishers, and six experimental setups, expectations are shown not to affect punishment in any systematic way.

Betrayal aversion has been operationalized as the evidence that subjects demand a higher risk premium to take social risks compared to natural risks. This evidence has been first shown by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (J Econ Behav 98:294–310, 2004) using an adaptation of the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism (BDM, Becker et al. Behav Sci 9:226–232, 1964). We compare their implementation of the BDM mechanism with a new version designed to facilitate subjects’ comprehension. We find that, although the two versions produce different distributions of values, the size of betrayal aversion, measured as an average treatment difference between social and natural risk settings, is not different across the two versions. We further show that our implementation is preferable to use in practice as it reduces substantially subjects’ mistakes and the likelihood of noisy valuations.

This paper specifies the panel data experimental design condition under which ordinary least squares, fixed effects, and random effects estimators yield identical estimates of treatment effects. This condition is relevant to the large body of laboratory experimental research that generates panel data. Although the point estimates and the true standard errors of the estimated average treatment effects are identical across the three estimators, the estimated standard errors differ. A standard F test as well as asymptotic reasoning guide the choice of which estimated standard errors are the appropriate ones to use for statistical inference.

There is a long-standing unresolved debate in game theory and experimental economics regarding the behavioral equivalence of the direct-response method (hot play) and the strategy method (cold play). Using a unified experimental framework, we compare behavior elicited via both methods in four different Centipede Games that differ in their incentives to take or pass, in the evolution of those incentives over decision nodes, and in the asymmetry of the incentives across the two player roles. Out of the four Centipede Games, we find that both methods yield statistically different behavior in two of them, while in the remaining two we cannot reject the same behavior across the hot and cold methods. Whenever the behavior diverges, hot play consistently makes individuals stop earlier. These findings should shift the question from whether both methods are generically behaviorally equivalent to under which conditions they are (not) and why.

We establish whether the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation is dependent on the degree of approval motivation within teams. Approval motivation is defined as the desire to produce positive perceptions in others and the incentive to acquire the approval of others as well as the desire to avoid disapproval, (Martin in J Personality Assess 48(5):508–519, 1984). Contrary to the theoretical predictions, the results from the experiment suggest that mutual monitoring was not effective in fostering cooperation in teams. Furthermore, the efficacy of mutual monitoring in fostering cooperation was not correlated with the degree of approval motivation within teams.

Dictator game experiments come in three flavors: plain vanilla with strictly dichotomous separation of dictator and recipient roles, an interactive alternative whereby every subject acts in both roles, and a variant thereof with role uncertainty. We add information regarding which of these three protocols was used to data from the leading meta-study by Engel (Exp Econ 14(4):583–610, 2011) and investigate how these variations matter. Our meta-regressions suggest that interactive protocols with role duality compared with standard protocols, in addition to being relevant as a control for other effects, render subjects’ giving less generous but more efficiency-oriented. Our results help organize existing findings in the field and indicate sources of confounds.

Laboratory experiments have been often replaced by online experiments in the last decade. This trend has been reinforced when academic and research work based on physical interaction had to be suspended due to restrictions imposed to limit the spread of Covid-19. Therefore, data quality and results from web experiments have become an issue which is currently investigated. Are there significant differences between lab experiments and online findings? We contribute to this debate via an experiment aimed at comparing results from a novel online protocol with traditional laboratory settings, using the same pool of participants. We find that participants in our experiment behave in a similar way across settings and that there are at best weakly significant and quantitatively small differences in behavior observed using our online protocol and physical laboratory setting.

Formal enforcement punishing defectors can sustain cooperation by changing incentives. In this paper, we introduce a second effect of enforcement: it can also affect the capacity to learn about the group's cooperativeness. Indeed, in contexts with strong enforcement, it is difficult to tell apart those who cooperate because of the threat of fines from those who are intrinsically cooperative types. Whenever a group is intrinsically cooperative, enforcement will thus have a negative dynamic effect on cooperation because it slows down learning about prevalent values in the group that would occur under a weaker enforcement. We provide theoretical and experimental evidence in support of this mechanism. Using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, we observe that, in early interactions, having faced an environment with fines in the past decreases current cooperation. We further show that this results from the interaction between enforcement and learning: the effect of having met cooperative partners has a stronger effect on current cooperation when this happened in an environment with no enforcement. Replacing one signal of deviation without fine by a signal of cooperation without fine in a player's history increases current cooperation by 10%; while replacing it by a signal of cooperation with fine increases current cooperation by only 5%.

I develop a survey method for estimating social influence over individual political expression, by combining the content-richness of document scaling with the flexibility of survey research. I introduce the “What Would You Say?” question, which measures self-reported usage of political catchphrases in a hypothetical social context, which I manipulate in a between-subjects experiment. Using Wordsticks, an ordinal item response theory model inspired by Wordfish, I estimate each respondent’s lexical ideology and outspokenness, scaling their political lexicon in a two-dimensional space. I then identify self-censorship and preference falsification as causal effects of social context on respondents’ outspokenness and lexical ideology, respectively. This improves upon existing survey measures of political expression: it avoids conflating expressive behavior with populist attitudes, it defines preference falsification in terms of code-switching, and it moves beyond trait measures of self-censorship, to characterize relative shifts in the content of expression between different contexts. I validate the method and present experiments demonstrating its application to contemporary concerns about self-censorship and polarization, and I conclude by discussing its interpretation and future uses.

Under what conditions are people more likely to support judicial invalidation of legislative acts? We theorize that constitutional recency confers greater democratic legitimacy on constitutional provisions, reducing concerns that judges may use dated language to impose their own will on a living majority. Exploiting differences among US state constitutions, we show in a pre-registered vignette experiment and conjoint analysis that Americans are more supportive of judicial review and original intent interpretation when presented with a younger constitutional provision or constitution. These results imply that Americans might alter their approach to the US Constitution if it were changed as easily and as often as a typical state constitution.

Threat perception provokes a range of behaviour, from cooperation to conflict. Correctly interpreting others’ behaviour, and responding optimally, is thought to be aided by ‘stepping into their shoes’ (i.e. mentalising) to understand the threats they have perceived. But IR scholarship on the effects of attempting this exercise has yielded mixed findings. One missing component in this research is a clear understanding of the link between effort and accuracy. I use a US-based survey experiment (study N = 839; pilot N = 297) and a novel analytic approach to study mentalising accuracy in the domain of threat perception. I find that accurately estimating why someone feels threatened by either climate change or illegal immigration is conditional on sharing a belief in the issue’s overall dangerousness. Similar beliefs about dangerousness are not proxies for shared political identities, and accuracy for those with dissimilar beliefs does not exceed chance. Focusing first on the emotional states of those who felt threatened did not significantly improve accuracy. These findings suggest that: (1) effort does not guarantee accuracy in estimating the threats others see; (2) emotion understanding may not be a solution to threat mis-estimation; and (3) misperception can arise from basic task difficulty, even without information constraints or deception.

This article investigates the effect of priming the existence of corrupt connections to the bureaucracy and of trusted references on the demand for intermediary services. We performed an experimental survey with undergraduate students in Caracas, Venezuela. Participants are presented with a hypothetical situation in which they need to obtain the apostille of their professional degrees in order to migrate and are considering whether to hire an intermediary (“gestor”) or not. The survey randomly reveals the existence of an illicit connection between the gestor and the bureaucracy and whether a trusted individual referred the intermediary. Our findings are not consistent with the “market maker” hypothesis that revealing the existence of illicit connections increases demand. Consistent with the view that trust is a key element in inherently opaque transactions, we find that the demand for intermediaries is price inelastic when gestores are referred by trusted individuals.

The human sciences should seek generalisations wherever possible. For ethical and scientific reasons, it is desirable to sample more broadly than ‘Western, educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic’ (WEIRD) societies. However, restricting the target population is sometimes necessary; for example, young children should not be recruited for studies on elderly care. Under which conditions is unrestricted sampling desirable or undesirable? Here, we use causal diagrams to clarify the structural features of measurement error bias and target population restriction bias (or ‘selection restriction’), focusing on threats to valid causal inference that arise in comparative cultural research. We define any study exhibiting such biases, or confounding biases, as weird (wrongly estimated inferences owing to inappropriate restriction and distortion). We explain why statistical tests such as configural, metric and scalar invariance cannot address the structural biases of weird studies. Overall, we examine how the workflows for causal inference provide the necessary preflight checklists for ambitious, effective and safe comparative cultural research.