The European Union (EU) is currently overhauling its pharmaceutical regulations, seeking to mature a single market for medicines as part of a ‘European Health Union’. We reflect on the interactions between regulations and markets in these reforms and investigate what this single market for medicines may mean in practice. We note how the proposed reforms aim to ensure equitable access to innovative treatments, yet at the same time, tie this access directly to regulatory exclusivities, limiting price competition. The reforms also do not seek full pricing transparency: prices will remain largely opaque and be set at the national levels rather than created through market exchange and open competition at the EU level. The envisioned single market for medicines thus remains a market that operates without direct reference to price − a situation not addressed head-on by the proposed reforms.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine catalysed a shift in the security and defence policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states. Notably, the deployment of the European Peace Facility (EPF) to finance lethal military materiel for Ukraine has been described as a gamechanger for the EU. This article explores to what extent and how the policy shift regarding the EPF signals broader evolution in EU strategic agency. Contributing to the study of European strategic cultures, the article investigates dynamics of change and convergence in the strategic discourses of the EU and selected member states regarding the EPF amid the exogenous shock and policy shift. Specifically, the article first traces the evolution of the EU’s strategic narrative and its use of the EPF before and after the invasion. Second, drawing on interview data, it analyses four member states’ approaches to this instrument. The findings point to a changed strategic narrative and an evolving practice regarding EU military assistance, highlighting the EU institutions’ initiative-making power in crisis. While the member states continue to use the EPF for varying purposes, the joint experience of using the tool contributed to shifting national perspectives and growing consensus on the utility of EU security agency.

Climate policy remains inadequate even among leaders like the European Union. This is largely due to opposition from fossil fuel producers and heavy industrial sectors that are existentially threatened by decarbonisation. The rise of green industrial policy promises to advance climate policy by reducing this opposition and mobilising corporate supporters. But can climate policy strategies actually shift the balance of interest group mobilisation among expected winners and losers simply by using different policy instruments? I theorise that policy strategies (de)mobilise corporate interests through regulatory targeting. Corporations directly targeted by a proposed policy are more likely to lobby because of policy-specific informational advantages and more certain and immediate impacts. Compared to traditional climate policies that impose direct costs on fossil fuels, green industrial policies should therefore demobilise high-carbon firms and mobilise their low-carbon counterparts. I collect and code novel data on all corporate responses to online consultations in European Union climate and energy policy from 2017 to 2022. Dyadic regression analyses confirm that low-carbon sectors lobby mostly on green industrial policies while high-carbon sectors mobilise more around traditional climate policies, and that stakeholders are more likely to lobby when directly targeted by policies. These results document that climate policies can indeed determine climate politics, a finding that has implications for other policy areas characterised by business conflict and for interest group scholarship more broadly.

The recent turn to market activism is transforming the politics around the state and capitalism, while significantly restructuring markets. We focus on one important but understudied element in this development: the securitization of market competition in the European Union. We argue that European political actors are strategically using specific narratives to construct competition policies in a new way, one that implicates the geopolitical standing of the EU and its national security. This contrasts with the longstanding view of EU competition policy as existing in a separate sphere, disembedded from politics, where market efficiency is paramount. To empirically capture this change, we undertake a systematic analysis of DG Competition Annual Reports, using a language-analysis schema over the decade from 2013 to 2023. Our findings demonstrate that this securitization strategy has been consistently increasing over time in the EU, evidenced in the rhetorical use of crises, the linking of markets to a larger set of issues and policy goals, the invocation of geopolitical pressures, and the framing of a need for the consolidation of EU power. We note, however, that this policy turn towards securitization of economic policy brings substantial political tensions given the EU’s limited democratic accountability.

In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aimed at positioning China at the forefront of the global economy. Central to the BRI is the pursuit of energy security—a long-standing priority linked to diplomacy and essential for China’s continued growth. To meet its rising energy needs, China has launched numerous infrastructure development projects, with energy playing a key role within the broader BRI framework. Similarly, since the oil crisis of the 1970s, the European Union (EU) has prioritised energy security through investments in alternative energy sources and resource diversification. This article explores the shared interests of these two economic powers in securing and investing in alternative energy. It focuses on a central question: how might the BRI align with the EU’s Neighborhood Policy to strengthen energy independence across Eurasia and generate mutual benefit? This analysis examines both the challenges and the opportunities for collaboration and synergy.

This article advances research on ‘collective securitisation’ by theorising how ostensibly separate securitisation processes within different international organisations (IOs) interact and shape each other’s policy outcomes. Focusing on climate change adaptation within the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU), the study uses an extensive database of documents (1972–2023) and interviews with officials to trace these dynamics. The analysis reveals that the UN initially securitised climate change through a risk-oriented approach emphasising long-term risk management, subsequently influencing the EU’s adaptation policies. Conversely, the EU intermittently reintroduced threat-based framing into the UN, highlighting recursive interactions between these organisations. Findings suggest key moments of cross-organisational influence, notably during the audience acceptance and policy output stages. By incorporating insights from transnational policy learning and norm diffusion, the paper theorises precisely how and when these interactions occur, enriching the analytical framework of Collective Securitisation. This article contributes to understanding how international organisations’ securitisation processes interact and shape climate adaptation policies, emphasising the nuanced interplay between threat-based and risk-based logics.

The international solidarity principle is a crucial legal norm of international society. It helps guide state conduct and facilitate cooperation among international actors to respond to global challenges and uphold human rights. The European Union (EU) and its Member States have argued that their bilateral agreements with non-EU countries to prevent irregular migration to Europe is a demonstration of international solidarity that fulfils their obligations to asylum seekers and refugees. However, the EU’s interpretation of international solidarity in these arrangements has been contested. This article argues that the EU has strategically interpreted the international solidarity principle to fit in with, and complement, its migration deterrence policy framework. It posits that the EU’s interpretation abuses the international solidarity principle as it aims to separate the solidarity principle from the realisation of human rights, thereby hurting, instead of benefitting, asylum seekers and refugees. This article makes an important contribution to understanding how the solidarity principle is interpreted between EU and non-EU partners, and the intimate connection between solidarity and the realisation of human rights. More importantly, it demonstrates how the interpretation and evasion of the international solidarity principle has been shaped by, and shaped to fit, the EU’s migration externalisation policy framework.

Equitable access to medicines is vital for people with disabilities to receive effective, affordable, and quality treatment, helping preserve functionality, prevent further disability, and promote social and economic inclusion. This paper explores the specific medicine needs of people with disabilities in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), focusing on the European Union’s (EU) extraterritorial legal obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). As the first regional international organization to accede to a UN human rights treaty, the EU offers a unique case for examining how international legal commitments extend beyond its borders. The paper outlines a legal framework based on the CRPD to assess the EU’s responsibilities for ensuring access to medicines globally. This framework is applied to two case studies: the EU’s internal joint COVID-19 vaccine procurement strategy and its external BioNTainer initiative for vaccine production in Africa under Team Europe. The analysis finds that the EU falls short of its CRPD obligations, particularly in areas of technology transfer and intellectual property sharing, which are essential for equitable global vaccine access. The paper concludes that the EU’s current actions do not fulfill its human rights commitments to people with disabilities in LMICs.

Recent times have been hard for global governance, not least for formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs). Given changing conditions and their inability to adapt, many observers argue that FIGOs are drifting and losing ground to low-cost institutions (LCIs). We argue that this widespread perception is incomplete and that it dismisses too quickly the durability of FIGOs. We begin by pointing out that not all FIGOs are drifting and that some may even thrive amid transnational crises and power shifts. We then highlight the possibility that in a densely institutionalized global environment, states can substitute one FIGO for another. Thus, even as one FIGO is drifting, other FIGOs, rather than or alongside LCIs, can take the mantle. We identify and exemplify three key motivations for FIGO substitution: overcoming gridlock, enhancing ideological alignment, and policy laundering. During crises and power shifts, some members might paralyze a FIGO, leading to gridlock and prompting other members to cooperate in another FIGO. Power shifts and crises can also motivate dissatisfied FIGO members to pursue parallel activities in a FIGO that better fits their ideological outlook. Policy laundering occurs when members use one FIGO over another to signal political intent. We conclude by exploring the normative implications of FIGO substitution.

Amateur and professional athletes often consume protein supplements to accelerate muscle gain; however, it has been suggested that these products not only are associated with risks when consumed excessively. Several recent reports have indicated that certain products are contaminated with heavy metals. Therefore, in this study, we aimed to investigate protein powders in Hungary for heavy metal contamination. A total of 22 commercially available protein powders (including whey, vegan, and beef based) were purchased on the internet for testing. We analysed the samples using laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) to assess heavy metal contamination. The products were analysed for the presence of 16 elements (Be, Al, Cr, Mn, Co, Ni, Cu, As, Se, Rb, Cd, Sb, Cs, Ba, Hg, and Pb). The LIBS spectral analysis revealed the characteristics of the protein elements (C, C2, H, N, and O) and alkaline metals (Ca, Na, K, and Mg), which were consistent with the previous results. Neither LIBS nor ICP-MS measurements detected significant heavy metal content in the investigated samples above the limit specified in the regulations. Heavy metal contamination of protein supplements can be a serious health threat. Based on the varied results of the previous studies, it is prudent to include testing for heavy metals as part of the routine and mandatory quality control of these products.