This chapter describes steps that can be taken to advance deterrence theory using comprehensive deterrence theory (CDT). It discusses, for example, the possibility of identifying second-level principles that integrate CDT’s first-level principles. There is, too, the possibility of advancing CDT by investigating causes of the intrinsic elements and modifying the principles or creating new ones. Another avenue to pursue entails identifying how deterrent processes and effects may vary across different individuals, groups, conditions, types of crime, and units of analysis. Still other avenues involve incorporating offending theories into CDT and contemplating how deterrence processes may vary when considering offending onset, persistence, and desistance.

This chapter explains why right-wing strategies of adaptation and survival had varying degrees of success during and after the left turn. It argues that right-wing parties were most likely to survive and remain competitive in national elections when they relied on strong party brands and organizations. These strong party brands and organizations depended, in turn, on when the parties were founded and whether they had roots in an authoritarian regime.

In this chapter, we test the effects of community policing in the Sorsogon Province of the Philippines. The intervention generated a four-fold increase in police-citizen interactions in treated villages, but consistent with meta-analysis of all six sites in this volume, we found no effects of the intervention on crime rates or citizens’ attitudes about public safety. To disaggregate the effects of different aspects of community policing, we sequenced the implementation of community engagement (CEP) and problem-oriented policing (POP) but found no effects on the harmonized outcomes of either CEP on its own or the combination of CEP and POP. Finally, we present suggestive evidence of positive impacts on the specific types of crimes that barangays’ problem-oriented policing teams elected to focus on, indicating that while community policing cannot address all of a community’s problems en masse, it may improve specifically targeted issues.

In this chapter, we test the efficacy of community policing in thirteen districts throughout rural Uganda. As in many authoritarian regimes, police in Uganda serve the dual role of providing security to citizens on the one hand and quelling dissent and opposition on behalf of the regime on the other. Community policing may help citizens delink the political arm of the police from less politicized local officers. The community policing initiative we study was locally designed and funded by the Ugandan police. Our evaluation combines administrative crime data from the Uganda Police Force with surveys of thousands of Ugandan citizens, local leaders, and police officers. While the initiative we study succeeded in increasing the frequency of interactions between citizens and the police in these far-flung villages and improved citizens’ understanding of the criminal justice system, we find no evidence that it reduced crime, enhanced perceptions of safety, improved attitudes towards the police, or strengthened norms of cooperation with the police. These results are consistent with other chapters in this volume and point to the potential limitations of community policing in low-income countries.

This chapter describes patterns of crime and insecurity in the six study countries where the coordinated randomized trials took place and how these places compare to other countries. It then provides a theoretical framework for understanding the causes of crime, why crime rates often diverge from citizen perceptions of insecurity, and how crime and perceived insecurity can be reduced. The chapter concludes by surveying the set of policy tools used to reduce crime, and how policing fits into those tools.

What is the effect of community policing in settings where the rule of law is weak and communities gripped by crime turn to vigilantism to deter and prevent crime? In this chapter, I test the effectiveness of the Liberia National Police’s model of community policing, which focuses not only on building citizens’ trust and cooperation but also on providing communities with an alternative to vigilantism via its Community Watch Forum initiative. Drawing on large-scale crime surveys and administrative data, I find that the program led to moderate improvements in perceptions of police intentions, norms of cooperation, and perceptions of police capacity. I also find that the program increased community contributions to local security groups, reduced support for mob violence, and reduced reports of actual mob violence incidents by 39 percent. Despite these improvements, the program had no significant effect on other forms of crime victimization, crime reporting, crime tips, or residents’ sense of security.

This chapter summarizes the findings from our study, based on the meta-analysis averaging across the effects from the six experiments. We found that increases in locally appropriate community policing practices led to no improvements in citizen–police trust, no greater citizen cooperation with the police, and no reduction in crime. Despite a strong commitment from leadership in each context at the outset, the police implemented the interventions unevenly and incompletely. Although citizens reported more frequent and robust exposure to the police in places where community policing was implemented, we have limited evidence of police action in response to citizen reports.

What is the effect of community policing in settings where trust in the police is low and local legal institutions make witness cooperation unusually critical for certain kinds of offenses? We study the effect of a citizen-centric problem-oriented policing (CPOP) intervention introduced in March 2019 in Punjab’s Sheikhupura Region, a mixed urban-rural region of 4.9M people. Treatment roll-out in Pakistan was significantly hampered by frequent transfers of the regional and district police officers, reflecting the challenges of implementing institutional reforms in settings where the police face frequent personnel changes. Despite these challenges, the intervention, which included regular town hall meetings at which citizens could share their concerns, led to significant increases in overall perceptions about the police and in citizen beliefs that police have good intentions with respect to addressing crime. Despite the favorable institutional environment for increased trust to lead to crime reduction, we find no evidence of downstream impacts of the program on self-reported crime victimization or crime reported to the police. Observational evidence from follow-up visits suggests that this was because of resource and institutional challenges that limited community police officers’ agency and prevented them from responding to community concerns.

Chapter 4 investigates if whites apply an “anger penalty” to a Black politician relative to a white politician. We examine if an angry Black Democrat politician is racially handicapped among racially prejudiced whites. We test our predictions using several survey experiments on adult national samples of whites. We uncover evidence of an anger penalty in that racially prejudiced whites evaluate an angry Black Democrat politician more unfavorably than a non-angry Black Democrat politician and an angry white Democrat politician. Additionally, we find a similar effect among whites oriented to supporting group-based social hierarchies (i.e., having a social dominance orientation). In another study, we examine if this anger penalty depends on the issue. We expect an anger penalty is greater when the issue implicates Black Americans than if it is unrelated to the group. The findings show that racially prejudiced whites penalize a Black politician only when the anger is related to a racialized issue and not when the issue is unrelated to race. In our final experimental study, we examine whether a Black female politician’s anger is treated differently than a Black male’s; the anger penalty does not appear to be conditioned on gender.

What are the politics of choosing specific frames? This chapter is anchored on this question and finds a marked difference between frames employed at the field level and those by subfields in each country. It finds, for example, that the Kenyan national subfield’s favored frame resembled those selected by fields in the Global North. Concomitantly, it finds an ambivalence in using the genocide frame to talk about the atrocities in Darfur, arguing that this ambivalence is due to perceptions of how the frame would affect peace negotiations and the posture taken by transnational organizations such as the ICC, UN, and AU.

This chapter shows that violence today sows the seeds of future fighting through a series of vicious cycles. First, it is stressed that persistent poverty creates vicious cycles of deprivation and disputes. Namely, poverty provides the breeding ground for violence, as the lack of income and perspectives makes it relatively more appealing to join armed rebellion. This, in turn, further impoverishes the country. Secondly, wars tear apart the social fabric of society, which in turn hinders postconflict reconstruction. Put differently, hate and distrust in the aftermath of fighting often trigger revenge wars further down the road. The third vicious cycle studied concerns education, with low human capital fueling fighting and subsequent wars destroying schools. Last but not least, this chapter discusses the impact of war trauma on future crime propensity. These various vicious cycles are illustrated with the help of a series of historical examples, spanning Peru, Angola and Uganda to Sri Lanka, Tajikistan and Switzerland. This discussion highlights the crucial importance of fostering peace right now, which leads to a powerful peace multiplier.

This chapter deals with all manner of state-derived prohibitions. Ancient states prohibited a broad variety of behaviours, threatening punishment for those who would transgress boundaries. The logic of prohibition was wide-ranging: from the marking of spaces, objects and officials as somehow distinct from the rest of ‘society’, leading factions within ancient states sought to preserve and protect their individual prerogatives. They also sought to reinforce their claims to leadership by incentivizing subjects to settle their disputes in state-sanctioned venues. The evidence for such prohibitions is extensive, but did they add up to something that we might legitimately call ‘social control’? Did ancient states succeed at inducing subject populations to accept their claims to rule? If so, how? This chapter suggests that the logic of prohibition was a site of contestation for both statecraft and subject-craft.

Through the energetic work of the reformer John Calvin, the small city-state of Geneva became the so-called Protestant Rome in the sixteenth century. Calvin created a morals court, the Consistory, which worked in conjunction with the city council to attack a wide range of ‘sins’, including illicit sexuality, defined as all sexual activity outside of marriage. In Calvin’s time, authorities pursued male and female fornicators (including fiancés) with the same rigour and on rare occasions sentenced adulterers to death. After Calvin’s death a double standard appeared in the treatment of adultery, most blatant in the fact that sexual relations between female servants and their married masters resulted in more severe penalties for the former than the latter. Same-sex relations were considered crimes against nature, but authorities adjudged those involving men much more severely than those involving women, probably based on a belief that sexual relations between male partners degraded them to the level of women. Although a few men were prosecuted for rape, religious and political authorities largely enhanced patriarchy; given the persistent numbers of people who were summoned, they clearly were also less successful in nurturing self-control among Genevans in their sex lives than in other areas of behaviour.

The chapter views automatism in the light of the Victorian emphasis on the value of free will and individual responsibility. Daily life involved repeated practical synthesis of contradictory judgments about the determined, or automatic, and moral sources of action. Criminal court cases in which there was a defense of insanity exemplified the issues at stake in relating the disordered brain and the moral will. In the Victorian period, medical experts began to play a large part in legal judgments about insanity and criminal responsibility, and they articulated evidence for the involuntary, or automatic, form of insane actions. Public interest in these issues preceded and informed debate about automatism in philosophy and science. The chapter uses a spectacular 1854 case of multiple child murder by the children’s mother to shape discussion of the wider issues. The case both shows the complexity of social issues touching on automatism and offers insight into the imagination that accompanied Victorian fears about automatism replacing free will.