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Species of the genus Rauschiella are trematodes of frogs and snakes in the Americas. The taxonomy of the group is complex, and most of the 18 currently valid species are known only from the original description. Moreover, genetic data are available only for two North American species (Rauschiella tineri and Rauschiella poncedeleoni). In this context, integrative taxonomy studies are necessary for Rauschiella spp. found in South America. Herein, during a long-term herpetological and helminthological study conducted in Selvíria, Mato Grosso do Sul, Brazil, between 2016 and 2019, 296 anurans from 17 species were necropsied. A plagiorchioid trematode found in the intestine of 7/12 Leptodactylus macrosternum, 10/106 Leptodactylus podicipinus, and 13/20 Pseudis platensis was subject to morphological and molecular characterisation. Samples of the trematodes were studied by optical and scanning electron microscopies and identified as Rauschiella proxima (Freitas, 1941), here reported in new anuran hosts and geographical area. Sequences of the nuclear gene 28S rDNA (1148 bp) were generated and subjected to phylogenetic analysis. Our isolates of R. proxima from Brazil grouped in a well-supported clade with R. poncedeleoni and R. tineri, and genetic divergences to these species were low (0.45% and 0.54%, respectively), supporting the congeneric status among them. However, the addition of a South American representative of Rauschiella and the construction of more comprehensive phylogenetic analyses, including 78 plagiorchioid species from 15 families, did not result in advances concerning the familial level of classification of this genus, which remains as incertae sedis in the superfamily Plagiorchoidea.
We investigate the impact of corruption on female leadership in Brazil using cross-sectional municipal-level data. Our findings suggest that corruption significantly reduces the proportion of working women in leadership roles. Additionally, corruption decreases female representation in leadership relative to men, though this effect is less robust. When examining sectors most vulnerable to corruption, the results remain largely consistent, but we also note that women tend to avoid these sectors entirely. Our findings suggest that corruption acts as a significant barrier to female leadership.
During the first half of the 20th century, Brazilian Protestants turned to their pens and periodicals to defend the legitimacy and beneficial nature of their presence in a majority Catholic nation. This period—spanning Brazil’s first republic, Getúlio Vargas’s authoritarian Estado novo, and the developmentalist era of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961)—witnessed several regime changes and new national constitutions. Amid these political shifts, the Brazilian Catholic church sought to increase its cultural and symbolic dominance in the country. Meanwhile, several Brazilian Protestant groups came together to form the Confederação Evangélica do Brasil (CEB) in 1934, both to coordinate Protestant educational and social work and defend freedom of Protestant religious expression. With their denominational roots in Brazil extending less than one hundred years and their ties to US mission boards making them appear suspiciously foreign, Brazilian Protestants vehemently defended their patriotism. Relying on the writings of many CEB leaders, the organization’s periodical Unum corpus, and biannual reports, I argue that the Brazilian ecumenical leaders used several strategies to create a rhetorical defense of Brazilian Protestant legitimacy. They expressed occasional appreciation for Brazilian Catholics, celebrated Brazilian Protestant history and public recognition of contemporary Brazilian Protestants, and stridently opposed Catholic attempts to achieve cultural or social dominance. I also argue that because they maintained a constant defensive posture, the Brazilian Protestant ecumenists of the 1930s–1950s embraced a vision of ecumenism that explicitly excluded Roman Catholicism.
This article explores the theory of racial whitening’s role in the political attempt to reshape the national collective in the First Brazilian Republic (1889-1930) to explain the theory’s origins and characteristics and suggest its international relevance. It is argued that this theory—which proposed that Brazil could modernize through interracial marriage and mass European immigration—was not a Brazilian or Latin American peculiarity but was aligned with a transformist strand of previous scientific racialism. The main novelty came from wide political resonance, not intellectual newness. In addition, the article demonstrates that racial whitening oriented the First Republic to construct ambiguous, yet effective, structures of discrimination, aimed at molding the national collective. These structures seem to have anticipated the transformation of racial relations elsewhere, preceding the global shift in the justification of institutional racism from biological to cultural bases after 1945. The article then underscores the importance of understanding historical dependencies and subtle mechanisms through which racism can be perpetuated, especially in societies that claim to be racially progressive.
Deliberation is routinely considered an essential component of a jury trial, contributing to the quality of fact-finding and confidence in jury verdicts. Unlike all other countries that use juries, Brazilian jurors do not deliberate. Instead, under the Brazilian jury system’s “incommunicability rule,” they submit their votes individually, without discussing the case with one another. How jurors approach the task of individual decision making and how they view and experience this notable absence of deliberation are unknown. The aim of this article, which is part of a broader research project on jurors’ decision making in femicide trials in Brazil, is to understand these experiences and views of Brazilian jurors, especially regarding the incommunicability rule. The research used qualitative methods, including ethnographic observations of trials and semi-structured interviews of jurors. The majority of jurors voiced support for the current practice, explaining that refraining from deliberation would ensure their impartiality. However, 41 percent of the jurors said that they would have liked to deliberate with others to exchange and debate views. Interviews also shed light on how the absence of deliberation affected the decision process and jurors’ satisfaction with the overall jury experience. This research contributes to an ongoing debate in Brazil over the incommunicability rule.
This chapter examines the national-scale origins and political linkages of land mafias and rural militias in Brazil. These linkages, especially to political power, explain how, over just a few decades, an RDPE of active and open land-grabbing mafias has spread from southern Brazil to the Amazon. These cases illustrate the dynamics by which federal-level changes can expand an RDPE system to the national scale and to other parts of the same jurisdiction, polity, and political system. The land-grabbing process is linked to illegalities and violence, which are mutually self-reinforcing through the logics operating in these systems. This chapter examines the rapid post-2019 transformation of pastures into monoculture soybean or corn plantations, especially in southeastern Acre and along the paved BR-163 highway. Part of the problem is the institutionalization of illegal land grabbing and its mafia-like tactics, whose continuation is ensured through legal loopholes and ambiguities. The situation worsened, especially during the reign of Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2023), as land mafia dynamics penetrated deeper into the sociopolitical fabric of Brazil.
This chapter explores the ongoing and novel merging of gold mining with organized crime, highlighting the relation of drug trafficking, land grabbing, and other related sectors to deforestation. The recent gold-mining expansion and boom in the Amazon is linked to gold markets and the global political economy. The chapter scrutinizes the rise of narco-gold mining, linking drug trade, organized criminal groups, and money laundering with rainforest gold and the surge of authoritarian and mafia-like power. During the Bolsonaro era there was a significant deepening of the link between gold-mining activities and organized drug traffickers and criminal networks. In southwestern Pará, gold mining is the leading cause of deforestation inside areas like the upper Tapajós Munduruku Indigenous lands near Jacareacanga. This chapter utilizes field research experiences, interviews, and ethnographic observations to illustrate the complex dilemmas faced by communities currently being pressured and divided by increasing gold extraction in their territories. In the end of the chapter the discussion turns to solutions for how to address these and other root causes of deforestation in political economy.
As gold prices have soared, the Amazon and its inhabitants have had to bear the brunt of a rampant, environmentally destructive gold-mining rush. Small and medium-sized illegal, informal, and other irregular forms of so-called artisanal gold mining, as well as large-scale corporate gold mines, cause major and multifaceted socioenvironmental–health–human rights crises. The dynamics of the gold-mining boom are important to understand the key political economic sectors behind forest degradation and deforestation and to highlight how RDPEs work. The overall situation in the Amazon is presented, analyzing the causes of gold mining and the violence, especially in Peru, Brazil, and other key regions. The triple frontier between Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil is also analyzed as the irregular gold-mining RDPE is one of the most important drivers of deforestation. In this region, gold-mining operations are led by ex-guerilla groups in Venezuela, paramilitaries and other armed groups in Colombia, and, increasingly, by the First Capital Command and other drug factions from southeastern Brazil in Roraima’s Yanomami Indigenous lands.
This chapter is a novel intersectorial analysis of deforesting industries in Brazil linked to illegal land grabbing/land value speculation, including ranching, monoculture plantation expansion, logging, and infrastructure development. The driving and pulling causes of deforestation in the Amazon are explored through a deeper analysis of the ranching-grabbing regionally dominant political economy (RDPE). Ranching speculating is by far the most prominent key driver and dominant political-economic sector in explaining deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Counterintuitively, politically enabled illegal land grabbing/speculation have become more lucrative in many places than the actual ranching activities on the deforested land. Drawing on field research and expert interviews in the Brazilian Amazon, this chapter explains how ranching opens lands for other forms of extractivism, especially the expansion of monoculture plantations. The relations and distinct yet interlinked business logics within ranching and soybean plantation sectors yield an analysis of “modern” and “primitive” forms of agribusiness. The particularities of Amazonian cattle capitalisms are explored via regional comparisons.
This chapter explores how the ranching-grabbing RDPE is supported by moral economic changes, which in this context is veneration for the cowboy lifestyle and scorn of traditional/Indigenous livelihoods. The cowboy lifestyle is often seen in a positive light, despite the violence that accompanies forest removal. These changes in the moral economy help to explain how locals increasingly welcome ranching-land speculation, even inside multiple-use conservation areas. Another key factor in deforestation processes are the policies and infrastructure investment decisions made at the federal and state level, which render large areas available for appropriation. These problems are also international, as groups expanding deforestation are still often funded by international banks, creating investment lock-in, as investors are more interested in preserving returns on investments than curbing illegalities. Simultaneously, there is a wide variety of activists in local communities who are resisting these extractivist pushes. The chapter examines where and how Indigenous peoples/forest-dwellers successfully resist land grabbing and clearcutting on their lands.
This book analyzes the role of different political economic sectors that drive deforestation and clearcutting, including mining, ranching, export-oriented plantation agriculture, and forestry. The book examines the key actors, systems, and technologies behind the worsening climate/biodiversity crises that are aggravated by deforestation. The book is theoretically innovative, uniting political economic, sociological, political ecologic, and transdisciplinary theories on the politics of extraction. The research relies on the author’s multi-sited political ethnography, including field research, interviews, and other approaches, across multiple frontiers of deforestation, focusing on Brazil, Peru, and Finland. Why do key global extractivist sectors continue to expand via deforestation and what are the differences between sectors and regions? The hypothesis is that regionally and sometimes nationally dominant politically powerful economic sectors are major explanatory factors for if, how, and where deforestation occurs. To address the deepening global crises, it is essential to understand these power relations within different types of deforesting extractivisms.
In 2011, the Brazilian Government began dismantling the country’s robust framework for Indigenous land rights by enacting measures to deny Indigenous Peoples’ access to their ancestral lands. From 2019 to 2022, the government did not recognize or title a single hectare of Indigenous lands, despite more than 700 pending requests for demarcation (or formal designation and titling). A change in government and six land demarcations in 2023, however, show signs of a new era for Indigenous Peoples’ rights and relationship with the state. This chapter analyzes evolving Indigenous land rights pre- and post-constitutionalization in 1988, the result of intense political mobilization and shifting colonialist perceptions of Indigenous Peoples. This chapter also discusses the main obstacles faced by Indigenous Peoples in enforcing Brazil’s protective land rights framework, accounting for the structures of settler colonial states – structures that permit institutional and physical violence against Indigenous Peoples by state and non-state actors alike. Finally, this chapter examines the opportunities created since the change in government in 2023, proposing new avenues to advance Indigenous Peoples’ constitutional land rights in Brazil.
Between 1847 and 1876, the textile factory Todos os Santos operated in Bahia. During these almost three decades, it was the largest textile factory in Brazil and came to employ more than four hundred workers. Until recently, many aspects of the factory’s labour force were hidden. There was a hegemonic narrative that all of these workers were free and waged individuals and that their living and working conditions were extremely progressive for the period. Meanwhile, there was a silence about the employment of enslaved people in the institution as well as a lack of in-depth analysis concerning the legally free workers. This article analyses labour at the Todos os Santos factory. On the one hand, it provides evidence on why the myth about the exclusive use of free and waged workers in the factory was formulated and the interests behind this narrative. On the other, through analysis of data from newspapers, philanthropic institutions, and legal and government documents, it reveals the profiles of the supposedly different classes of free and enslaved workers employed at Todos os Santos—men, women, and children of different colours—showing how complex, and often how similar, their living and working conditions were.
The objective of this study is to analyze the debate surrounding the transformation of the Bank of Brazil into a central bank in 1923. The article seeks to answer the question: What was the role of a central bank for Brazilian policymakers at that time? Unlike other Latin American countries that established their central banks during this period, Brazil’s institution was not the result of any foreign mission. While central banks in other countries were primarily concerned with maintaining the gold standard, in Brazil, the main impetus for establishing a central bank was the need to address cash shortages and expand credit, rather than focusing on monetary discipline. Advocates for the creation of a central bank in Brazil were inspired by the model of Germany’s Reichsbank, and part of their theoretical influence came from the German Historical School. Other references cited in the debates included the works of Keynes and Cassel, and the participants of the debate made parallels with other sciences, such as comparing the central bank to elements of mechanical physics. Beyond controlling the money supply, the central bank was seen as an element for the economic development of the country, and there was an emphasis on the bank’s private management.
The established economic historiography asserts that Brazil’s per-capita GDP stagnated in the 19th century and that it grew extremely slowly in the period of the monarchy (1822–1889). We argue that these conclusions are based on inadequate methods, insufficient statistical evidence, and disregard for available historical evidence. Building on the methodology followed by one of us in a previous article, with the use of new databases, and a reasoned exploration of alternatives, our best estimate is that over the 1820–1900 period, Brazil’s per-capita income grew at a trend rate of 0.9% per year, a performance like Western Europe and other Latin America countries. Only a sharp economic contraction at the end of the period dulled Brazil’s performance in the 19th century.
We derive optimal road fuel taxes for gasoline, diesel and ethanol for Brazil. Fuel-related externalities, including carbon emissions and air pollution, and distance-related externalities, such as accidents, congestion and road damages, are added as Brazil has today no other way to effectively tax these components. A value-added tax (VAT) of 26.5 per cent is added to the tax for gasoline and ethanol, but not for diesel which is mostly an input and not final consumption. On this basis, we find that the optimal gasoline, diesel and ethanol taxes are US$1.03, 0.85 and 0.58 per litre, of which the respective carbon taxes, excluding VAT, are about US$0.14, 0.16 and 0.04 per litre given a carbon price of US$60 per ton of CO2. The largest externality component for gasoline and ethanol is accidents followed by congestion and carbon emissions. For diesel, air pollution is most significant, followed by accidents and congestion.
This article examines how subnational fiscal competition over foreign direct investment affects both the siting of new projects and the ability of local governments to raise tax revenue for social spending. We leverage a quasi-natural experiment, an unexpected declaration by the Brazilian Supreme Court in 2017 that reduced states’ ability to offer investors differentiated tax subsidies. Our results show that disadvantaged regions did not see a major shift in investment patterns after the change in investment law. We do not find a consistent relationship between the incentive law change and state revenue generation, but we do find that incentives are associated with less revenue. The results are consistent with arguments that investment incentives exacerbate inequality by reducing states’ capacity to collect revenue while doing little to affect investment location. Our results illustrate that economic agglomeration is difficult to reverse through tax policy and that fiscal federalism often cannot provide strong enough inducements to drive investment into less advantaged regions.
Does decarbonization depend on policy stability that makes climate policies and institutional development irreversible, or does it depend on mastering a messy political conflict with uneven progress that might be inherent in large political economy transitions? This chapter draws on case studies of two large emerging powers, Brazil and South Africa, to argue that politicization of climate action seems inevitable in decarbonizing energy transitions. Fossil fuel coalitions are too powerful and the threat to them too existential to avoid politicization as they defend their interests. At the same time, Brazil shows that policy stability was a critical step in a large expansion of wind power there – not a full energy transition itself but providing an important alternative to fossil fuels. Both countries show that allies in the struggle against fossil fuels can be won and lost in non-climate political economies of energy transition. The potential for new industry and job creation, enhanced energy security, and impacts on communities that host infrastructure are all important to energy transition, with each following a political economy logic that may or may not focus on climate change.
This article explores the intersection of carceral geographies and climate (in)justice in Brazil, home to one of the world’s largest incarcerated populations. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, interviews and an analysis of reports from monitoring organisations examining facilities across the country, we ask how thermal conditions are part of a national project of inflicting suffering within the prison system. Conductive building materials, a lack or excess of water and ventilation, as well as overcrowding, exacerbate exposure to scorching heat or bone-chilling cold, subjecting prisoners’ bodies to extreme temperatures. We argue that this constitutes a form of thermal violence, in which heat and cold are weaponised to harm and punish.
Chapter 7 explores the reasons why Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela experienced relatively stable authoritarianism during the early twentieth century. All three countries professionalized their militaries during this period, which helped bring an end to the frequent revolts that had undermined their prospects for democracy in the nineteenth century. None of the three countries developed strong parties, however. The absence of strong parties impeded democratization in several ways. First, party weakness allowed presidents to concentrate authority and extend their hold on power in some cases. Second, and even more importantly, the weakness of opposition parties meant that the opposition had little chance of winning elections or enacting democratic reforms, particularly in the face of widespread government electoral manipulation. As a result, the opposition frequently abstained from elections, which only deepened authoritarian rule in these countries. In some instances, the opposition also encouraged the military to intervene to overthrow the president, which undermined otherwise mostly stable authoritarian regimes.