Debates on human behavioral evolution have largely focused on African and European records, while Asia’s contribution remains underrepresented. Despite the significance of the Asian Pleistocene fossil record, its behavioral insights have been hindered by limited taphonomic research, restricted dissemination, and shifting academic trends. Many key Chinese archaeofaunal sites, particularly in karstic contexts, contain complex palimpsests that challenge traditional taphonomic methods prone to equifinality.

Advancements in artificial intelligence and computational archaeology now offer new ways to address these challenges. Machine learning classifiers, computer vision through convolutional neural networks, and 3D deep learning architectures enable precise discrimination of bone surface modifications. These techniques refine carnivore agency identification down to the taxon level and provide mathematical certainty in agency attribution, aiding in disentangling complex palimpsests.

This study highlights key Chinese archaeofaunal records, particularly Zhoukoudian, and proposes methodological approaches to improve their resolution. By integrating these cutting-edge techniques, the Asian Pleistocene record can take a more central role in discussions on early human behavioral variability. This research aims to establish a model for applying the “new taphonomy” globally, enhancing our understanding of hominin activities and their ecological contexts.

As part of a scholarly endeavor to explore the micro-foundations of international relations amid the evolving dynamics between China and the United States, this chapter examines the Chinese public’s perceptions of the United States. A theoretical framework is established to investigate the cognitive, evaluative, and affective dimensions underlying public views of a foreign country. The findings indicate a declining perception of US influence in Asia, accompanied by an increased awareness of the negative impacts of the United States on China. Additionally, the perception of the United States as a model country has diminished among the Chinese populace. The interplay between China’s engagement with the global community and the Chinese authorities’ manipulation of political socialization represents two competing forces that shape the Chinese public’s view of the United States.

Employing a mixed-methods approach, this chapter surveys and compares how Chinese youth perceive China’s rise in relation to their Asian counterparts. The findings reveal that Chinese youth exhibit greater optimism regarding political stability and nationalism associated with China’s rise. However, they also demonstrate a willingness to acknowledge various social problems that accompany economic growth. Regarding China’s international influence, the majority of Chinese youth express strong confidence in the notion of China’s peaceful rise, while simultaneously recognizing perceived threats from other countries – factors often overlooked in the prevailing China threat thesis. Moreover, Chinese youth tend to attribute the negative evaluations of China by their Asian peers to external factors rather than interpreting them as reflections of China’s “problematic” foreign policy. Interview materials show why and how Chinese foreign policy is justified among Chinese young people.

China’s engagement with the global arena and its economic modernization are anticipated to foster democratization and alignment with the liberal international order. However, despite several decades of economic development, the authoritarian system remains resilient, and China’s foreign policy has become increasingly assertive. This chapter aims to unveil the micro-foundations underlying the unexpected trajectory of China’s rise by examining the public’s nationalist and international orientations. The findings indicate that international orientations exert a limited influence on popular attitudes toward domestic politics and foreign relations, whereas nationalist orientations significantly bolster public support for the authoritarian regime and China’s assertive foreign policy. Additionally, intergenerational variations in public opinion are evident, with the Xi generation displaying a distinct pattern of political values compared to preceding generations.

The Mongol Empire became a chief destination for European travellers in a very specific moment of the medieval period, roughly framed by two events: Ögedei Khan’s European campaign of 1240−41, and the formal fall of the last Yuan Mongolian emperor in 1368, which marked the takeover of the Chinese Ming dynasty and the opening of a new social and political paradigm in Asia. Between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Mongol rule brought about an unprecedented geopolitical stability across Eurasia, traditionally referred to by historians as Pax Mongolica. The general safety of the roads and the relatively smooth administrative system of the Mongol khanates allowed for a productive period of economic and cultural interconnections between Europe and the Far East, whose protagonists were traders, diplomats, missionaries, and adventurers. While merchants exploited the safety of the Silk Road to reach territories both within and beyond the Mongol area, the Mongol Empire was the express destination of several diplomatic and missionary expeditions, carried out by Franciscan and Dominican friars.

Starting in 1325, Ibn Battuta set out on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Taking advantage of the routes opened up by the spread of Islam from one end to the other of the eastern hemisphere, he then travelled twenty-nine years, tracing the contours of Afro Eurasia, from North Africa to the China Sea and back. Ibn Battuta swears early in his journeys to travel the world without ever repeating a single route (2: 283; 191). and he undertook journeys three times the extent of Marco Polo’s, totalling around 75,000 miles. Ibn Battuta’s adult years devoted to journeying also involved him learning many scholarly livelihoods, and taking many forms of training and service, of which the final one, travel writer, might be considered the consummation. I will argue that Ibn Battuta was able to perform himself as a professional traveller-author of such extensive outreach because he employs extraordinary tactics at particular thresholds, essentially becoming his own passport by cultivating, adopting, or pretending to a range of roles that will secure admission. This gave him unusual, but not complete access to many thresholds otherwise rarely crossed.

Using the World Value Survey from Wave 2 (1989–1993) to Wave 7 (2017–2020), Study 1 demonstrates that individuals in individualistic regions exhibit more anti-competition attitudes compared to those in collectivist regions. Additionally, individuals in authoritarian, socialist, and collectivist Asian regions show the highest level of pro-competition attitudes, followed by those in democratic, capitalist, and individualistic Western regions and those in democratic, capitalist, and collectivist Asian regions. Study 2 reveals that competition is more likely to be endorsed by individuals who prioritize the individual’s responsibility over the government’s responsibility, value private ownership of businesses over government ownership of businesses, emphasize hard work for success, and prefer income incentives over income equality. Moreover, individuals with higher levels of materialism and self-determination are also inclined to endorse competition. Notably, variations exist in the relationship between individual difference variables and attitudes toward competition among the regions.

The Asia region (including the Indo-Pacific region) is critically important for Australia’s long-term future as people-to-people links through education and cultural exchange, migration, business, trade, defence and tourism continue to expand and Australia’s relationship with the countries of the region evolves. Referred to as the ‘Asia priority’, the Asia and Australia’s engagement with Asia cross-curriculum priority provides opportunities for learners to investigate, understand and recognise the diversity within and between the peoples and countries of the Asia region as well as the diversity within communities in Australia. Referred to as ‘Asia literacy’, and more recently as ‘Asia capability’, this combination of knowledge, understanding and skills prepares learners for the challenges of living, studying and working in the region and in global contexts. This chapter offers strategies for teaching and learning about and from the diverse peoples and cultures of the region in ways that go beyond the instrumentalism of national economic and security interests in Asia. Learners can be encouraged to recognise commonalities and differences as well as appreciate and empathise with the lived experiences of diverse peoples and local communities in Asia and in Australia.

The Australian Curriculum’s three cross-curriculum priorities are intended to give global, national, and local perspectives, providing students with the tools and language to be able to understand the world in which they live and to consider the future world they could inhabit.Within the Australian Curriculum, three cross-curriculum priorities have been defined: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Histories and Cultures; Asia and Australia’s Engagement with Asia; and Sustainability. These three cross-curriculum priorities are not intended to be taught as separate Learning Areas; instead, they are about exploring relationships between subjects. They offer learning opportunities to add depth and richness to student learning in specific discipline content at the same time as developing knowledge, understanding and skills relating to the three priorities.

Over 60 years have passed since the initiation of the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. It is widely accepted among drug policy experts that the global war on illicit drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world. Various countries have moved away from a drug policy based on criminal punishment to a harm reduction approach - but others continue to pursue a punitive drug policy, including the use of the death penalty for drug-related activities. Despite the UN Human Rights Committee taking the position that the death penalty is only permissible for the ‘most serious crimes’, defined as intentional killing, 34 countries retain the death penalty for a range of drug offences. This chapter outlines the change in drug policy at the UN level as well as developments at the country level.