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This paper presents a comparative evaluation of Word Grammar (WG), the Minimalist Programme (MP), and the Matrix Language Frame model (MLF) regarding their predictions of possible combinations in a corpus of German–English mixed determiner–noun constructions. WG achieves the highest accuracy score. The comparison furthermore revealed a difference in accuracy of the predictions between the three models and a significant difference between WG and the MP. The analysis suggests that these differences depend on assumptions made by the models and the mechanisms they employ. The difference in accuracy between the models, for example, can be attributed to the MLF being concerned with agreement in language membership between the verb and the subject DP/NP of the clause. The significant difference between WG and the MP can be attributed to the distinct roles features play in the two syntactic theories and how agreement is handled. Based on the results, we draw up a list of characteristics of feature accounts that are empirically most adequate for the mixed determiner–noun constructions investigated and conclude that the syntactic theory that incorporates most of them is WG (Hudson 2007, 2010).
We provide a unified, theoretical basis on which measures of data reliability may be derived or evaluated, for both quantitative and qualitative data. This approach evaluates reliability as the “proportional reduction in loss” (PRL) that is attained in a sample by an optimal estimator. The resulting measure is between 0 and 1, linearly related to expected loss, and provides a direct way of contrasting the measured reliability in the sample with the least reliable and most reliable data-generating cases. The PRL measure is a generalization of many of the commonly-used reliability measures.
We show how the quantitative measures from generalizability theory can be derived as PRL measures (including Cronbach's alpha and measures proposed by Winer). For categorical data, we develop a new measure for the general case in which each of N judges assigns a subject to one of K categories and show that it is equivalent to a measure proposed by Perreault and Leigh for the case where N is 2.
We propose a coefficient of agreement to assess the degree of concordance between two independent groups of raters classifying items on a nominal scale. This coefficient, defined on a population-based model, extends the classical Cohen’s kappa coefficient for quantifying agreement between two raters. Weighted and intraclass versions of the coefficient are also given and their sampling variance is determined by the Jackknife method. The method is illustrated on medical education data which motivated the research.
Several measures of agreement, such as the Perreault–Leigh coefficient, the \documentclass[12pt]{minimal}\usepackage{amsmath}\usepackage{wasysym}\usepackage{amsfonts}\usepackage{amssymb}\usepackage{amsbsy}\usepackage{mathrsfs}\usepackage{upgreek}\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}\begin{document}$$\textsc {AC}_{1}$$\end{document}, and the recent coefficient of van Oest, are based on explicit models of how judges make their ratings. To handle such measures of agreement under a common umbrella, we propose a class of models called guessing models, which contains most models of how judges make their ratings. Every guessing model have an associated measure of agreement we call the knowledge coefficient. Under certain assumptions on the guessing models, the knowledge coefficient will be equal to the multi-rater Cohen’s kappa, Fleiss’ kappa, the Brennan–Prediger coefficient, or other less-established measures of agreement. We provide several sample estimators of the knowledge coefficient, valid under varying assumptions, and their asymptotic distributions. After a sensitivity analysis and a simulation study of confidence intervals, we find that the Brennan–Prediger coefficient typically outperforms the others, with much better coverage under unfavorable circumstances.
Reliability and agreement studies are of paramount importance. They do contribute to the quality of studies by providing information about the amount of error inherent to any diagnosis, score or measurement. Guidelines for reporting reliability and agreement studies were recently provided. While the use of the kappa-like family is advised for categorical and ordinal scales, no further guideline in the choice of a weighting scheme is given. In the present paper, a new simple and practical interpretation of the linear- and quadratic-weighted kappa coefficients is given. This will help researchers in motivating their choice of a weighting scheme.
Experiments are considered where each of a sample of subjects is assigned to one of C categories separately by each of a fixed or varying group of observers. Building on earlier publications, general procedures are proposed to analyze agreements and disagreements among observers. In the case of a varying group of observers, it is shown that it is not necessary to demand a constant number of observers per subject. In the case of a fixed group of observers, the problem of missing data is considered.
The procedures are illustrated within the context of two clinical diagnosis examples. In the first example it is investigated which categories are relatively hard to distinguish from one another; a new theorem is applied that shows a useful property of the statistic kappa. In the second example it is investigated if a subgroup of observers can be found with a significantly higher degree of interobserver agreement.
Most measures of agreement are chance-corrected. They differ in three dimensions: their definition of chance agreement, their choice of disagreement function, and how they handle multiple raters. Chance agreement is usually defined in a pairwise manner, following either Cohen’s kappa or Fleiss’s kappa. The disagreement function is usually a nominal, quadratic, or absolute value function. But how to handle multiple raters is contentious, with the main contenders being Fleiss’s kappa, Conger’s kappa, and Hubert’s kappa, the variant of Fleiss’s kappa where agreement is said to occur only if every rater agrees. More generally, multi-rater agreement coefficients can be defined in a g-wise way, where the disagreement weighting function uses g raters instead of two. This paper contains two main contributions. (a) We propose using Fréchet variances to handle the case of multiple raters. The Fréchet variances are intuitive disagreement measures and turn out to generalize the nominal, quadratic, and absolute value functions to the case of more than two raters. (b) We derive the limit theory of g-wise weighted agreement coefficients, with chance agreement of the Cohen-type or Fleiss-type, for the case where every item is rated by the same number of raters. Trying out three confidence interval constructions, we end up recommending calculating confidence intervals using the arcsine transform or the Fisher transform.
This paper deals with a construction, which we dub Non-Agreeing Degree (NAD) constructions, with the distinguishing property that the agreement pattern between subjects and degree predicates is optionally disrupted, even in languages (like Spanish) where verbs commonly agree with their subjects. We show that the agreeing versus non-agreeing alternation comes with important semantic differences for the interpretation of the degree construction. We provide a first systematic description of this type of constructions and postulate a formal syntactic and semantic analysis. We argue that NAD constructions are characterized by degree predicates that introduce a non-conventional nominal scale and by subjects that are interpreted as equally non-conventional units of measurement. We postulate an intensionalization process on the subject of NAD constructions, which we capture via a general nominalization function that allows a default as well as an ordinary agreement pattern between subject and copula.
The seemingly idiosyncratic behavior of numerals in Russian and other Slavic languages has long puzzled linguists. This entry describes the core phenomena, taking Russian as a point of departure. Significant differences in other Slavic languages are also identified, since a central problem of analysis is how variation across Slavic might be accommodated. The core data issues concern case and agreement, the former with respect to the phrase containing the numeral, the latter both internal to the numeral phrase as well as between it and the predicate. Related phenomena exhibited by other quantity expressions are also presented. In the course of the presentation, several conceptual approaches are briefly identified, and the reader is directed to relevant research.
The present chapter discusses agreement in Slavic languages. Slavic languages are interesting because of their canonical subject-verb agreement, which offers a direct insight into this core syntactic relation (syntactic agreement). Additionally, Slavic languages feature well-documented agreement alternations, which suggest involvement of other language components in agreement (semantic and discourse agreement). Finally, strictly local agreement, often devoid of alternations, operating inside the nominal phrase commands theoretical interest.
English morphosyntactic agreement, such as determiner–noun agreement in These cabs broke down and noun–verb agreement in The cabsbreak down, has a few interesting properties that enable us to investigate whether agreement has a psycholinguistic function, that is, whether it helps the listener process linguistic information expressed by a speaker. The present project relies on these properties in a perception experiment, examines the two aforementioned types of English agreement, and aims at analyzing whether and how native English listeners benefit from agreement. The two types of agreement were contrasted with cases without any overtly agreeing elements (e.g. The cabs broke down). Native speakers of English with normal hearing heard short English sentences in quiet and in more or less intense white noise and were requested to indicate whether the second word of the sentence (e.g. These cabs broke down) was a singular or plural noun. Accuracy was entered as the response variable in the binomial logistic regression model. Results showed that overt determiner–noun agreement clearly increased response accuracy, while noun–verb agreement had at best marginal effects. The findings are interpreted against the background of functional aspects of linguistic structures in English, in the context of unfavorable listening conditions in particular.
Recent research has highlighted the character and importance of the study of agreement. This paper, paralleling work on the more familiar concept of deep disagreement, will provide a first articulation of the character and implications of deep agreements, that is, agreements so deep that disagreement cannot overcome them. To do so, I start by outlining the main features of deep disagreement. I then provide a brief characterization of agreement in general to ground the discussion of the unique characteristics of deep agreements and compare them to deep disagreements. After distinguishing the concept from other more familiar ones, I then point to a few of the major social and theoretical issues the existence of deep agreements poses before concluding with some remarks pointing to valuable areas for future research.
In the literature on philosophical progress it is often assumed that agreement is a necessary condition for progress. This assumption is sensible only if agreement is a reliable sign of the truth, since agreement on false answers to philosophical questions would not constitute progress. This paper asks whether agreement among philosophers is (or would be) likely to be a reliable sign of truth. Insights from social choice theory are used to identify the conditions under which agreement among philosophers would be a reliable indicator of the truth, and it is argued that we lack good reason to think that philosophical inquiry meets these conditions. The upshot is that philosophical agreement is epistemically uninformative: agreement on the answer to a philosophical question does not supply even a prima facie reason to think that the agreed-upon view is true. However, the epistemic uninformativeness of philosophical agreement is not an indictment of philosophy's progress, because philosophy is valuable independent of its ability to generate agreement on the correct answers to philosophical questions.
In what sense is language social? I suggest we distinguish two questions here: First, what degree of social interaction is essential to constituting someone as a language-user? Second, what degree of agreement in meanings must language involve? Each of these questions may be given individualist, interpersonalist, or communitarian answers – not necessarily the same to both. For instance, Davidson is an interpersonalist concerning the first question and an individualist concerning the second. Kripke’s “skeptical solution” is commonly taken to imply a communitarian answer to both of these questions, but in the present chapter I argue that, despite its differences with Davidson’s view of language, it is compatible with constitutive interpersonalism and meaning-individualism. While it may seem as though a genuinely communitarian answer to the first question would imply communitarianism about the second as well, I close the chapter by suggesting that this is not as obvious as it seems.
Kripke’s writings can be understood as suggesting that Wittgenstein, though a non-reductionist, was not a quietist about meaning, that is, did not maintain that nothing philosophically constructive could be said about it. It is Kripke and the quietist who can in fact be seen to have much in common. For, though they both conceive of the skeptical challenge as a meta-semantical challenge, calling for a foundational account of meaning, they both end up with purely semantic, descriptive remarks about meaning. Failing to share his diagnosis of the paradox with Wittgenstein, Kripke does not recognize that, once the skeptical problem is dissolved, as Wittgenstein recommends, a new meta-semantical challenge arises, which is connected to the essential link Wittgenstein emphasizes between meaning and use. Consequently, Kripke does not see that the positive remarks Wittgenstein makes after dismissing the skeptical paradox, especially those concerning agreement, are meant to do some constructive, not just descriptive, work, in response to the problem newly arisen.
Of particular concern in the literature on business is the importance of trust and the disabling consequences of broken trust on business partnerships. Chapter 3 draws on extensive interviews in exploring the issue of trust, and reports novel findings which lead to new theoretical formulations. It has been central in sociological understanding that embeddedness in social and business exchanges generates and maintains interpersonal trust. Should opportunistic behaviour or violation of trust occur it is routinely assumed that such breaches would be exposed or punished, including reputation loss and exclusion from future exchange opportunities. What is less explored is that breaches of trust in many instances may not lead to disclosure of such a behaviour or termination of exchange relationships. Chapter 3 expands our understanding of broken trust. It identifies and explores mechanisms which operate in avoidance of confrontation, exposure and retaliation in instances of breaches of trust and also strategies employed by entrepreneurs in continuation of exchange relationships with violators of trust. The chapter examines underexplored aspects of the complexity and dynamics of business exchange relations and points to a rethinking of trust and social exchange.
This study investigated the morphosyntax of adjectival concord in case and number and subject-verb person agreement by monolingual and bilingual speakers of Russian. The main focus of the study is on the potential factors that may trigger divergence between Heritage Language (HL) speakers and those speakers who are dominant in that language, be they monolingual or bilingual. We considered the effects of cross-linguistic influence; limited input (as indexed by Age of Onset of Bilingualism, AOB), and working-memory limitations. An auditory offline grammaticality judgment task was performed by 119 adult participants split into four groups: (1) Monolingual Russian-speaking controls (MonoControl), (2) Immigrant Controls, that is, Russian-Hebrew bilinguals with AOB after the age of 13 (IMMControl); (3) bilinguals with AOB between 5–13 (BL-Late); and (4) bilinguals with AOB before the age of 5 (BL-Early). The latter group represents HL speakers. We did not find effects of cross-linguistic influence or extra memory load; at the same time, the effects of AOB were robust. Additionally, HL speakers (BL-Early group) differed from the other groups in poor performance on adjectival concord, but patterned with the others on person agreement, which indicates that the feature [person] is more robust than other agreement/concord features in HL grammars.
This chapter looks at the mechanics of Agreement, and the role that Agreement plays in Case-marking and A-Movement. It starts (Module 3.1) by characterising Agreement, Case-marking and A-Movement as involving a probe-goal relation, and outlines how agreement and case features are valued in the course of a derivation. Module 3.2 goes on to look at how agreement works in expletive it clauses, and contrasts this with multiple agreement in expletive there clause: it also examines conditions on the use of expletives. Module 3.3 then turns to explore the potential role of abstract agreement in Passive, Raising, Exceptional Case-marking, and Control infinitives. Next Module 3.4 investigates non-standard structures involving agreement across a finite clause boundary (e.g. He seems is very active), and at Copy Raising structures (e.g. He looks like he’s winning). The chapter concludes with a Summary (Module 3.5), Bibliography (Module 3.6), and Workbook (Module 3.7), with some Workbook exercise examples designed for self-study, and others for assignments/seminar discussion.
No studies have investigated the neural correlates of Number and Person agreement processing in bilinguals. Because a previous fMRI study showed difference in L1 and L2 morphosyntactic processing of L1 Turkish–L2 Persian bilinguals, it was of interest whether this difference can be specifically attributed to Number or Person processing. Therefore, we reanalyzed these data at the whole-brain level, revealing a selective response for Number Violations in the pars opercularis (PO), whereas Number and Person Violations activated the posterior superior temporal gyrus (pSTG). These results support the decomposition of agreement projections and their neuroanatomical substrates in bilinguals and confirm the involvement of systematically different feature-checking and feature-mapping mechanisms in Number and Person agreement but shared mechanisms between L1 and L2. Moreover, at variance with previous reports, Number Violations evoked more effects than Person Violations in pSTG, suggesting qualitatively different processing underlying R-expression and pronominal controllers.
This chapter analyses in detail the major part of Socrates’ long and complex discussion with Critias about the nature of temperance. Central to the discussion is Critias’ proposal that temperance is knowing oneself. It is argued that this discussion brings out several important ways in which Socrates and Critias differ from one another. One is in their respective attitudes towards interpretation: while Socrates is negligent of interpreting the words of others, Critias shows a keen interest in the interpretation of texts. A second difference is in the pair’s conception of self-knowledge. It is argued that Critias’ conception is based on what I call a social authority model, while Socrates’ is based on what I call a reflective model. It is shown that, despite the heavily aporetic nature of the discussion, a substantive conception of temperance can be gleaned from critical engagement with that discussion.