Good nursing practice is based on evidence and undertaking a community health needs assessment is a means to providing the evidence to guide community nursing practice. A community health needs assessment is simply a process that examines the health status and social needs of a population. It may be conducted at a whole-of-community level, a sub-community level or even a sub-system level. Nursing practice frequently involves gathering data and assessing individuals or families to determine appropriate nursing interventions. This concept is transferable to an identified community, when the community itself is viewed as being the client. This chapter focuses on exploring the principles and processes involved in undertaking a community health needs assessment.

This chapter explores epistemic naturalism and some claims associated with it. We examine the replacement thesis, the continuity thesis, and the Darwinian argument. We examine the views of Quine, Kornblith, Maffie, and Goldman.

This chapter examines the problem of epistemic circularity. Can one use a source of belief, F, to support or justify the belief that F is a reliable source of true belief? We examine the views of Alson and Sosa concerning epistemic circularity.

This chapter examines some versions of the coherence theory of justification, and arguments for and against the coherence theory of justification.

This chapter examines various foundationalist theories of justification. We consider the regress argument for foundationalism, classical and modest foundationalism, and Phenomenal Conservatism.

We explore the problem of the criterion as formulated by Roderick Chisholm and his defense of common-sense particularism. We examine various criticisms of this approach.

In this chapter we distinguish two forms of internalism about epistemic justification and consider three sorts of arguments in favor of internalism.

This chapter examines reliabilist theories of justification and Sosa's virtue epistemology. We look at the new evil demon problem and the problem of unknown reliability. We examine Sosa's virtue and his distinctions between accurate, adroit, and apt belief.

In this chapter, we examine some views about a priori justification. We consider, for example, whether a priori justification must be indefeasible. Is a priori justification confined to those propositions that are analytic? What is it for a proposition to be analytic?

This chapter introduces the Gettier problem and considers some main solutions to it. It also examines Williamson's knowledge first epistemology and the view that knowledge is unanalyzable.

In this chapter we look at two important topics in social epistemology: testimony and disagreement. What is necessary for testimony to be a source of justification or knowledge? Can testimony be a basic source of justification? We also consider three views concerning the appropriate stance in the face of disagreement with one's epistemic peers: the Equal Weight View, the Steadfast View, and the Total Evidence View.

We examine some main arguments for skepticism. We consider in detail the argument from ignorance and various replies, including the relevant alternatives reply, the contextualist reply, the Moorean reply, and the inference to the best explanation reply.

This chapter introduces and examines some concepts central to our traditional understanding of knowledge, such as truth, belief, and justification.