This essay investigates the shifting centrality/marginality axis of scientific authority in nineteenth-century Britain by comparing two key works of the newly-developed discipline of sexology: Psychopathia Sexualis (1886–1902) written by Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Sexual Inversion (1897) written by John Addington Symonds and Havelock Ellis. Examining the production and dissemination of the two works highlights the contested authorial positions within the new discipline. It reveals that the boundaries between the role of sexologist and that of the sexological case study of the (male) ‘sexual invert’ were fluid. While the concept of ‘sexual inversion’, which was developed by Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, who claimed that same-sex sexuality is a form of gender inversion, theoretically included forms of female ‘sexual inversion’, in this context, it refers to male same-sex love. The psychiatrist, Krafft- Ebing developed new sexual taxonomies and published them in 12 revised editions of his magnum opus on sexuality. Ellis, scientist and literary scholar, is today better remembered for his involvement in the first study in English of same-sex sexuality than its initiator Symonds, a Renaissance scholar, literary critic and self-identified ‘sexual invert’. By comparing the production of Psychopathia Sexualis and Sexual Inversion and their impact on British culture, I hope to unveil some of the forces that shaped the battle for sexological authority in late nineteenth-century Britain. I argue that, unlike in European branches of sexology, which were firmly anchored within scientific tradition, British sexology was partly indebted to the literary realm.

Perhaps more than any other historical period, the Victorian age emphasized the link between the management of morals and the social health of the nation. If an individual could exercise control over his or her own behaviour, regulating undesirable propensities and developing positive faculties, then society would function according to the organic principles of steady growth, gradual development and eventual transformation. The tradition of self-help books promoted this idea of governance in that they offered practical guides to the working and middle classes about almost any aspect of human life, from conduct to cooking. Samuel Smiles's Self-Help (1859) was a hugely influential early example of a genre of writing that has again become popular for its advocacy of the benefits of individual action as a means towards self-knowledge and personal development. Then, as now, this idea of self-help was underpinned by hard work and perseverance, both virtues that had currency in all classes of society.

It might seem curious to group practical guides to the mind with cookery books, but a defining characteristic of the Victorian period was its preoccupation with seeing the hidden patterns that lay beneath the surface of things. Of special interest were explorations of the workings of the human mind because they provided insights into individuality and autonomy, and in particular the significance of will. The practices of physiognomy and phrenology fed this interest in mind and body, providing readings of external (physical) appearance that illuminated internal (mental) form.

In the February 1869 issue of Belgravia magazine, an essay entitled ‘Women and Men’ opens with a trio of questions: ‘What is a woman? What is a man? Are women men?’ The writer then takes issue with a particular ‘strong-minded woman’, Lydia Becker, who had campaigned for women to appear on the voting register in Manchester, and finally arrives at the heart of the article: ‘Although Miss Becker appears to have had her innings in the registration court at Manchester, her grand field-day … was at Hull, when at the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science she attracted one of the most crowded audiences, by reading a paper with this extremely grotesque title: “On the supposed Differences in the Minds of the two Sexes of Man.”’ As it happened, Becker's title was slightly, though significantly, different: ‘On some supposed Differences in the Minds of Men and Women with regard to Educational Necessities’. While Belgravia dismisses Becker's paper as ‘singularly illogical’ and ‘based on a delusion’, the prominence given to its substance, including the three propositions that form the kernel of Becker's argument, is noteworthy. Take, for instance, the second proposition: ‘That any broad marks of distinction which may at the present time be observed to exist between the minds of men and women collectively, were fairly traceable to the influence of the different circumstances under which they passed their lives, and could not be proved to inhere in each class in virtue of sex.’

Victorian England witnessed the curious intellectual union of scientific naturalism and the belief in magic as these two seemingly opposed systems of thought rose to prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century. The doctrine of the former was formulated in part by the demands of scientists such as Thomas Huxley and John Tyndall. Naturalist thinkers wished to establish a scientifically directed culture and to eradicate religious belief and other such ‘superstitious’ thought entirely. Scientific naturalism maintained that belief in any non-physical agencies was superstitious and indicative of a culturally dysfunctional society. The doctrine of the latter was expressed in esoteric societies such as the Theosophical Society and the Hermetic Society and sought to establish, within the natural world and governed by natural laws, the mystery and spirituality traditionally associated with religious thinking and belief in magic. The people who belonged to these esoteric and magical societies that were springing up at the end of the century understood magic as the interaction of the human will and imagination with visible and invisible correspondences within the natural world in order to effect change.

To read the geological work of John Ruskin from the early 1860s until the mid-1880s is to look at a marginalized science through the lens of a marginal – and, ultimately, marginalized – practitioner. The inception of the dense, professional Geological Magazine in 1864 does show that able work was being done by an increasingly self-aware international community. But while geology was not being practised less, its significance in Victorian scientific culture was diminishing. Not only the question of evolution, but questions about the nervous system, solar power, sociology and the relation between mind and body began to edge geology out of its former place. The science which had fed controversy about the age of the earth, the historical accuracy of the Bible and the origin and evolution of life began to shift to a science of filling informational gaps. Geology's leading practitioners certainly resisted being relegated to the sidelines. As the Oxford geologist John Phillips lectured to the British Association in 1864:

Introduction

The evaluation of the current situation and prospects of the contemporary Russian economy in the Russian and Western economic literature and in the activities of the international economic organizations is complicated by two factors. First, Russian economic statistics remain unreliable. Second, the overwhelming majority of researchers make forecasts of Russian long-term economic development based on the results of the last few years, at the most of the past 10–20 years. Furthermore, these forecasts are based on purely economic factors, without taking account of the human potential and moral condition of the society.

My goal is to evaluate the prospects for Russian economic development on the basis of reliable economic statistics and on the main features of its economic development over the past three hundred years, for which period there are more or less reliable macroeconomic statistics. In the economic development of Russia in this period one can observe some regularities that enable one to forecast the future development of Russia and its economic policy. I attempt also, to the extent that is possible, to take account of the human potential and moral condition of contemporary Russian society.

Contemporary Russian Macroeconomic Statistics and the Need for Alternative Estimates of the State of the Russian Economy

Despite the fact that the Russian statistical service since the beginning of the 1990s has declared its transition to international statistical standards, Russian macroeconomic statistics remain unreliable.

Introduction

A growing body of empirical research suggests that countries endowed with great natural resource wealth tend to lag behind comparable countries in terms of long-run real GDP growth, a finding that has given rise to widespread debate about a so-called ‘resource curse’ or a ‘paradox of plenty’. Explanations of the resource curse focus on a wide range of economic and political factors. The most prominent lines of argument emphasize the impact of resource wealth on the competitiveness of other tradables (‘Dutch disease’); the impact of commodityprice volatility, particularly on fiscal revenues; the interaction of commodity-price volatility with financial market imperfections, which can lead to inefficient specialization; and the impact of resource wealth on the quality of institutions, political processes and governance. Significantly, the major economic explanations of resource-exporters' poor growth performance are all, at least in principle, treatable: governments have at their disposal policy tools to mitigate, if not eliminate, such economic hardships as ‘Dutch disease’. The fact that they so often fail to do so suggests that consistent policy failure lies at the root of the problem.

If this is indeed the case, then the most promising approaches to the resource curse are likely to be those relying on political economy explanations, for the key must lie in understanding why resource-based economies are more likely than others to suffer from bad policies. The answer must be that resource wealth somehow distorts their politics in such a way as to produce institutional and policy failures.

Given its economic structure, Russia is bound to remain a heavily hydrocarbondependent economy for some time to come. This reality largely defines the two most important challenges facing Russian policy-makers as they seek to create a framework for sustained growth. These are managing a resourcebased economy successfully and facilitating economic diversification over time. This chapter first looks at the policies and developments that have been underlying Russia's strong post-crisis growth performance, before setting out the policies that Russia—as a resource based economy—would have to follow in order to sustain high growth rates.

The Policies and Developments Underlying Growth

The most important economic policy choice underlying the expansion since 1998 was the adoption of a prudent fiscal stance—in sharp contrast to the pre-crisis period. From 2000 to 2004, federal budgets were drafted to aim for surpluses based on conservative oil price assumptions. This approach not only delivered sizeable surpluses but also a budget that was balanced over the oil price cycle. Simulations show that the federal budget would have remained in rough balance even with oil prices unchanged at USD 19/bl (Urals) throughout the period. Indeed, there would have been only a relatively moderate deficit, not exceeding 2 per cent of GDP, if oil prices had fallen to very low levels (Kwon 2003, Ahrend 2004a). To be sure, fiscal responsibility was facilitated by growing revenues due to favourable terms of trade and strong growth.

Russia is the world's second largest producer and exporter of oil. It is also the largest producer and exporter of natural gas. At times of low world market prices for oil and natural gas, such as 1986–88 (for natural gas 1987–89) and 1998, it experiences economic crises. The balance of payments crisis caused by the low energy prices during the first of these periods contributed to the failure of Gorbachev's perestroika and the collapse of the USSR. The second period of low energy prices was an element in the macroeconomic crisis of 1998 when the exchange rate fell sharply, the government defaulted on its internal debt and was forced to reschedule its external debt, many Russian entities defaulted on their external commitments, and real wages and living standards fell sharply. When prices are high, as in 2004–05, it enjoys a bonanza. The budget is in surplus, public sector salaries are increased and paid on time, there is an enormous surplus on the current account of the balance of payments, foreign exchange reserves shoot up, and living standards rise as the population consumes imported consumer goods and foreign holidays.

Any visitor to Moscow or St. Petersburg in 2005 might have taken it for granted that for Russia high world market prices for energy are an unmixed blessing.

Entrepreneurship and geography are both important factors of economic development. Both have been recognized as posing problems for the long-run growth of the Russian economy. This chapter looks at a possible connection between these two factors.

Stunted Entrepreneurship

Theoretical arguments about the importance of new business creation for economic growth are usually traced back to Josef Schumpeter, and have been further developed in the last 25 years in the context of models of industry evolution. Empirical evidence in support of this proposition has long remained fragmentary, as in Audretsch (2002, pp. 17–27). Comprehensive data on firm dynamics across many countries now make it possible to estimate the contribution of firm births and deaths to the growth of labor productivity, which turns out to be significant (Bartelsman, et al. 2004, pp. 32–44). Unlike the mature market economies, where the annual number of firm births closely matches that of deaths, the more successful Eastern European economies have seen explosive growth in the number of new firms in the 1990s (Bartelsman et al. 2004, pp. 15–17). Indeed, it is argued that their success was, in large part, a result of this growth (McMillan and Woodruff 2002).

Data on firm births and deaths in Russia are not available, and published data on the total number of firms appear to be deeply flawed (Kontorovich 2005, pp. 243–4).