Introduction

This chapter is born out of a dialogue between two solitudes—the solitude of the outside and of the solitude inside. The solitude of the outside may be found in the enormous, vacant stretches of the world, the icy wastes of Siberia, the emptiness of the tundra in North America or the deserts of Africa. This kind of solitude is very much out there; it hits you in the middle of the eye.

Vast, empty spaces, totally devoid of people, large swathes of wilderness, whiteness of snow or starkness of sand that hurts the eye. Canada is a country of such solitudes. Most of its population is huddled within a hundred miles of the border with the United States. The rest of the hulking continent in the North is practically devoid of people. It is too cold and too forbidding to attract substantial human habitation as yet. When I first visited Canada in summer 2000, I saw large cities, full of lit-up buildings and a vast network of bright streets, but with hardly any people. We drove into our hotel in Calgary in the evening, passing through empty lots and subdued suburbs, with not a soul in sight.

There is another immense solitude, the solitude of India, the country I live and work in. It is not the emptiness of the outdoor landscapes, but the fullness of chidakash, the limitless firmament of consciousness, the terrain of silence and new creation.

Introduction

It was from my friends in the Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry that I first heard that the Mother wanted Sanskrit to be made the national language of India. Indeed, Sanskrit is taught from childhood not only in the ashram schools, but also at Auroville, the community that the Mother founded. On 11 November 1967, the Mother said, ‘Sanskrit! Everyone should learn that. Especially everyone who works here should learn that…’ (Mother 1967).

Because some degree of confusion persisted over the Mother's and Sri Aurobindo's views on the topic, a more direct question was put to the former on 4 October 1971:

When asked by a disciple on what basis she had said that Sanskrit should be the national language of India, the Mother replied, ‘I said Sanskrit because Sri Aurobindo had told me so’.

Introduction

Policies that facilitate innovation in general and innovative performance in domestic industry in particular are an integral part of the development policies pursued by most countries. If the available evidence is any indication, India has been no exception. Both in terms of the institutional arrangements evolved over the years and of policy initiatives, India stands head and shoulders above developing country standards and in some respects is even on a par with some of the developed countries. Indian policymakers, particularly in the early years of independence, highlighted the crucial role of technology in addressing the development problems in the country and underscored the role of domestic generation of technology. The policies on technology imports in general, although initially liberal, were subsequently made restrictive for both embodied and disembodied imports to stimulate enterprises to take up and improve technology. Accordingly, almost all the policies formulated over the first forty years – including the policy statements exclusively for science and technology and others relating to industry, trade, investment and fiscal measures – were intended to influence either domestic generation or imports of technology or both. Apart from establishing its own agencies to promote innovation, the government encouraged the private sector, with the aid of various policy measures, to engage in in-house R&D activities. Also, with a view to promoting dissemination of technology, especially in agriculture, appropriate policy measures and other institutional action were taken from time to time.

Introduction

Debates on innovation policy—its importance, scope, impacts, etc.—have taken place in the ambit of both developed and developing countries. The BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) stand out within this debate for their social and economic potential and also for the impact such development may have on other countries.

With a view to furthering this debate, this article presents the innovation policy adopted by the Brazilian Federal Government. The focus is on the period ranging from 1990 to 2006 even though some general remarks will be made about state intervention before this period that has influenced the Brazilian national system of innovation. The analysis will be tackled by means of an approach that is explicitly based on a combination of the neo-Schumpeterian and Latin American structuralist frameworks, conceiving innovation as the key element of the capitalist dynamics (Cassiolato & Lastres 2008).

Within this framework, the idea of a National System of Innovation1 understands the innovative process as an integrated and systemic (and not linear) process. Although it focuses on the enterprise, institutions and organisations—and how they interact—are also important elements. Furthermore, context and history are crucial components and all policy elements affect the dynamics of the system. Thus, the analysis that follows covers not only innovation policy but science and technology and industrial policy and, more importantly, the overall economic policy of Brazil during the period.

Introduction

Over the past 10 years the world scene has changed and major new actors have taken the stage. It is thus interesting to note that the Lisbon strategy was mainly occupied with lessons to be drawn from the relative success of the US in the ICT-based new economy and that the strategy showed little concern with the five BRICS countries. Today it is obvious that Europe needs to recognise their role both as potential competitors in world trade and as potential partners when it comes to solving major problems of economic instability and environmental sustainability. While in 2000 it seemed adequate to regard the ‘knowledge-based’ economy as reigning solely in the OECD area, this report demonstrates that it is no longer the case.

As we can see from the contributions in this volume Russia and India have impressive knowledge bases in terms of their educational level while China has expanded its investments in both higher education and research at an outstanding rate. In Brazil and South Africa government bodies increasingly apply systemic approaches to policies aimed at promoting innovation. Understanding the specific dynamics linking the knowledge base to innovation and economic performance in each of the five BRICS countries is today a prerequisite for understanding the direction in which the world economy is heading. Here the BRICS project contributes with interesting insights.

Introduction

This chapter is a reflection on how changes in our idea of the nation determine the pragmatics of the academy in contemporary India. More particularly, it examines how the predominantly secularized, ‘Hindu’ academy has responded to the threat posed by the political upsurge of right-wing, Hindu majoritarianism. It argues that the academy has responded by a peculiar politics of its own, which, by virtue of its apparently oppositional and progressive stance, cheats itself into feeling that it is fighting religious fanaticism, but actually blocks it from doing so. This ‘false consciousness’ prevents the academy from discharging its larger social and cultural responsibilities, something that it appears so eager to do. In other words, much of the counter-communalistic academic discourse is, paradoxically, a distorted reflection of the very thing that it seeks to defeat and destroy. This discourse, which has its own paranoias and insecurities, upon closer scrutiny reveals an uncanny resemblance to Hindu extremism. Consequently, the secular academy is not just fearful and aggressive, but also partial and selective in its methods and strategies.

Simply speaking, academic Hinduphobia is born out of the insecurities of the secular Hindu intelligentsia. Alarmed that the very middle classes whose vanguard and champion it supposed itself to be was now deserting it lured by what was so obviously an inferior ideology, it has reacted with predictable anger and bitterness. This secular intelligentsia had almost come to equate Hinduism with its brand of secularism, having been paternalistically tolerant of minority fanaticism, whether Muslim, Sikh, radical, or caste-based.

Introduction: Being Responsible for India

In a sense, this whole book is an outcome of my feeling responsible to and for my country. Caring for India and being involved in the Indian narrative has been the mainstay of my intellectual life for the last thirty years. This process has implicated me in the question of what it means to be a citizen of India and also what India itself means as a nation, state, civilization, and cultural entity. Who are we? How did we come to be this way? Where are we heading? Such questions inform much of the reflections in the chapters that follow. However, instead of beginning at the other end, with speculations about the meaning of India, I thought a productive way to start was to reflect on the idea of responsibility itself from which this book originates. What does it mean to be responsible? How does one show this responsibility? My opening chapter will try to address this question by trying to take stock of India as a nation and civilization, before going on to ask what responsibility means to us.

India is a very ancient and complex living civilization that is larger than the present nation-state called the Republic of India. This nation, which would be more appropriately described as a civilization-state, is also the custodian of a diverse and plural culture, which has many layers, regions, languages and subnationalities.

About one hundred years ago, in 1909, Mahatma Gandhi published Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule. Not only was this the first book that he wrote, it was also the only book of his that Gandhi himself translated into English. Written originally in Gujarati between 13 and 22 November on board the Kildonan Castle on his way from England to South Africa, it appeared in two installments in the 11 and 19 December issues of Indian Opinion, a journal Gandhi used to bring out. In January 1910, it was published as an independent booklet by Gandhi's own International Printing Press from Phoenix Farm, Natal, with an English version appearing two months later in March.

Hind Swaraj was an imaginary dialogue between a Reader and the Editor, the latter presumably standing for Gandhi himself. This dialogue covers a range of topics including the Congress Party and its officials, the state of India, the reasons for India's colonization, the meaning of svaraj (self-rule), the best means to attain it, Gandhi's vision of an ideal society, the definition and practice of satyagraha (‘truth-force’), the qualities required to be a satyagrahi, Hindu-Muslim unity, railways, lawyers and doctors, and English education in India. The book became notorious for its attack on machinery and modern,Western civilization. Yet, more than that, it contained the earliest, most comprehensive, exposition of Gandhi's philosophy. Extremely influential politically, Hind Swaraj was soon banned in India.

If the first part of this book looked mostly at political and historical aspects of the Indian nation, the second part concentrates on the linguistic, cultural and educational facets. This chapter is concerned with Hindi, while the one that follows it, with Sanskrit. I wish to examine how both these languages helped to form and underwrite the ‘Indianness’ of India.

Speaking of Hindi, I should have been writing this chapter in Hindi. Not just this one, but several others—and perhaps, poems, stories, book reviews, too. Many years ago, in a fit of joyous exuberance, I actually wrote several pages of my daily journal in Hindi. It happened after the language suddenly sprung to life in my inner being—at least partially.

I was doing a Pre-University Course at the Madras Christian College. My second language option was Hindi. We had two teachers, Dr P. K. Balasubramaniam and Dr Ravindra Nath Singh. I remember both of them very well. The latter, a young man then, had a PhD from Allahabad. I assumed that he was from the North, but was told that he was actually from Tamil Nadu, where they also had ‘Singh’ as a surname. How little I knew about India, let alone Tamil Nadu. The senior teacher's initials, ‘PK’ led to the usual jokes. PK or peeke means (having) drunk. When terribly enthused, he did look a bit inebriated, though he was a teetotaler.

Introduction

Science and technology (S&T) and innovation have been a strong force in Chinese economic growth. They are expected to play a more important role on the road to building a prosperous society according to the National Plan 2006–2020 for the Development of Science and Technology in the medium and long term.

S&T and innovation policy has been playing a key role in enabling China to catch up and move forward to become an innovative country. But in past decades, China had a different strategy for policy making and adopted a variety of policy tools. Some policies had a great impact on economic growth, some did not. As China has achieved double-digit economic growth for more than ten years, some would like to ascertain the role played by S&T and innovation policy in this long period of growth. The purpose of the paper is to analyse the origins and development of science, technology and innovation policy in China since 1978 and the challenges ahead.

Science policy is about how to promote science in a country. It was given the status of a special policy by Bernal in 1939 (Bernal, 1939). Later on, Vannevar Bush further clarified the role of science in the famous report Science: The endless frontier. According to Bush, the purpose of science policy is to contribute to national security, health and economic growth (Bush, 1945).

Until the end of the last century, generation of scientific knowledge was concentrated mainly in three regions of the world – Japan, the USA and Europe. The last decade has brought a marked shift towards other major players. Today the ‘BRICS countries’ – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – are contributing strongly to knowledge production.

This change in the global research landscape, together with the urgent need to tackle jointly key global challenges, such as climate change, energy and food security and poverty reduction, created a need for Europe to step up its international cooperation on science and technology (S&T) with other parts of the world.

The ‘Strategic European Framework for International Science and Technology Cooperation’ adopted by the European Commission in September 2008 and endorsed by the EU Member States in December 2008, was the European Union's answer to this need. The aim was to create the conditions for a more coherent and coordinated approach to international S&T cooperation based on strategic partnerships with leading countries and regions.

These strategic partnerships need to be based on an analysis of the comparative strengths of potential third-country partners and of Europe alike. Such analysis would lay the foundation for determining the scope and opportunities for cooperation and the potential mutual benefits.

This book is expected to contribute to such analysis. It presents research findings about the national innovation systems of the five BRICS countries and compares trends in their science, technology and innovation policies

Introduction

In this last chapter of the book, I wish to come back to Mahatma Gandhi. Not just Mohandas Karamchand, but Mahatma, the great soul. In contrast to this exaltation of Gandhi, it would be useful to bear in mind that his nearest and dearest called him by a much more intimate appellation, Bapu, or father. When I speak of the availability of the Mahatma, I am also simultaneously speaking of the availability of Bapu, a father, an ancestor.

Much of this book has been about India, especially the nation that is India today, how it sought and found altered destinations, becoming in the process what it uniquely is. No single individual has been more important in this seeking and finding than Bapu. It was he who taught us how to stand up to greater power without being afraid, thereby reversing the usual order of things as we know it in the material world. No wonder Bapu is most important to my own project of reclaiming India and redefining its priorities today.

But Bapu is no longer available to us as he was to his close followers or even to previous generations. There's a huge gap between his time and ours, as there is in his thinking and ours. That is why in order to formulate what I would call a Neo-Gandhian praxis, I would like to consider the broader issue of the availability of tradition, before turning more specifically, to the availability of Mahatma Gandhi himself.