The purposes of this study are to assess the extent of youth movement activity in Western and Eastern Europe in the 1980s, and to interpret the youth movements from a political generational perspective. Based on information from news sources, books, and journals published between 1980–1990, the major European youth movements are listed by year of occurrence and country of origin. The findings of this study indicate that much of the youth movement activity in Western Europe took place during the early-to-mid 1980s, involving youth protests against environmental destruction, militarism, NATO, and the presence of U.S. nuclear missiles on European soil. In Eastern Europe youth movements peaked in the late 1980s over the issues of freedom, democracy, glasnost, and independence from Soviet Russian domination. University reform protests and the counterculture movements occurred in both Western and Eastern Europe throughout the 1980s. From a political generational perspective, the extensive youth movement activity, issues of protest, and existence of various life-course, cohort, and period effects within European youth movements suggest there were two extraordinary political generations in the 1980s—an earlier one in Western Europe and a later one in Eastern Europe.

Youth Movements

As far back as antiquity, young people have rebelled against their elders and acted out against society. Much of this rambunctious youthful activity represented brief episodes of collective behavior, and it was not until the early nineteenth century that full-fledged youth movements came into being, characterized by the organized efforts of young people to bring about political reform or revolution. At the root of youth movements is a shared perception by a critical mass of young people that traditional institutions, the political regime, and the implementation of a society's social and economic values are no longer legitimate or effective. As a result, youth take it upon themselves to protest against existing societal conditions and to change the political order.

The first youth movement (the Burschenschaft) occurred in 1815 at the University of Jena in the central German state of Weimar, followed by other youth movements throughout Europe, which, like the Burschenschaften, rejected absolutism in favor of the modern nation-state.

This study explores the relationship between youth movements and citizenship that developed and changed over the past 200 years. The principal historical and contemporary perspectives on citizenship are summarized, noting that youth movements—which first began in 1815—have occurred in waves during certain periods in modern history. These waves or clusters of youth movement activity are called historical generations, representing combinations of generational and historical forces. The characteristics of historical generations are outlined, and five extraordinary periods of youth movement activity are identified and described: Young Europe, Post-Victorian, Great Depression, 1960s Generation, and 1980s Generation. Focus is given to the types of citizenship around which young people mobilized within each of the five historical generations. Finding that the struggle for citizenship has been a central feature of youth movements, some of the common patterns and newly emerging themes in the evolving relationship between the individual and the nation-state are discussed. The study concludes with a brief summary of the findings.

INTRODUCTION

One of the characteristics of the 1980s was the eruption of political protest and widespread youth movement activity throughout every region of the world. Youth movements are the organized efforts of young people to mobilize for political change, and in the 1980s young people formed political movements in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Central and Latin America, North America, Africa and the Middle East, and Asia (Braungart and Braungart 1990c). In Western Europe, young people rallied around slogans such as “Stop de N-bom,” “Chase the Yankees out and shatter NATO,” and they demanded “free space” or autonomous youth centers. In Eastern Europe, the rallying cries were “Democracy now or never,” “Freedom and peace,” and “Away with the army,” while Chinese youth chanted “Down with dictatorship” and “Give me liberty or give me death!” Whether peaceful and earnest or bloody and murderous, the 1980s youth movements signalled young people's anger, dissatisfaction, and rejection of the status quo along with their personal determination to make a difference in society by bringing about needed reform.

To much of the world's adult population, the 1980s youth unrest was reminiscent of another era of youthful protest that took place in the 1960s.

My narrative is concerned with some elements in Anglican theology over the last halfcentury or so, and with their wholly unforeseen legacy for the credibility of those who represent and wish to commend Christian tradition. I have chosen to provide a thread of connection through my narrative by referring to the work of Stephen Sykes, a near contemporary, whose concern throughout his career was to commend the integration of specifically Church of England liturgy and theology. A distinctive characteristic of his perspective was his confidence in the theological competence of the laity given the episcopate as ‘authorised interpreters’ of the resources they had inherited and faithfully transmitted. My overall proposal is that whatever the theological and liturgical competence of at least some members of the episcopate, their failure to address themselves to much-needed change in the very structure of relationships in the church has put in jeopardy the trust in its representatives on which its members should be able to rely and indeed enjoy.

Introducing the Thread of Connection

I begin with an initial introduction to the life and work of Stephen Whitefield Sykes, for a decade a colleague in the University of Durham's Department of Theology, and a lifelong contact in friendship thereafter. Stephen Sykes was born in 1939 into a clerical family then based at a Bristol college for the training of Church of England candidates for ordination. His secondary education began at Bristol Grammar School, but he was sent from there to what was then an all-boys school in Bath, graduated from St John's College, Cambridge in Theology, and trained for ordination at Ripon Hall, Oxford. Ordained deacon in 1964, he returned to Cambridge as dean of his Cambridge College, and was made priest in the following year. A stint as an assistant and then a full lecturer led to his becoming Van Mildert Canon of Durham Cathedral and professor in the university's Department of Theology (1974–1985). It was during that decade that he identified some of the central preoccupations of his theology. He left Durham to become Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge for just five years, becoming bishop of Ely 1990–1999, thence back to Durham as principal of St John's College until retirement in 2006 – the year of the publication of his concluding and controversial ref lections on ‘power’.

After studying the formation, patterns, and dynamics of youth movements from 1815–1990, the next question is what is happening with youth movement activity in the 21st century? So far in this new century, the media has reported numerous outbreaks of youthful protests and activism, such as the color revolutions in Eastern Europe; the Occupy Wall Street movement that began in New York City and spread to other cities and countries; the Arab Spring uprising in the Middle East; and the demonstrations and skirmishes between young protesters and police in Hong Kong. In the United States, people of many ages took to the streets in cities to protest racism against blacks and police brutality in what became known as Black Lives Matter. There also was the anti-gun movement organized by teenagers in Florida after a former student went on a rampage in the high school and killed 17 students. And there was a compelling global environmental movement over the need to address climate change that was started by Greta Thunberg, a 15-year-old Swedish student. Her Friday School Strike and sit-in at the Swedish parliament in 2018 sparked youthful support and ignited coordinated demonstrations and strikes to address climate change by young people throughout the world.

With the exception of the global climate change movement, this eruptive youthful political activity in the first two decades of the 21st century was treated as a series of widely scattered youth demonstrations and unrest. But we wondered what is going on with young people in so many countries around the world. Why are large numbers of youth taking to the streets to protest and demand social and political change? Our interest was piqued, and we also wondered about the extent of youth movement activity and whether these 21st-century youth movements differed from those in the previous eras of generational conflict discussed in this anthology.

In the concluding chapter, we examine the extent of youth movement activity in the 21st century in each world region and assess how it relates to other eras of upsurges in youth activism and unrest. We then discuss what this new era of youth protest may indicate for societies and politics in the future.

For the purposes of what is necessarily merely an introductory essay in reading Lewis on ‘gender’, the term is to be taken to refer to the relationship of the ‘feminine’ to the ‘masculine’ and vice versa. We assume that one cannot be understood without the other. Lewis himself lived through a period of immense change in what we would now call ‘gender relationships’, and we can draw attention to but a few examples of his views. We need to note also that, given his resistance to the merits and growth of some of the ‘social sciences’, one cannot imagine that he personally would have been sympathetic to the development of ‘gender studies’ which took place after his death. In such studies, attention to ‘masculinity’ is as yet still coming into focus, not least in the study of the Christian tradition in all its complexities.

We can recall, for example, that it was axiomatic in the church of Lewis's baptism, the Church of Ireland, part of the Anglican Communion, that very few were able to take seriously those women who believed themselves to have a vocation to ordination. So whilst women could be baptised, confirmed, forgiven, exchange vows with a male in marriage, receive communion, chrism or a blessing, and like any other baptised person, could baptise someone in extreme circumstances, they would never be able to confirm anyone, pronounce divine forgiveness, celebrate communion, chrismate or bless someone. Whether they could read scripture in public, let alone give an address or preach to a ‘mixed’ audience, was contentious across different churches, as indeed remains the case in our own time. Only in 1944 was Florence Li Tim-Oi ordained by the Anglican bishop of Hong Kong to serve Christians in China, otherwise bereft of priestly ministry. She ceased to act as a priest in 1948 when her bishop's actions were condemned by his fellow-bishops at the Lambeth Conference, though her ordination was eventually recognised within the Hong Kong diocese in 1970. In due course some provinces of the Anglican Communion accepted the ordination of women to the priesthood, including the Church of England itself in 1992.

The vigour of the debate about the ordination of women in the twentieth century was virtually inevitable given the changes of attitude to gender in other areas of life, such as access to university education.

Using a broad definition of youth movements, this study examines the extent and type of youth movement activity throughout the 1980s in the major regions of the world. The objectives of the investigation are to determine: (1) how much youth movement activity has occurred between 1980 and 1989, (2) over what issues young people have mobilised and protested, (3) whether the 1980s youth movements are similar to those of the 1960s, and (4) how the various youth movements of the 1980s may be explained. Based on information taken from news sources, manuscripts, books and journals, youth movements that occurred from 1980 to 1989 are described for each global region. The findings of the study, while not exhaustive, indicate that there was widespread youthful political protest throughout the world over many issues, with the youth movements of the 1980s representing both a continuation and departure from the 1960s Generation. The extensive youth movement activity of the 1980s is partially rooted in significant global changes and trends—most notably, a decline in East-West superpower influence; different issues of concern among youth in the Northern hemispheric countries versus those in the Southern hemispheric countries; and the rise in cultural pluralism, self-determination and political activity in every global region.

Youth movements

Youth movements represent organised and conscious attempts on the part of young people to initiate or resist change in the social order. When traditional institutions fail to meet the legitimate needs of age groups in society, and when a critical number of people become aware of their common plight and feel something can be done to alleviate their problems, generational or, in this instance, youth movements, may appear. The perceived discrepancy between the individual needs or aspirations of young people and the existing social and political conditions lies at the root of youth unrest.

Youth movements are not random behaviour but are direct responses to historical events and forces. From a national perspective, the emergence of political activity among youth would be expected to occur in countries undergoing rapid transformations, where, for a variety of reasons, the particular mix of circumstances tests the ability of a political system to perform necessary functions and services. Countries that experience institutional instability along with weakened legitimacy and effectiveness provide the ideal environments for protest behaviour.

This study explores the little understood relationship between historical generations and generation units. The attempt is made to construct a theory of historical generations and generation units that has broad enough analytic ability to explain the rise of youth movement activity throughout the world. In applying the theoretical assumptions over the last 170 years, this study identifies four historical generations (the Young Europe, Post-Victorian, Great Depression, and 1960s Historical Generations), representing 41 generational movements and 82 sets of generational units. The study also distinguishes between spontaneous and sponsored generational units on the political left and right, and traces the global growth and spread of generational movements over world time. The findings suggest a surprisingly good fit between theory and data.

INTRODUCTION

Problems with youth are as old as history, but youth movements, as we know them today, are less than two centuries old. Youth movements are types of collective behavior in which age-conscious groups or generation units mobilize to bring about or resist change. Generational units develop from the unique interaction between generational and historical forces that produces extraordinarily volatile periods in world time. These dynamic periods, called historical generations, are temporary combinations of historical and generational forces so closely intertwined that they operate as a single causal force for change—a unique blend of circumstances and social forces which may never be repeated in exactly the same way (Braungart, 1984a, 1984b).

During certain periods in world time (defined as the temporal order or unfolding of major local, national, and global events, and patterns of institutional structure and change), self-conscious, mobilized groups of young people act on behalf of their historically conditioned beliefs and attempt to expand new social, political, and cultural opportunities. Unlike recurring age cohorts who come of age on a continuous basis and act in relative harmony with prevailing historical forces, historical generations, represented by generational movements and generation units, reject existing social and political forms and erupt in a flurry of political and cultural activity. Historical generations represent periods of “moral upsurge” (Mills) or “creedal passion” (Huntington) in world time, eras when cultural ideals clash with social reality. The conflict and tension created by newly formed or perceived ideals and the existing social and political conditions lie at the root of generational movements.

Given more than a century since the birth of Simone Weil (1909–1943), we are in a sense better placed than ever before to appreciate her work, having progressed beyond the days when carefully edited selections of her writing were being released into press in a somewhat piecemeal manner. On the other hand, given the availability of the whole range of the work of such an extraordinarily gifted woman, we are presented with further difficulties. She wrote intensively throughout her relatively short adult life, but not necessarily for publication. Some of her work is best understood to be in the nature of exploratory drafts, whilst her confidence in the value of parts of it, and the care with which she left manuscripts with friends and correspondents, at least encourages us to seek among those drafts for comparably valuable insights. Her long-suffering parents clearly believed in her importance, with her mother especially putting in hours of time typing up her work, not least after Simone's death, making it possible for its publication in due course. All in all, we are left with questions about how best to ‘read’ her without over-systematising her thoughts. Albeit reading selectively, there is certainly coherence to be found, but we can also relish the provocative stimulus of some of her notebook entries as well as the clarity and conviction of such writing with which she seems to have been satisfied, much of it produced in the pressure of extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

We may begin by noting the pressures intrinsic to her education, being brought up alongside a brilliant and affectionate older brother, who became one of France's greatest mathematicians (eventually associated with the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies), as well as managing her own particular talents and achievements. In certain parts of Europe, women gained access to prestigious educational institutions only after World War I – Oxford, for instance, admitting women to degrees only in 1920. In France, it was not until 1928 that women were admitted to the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS). It is a mark of her exceptional abilities that Simone Weil was among the tiny minority of women first under the French philosopher Alain (pseudonym of Emile-Auguste Chartier) at the Lycee Henri IV and then at the ENS.

This essay provides an overview of the relationship between aging and politics from childhood through older adulthood. It describes the developmental and political characteristics of each stage in the life course and the effects of mentoring, mid-life crisis, and aging processes on the behavior and policies of political leaders. An assessment is made of the life-cycle predictions that different age groups are likely to disagree over politics and that political outlooks change with age. Results indicate that age-group disagreement is greater over some political issues than others and that the political orientations developed during youth do not change substantially with age.

The relationship between age and politics has long intrigued students of human behavior. Dividing the life span into the three stages of childhood, youth, and old age, the ancient Greeks identified the distinctive characteristics and interests of the different age groups. Youth was seen as a time of energy and impetuousness, while old age was viewed as a time of inactivity, contemplation and counsel, with the high spiritedness of youth requiring the steady direction of the elders (Nash, 1978). The Greeks also recognized that inherent in the relationship between the young and old are the forces for social stability and change. As Aristotle observed, political revolutions are not only due to the conflict between rich and poor but between fathers and sons (Feuer, 1969; Marias, 1970). In the 19th century, the French positivists divided the life span into distinct ages which act as “conditioning forces” for human experiences. “Discoverable” laws of historical development were assumed to be rooted in the human life cycle. According to the positivists, the past influences interpretations of life in the present, and the interaction of those in different phases of life plays a major role in societal change (Jansen, 1975). Schooled by the positivists, Ferrari extended these ideas to politics in his Histoire des révolutions d’ltalie (1856–58), contending that history changes about every thirty years as each new “biotic” generation tries to overthrow the government in order to take its place and rule (Marias, 1970).

More recently, the growing literature in human development and the heightened political activity of young people in the 1960s prompted renewed interest in the relationship between age and politics.

Moral development involves learning and expressing standards of right and wrong and gaining a sense of duty and obligation. What is considered good and bad, proper and improper, is grounded in values (e.g., caring, personal achievement, fairness) and ideals (e.g., virtues, ethical principles, civil rights) and reflected in cultural tradition, law, and social institutions, especially the family, education, and religion. How moral values are formed, what motivates moral behavior, and why people may or may not act on their moral beliefs are questions that have been debated throughout history.

While scholars and theologians continue the discussion today, this examination of moral development and its relation to youth activism is based on contemporary theory and research in psychology and the social sciences. After briefly identifying some of the central dimensions of morality, the principal social and psychological explanations for moral development are reviewed. These explanations or theories describe moral learning and a variety of influences on people's beliefs and behavior. Next, the relationship between morality and youth activism is explored by examining young people's development and the various forms of their activism as well as what the research indicates about moral development and youth activism.

Youth activism is considered here in its broadest sense as referring to the participation of young people in activities intended to improve the community and in youth movements to change society. Schools, religious groups, political organizations, and local and national institutions encourage youngsters to volunteer in their communities, which is generally considered an excellent way to foster young people's moral values, character, and citizenship.

Youth movements are another form of activism and may be defined as the organized, conscious attempt of young people to bring about or resist social change. Youth movements may be initiated by young people or sponsored by adults and adult organizations. A survey of modern history indicates that from 1815 onward, youth movements erupted periodically, resulting in at least five identifiable waves or clusters of youth movement activity. What began as a few youth movements in the early nineteenth century became global in scope by the 1960s and 1980s (see Braungart and Braungart, 1989). Youth movements are especially threatening to adult authorities, often creating societal turmoil and sometimes toppling governments and revolutionizing societies.

This study examines the life-course development of selected former political activist leaders from the 1960s. Three theoretical perspectives contribute to our understanding of life-course development: life cycle, socialization, and political generations. While most research of 1960s American student activists focused on left-wing activists, this study investigates the lives of both left- and right-wing political activists. Based on life-history interviews with 13 leaders of the left-wing Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and 11 leaders of the right-wing Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), three distinct stages in the life course of these activists are examined and compared: their formative childhood and adolescent years, their 1960s activist-youth stage, and their postactivist adult lives. Results indicate that (1) there was political continuity in the life-course development of SDS and YAF leaders; (2) data support the life-cycle, socialization, and generational explanations for youth movements, and suggest further that these factors interacted at each stage in the life-course development of the former 1960s activist leaders; and (3) while similar in life-cycle and generational dynamics, SDS and YAF leaders differed most in their political socialization experiences.

Introduction

“Never Trust Anyone Over 30”; “Ban the Bomb”; “Make Love, Not War”; “Hell No, We Won't Go”: These are faint echoes of the turbulent 1960s Generation. This was a time when political conflict divided along age-group lines, as young people in the United States and throughout the world formed political generations by organizing against what they perceived to be a disappointing set of conditions created by their elders and worked for social and political change. During an era of political generational activity, there is not only heightened intergenerational conflict but also intragenerational conflict, as the members of the same generation form competing generation units to redirect the course of politics (Braungart and Braungart, 1986, 1989; Heberle, 1951; Mannheim, 1952). In the 1960s two prominent opposing generation units squared off against each other—Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) on the political left and Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) on the political right.

Since the eruption of the student movement in the United States, there has been an ongoing effort to put the 1960s Generation into perspective.

This is a book that has been three decades in the making. Back in 1992, I wrote a featured essay for Utopian Studies on histories of utopia to 1950. Nettlau's book was one of those I listed and briefly discussed. I have persisted with an edition of Esbozo de historia de las utopías over the years (despite delays and the creation of many other books and articles) because it profoundly matters that there is a tradition over more than 2500 years of people giving expression to a desire for social betterment—whether by means of written works or the creation and sustaining of intentional communities. It matters now, in particular, as the earth under late capitalism is becoming more and more unlivable. It matters, too, that a little heard voice can, for a moment or two, be heard above the better-known words of Lewis Mumford, Krishan Kumar, Ruth Levitas, and Frank and Fritzie Manuel so as to give to a wellknown story an anarchist spin, a spin which began more than 70 years ago with Marie-Louise Berneri's brief account: Journey through Utopia. Max Nettlau, as this book will show, is an original.

It matters for one final reason too. I have been struck by this simple fact: of the hundreds of utopian and anarchist thinkers and writers mentioned by Nettlau, I have been unable to provide even the most basic information (birth and death dates, nationality, amateur and professional interests, and so on) for more than 50 and little information for many. They have, even in this age of information, vanished from the historical record as if they never were. Yet, these women and men mattered to themselves, to their families, to their loved ones, to their friends. They devoted themselves to the achievement of ideas. They are gone. Unintentionally, this book is philosophically about transience. The great antidote to egotism is, surely, the realization that oblivion awaits many of us, and that realization makes the cause of social betterment more not less pressing.

As to the organization of this edition, I hope it is reasonably self-evident. I begin with an introduction which presents a chronology of Nettlau's life, Nettlau's ideas about anarchism and utopian thought, the argument of the Outline (Esbozo), and the copy-texts and editorial principles I have used in this edition.

Political generations occur when age groups divide and conflict over politics, and are seen as resulting from the interaction between life-course, cohort/generational, and period effects. In this essay, political generations are examined both from a macro generational conflict interpretation, based largely on Mannheim's theory, as well as from a more micro intergroup relations approach, as developed by the Sherifs. It is argued that generational conflict and intergroup relations provide different yet complementary perspectives in the study of political generations. After briefly reviewing the literature on generational conflict and intergroup relations, these two approaches are illustrated by drawing examples from political generations in history. Finally, a comparative framework is offered that outlines the key concepts in the relationship between generational conflict, intergroup relations, and political generations.

Political Generations

A political generation occurs when an age group mobilizes to work for social and political change—or, to paraphrase Spitzer (1973), when age correlates with collective political behavior. Age is, of course, one of the most fundamental social categories in all societies, providing the basis for prescribing normative behavior and granting status, privilege, and power, with the relations between age groups having much to do with societal stability and change (Bengtson, Cutler, Mangen, and Marshall 1985; Mannheim 1952; Riley 1978; Ryder 1965; Streib and Bourg 1984). Young people as they come of age develop a fresh awareness of the larger social and political world, while the adults’ role is to socialize and integrate youth into society as responsible citizens. During so-called routine periods, the socialization of youth proceeds without major incident, but every so often, youth perceive themselves as a distinct age group whose politics differ markedly from adults. Rejecting the social and political world of their elders, young people may form a political generation whose mission is to redirect the course of politics and history (Braungart 1984a, 1984b, 1984c; Esler 1971, 1982; Heberle 1951; Rintala 1974).

The most recent period of political generational activity occurred in the 1960s.

I come now to utopias written from the turn of the century until the First World War. This period I see as characterized above all by the numerous utopian publications of H. G. Wells.

This man of great talent has written more utopias than any other writer, except Jules Verne—whom I cannot take seriously. Wells knew how to persuade the public through fantasy combined with a well-respected talent for sociology. However, he abused the poor utopia that had created his reputation by writing one after another, and still he continued to write them as they had become a way of making money for him. The public indulged in the game of reading them just as at another time they might play with a kaleidoscope. Another version of utopia is found in each new book from Wells. Utopia, however, doesn't deserve this treatment, for in the most difficult times it has been a way in which an individual fantasy finds a voice and makes itself heard. The utopian, as an honest man, is only one voice. Most often they make their confession to the public just once through a utopia. Then, in later works, they explain their idea, develop their idea, or retire from writing. On occasion, utopian writers do lose their faith and can only regain it by writing a new utopia. Utopias are often written, as it were, with the heart's blood and are preceded—if they are worth anything—by laborious thought. A utopia establishes its fundamental idea and then set dresses it, as appropriate, with a fantastic framework so as to make it attractive to the public. This was, as the previous chapters have shown, a creative habit of old, and the process was respected until Wells came along. Bellamy wrote his first, then his second book, and then one hundred explanatory articles before retiring and dying. By contrast, Wells wrote a new utopia almost every year. It is the utopia commercialized, paid for, exploited. It is exploited, ironically, when so many other utopians felt inspired to try to put an end to exploitation and make the world free and beautiful. This relationship is mirrored by the decline in intellectual life in the years before the war, years that saw the commercialization and brutalization of culture—and that process had to end in catastrophe.

This study identifies the moderate-extreme and left-right origins of youth politics. Based on the intersection of two factors or axes, a conceptual model is constructed having four distinct political types: moderate left, moderate right, extreme left, and extreme right. The four-celled typology is tested on three large samples of youth collected in 11 countries during the 1960s. Results suggest that youth politics operates within a relatively predictable moderate-extreme and left-right political framework, and the exact configuration of youth politics resembles a curvilinear, arch-shaped pattern, with both moderate left-right and extreme left-right youth and youth groups sharing many features in common. Study results offer opportunities for further historical, generational, and global comparisons.

The political process contains ideas that both maintain and transcend the existing social order. Moderate forms of politics are acceptable to the majority of citizens because they do not threaten or undermine the institutions and beliefs that sustain society. Political moderation typically is represented by competing groups that wish to participate in society, not drastically change it. Political extremism, on the other hand, may be characterized as sets of ideas directed at criticizing the existing social order and generating political activity toward transforming society into some preconceived notion of the best society. Radical political extremists are willing to renovate antagonistic political forms as they strive for power, authority, and fulfillment in a new order that replaces the old. Another way of differentiating moderate and extreme sources of politics is to note that political moderates embrace a “tender-minded” style of politics, while political extremists prefer a “tough-minded” approach to politics (Converse, 1964; Levinson, 1964; Hampden-Turner, 1970; Inglehart, 1977; Simpson, 1977; Rothman and Lichter, 1982).

The rise of liberal and conservative politics was in part the result of the collapse of the medieval estate system. Conceptions of liberal or “left” and conservative or “right” styles of thought grew out of the 1789 French National Assembly that held its meeting in a large horseshoe-shaped amphitheater in Paris. The seating arrangement at the Assembly gave rise to the use of directional terms in politics—the conservative party sat to the right of the speaker, the liberal party, in the center, and the radical party, to the speaker's left.