It has been widely accepted that the Cultural Revolution was the negation of the post-famine recovery approaches and actions if the personality politics between Mao and his first-line leaders can be set aside. Up to mid-1966, almost all of the newly implemented open and fair social mechanisms were criticised and rejected as the revisionist line defined by Mao and his followers. Chinese politics were once again pushed strongly by Maoists, aided by radical students, to turn to the left of the ideological spectrum. Mao's caution to never forget class struggle and to prevent the restoration of pre-1949 capitalist system unified his followers, making them realise the need to guard their interests and their social status, which they had achieved through the revolution. This was partially the reason why the radical and rebellious student group – initially formed by Tsinghua High School students – was called Red Guards. As a consequence of such political impetuses, the connection between politics and personal behaviour that was already separated to some degree in the post-famine years was once again closely connected. Many confused students had then staged violent acts of destruction in several cities, which was once proudly called the Red Terror (Chan 1982; Unger 1982).

Having demonstrated their mad political shows all over the country from the early summer to the early winter of 1966, the start of another process of negation in post-1949 Chinese history came into view. An internet writer who attended Mao's eighth grand reception of the Red Guards in Beijing wrote the following reflection: in 1967, Mao ‘had clearly disliked the Red Guards and turned to rely on various Workers’ Rebel Command Headquarters to continue with’ his Cultural Revolution (Zhu 2006, n.p.). On the other hand, an online memoir records the following vivid scene at the famous Beijing Railway Station:

Preamble

The conception of this edited collection is inherently tied to the immense challenges to mobility, migration and race relations posed by global phenomena, including the politicisation and securitisation of migration, Islamophobia and the Covid-19 pandemic. In line with our objective of including non-academic perspectives in this book, we invited Race Relations Commissioner Meng Foon to contribute his perspective on the key tasks for Aotearoa with regard to countering the structural forces that perpetuate racialised inequities, particularly for migrant communities. In response, Meng Foon kindly granted us, as editors of the collection, an interview. The printed version of this conversation has been edited for brevity.

Jessica Terruhn and Shemana Cassim

Meng Foon: I’ve always been interested in people's well-being. As the mayor of Gisborne for about 24 years, I thoroughly enjoyed the well-being of our community, and it was actually about having a listening ear, doing stuff and participating in [local people’s] lives. Whether it's birthdays, christenings, book launches, funerals, weddings – I think the key thing is actually being part of our community. You can learn about our community, but how do you actually apply that? Applying it means making friends with lots of people, having lots of cups of tea, and it was more a relationship thing. I think having lived in a multicultural community/ society, speaking Māori, my parents were immigrants, I think that all helped as well. So that life experience and the background definitely resonates with a lot of people. And the trials and tribulations of that.

The issues – there are different levels of issues. I think the issue at the top end is the structural, systemic racism which is caused by the Crown. I don't like to say that it’s caused by Pākehā. I don't like to say that it's caused by governments. But it is the Crown that alienated Māori land through various means and also suppressed Māori culture through legislation and through the starvation of resources. And so that was the key issue for tangata whenua.

Since the time when Mao was alive and leading the Cultural Revolution, a widely used narrative suggests that Mao was fighting for his political legacy in Chinese history. This was based on his own logic and the example of the then Soviet Union's leader, Nikita Khrushchev. After taking over leadership of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev had strongly condemned Stalin's wrongdoings. Stalin's embalmed remains were even removed and buried elsewhere. This story was awful in the eyes of the Chinese culture of Mao's generation. Mao made strategic use of this case and cautioned his followers of the real danger of China's Khrushchev: Liu Shaoqi, Mao's first successor, who openly criticised Mao for the famine at the 1962 Seven-Thousand Cadres Conference. Obviously, Mao's efforts in his last 10 or so years were not only to place himself in history in the fashion he would have wanted, but also to fight against any form of revisionism or attempt to modify his anticipated position in history. This was a form of competitive repositioning – even if at a different level – aiming at positioning his revolutionary legacy in the world.

Mao had clearly overplayed his repositioning efforts, running against what he would wish to be remembered for. Having put a break to the faction fights between student rebel groups in July 1968, the CCP's Ninth National Congress was finally held in April 1969, almost thirteen years after its Eighth National Congress held in 1956. At the Ninth National Congress, Lin Biao was formally designated as Mao's successor. Mao could in fact stop at this point and avoid more damage to his historical position, but he was offended by Lin's proposal to reinstate the position of the PRC's president at the Lushan Conference held in early autumn 1970.

Lin Biao must have felt deceived by Mao after the 1970 Lushan Conference, so he started to show part of his military man's nature. He had since kept a long distance from Mao for a year, before opting to run away from China on 13 September 1971. His plane crashed in Mongolia on the way to the Soviet Union. The ‘September 13 Incident’ – or the 9/13 Incident as it is called in Chinese – was therefore a conclusion of Lin Biao's historical repositioning. His not-so-glorious relationship with Mao in much of the 1960s ended with his fleeing China and subsequent death. His death earned him a position in Chinese history.

Introduction

This chapter starts by providing a brief introduction to the history of social cohesion in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The deployment of the concept locally draws on a complex and long history of the term (see Schiefer and van der Noll 2017, especially for the history of the term; see also Cheong et al. 2007; Fonseca, Lukosch, and Brazier 2019), although the policy and conceptual work that originated in Canada in the late 1990s was especially influential in local approaches and thinking. This can be seen in the work led by the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) in 2005 and 2006. By late 2020, MSD was again the lead agency in a further wave of work on social cohesion, largely as a result of a Royal Commission (2020) recommendation. In the meantime, the initial focus on immigrant settlement and affairs surrounding the ethno-cultural diversification of Aotearoa/New Zealand's population had been replaced by vastly different political imperatives: the challenges to social cohesion had been redefined by voices on the political left and right, that is, political movements that either sought justice or challenged the political and social acceptance of diversity in some way. The proliferation of online hate has emphasised these contemporary challenges, especially as the volume of such material (domestically and internationally) has increased significantly since 2015–2016.

If social cohesion is to have any relevance or political acceptability, then it needs to address questions of equity and social justice. We position social cohesion as providing an important political and policy option to ensure an active, engaged and inclusive citizenship which, in turn, requires the reshaping of possibilities and governance (cf. Harris and Johns 2021). Given the context and imperatives of a contemporary Aotearoa/New Zealand, Te Tiriti o Waitangi (The Treaty of Waitangi) and the values and principles that underpin it must become critical to a rejuvenated approach towards, and understanding of, social cohesion. Such a re-envisioning of social cohesion represents a political opportunity to reduce or abandon the integrationist and assimilatory approaches of the past and to instead address the long-standing effects of institutional racism and social, educational and economic marginalisation.

A Brief History of Social Cohesion in Aotearoa/New Zealand

Initial approaches: Addressing immigration and diversity

Aotearoa/New Zealand's interest in social cohesion as government policy emerged from a period of changing demographics in the 1990s.

The feminist theories have a strong role in the arguments for paid parental leave. Although liberal feminism has been identified as a strong foundation for women's rights, it has limitations in analysing paid parental leave policies because of the disregard of biological differences. If paid leave had been designed in line with this theory, it would have been enacted by the Fairwork Act 2009 and provided up to two years of unpaid leave for both men and women on the birth or adoption of a child. Childbirth, recovery from childbirth and breastfeeding are biological realities that separate parents who adopt from those who do not. On the contrary, cultural feminism, which appreciates women's unique qualities, champions women's rights by celebrating the differences that liberal feminism chooses to ignore. An illustration of cultural feminism is the enactment of the Paid Parental Leave Act 2010, granting women 18 weeks of paid parental leave on the birth or adoption of a child. On the face of it, this arrangement appears to benefit women and is consistent with the most up-to-date ILO Maternity Protection Convention No. 183 and Maternity Protection Recommendation No. 191. However, it falls short of meeting the ‘best interests of the child’ obligations set out by the CRC since it does not meet the 26-week minimum leave duration recommended by the WHO for optimal maternal and child health. Further, the minimum leave duration warrants women to choose between returning to work early or taking unpaid leave or even exiting the workforce to care for their infant for the recommended 26 weeks. Consequently, taking leave or exiting workplace might contribute to the discrimination against women because of family or carer responsibilities, as pointed out by the Law Council of Australia in their submission on the Fairer Paid Parental Leave Bill. Since the 18-week statutory paid parental leave is exclusive to women, an assumption is made through the lens of cultural feminism that women are full-time caregivers and incapable of being long-term family providers. Meanwhile, reconstructive feminism follows the premise that women need equality and argues that equality is achieved by stripping down social, often masculine norms that put women at a disadvantage.

Introduction

Some types of harm inflicted by human beings upon each other are dealt with either informally, such as insults, bad manners and sexual infidelity, or via civil law generally pursued by the individual or organisation harmed, but under state supervision of via the mechanisms of the legal system. Others are more likely to respond in institutionalised ways, such as assault, fraud, theft, sexual abuse and murder, whether as individuals or as collective entities such as organisations or states. The response to each of these types of harm is associated with corresponding doctrines, procedures and courts for dealing with them: civil wrongs and criminal wrongs pursued by the state. The distinction is not rigid: the state also initiates actions in the general interest in civil law, many civil sanctions bear strong resemblances to criminal penalties (Mann 1992), and civil law is still ultimately backed by the sanctions of criminal law. Its boundaries also shift over time, so that one can observe over time a gradual expansion of the kinds of harms covered by criminal law.

The state's assumption of responsibility for the imposition of the sanctions of the criminal justice system, its infliction of punishment and direct constraint of individual liberties and rights, in the name of society as a whole, is also central to the selfunderstanding of modern sovereignty, as the first Chief Justice of Australian High Court, Sir Samuel Griffith, stated in 1915:

A Paid Parental Leave Scheme

Despite public pressure and several attempts by private entities to introduce paid parental leave, it was not introduced in Australia until 2010. Since its introduction, paid parental leave arrangements have been limited, and current arrangements fall significantly below international standards.

1 History of Paid Parental Leave

In 2009, the Productivity Commission was tasked by the Australian Government to undertake a public inquiry regarding paid maternity, paternity and parental leave. At the time of the inquiry, there was a substantial disparity across the Australian workforce regarding access to paid parental leave provisions. Almost one out of two female employees did not have access to paid maternity leave. However, public servants had some form of paid parental leave available to them.

At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Productivity Commission outlined its recommendations in its report entitled: ‘Paid Parental Leave: Support for Parents with Newborn Children’ (‘Report’). The main recommendation of the Report was the introduction of a statutory paid parental leave scheme in Australia. Recommendation 2.1 provided that the paid parental leave scheme should be for a total of 18 weeks, which could be shared by eligible parents, with an additional two weeks of paternity leave reserved for the father sharing the same daily primary care of the child; the payments were equivalent to the adult federal minimum wage for each eligible week. Recommendation 2.6 provided that all those employed with a reasonable degree of attachment to the labour force should be eligible, including the self-employed, contractors and casual employees. Recommendation 2.7 noted that a broad range of family types should be eligible, including conventional couples, lone parents, non-familial adoptive parents, same-sex couples and non-parental primary carers in exceptional cases, as long as they met the employment test.

The Report outlined that the proposed scheme would meet a range of commonly agreed objectives. First, it would generate maternal and child health and welfare benefits through the projected increase in time off parents could obtain from work. Through this time off, a considerable number of families would have an increased capacity to provide exclusive parental care for children for six to nine months. Second, the scheme would promote essential, publicly supported goals within society, particularly so that having a child and taking time off for family reasons could be viewed by society as part of the ordinary course of work and life for working parents.

Introduction

Norbert Elias is recognised today as a major contributor to the development of the sociological tradition over the past century. This chapter introduces readers to the broad oeuvre of figurational research on sport and leisure, produced by Elias in collaboration with Eric Dunning in Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process (Elias and Dunning 2008 [1986]). Matters of the human body and excitement processes were also outlined in Elias's (2009a) work on the sociology of knowledge where he eschewed the dichotomy between ‘body’ and ‘mind’. Here, we examine some of the creative seams in their work that have been taken up by successive generations. As we have noted elsewhere (for example, Liston 2011; Maguire 2005), there is now a 50-year corpus of figurational research on sport and leisure forms throughout the world. This has been ambitious in scope and precise in conceptual development: all the while being open to empirical verification and testing. Taken as a whole, it confirms Elias and Dunning’s (2008) basic contention that these phenomena could not be understood without reference to the overall social standards of conduct and sentiment because knowledge about sport and leisure was knowledge about society. To illustrate this, we outline the main ideas set out by Elias and Dunning on sport, leisure and the quest for excitement/exciting significance (Elias and Dunning 2008; Maguire 1992). This is a necessary precursor to appreciating the contribution of figurational work to understanding violence and sport and the social roots of football hooliganism conducted by the Leicester School. Thereafter we explore matters of identity, embodiment and power relations that are revealed in figurational research on medicine and health, and on gendered and national identities. Initially, we provide an overview of the theory of civilising processes as it applies to sport, leisure and the human body. This is important because ‘sociologist of sport’ is too limiting a descriptor for many of the researchers mentioned here, including Eric Dunning most notably.

Civilising Processes, the Body and the Quest for ‘Exciting Significance’

People do not just have an embodied self, a ‘body’: it is more correct to think of people's ‘bodies’ and ‘bodies of people’ as living formations of people acting out their lives in cultural and structural contexts.

Introduction

Although Norbert Elias's On the Process of Civilisation is by far his most widely known work, his sociological theory of knowledge and the sciences deserves to be regarded as of at least equal significance for sociology and cognate disciplines. Indeed, it has even been argued (Mennell 2022, 24) that On the Process of Civilisation should be seen merely as an early empirical case study illustrating Elias's vision of how sociological knowledge can be pursued.

One reason why Elias's sociology of knowledge is less well-known is that it was developed gradually in tandem with painstaking empirical work, and across an array of books and essays. Its beginnings can be glimpsed in his earliest writings in the 1920s and 1930s (Elias 2006), but its first fuller expression came after he had worked on the empirical–theoretical studies presented in On the Process of Civilisation and The Court Society. This first formal working out came in 1956, in an article in the British Journal of Sociolog y entitled ‘Problems of involvement and detachment’, a title that led to its being commonly misunderstood as yet another essay on ‘objectivity’ in the manner of Max Weber, rather than as an outline of what became a fully-fledged sociological theory of knowledge. The theory was further developed in numerous essays in the last two decades of Elias's life, the 1970s and 1980s.

Where to Find Elias's Theory of Knowledge

Given that these writings are so scattered, it is as well to say where the main components can be found. The original 1956 essay is included in the book Involvement and Detachment (Elias 2007a [1987]), along with an equally important essay entitled ‘The fishermen in the maelstrom’, two fragments ‘On the great evolution’, and a substantial Introduction by Elias. A dozen late essays that appeared in many different books and journals are collected for the first time in Essays on the Sociolog y of Knowledge and the Sciences (Elias 2009a). But besides these, there are two important late books that are highly relevant: An Essay on Time (Elias 2007b [1992], and The Symbol Theory (Elias 2011 [1991]). Finally, Elias left behind a mass of usually unfinished papers, some of which have been published since his death by permission of the Norbert Elias Foundation and the Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach am Neckar. Two are particularly relevant to the concerns of this chapter.

The main purpose of this chapter is to present Norbert Elias's core contribution to political sociology. During Elias's lifetime, he was famed for his book On the Process of Civilisation and his attempt to develop an alternative to mainstream sociological theory. Although most sociologists would agree that parts of Elias's work would count as political sociology only a very few would characterise him as a ‘political sociologist’ in a narrow sense. Our aim is not to prove that he was more a political sociologist than anything else but to demonstrate that Elias made a significant contribution to political sociology – a contribution which often is overlooked, neglected or forgotten. We also hope to persuade political sociologists to go back and read Elias because his theoretical concepts and analyses are more relevant today than ever. In other words, there is an important Eliasian legacy we need to explore.

Elias was enormously prolific and so we cannot present and discuss his entire political sociology within this chapter. Therefore, we have decided to look into a particular problematique – the problem of state formation, consolidation and decline, and how these processes are closely connected with other processes of violence and warfare – a central turning point in Elias's sociological theory. We will then move on to his key concepts: survival units and figurations. Subsequently, we will present some of Elias's ideas about community, civil society, we-feeling, national habitus, nationalism and the nationstate. The chapter is structured according to key interrelated aspects of European state formation processes:

• 1. Elias and state formation theory

• 2. Survival units and human development: war as a constant

• 3. What is a survival unit?

• 4. European civilising processes, figurational dynamics and competing survival units

• (AD 800–1500)

• 5. National habitus and nation state

• 6. We-feelings and nationalism

• 7. Concluding remarks: from sharp observation to innovative theoretical consistency

1. Elias and State-Formation Theory

In the field of state-formation research, we find a number of competing theories and approaches with different emphases and explanatory factors, embedded in philosophies of science that, in some cases, operate with a range of independent or intermediate variables.

Introduction

In May 2021, one year into – and in large measure prompted by – the Covid-19 pandemic, the New Zealand Government announced a ‘once-in-a-generation reset’ of the country's immigration system (Radio New Zealand 2021). Since then, the New Zealand Productivity Commission (NZPC), which was tasked with establishing how to ‘make immigration fit for the future’, has articulated recommendations for reform (New Zealand Productivity Commission 2021; 2022), and the Labour Government has recently introduced new migration policies. Overall, recommendations and policy changes so far have aimed to ‘rebalance’ migration by reducing the high levels of largely low-skilled temporary migration that characterised the decade leading up to the Covid-19 pandemic and by simultaneously prioritising highly skilled and highly paid migrants for work visas and pathways to residence. While these developments are rapid, and ongoing, in brief, key elements of this shift so far are the newly introduced Accredited Employer Work Visa (AEWV) which includes salary thresholds that determine both eligibility for attaining the visa and rights regarding length of residence, as well as the Green List which offers fast-tracked residence for migrants in occupations that are highly sought after in Aotearoa. Michael Wood, the current Minister for Immigration, said of the policy change: ‘It marked a shift away from a low-cost labour model that had predominated over the last 15 years, to be more focused on needed skills, sustainable workforces and fair treatment of migrant workers’ (Palmer and McCulloch 2022).

Challenging this perception of fairness, this chapter argues that many of the discourses that inform the NZPC's recommendations as well as the policies introduced so far will effectively further entrench the inequities that have been created by a long-standing and increasingly economistic approach to migration. This approach has pro-gressively encouraged ‘permanent temporariness’, especially of workers categorised as low skilled and low income to fill labour market gaps while curtailing their residence rights (Collins 2019). Pathways to residence have become obstructed with selection criteria that require prospective residents to meet a range of qualifications, skills, wealth and/or, increasingly, income requirements. As a result, the security that permanent residence and naturalisation entail are only accessible to those migrants who are deemed ‘valuable’ settlers.

Introduction

The introduction of the 1987 Immigration Act fundamentally shifted the immigration system of Aotearoa/New Zealand. It transformed the system's previous race-based immigration policy into an economic-centric immigration policy and opened its borders to a much wider range of immigrants worldwide. Although strengthening family connections of immigrants was a major feature of the Act (Trlin 1992), a series of Aotearoa/New Zealand family immigration policy changes since then have increasingly restricted immigrants’ ability to reunite with their families from their country of origin. This is particularly true for the reunification between first-generation adult immigrants and their older parents (Bedford and Liu 2013; Ran and Liu 2021).

After more than three decades of embracing this immigration policy change, alongside the rapid increase of immigrants from all over the world – particularly Asian immigrants – a substantial new Chinese immigrant community from the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Liu and Ran 2021b). The practice of building a close-knit multigenerational family is an important feature of family life for this immigrant group (Ran 2020). Often, multiple generations from both the PRC and Aotearoa/New Zealand sustain close ties in highly interdependent relationships across different stages of the members’ migration process (Liu 2018). However, evidence reveals that changes in family immigration policy in Aotearoa/New Zealand have had significant impacts on those families, including reshaping their family maintenance patterns and intergenerational dynamics (Ho and Bedford 2008; Liu and Ran 2021a, 2021b).

The impact of those changes on the well-being and functioning of these families and their individual family members has become an issue of increasing academic interest in recent decades, particularly with those families who adopted new family arrangements involuntarily mainly because of the changing family immigration policy (Bedford and Liu 2013; Brandhorst et al. 2020; Bryceson 2022; Ho and Bedford 2008). Therefore, a research project was created and undertaken by the author to explore the relationship between people's experiences of transnational migration and their multigenerational family dynamics (from 2017 to 2021). The project, which informs this chapter, had a particular focus on identifying the impact of the family immigration policy in Aotearoa/New Zealand on the intergenerational relations of Chinese immigrant families.

Drawing on the major findings of the research project, this chapter discusses the impact of the recent changes to the family immigration policy on Chinese immigrant families in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Introduction

On 19 March 2020, the New Zealand Government announced that the country's international border would be closed to entry of anyone who was not a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident. This unprecedented decision matched that of an increasing number of countries worldwide in an attempt to contain the spread of a new strain of severe acute respiratory coronavirus, now widely known as Covid-19.

At the time New Zealand's border closed, there were over 300,000 people on temporary study, work and visitor visas in the country and at least as many New Zealand citizens and permanent residents temporarily absent overseas. As borders closed and associated travel restrictions were implemented worldwide, international air travel reduced significantly. Getting home quickly became impossible for most of those temporarily in New Zealand or for New Zealanders wanting to return. Governments globally were scrambling to address the dual challenge of containing the virus while also addressing the plight of those whose visa status did not allow them to stay long term in (or return to) the countries where they were temporarily resident.

There is an extensive literature on the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on international migration. For migrant workers, of which there were an estimated 164 million in 2017 (ILO 2018), the Covid-19 pandemic presented challenges to health, livelihoods and mobility. In many countries, migrant workers make up a sizeable share of the workforce ‘on the front lines’, carrying out jobs in essential sectors including health and aged care, transport, construction and agriculture (ILO 2020). States’ measures to control transmission of Covid-19, in the form of border closures, quarantine and travel restrictions, disrupted transport networks and the ability of people to move. For some migrant workers, border closures meant they were unable to enter a destination country for work; for others, travel restrictions meant they were caught in the host country and unable to return home. This had significant implications for workers and their families who relied, to some extent, on incomes earned overseas and remittances to support livelihoods at home (World Bank 2020).

In common with other states worldwide, Pacific Island countries and those on the Pacific Rim, including Australia and New Zealand, responded to the pandemic by restricting entry of non-citizens and implementing requirements to spend time in Managed Isolation and Quarantine (MIQ) facilities for persons permitted to enter the country.

This short chapter concludes this book, with a focus on theoretical insights into how societal dynamics and changes in China's recent past can be better understood and what practical inferences may be drawn from this analysis. As noted in Chapter one, this analysis is conducted from the perspective of competitive social repositioning, some features of which need to be further considered. Special attention must also be paid to the political importance of the Three-Represents theory. This theory was initially put forward by Jiang Zemin in early 2000 as the ideological responses of his leadership generation to the new social class structure, societal dynamics and many other changes taking place in post-Mao China. Two decades after it was proposed, the Three-Represents theory is virtually abandoned by the post-Jiang leadership, despite the occasional, and largely ceremonial, mention in some official media reports. However, it remains not only a conclusion drawn by reformist Chinese leaders from the previous reforming decades, but also a set of ideological and political responses to the main hurdles in modern-ising the CCP from a revolutionary party to a ruling party.

The first section of this final chapter summarises the analysis in earlier discussion chapters and offers further explication of the competitive social repositioning perspective, especially its theoretical and analytical usefulness and importance in examining deep-rooted social dynamics and subsequent social changes. The second section con-siders the practical implications of this study, including a brief analysis of the fate of Jiang Zemin's Three-Represents ideas over the past two decades. Suggestions for future research are offered with the objective of promoting the use of a competitive social repositioning lens in future studies.

Perspective Matters

The three and a half decades from 1964 to 2000, which form the subject of this book, were a historical period when China's economy, people's living conditions and political culture deteriorated to a new crisis level and then started climbing upwards. Specifically, during this period, the Chinese people suffered from the famine of the early 1960s and were then dragged into a decade-long Cultural Revolution. The latter led to widespread support for leaders who had different ideas and governing strategies from Mao, driving China onto the reform track from the late 1970s. Throughout the above social process, a high proportion of Chinese people actively participated in continuous and competitive social repositionings, making the whole country both chaotic and dynamic.