In ‘Doing Things with Concepts in Sextus Empiricus’, Richard Bett examines Sextus’ terminology in connection to his use of such strategies and highlights their inventiveness and sophistication. On the one hand, Sextus appears to agree with his dogmatic opponents insofar as he says that we need to get our concepts clear before investigating any topic. On the other hand, he often raises objections against dogmatic concepts, arguing, for instance, that they are inherently inconsistent and therefore there are no objects corresponding to such concepts or, alternatively, that even if we accept these concepts, there exists nothing real corresponding to them. It is not clear whether or how these two lines of approach can be coherently combined. Nonetheless, Sextus frequently runs the two together, and Bett enquires into his reasons for doing so. An important upshot of this study is that it leads us to consider what kinds of concepts and what sort of reflection about concepts are available to a sceptic of Sextus’ variety.

The Introduction provides an overview of the conceptual background and main themes of the book. It briefly considers the advances in assisted reproduction technology (e.g. in vitro fertilisation and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis) and their benefits for aspiring parents. It suggests that these scientific developments not only have led to the emergence of new trends in bioethical politics, but have also inspired claims in the international human rights arena. In fact, an increasing number of legal cases, most notably in the European Convention on Human Rights system, has started to establish a set of rights in connection with access to medically assisted procreation; they are an extension of autonomy rights, the right to respect for family life and non-discrimination rights. The Introduction offers a synopsis of each chapter, outlining the key bioethical and legal controversies examined therein, as well as the central arguments proposed by the book in light of international litigation.

Chapter 5 examines the impact of gender, sexual orientation and civil status on access to ART and the enjoyment of family life formed through ART. Aspiring single parents, women in a relationship with a same-sex or transgender male partner, and men in a same-sex relationship are reliant on gamete donation (as well as, in the case of male couples, surrogacy) in order to have a biological child and are particularly disadvantaged by prohibitions on third-party reproduction. These remain, nonetheless, within States’ margin of appreciation. However, where a child was born following the use of donated gametes or surrogacy abroad, the Strasbourg Court requires measures of protection. Significantly, the relationship of surrogate-born children with the intended non-biological parent is equally protected whether the genetic father has an opposite-sex or same-sex spouse. The chapter criticises, however, the less favourable treatment of commissioning mothers based on a conservative understanding of motherhood as gestational.

The chapter ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on Concepts’ by Frans A. J. de Haas takes up another aspect of concept theory, that is, the endeavour to define what a concept is. Furthermore, he explores the interactions between the Peripatetics and the Stoics, as they are evidenced by Alexander, on ontological as well as psychological and epistemological issues. De Haas also offers a systematic study of part of Alexander’s rich vocabulary denoting concepts, thoughts, and universals, and of a correspondingly rich collection of verbs referring to the human activities of abstracting or constructing concepts. Importantly, this analysis sheds light on Alexander’s understanding of ennoia and noêma, and on Alexander’s views concerning the epistemic reliability of concepts and the unity of concepts in the human soul.

Chapter 1 argues that parenthood aspirations, including those reliant on novel reproductive techniques, have started to evolve into justiciable rights. It challenges the view that human rights law cannot adequately address bioethical issues and examines commonalities and mutual influences between human rights and bioethical discourse. The chapter first analyses international case law establishing (predominantly negative) obligations in relation to natural procreative capacity. As regards medically assisted procreation, it observes that, perhaps counter-intuitively, most of the claims raised in Strasbourg litigation have been assessed by the European Court of Human Rights as involving active interferences as opposed to lacunae. The chapter provides a catalogue of (alleged) negative and positive obligations as they emerge from the case law; it examines the rationale for the Court’s treatment of a claim through the lens of negative or positive obligations while suggesting that that classification does not have a significant practical impact on the outcome of the case.

Chapter 3 argues that intention-based parenthood has started to acquire relevance in donor insemination and foreign surrogacy case law. The Strasbourg Court has recognised the right of surrogate-born children to establish legal ties expeditiously with their non-genetic intended parent. The latter is an incidental beneficiary, as his/her own right to respect for the parental project/de facto care of the child is outweighed by public interests. However, intentional parenthood is parasitic on marriage to the child’s genetic parent, and hence vulnerable in case of relationship breakdown. The chapter further discusses the different approach to intentional parenthood in donor insemination cases: by contrast with cross-border surrogacy situations, the Court only requires measures safeguarding the de facto ties between children and their social parents (not parental status). Surrogacy cases where neither intended parents is related to the child do not attract an obligation to establish legal affiliation, insofar as the child’s identity is defined by genetic heritage.

Problematisation about concepts and related notions in Aristotle greatly depends on the particular work or works under consideration. Richard McKirahan’s contribution ‘Concepts and Concept Formation in Aristotle’s Logical Works’ argues that an account of how concepts are formed may be extracted from passages of the Organon, on topics relating to the problem of how we gain knowledge of scientific principles, in combination with Aristotle’s statements on the relations among objects in the world, affections in the soul, and language. Aristotle’s view is pieced together on the basis of the account in Posterior Analytics 2.19, supplemented by the parallel account in Metaph. A.1, as well as Aristotle’s remarks on the utility of dialectic for the sciences in Top. 1.2 and the brief discussions of epagōgē (frequently and controversially rendered by ‘induction’: An. Post. 1.18 and 1.31). The chapter also addresses questions about the nature of perception as conceived in the Organon, the epistemic status of experience, the transition from the awareness of individuals to the grasp of universals, the status of nous, and the relation between universals and concepts.

‘Concepts and Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysical Thought’ by Christof Rapp starts with the recognition that Aristotle does not have a general term for ‘concept’ and examines which entities in his metaphysical theory might play the role of concepts. According to Rapp, many of Aristotle’s discussions focus on the meaning of general terms and whether they signify something real and existing independently in its own right. Aristotle remains committed to the view that universals as captured by genuine definitions are crucial for human knowledge and understanding. Insofar as Aristotle resists a conception of universals as existing in the way that particular substances do, he can be taken to intimate that universals are ‘merely conceptual’. In the Metaphysics, he distances himself from the view that universals such as genera and species qualify as substances. His main contribution to our thinking about concepts consists in the view that both universals and embodied substantial forms have mental counterparts, by which we grasp and understand the things falling under the conceived form or essential definition.

The Introduction by Gabor Betegh and Voula Tsouna outlines the historical and philosophical objectives of the volume, identifies principal questions and challenges that the authors are invited to address, gives summaries of the individual chapters, and specifies the contribution of the volume to the history of scholarship and to contemporary philosophical thinking about concepts. Especially useful is the survey of the technical or quasi-technical terminology used by the ancient authors in order to talk about concepts and related notions. This terminology is rich and nuanced and, as the editors point out, sorting it out is not merely a lexical matter but an inextricable part of the analysis of substantive philosophical questions.

Matthew Duncombe’s chapter ‘Relative Concepts’ asks: what are relative concepts according to ancient philosophers? Duncombe argues that Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics have a clear concept of relatives, distinct from incompleteness approaches, which he calls ‘constitutive relativity’. The core idea of constitutive relativity is that a relative is constituted precisely by the relation it bears to an exclusive correlative. Duncombe discusses particular philosophers and schools in detail. The examination of Agathon’s speech in Plato’s Symposium illustrates that Socrates understands relative concepts in general and love in particular, on the constitutive model. Aristotle’s concept of relatives in Categories 7 draws on Plato, but Aristotle addresses a worry that relative concepts might be vacuous. Duncombe argues that a Stoic relative concept is the concept of a relative that relates exclusively to a correlative. He examines Sextus’ sceptical argument, which raises a worry about any conception of relativity where relatives relate exclusively to their correlatives.

In ‘The Place of Concepts in Socratic Inquiry’, Terence Irwin examines Socrates’ question ‘What is F?’, which is often taken to be a request for some sort of definition or account of what F is. When Socrates asks, ‘What is courage?’, ‘What is piety?’, ‘What is temperance?’, does his discovery that everyone, including himself, cannot answer such questions in a satisfactory manner imply that these answerers do not know what the words mean? If one cannot answer the ‘What is F?’ question, does it follow that one lacks the concept of F? Irwin argues that conceptual argument has an indispensable role in the arguments that lead to Socratic definitions, but it will not take us all the way to them. To understand Socratic definitions, Irwin compares them with Aristotelian real definitions, and with Epictetus’ views on the articulation of preconceptions.

Plotinus’ views on concepts have so far received little attention, whereas his views on ennoiai, conceptions, have been more widely discussed. This is partly due to the varied vocabulary that Plotinus uses to refer to what we might call concepts, assuming that the latter are understood as mental items distinct from thoughts. Sara Magrin’s chapter ‘Plotinus on Concepts’ focuses on one important passage of the Enneads (Ennead 6.6.12–14) which offers a critical discussion of an account of the concepts (ennoēmata) of one and numbers commonly attributed to the Stoics. The chapter pursues the twofold aim of reconstructing the account in question and of interpreting and assessing Plotinus’ criticism of it. This has scarcely, if ever, been attempted in the scholarship, both because the evidential value of that passage in respect of the Stoics has been deemed questionable and because Plotinus’ criticism of the Stoic concept of number is extremely compact and difficult to articulate. The main contribution of Magrin’s analysis consists in her use of Plotinus’ criticism of the Stoics as evidence, on the basis of which she pieces together Plotinus’ views on concepts.