Over the past 15 years the political behavior literature has taken a greater interest in identity politics (e.g., Druckman and Levy Reference Druckman, Levy and Rudolph2022; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes Reference Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes2012). This includes study of the varied roles race plays in shaping American public opinion (e.g., Tesler Reference Tesler2012; White and Laird Reference White and Laird2020; for discussions, see Tesler Reference Tesler2016). A prominent take argues that sorting has led to decreased social identity complexity as religious, partisan, and racial identities have aligned into “mega-identities” (Mason Reference Mason2018), though others offer reminders that racial identities remain particularly important (e.g., Jardina Reference Jardina2021). These ideas have permeated the rapidly growing literature on American Christian nationalism, where works have often characterized the desire for a Christian nation as a project of white supremacy. For example, in their book Religion is Raced, Yukich and Edgell (Reference Yukich and Edgell2020, 1–2) argue that “Christian nationalism has a color, and it is White. … Christian nationalists do not just seek a nation guided by Christian ideals—most seek a nation guided by White Christian histories and values” (emphasis in original). Braunstein (Reference Braunstein2021) argues that Christian nationalism operates as a kind of symbolic racism and as a (sometimes unintentional) coded message for white nationalism. Perry (Reference Perry2023, 68) writes that “[p]olitical leaders and pundits on the right … often use the term ‘Christian’ itself as a dog whistle to imply ‘white conservatives like us’” (see also Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022).
An outgrowth of these claims is the articulation of what we call the racialized Christian nationalism thesis, in which Christian nationalism has entirely different meanings to people in different racial groups. By this logic, white Christian nationalism is built to serve white supremacy, while nonwhite Christian nationalism serves other objectives. However, the literature abounds with conflicting findings concerning the linkage between Christian nationalism, issue attitudes, and race (e.g., Davis, Perry, and Grubbs Reference Davis, Perry and Grubbs2024; Dennen and Djupe Reference Dennen and Djupe2023; Perry and Schleifer Reference Perry and Schleifer2023; Perry and Whitehead Reference Perry and Whitehead2021; Perry, Whitehead, and Davis Reference Perry, Whitehead and Davis2019). So, when do we actually need different stories to explain the role Christian nationalism plays in shaping public opinion among members of different racial groups?Footnote 1
In this paper we advance a simple but important argument: Christian nationalism’s effects diverge by race only when interests diverge by race. We start with the common conceptualization that (American) Christian nationalism is a worldview—one built around the idea that the United States was founded by Christians and is for Christians. However, we build on this, adding that Christian nationalism is not just a worldview, but a racial in-group protection worldview that bends to in-group interests. Using survey data from a sample that includes equal proportions of white, Black, and Latino Christians,Footnote 2 we find that Christian nationalism does indeed have racially divergent effects when issues are racialized, but essentially uniform effects when issues are not racialized. These results are of broad interest and import beyond the religion and politics community and outside the American context, for they provide insights into which political issues may become tied to in-group interests in mass publics.
Defining the Racialized Christian Nationalism Thesis
Accounts that equate Christian nationalism with whiteness describe the US as a country founded by white Christians on white Christian principles (Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022). White Christian nationalists, then, resist government encroachment into their freedoms, particularly in the realm of the economy (Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022; Perry, Whitehead, and Grubbs Reference Perry, Whitehead and Grubbs2021), though their resistance is not nearly limited to that. Of course, a white Christian nationalist country is not one that supports freedom for all; “Christian heritage” primes considerations of “white conservative values” (Al-Kire et al. Reference Al-Kire, Miller, Pasek, Perry and Wilkins2024; Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022, 20). And those who do not fit within the bounds of a Christian country due to their ascriptive characteristics or their ideology—certainly non-Christians, but also Democrats, people of color, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals—are to be controlled by the state, using violence if necessary (Armaly, Buckley, and Enders Reference Armaly, Buckley and Enders2022; J. Davis Reference Davis2018; Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022; Perry, Whitehead, and Davis Reference Perry, Whitehead and Davis2019). White Christian nationalism asserts that the dominance of white Christians in the US is right and righteous (Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022; Perry and Whitehead Reference Perry and Whitehead2019).
The racialized Christian nationalism thesis extends this perspective, acknowledging that other racial groups exhibit Christian nationalism as typically measured, but arguing that Christian nationalism is of a fundamentally different character when it manifests within other racial groups. We focus on three issues that emerge in this literature, all of which are critically important for understanding the dynamics of religion and politics in the US. First, and most importantly, the bulk of the literature testing this thesis has focused on issues that are explicitly racialized, such as beliefs about the causes of the US Civil War (Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022), perceptions of racialized police treatment (Perry et al. Reference Perry, Whitehead and Grubbs2021), and racial boundary crossing in marriage and adoption (Perry and Whitehead Reference Perry and Whitehead2015a; Reference Perry and Whitehead2015b; Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2015). It seems clear that assessing a bevy of public policies, both racialized and otherwise, is necessary to affirm the existence of racialized Christian nationalisms.
Second, the racialized Christian nationalism thesis provides expectations for some groups, but not for all. For example, according to typical treatments of this thesis, Black Christian nationalism may assume a prophetic character that links Christian religious practice to a critique of the nation’s failures regarding racial equality (McDaniel and Ellison Reference McDaniel and Ellison2008; Perry et al. Reference Perry, Whitehead and Grubbs2021).Footnote 3 Black Christians have been more likely to argue that Christian principles of liberty and equality must be enshrined in political institutions for them to produce social change.Footnote 4 Because oppression is exemplified in policy, Black Christian nationalism “emphasizes structural explanations for and solutions to the problems of racial inequality” (Shelton and Emerson Reference Shelton and Emerson2012, 169; see also Perry and Whitehead Reference Perry and Whitehead2019).
By contrast, existing academic work provides few expectations for the relationship of Latinos to the idea of a Christian America, despite the emergence of media reports about rising Latino Christian nationalism (Hurtado and Telemundo Reference Hurtado and Telemundo2024). Although they constitute one of the oldest ethnic groups in the US and are sometimes racially classified as white, Latinos have not historically been rooted in the white-majority evangelical faith traditions in which white Christian nationalism has developed (though that has been steadily changing as Latinos have prevented some evangelical denominations from further declines; see, e.g., Winter Reference Winter2021). Latino Catholics tend to cluster in parishes that are ethnically segregated from white Catholic parishes (PRRI 2023b), preserving Latino ethnic distinctiveness from other white Americans (Calvillo and Bailey Reference Calvillo and Bailey2015). Latino Protestants, conversely, are the most likely of all American churchgoers to attend a multiracial or multiethnic church (PRRI 2023b). Moreover, the presence of Latino advisors to Donald Trump, in and around the charismatic and far-right New Apostolic Reformation movement, suggests Christian nationalism is not bounded by whiteness (Taylor Reference Taylor2024). Thus, do Latino Christians adopt white Christian nationalist attitudes, given their sometimes racial classification as white? Or does social marginalization lead Latinos to adopt Black Christian nationalism, despite their religious distance from Black Protestantism? The pervasive focus on Black and white religious expressions has left the racialized Christian nationalism thesis offering few expectations about this growing group of Americans.
Finally, the theoretical purchase of the racialized Christian nationalism thesis has, at times, been undermined by the nature of the samples used for analysis. Most nationally representative studies by definition contain fairly modest numbers of minority respondents. Some studies limit their sample(s) to white respondents (Davis and Perry Reference Davis and Perry2020; Perry and Whitehead Reference Perry and Whitehead2015a), while others do not consistently address the extent to which their findings extend to nonwhite respondents (Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022). Sample constraints are understandable, but only looking at white Christians—either because minority Christians are fully excluded from data collection, or in effect because they are too few in a dataset to permit inference—closes off the opportunity to parse out how deeply whiteness is embedded within Christian nationalism. Testing the racialized Christian nationalism thesis requires sustained and thorough comparisons across racial groups.
A Theory of Conditional Effects: Christian Nationalism as In-Group Protection
Our argument is that Christian nationalism is a superordinate worldview of in-group protection; it can transcend partisanship, religious tradition, and even at times racial and ethnic boundaries to offer a vision of an America that is rightfully dominated by Christians and Christian values. However, in contrast with other narratives, this conceptualization of Christian nationalism does not see white supremacy as “baked into” all instances of it. Rather, we theorize Christian nationalism as a tool that imbues with religious significance (“sacralizes”) the policy preferences and identities of its adherents. Individual adherents sensibly break ranks where public policies would disenfranchise or otherwise undermine their racial group. What emerges from this framework are expectations that (1) Christian nationalists across racial groups will take similar positions on public policies when issues are not racialized (i.e., their “general support” will be similar), (2) they will differ where those policies are widely understood to have constitutive consequences for their racial groups (i.e., when issues are racialized; see White and Laird Reference White and Laird2020), and (3) these group dynamics apply outside the white–Black paradigm that has heretofore dominated the literature on Christian nationalism. We develop each of these points in the next three subsections.
General Support for Christian Nationalism Should Work Similarly across Racial Groups
One reason why we expect Christian nationalisms to function equivalently across many policy domains is because they are constituted similarly. Important predictors of Christian nationalism support include religious identification, religious beliefs, and religious practice (Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2020), all of which are as present in nonwhite populations as in white ones. Concerning religious affiliation, Black and Latino Americans are as likely (or more so) to identify as Christians, particularly evangelical Protestants. The rate of disaffiliation from Christianity has risen among non-Hispanic white Americans, with over 23% now identifying as religiously unaffiliated, while 21% of Black and 19% of Hispanic Americans are unaffiliated. While 14% of Hispanic Americans identify as evangelical Protestant, 23% of non-Hispanic white and 35% of Black Americans claim to be evangelical (or born-again) Protestants (PRRI 2021).Footnote 5
All of this suggests that religiopolitical interests are just as important to nonwhite Americans as they are to white Americans, and that many Americans (white or nonwhite) may prefer public space and government to be dominated by Christians. Of course, this is just what the data suggest: using the Baylor Christian Nationalism scale, nonwhite Americans are just as Christian nationalist as white Americans, and nonwhite Christians are just as Christian nationalist as white Christians (Djupe, Lewis, and Sokhey Reference Djupe, Lewis and Sokhey2023; Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2020).
It makes sense to recognize that Christian nationalism may not be as tightly yoked to an American history of white Christian supremacy among all groups. But why would Christian nationalism be attractive to a range of groups? A suite of cultural changes have been linked to greater support for Christian nationalism both in experimental (Al-Kire et al. Reference Al-Kire, Pasek, Tsang and Rowatt2021; but see Djupe, Lewis, and Sokhey Reference Djupe, Lewis and Sokhey2023) and observational contexts (e.g., Shortle and Gaddie Reference Shortle and Gaddie2015; Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2020).Footnote 6 One dynamic with myriad effects has been the decline of American religion and the rise of those who identify with no religion—the “nones.” But the societal changes do not stop there, with substantial media coverage of greater rates of immigration (documented and undocumented), and near majorities agreeing with Trump that immigrants are “poisoning the blood of the country” (Khanna et al. Reference Khanna, Salvanto, De Pinto and Backus2024). Equally importantly, a range of figures have been making the claim that Christians are being persecuted—arguments that reach beyond racial, partisan, and religious traditional boundaries (Djupe Reference Djupe and Rudolph2022; Perry Reference Perry2023; Walker, Djupe, and Calfano Reference Walker, Djupe and Calfano2025). As one demonstration of that pattern, Djupe, Lewis, and Sokhey (Reference Djupe, Lewis and Sokhey2023, 17) show that Christian nationalism among Democrats actually increased during the Trump years, peaking in late 2020 or early 2021.
It is essential to note that these modern cultural changes challenging the centrality of Christianity have been threatening to Christians of all races—not only white, but also Black and Latino. Al-Kire and colleagues (Reference Al-Kire, Pasek, Tsang and Rowatt2021) find that the demographic decline of Christians raises equivalent concerns about pending Christian persecution and support for Christian nationalism across racial groups (see also Walker and Haider-Markel Reference Walker and Haider-Markel2024), and Walker, Djupe, and Calfano (Reference Walker, Djupe and Calfano2025) present evidence that Christian persecution beliefs operate similarly across racial groups. And changing views on gender and sexuality have been met with racially diverse Christian resistance (Djupe and Walker Reference Djupe and Walker2025). White conservative Christian opposition to LGBT rights is well established, but Black and Latino opposition is present too. For example, Black respondents are significantly less likely to express support for Black gay, lesbian, and transgender people than they are for Black women or formerly incarcerated people (Lopez Bunyasi and Smith Reference Lopez Bunyasi and Smith2019).
In sum, the religious predictors of Christian nationalism are present across white, Black, and Latino populations. Moreover, even though religious traditions developed along racially distinct trajectories, the belief that the US is departing from its Christian heritage bridges racial divides. Christian nationalism, then, is likely to act as a superordinate ideology, sacralizing the protection of the racial in-group. Consequently, we predict that general support for Christian nationalism will be equivalent for white, Black, and Latino Americans (H1), and that predictors of Christian nationalism support will not vary significantly across racial groups (H2).
But Issues Matter: When Christian Nationalism Should Work Differently across Racial Groups
The racialized Christian nationalism thesis asserts that white racial supremacy is at the heart of Christian nationalism (Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022; Jones Reference Jones2023), and this is revealed in its relationship with policy attitudes (Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022; Perry and Whitehead Reference Perry and Whitehead2019; Perry, Whitehead, and Davis Reference Perry, Whitehead and Davis2019; Perry, Whitehead, and Grubbs Reference Perry, Whitehead and Grubbs2022). But if Christian nationalism is a flexible worldview that facilitates racial in-group protection, then the link to policy attitudes may hinge on the degree to which issues are racialized. What is the logic for this?
First, aiding in-group members is a strong motivation across identity domains (Amira, Wright, and Goya-Tocchetto Reference Amira, Wright and Goya-Tocchetto2021; Halevy, Weisel, and Bornstein Reference Halevy, Weisel and Bornstein2012; Weisel and Böhm Reference Weisel and Böhm2015). Indeed, there are some early indications from the Christian nationalism literature that in-group protection is at play. Christian nationalism features in-group love (i.e., attachment to religious identities; see Broeren and Djupe Reference Broeren and Djupe2024), so much so that it can transcend other identity categories (Walker and Djupe Reference Walker and Djupe2025). And Christian nationalism seems to bend attitudes on racial issues in ways that amplify support for the racial in-group (Perry et al. Reference Perry, Schleifer, Whitehead and Frantz2023; Seto and Perry Reference Seto and Perry2025).
Second, individuals can belong to multiple identity groups simultaneously, and those distinct identities can have different effects (Gaither et al. Reference Gaither, Remedios, Schultz and Sommers2015) depending on the match between the identity and issue domain (Bocian, Cichocka, and Wojciszke Reference Bocian, Cichocka and Wojciszke2021). For example, when racial and religious demographic threat are directly compared, only religious demographic threat elicits stronger emotional reactions and support for Christian nationalism among white Christians (Walker and Haider-Markel Reference Walker and Haider-Markel2024). Moreover, the identity domain that respondents apply to an issue can vary (Walker Reference Walker2025). Much of the work on identity has focused on a single domain (Gaither Reference Gaither2018), and the existing work on the racialized Christian nationalism thesis is no exception. By neglecting side-by-side domain comparisons (e.g., Perry et al. Reference Perry, Schleifer, Whitehead and Frantz2023; Seto and Perry Reference Seto and Perry2025), the racialized Christian nationalism thesis neglects the possible role of other identities.
Finally, the extent to which issues are linked to religious or racial identities should affect whether respondents’ attitudes will vary by racial group. Of course, not all issues carry the same racialized overtones (Deckman et al. Reference Deckman, Elder, Greene and Lizotte2023), and the extent to which issues are racialized can change over time (Tesler Reference Tesler2012). Moreover, priming effects are not isolated to the racial domain, but can be found in the religious domain too (Albertson Reference Albertson2015; Weber and Thornton Reference Weber and Thornton2012).
Attitudes on economic issues do not explicitly reference racial identities. Christian nationalism is strongly linked to economic individualism, being strongly opposed to government economic intervention (Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022) and prioritizing economic liberty over societal well-being (Perry, Whitehead, and Grubbs Reference Perry, Whitehead and Grubbs2020; Reference Perry, Whitehead and Grubbs2021). While some work has shown that Christian nationalism’s effects carry racialized meanings (Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022), other work points to religion’s effect in pushing Latino and Black Christians toward the attitudes of white Christians (Lin Reference Lin2020; Lopez Bunyasi and Smith Reference Lopez Bunyasi and Smith2019; Molina Reference Molina2023). Likewise, Christians from all racial groups have wrestled with major social issues facing the country, especially those dealing with gender and sexuality. Despite growing acceptance of reproductive freedom and same-sex relationships among some Christians (PRRI 2023a; Ratliff Reference Ratliff2023), these culture-war social issues remain frequent topics that are addressed within white, Latino, and Black religious contexts (Pew Research Center 2016a).Footnote 7
By contrast, on the basis of their historical development and contemporary implications, some issues like reparations for slavery, voting rights, and criminal justice have clear racial overtones, and racial groups consequently express distinct attitudes regarding those issues (Hurwitz and Peffley Reference Hurwitz and Peffley2005; Pew Research Center 2016b; Reichelmann, Roos, and Hughes Reference Reichelmann, Roos and Hughes2022; Wilson, Brewer, and Rosenbluth Reference Wilson, Brewer and Rosenbluth2014).
The point is this: because Christian nationalism entails a preference for the politicization of religious interests in service of the in-group, we argue that the effect of Christian nationalism on political attitudes will be moderated by race to the extent that the issue itself is racialized. When an individual perceives that a policy position will affect their racial group (e.g., White and Laird Reference White and Laird2020), they apply Christian nationalism in whatever way best protects their racial in-group. When an issue does not have clear implications for the well-being of an individual’s racial group, Christian nationalism should have a consistent effect on issue attitudes across groups. In other words, we expect that the effect of Christian nationalism on issue attitudes will be moderated by race most strongly on explicitly racialized issues, and most weakly or not at all on other social and economic issues (H3).Footnote 8 In other words, by comparing the effect of Christian nationalism across issue domains, we can predict when the effects of Christian nationalism will be moderated by race and when they will not.
While we focus here on race, other work (Djupe, Lewis, and Sokhey Reference Djupe, Lewis and Sokhey2023; Walker and Djupe Reference Walker and Djupe2025; Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2019) has found that Christian nationalism bends some identity groups toward Christian nationalism, instead of leveraging Christian nationalism for partisan, sexual orientation, and sex-group protection. Why might race be different? First, racial groups have relatively impermeable identity boundaries (Ho, Roberts, and Gelman Reference Ho, Roberts and Gelman2015; Ho, Kteily, and Chen Reference Ho, Kteily and Chen2017), whereas sexual orientation and partisanship are invisible and, some believe, controllable to some extent (Haider-Markel and Joslyn Reference Haider-Markel and Joslyn2008). When an identity category is hard to jettison or hide, Christian nationalism is more likely to become a tool used to sacralize that group and its interests. And second, the credibility of recasting Christian nationalism also matters. Black Christians have vociferously asserted that Christianity and even Christian nationalism are consistent with a message of racial equality (Walker Reference Walker2025). Conversely, the linkage between heterosexuality, Republican partisanship, and male dominance, on the one hand, and Christian nationalism, on the other, are quite strong (Djupe and Walker Reference Djupe and Walker2025; Du Mez Reference Du Mez2020; Patrikios Reference Patrikios2008; Reference Patrikios2013; Walker and Djupe Reference Walker and Djupe2025; Walker and Haider-Markel Reference Walker and Haider-Markel2023a; Reference Walker and Haider-Markel2023b; Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2019), leaving LGBT people, Democrats, and women with fewer rhetorical or normative resources to bend Christian nationalism to the advantage of their group.
Incorporating Other Groups: Latino Christian Nationalism
A robust handling of race and Christian nationalism should be able to accommodate many, if not all, applicable societal groups. Unfortunately, the racialized Christian nationalism thesis has, to date, focused exclusively on the distinctions between white and Black Christian nationalism. We advance on existing treatments by offering a theoretical framework that can accommodate other groups, and by incorporating a sizable and heretofore overlooked one—Latino Christians—into our comparisons. On this point, if white Christian nationalism is emanating from white Christian traditions (Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022; Jones Reference Jones2023), and Black Christianity developed in response to white supremacy (e.g., Lincoln and Mamiya Reference Lincoln and Mamiya1990; Raboteau Reference Raboteau1999), then where does Latino Christian nationalism come from, and what might be our expectations for Latino Christians relative to their Black and white counterparts?
Christians’ responses to racialized issues have varied sharply by race. Black Christian beliefs and practices evolved under the institution of slavery, leading Black Christians to call for racial equality and liberation from a Christian America (Lincoln and Mamiya Reference Lincoln and Mamiya1990; Raboteau Reference Raboteau1999). These themes persist today in the activism of Black Christians and their churches in the areas of racial equality (McDaniel Reference McDaniel2009). White conservative Christians, conversely, have used Christian theology and institutions to preserve the racial status quo (Jones Reference Jones2016; Reference Jones2020). These messages have led, for example, to white Christians being overwhelmingly likely to defend historical (Confederate) monuments and to interpret police killings of Black Americans as isolated events (PRRI 2020).
Latinos have been caught in the middle. On the one hand, many see a common cause with Black Christians. The rise of interminority coalitions have united people of color, tightening the relationship felt between Black and Latino Americans (Jones-Correa, Wallace, and Zepeda-Millán Reference Jones-Correa, Wallace and Zepeda-Millán2016; Wilkinson Reference Wilkinson2015) under a shared sense of discrimination (Chin et al. Reference Chin, Luna, Huo and Pérez2023). One activist commented, “I think a lot of the Hispanic activists, we view the Black community … as trailblazers. … We find ourselves in their voice,” especially on issues like criminal justice reform (Miller Reference Miller2020). On the other, some Latino Americans classify themselves as white as they acculturate (Yancey Reference Yancey2003)—or try to reap the psychological “wages” of whiteness (Filindra and Kolbe Reference Filindra and Kolbe2020)—leading Latino religious elites to, at times, resemble white Christian elites in their messaging (Stewart Reference Stewart2020).Footnote 9 And when Latinos feel marginalized as Americans, they can accentuate their elevated position on the racial hierarchy to create distance from Black Americans (Pérez et al. Reference Pérez, Vicuña, Ramos, Phan, Solano and Tillett2023). Given the identity management strategies described above, the effect of Christian nationalism on Latinos’ attitudes should be especially contingent (Pérez and Cobian Reference Pérez and Cobian2024; Valenzuela and Michelson Reference Valenzuela and Michelson2016).
We argue that racial groups do not develop unique ideologies linking the nation to Christianity and then derive policy attitudes from first principles. Rather, Christian nationalism puts God’s stamp of approval on the protection of the group. Because of the racialized structure of the US, Black and white Christians’ group interests should be the most distinct. And because their group interests variously approximate those of Black and white Americans, we anticipate that the effect of Christian nationalism on policy attitudes will be most distinct for white and Black respondents, with the effect for Latinos falling in between (H4).
Design and Plan of Analysis
Most survey analyses are not up to the task of assessing racial differences in Christian nationalism effects. The proportion of racial minorities is often simply too small to return crisp estimates when compared with white Christians. Focusing only on white Christians is also problematic, particularly when arguments imply group comparisons. Instead, we use data gathered in the fall of 2022 with participants fielded by Qualtrics Panels to fill equal quotas of 1,600 white, Black, and Latino Christians.Footnote 10
All respondents self-identified as Christian—a design choice we intentionally made for two reasons. First, the goal of the study was to study Christian nationalism, and Christian nationalism is mostly concentrated among Christians (Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2020). A Christian-only sample helps us to ensure sufficient presence of Christian nationalist beliefs among respondents as we compare across racial groups. An added benefit, however, is that focusing on Christians limits variation on this independent variable relative to an unscreened sample, thus in some ways making for a harder test.
The second factor driving this approach—and one for all intents and purposes inseparable from the first—was to obtain as clean a test of racialized theory as possible. Individuals belong to multiple groups simultaneously and therefore experience multiple group interests. By focusing on samples of white, Black, and Latino Christians, we aimed, in essence, to hold constant Christian group interests, letting us turn full attention to the role of racial groups that is central to the racialized Christian nationalism thesis. Put differently, for present aims we cared less about the presence of variation in Christian nationalist beliefs within racial groups and more about how Christian nationalism effects potentially vary between racial groups.Footnote 11
We composed raking weights separately by Christian racial groups using Cooperative Election Study-derived figures for gender, education, partisanship, and Catholic identity. The data do not result from a probability sample, and we rely on raking and model-based weights to boost comparability between groups and with the national adult Christian population.
The dependent variables capture support for a diverse range of policies that vary in their degree of racialization; we have grouped policies into the categories of “racialized,” “economic,” “gender and sexuality,” and “other social issues.” To be clear, we are not arguing that we have somehow identified policies that are completely devoid of racial implications, or others that solely invoke race. Rather, the more defensible claim is that some of them are seen as more racialized (those in the “racialized” category), and others as less so. Statement wording and issue classifications are provided in table 1. All dependent variables were standardized to range between zero and one.
Table 1 Dependent-Variable Statement Wording
Note: all statements are Likert scales unless noted.
To assess racial identification, respondents indicated which racial or ethnic category they most closely identified with. Respondents who chose “Black or African American” are coded as Black; “Hispanic/Latino/Latinx” as Latino; and “European, White, non-Hispanic” as white.
Christian nationalism is measured by agreement with a set of six statements that assess support for religion, particularly Christianity, in public spaces and government policy.Footnote 12 In the main, our measure follows the battery that has come to dominate Christian nationalism research (Perry and Whitehead Reference Perry and Whitehead2015a; Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2020). Since the Whitehead and Perry (Reference Whitehead and Perry2020) measure has come under attack for some items’ failure to reference Christianity specifically (Smith and Adler Reference Smith and Adler2022), we added “Christian” to the school prayer and religious symbols items (see also note 6). Additionally, while Nicholas Davis (Reference Davis2023) argues that the Whitehead and Perry (Reference Whitehead and Perry2020) scale does not cohere well, our substantive results do not change when using Davis’s recommended two-item measure (see figures A8–A11 in the online appendix). Our measure of Christian nationalism creates an index of these six items, following the practice of most of the Christian nationalism literature cited here:
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• The federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation.
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• The federal government should advocate Christian values.
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• The federal government should enforce strict separation of church and state (reverse coded).
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• The success of the United States is part of God’s plan.
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• The federal government should allow Christian prayer in public schools.
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• The federal government should allow the display of Christian symbols in public spaces.
Cronbach’s alpha for the Christian nationalism measure in the entire sample is 0.8. When subdividing the sample by race, the measure better coheres for white respondents (alpha = 0.84) than Black (alpha = 0.74) or Latino (alpha = 0.80) respondents, but the measure performs sufficiently well for all racial groups.
We focus attention on an interaction term between race and Christian nationalism. All models otherwise include standard religious (born-again identification and frequency of religious service attendance), political (partisanship and ideology), and demographic (sex, education, income, and age) controls. Summary statistics and question wording for all variables and full model results are presented in the online appendix.Footnote 13
Results Supporting H1 and H2: There are Few Racial Differences in Christian Nationalism Support
Christian nationalism is not exclusively a white phenomenon; this has been noted elsewhere (e.g., Djupe, Lewis, and Sokhey Reference Djupe, Lewis and Sokhey2023; Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2020). But do we see this in our data, and do the same attributes predict Christian nationalism support across racial groups? Our model includes a race indicator variable, allowing us to compare the effects of race holding the usual predictors constant. Consistent with past research (Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2020), our data confirm that Black Christians express about 4% higher support for Christian nationalism than white Christians (p < 0.01). The substantive difference between Latino and white respondents is quite small (0.1%) and is not statistically significant. Notably, all three Christian racial groups score above the midpoint on the Christian nationalism scale. Race does predict support for Christian nationalism, but it is Black Americans—not white or Latino Americans—who are most supportive of Christianity in the public sphere, evidence supportive of H1.
This initial finding might not jeopardize the racialized Christian nationalism thesis if the predictors of Christian nationalism vary by race. To evaluate this, we estimated three separate models, one per racial group, to predict support for Christian nationalism. However, we find little evidence to support a racialized Christian nationalism, as illustrated by the plotted coefficients in figure 1.
Figure 1 The Predictors of Christian Nationalism Support Are Similar by Race
Source: September 2022 survey.
Notes: Full results are available in table A2 in the online appendix. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Weighted.
Both religious variables (religious service attendance and born-again identification) predict Christian nationalism support, with coefficients that are equivalent across racial groups. Religious service attendance is positively correlated with greater Christian nationalism support for all racial groups, with indistinguishable effect sizes. Likewise, a born-again or evangelical identification is linked to Christian nationalism support equivalently across racial groups.
Demographic variables show only minor variation in predictive power across racial groups. Higher levels of education are associated with decreased Christian nationalism support (negative coefficients) for all three groups of respondents. Age has virtually identical effects for all racial groups. While income increases Christian nationalism support for Latino respondents and decreases support for Black and white respondents, the effects are substantively small. And gender has a larger effect for white respondents, but these effects are statistically indistinguishable. Overall, we see the demographic variables behaving similarly across racial groups.
Finally, we examine the effects of party identification and ideology. For all respondents, Republican party identification and conservative ideology are associated with greater Christian nationalism support—a familiar story. However, here the effect sizes are distinct. For Black and Latino respondents, party identification has a smaller effect on Christian nationalism support than does party identification for white respondents (p < 0.001), surely because the variance is much lower among Black respondents. Ideology also has a smaller effect on Christian nationalism support for Black respondents compared to white and Latino (p < 0.01) respondents, perhaps because of contemporary patterns of partisan polarization (e.g., Iyengar et al. Reference Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra and Westwood2019).
Across the models for each racial group, significant predictor variables all move in the same direction and almost always have equivalent-sized effects. The same factors—especially religiosity and religious identity—tend to predict Christian nationalism support equivalently for white, Black, and Latino respondents, consistent with H2. Recall that the racialized Christian nationalism thesis argues that Christian nationalism is of a fundamentally different character when it manifests within different racial groups. Together then, these patterns support our first two hypotheses, and at the same time run against recent articulations of the racialized Christian nationalism thesis.
Results Supporting H3 and H4: The Conditional Relationship between Christian Nationalism and Policy Attitudes
We now turn to assess the effects of Christian nationalism across sets of policy issues, starting with racialized policy issues. Each of these models predicts the dependent variable with an interaction of race and Christian nationalism plus a standard set of controls. Our expectation is straightforward: Christian nationalism will have varied effects by racial group where white and nonwhite interests are seen as divergent (H3)—that is, on racialized issues, but not on nonracialized issues. Likewise, we expect that Christian nationalism’s effects on these racialized issues will be most distinct for Black and white respondents, with Latinos falling in between these groups (H4). We begin with racialized issues, then move to economic issues (some of which carry some racialized implications, but less so than racialized issues), and end with social issues (which are the least racialized).Footnote 14
Racialized Issues: Christian Nationalism Has Distinct Effects by Race
Our survey measured support for both explicitly racialized issues (the teaching of race in American history in public schools and reparations for the descendants of enslaved persons) and implicitly racialized issues (reform of police department procedures and same-day voter registration). Figure 2 illustrates the varying effects of Christian nationalism by racial group for these four policy issues.
Figure 2 Effects of Christian Nationalism Support on Racialized Policy Attitudes, by Race
Source: September 2022 survey.
Notes: Full results are available in table A3 in the online appendix. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals. Weighted.
Christian nationalism support affects how respondents feel about the teaching of race in American history. At low levels of Christian nationalism, Black, white, and Latino respondents express fairly positive support for the teaching of race. But, for white respondents, moving from the lowest to highest levels of Christian nationalism suppresses support by 9%. Christian nationalism has the opposite effect for Black respondents, significantly raising policy support. Latino support for teaching about race does not vary much across levels of Christian nationalism, and the effect of Christian nationalism for Latinos is not statistically distinguishable from white respondents. Our other explicitly racialized policy issue (reparations) likewise points to Christian nationalism as having racialized effects. At low levels of Christian nationalism, white, Latino, and Black respondents express significantly different support for reparations, with Black respondents expressing the highest levels of support by far. As Christian nationalism support rises, white support for reparations falls, while Black and Latino support rises slightly.
Even though race is not explicitly referenced in the survey question, the patterns for police reform support closely mirror those for the teaching of race. Opponents of Christian nationalism uniformly support police reform, but as Christian nationalism rises, support begins to diverge by racial group. White support for police reform decreases significantly at higher levels of Christian nationalism, and Latinos cannot be differentiated from white respondents. But Christian nationalism has the effect of increasing support for police reform modestly for Black respondents.
Finally, we turn to same-day voter registration. Despite also not referencing race explicitly, there are clear interactive effects (see also Perry, Whitehead, and Grubbs Reference Perry, Whitehead and Grubbs2022). Christian nationalism sharply moderates Christian nationalist support for same-day voter registration, amplifying Black support while depressing white support. Unlike the other racialized policy attitudes, though, Christian nationalism’s effect for Latinos more closely mirrors its effect for Black (as opposed to white) respondents. Together the pattern of results supports the narrative we introduced at the outset: the effects of Christian nationalism on support for racialized issues varies by racial group—each group applies Christian nationalism to positions that protect racial group interests (H3), and does so in ways that reflect the racial structure of the US (H4).
Economic Issues: Race Effects Are Muted
If we are right about the conditional nature of Christian nationalism and race in the US, we need to see the complement to the previous findings—that is, the absence of differences on nonracialized issues. We begin with economic attitudes.
First, we consider support for raising the federal minimum wage. Latino and Black respondents similarly apply Christian nationalism to their economic attitudes such that increased Christian nationalism support is associated with greater support for a federal minimum wage. Christian nationalism has no effect for white respondents. As we report with the other models, party identification, ideology, age, and gender also shape support for raising the federal minimum wage, as does education and income.
Of course, asking respondents to consider individual economic policy areas may lead to different responses than a generalized measure of support for government intervention. Thus, we assess attitudes relating to government responsibility in providing healthcare and care for the elderly and unemployed; we combine these three issue areas into a single index because these items are highly correlated (alpha = 0.80; top-right panel of figure 3). While Christian nationalists may advocate for less government intervention in general, Christian nationalism is actually associated with heightened support for government interventions in healthcare, elder care, and the unemployed specifically (although this coefficient does not reach statistical significance). This pattern obtains for all racial groups (the generally aligned, positive slopes), but is especially true for Black respondents, who express more robust expectations from the government as their support for Christian nationalism increases. Democratic party identification, liberal ideology, less frequent religious service attendance, identification as female, and youth are also related to attribution of government responsibility in these three areas.
Figure 3 Effects of Christian Nationalism on Economic Attitudes, by Race
Source: September 2022 survey.
Notes: Full results are available in table A4 in the online appendix. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals. Weighted.
Finally, questions of economic policy most often relate to the role of the government in the economy (e.g., in the context of religious effects, see Barker and Carman Reference Barker and Carman2000; Deckman et al. Reference Deckman, Cox, Jones and Cooper2017), and our questions engage this intersection. We first ask respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale ranging from “Government should see to jobs and a standard of living” to “Government should let each person get ahead on their own”; this assesses beliefs about the government’s role in providing economic support to individuals. Christian nationalism has the effect of pushing respondents toward greater support for individualistic economic outcomes, as we might expect. However, as illustrated in figure 3, Christian nationalism’s effect does not vary by race: the effect is virtually identical across the three racial groups. Instead, Republican party identification, conservative ideology, and being older, wealthier, and male contribute to greater support for economic outcomes based on individual actions rather than government intervention.
What should we make of this constellation of results? We see these effects as consistent with our narrative. The effect of Christian nationalism on economic attitudes is sometimes counterintuitive, and, notably, not consistently robust on its own. The issue for which the effects of Christian nationalism diverge most strongly by race is the very issue that is itself most racialized: minimum-wage policies have a substantially more beneficial effect for racial minorities (Derenoncourt and Montialoux Reference Derenoncourt and Montialoux2021), and public support for minimum-wage policies depends on whether the recipients are racial minorities (Newman, Reny, and Ooi Reference Newman, Reny and Ooi2022). Christian nationalism is more likely to have a distinct impact on Black rather than Latino respondents (our expectation in H4), but the critical point is this: white, Black, and Latino respondents apply Christian nationalism less distinctively to economic issues than they do to explicitly racialized issues (consistent with H3). In other words, as Black and Latino Christians increasingly adopt individualistic explanations for economic outcomes (Manning, Hartmann, and Gerteis Reference Manning, Hartmann and Gerteis2015; Winter Reference Winter2021), their sacralization of their economic attitudes become less distinct from that of white Christians.
Social Issues: Race Rarely Conditions the Effect of Christian Nationalism
Finally, we examine relationships across a set of other social issues that we also consider to be “less racialized.” To reiterate, we expect an absence of race-based differences, per our theory of conditional in-group sacralization. Our final analyses cover abortion, LGBT issues, flag burning, and gun rights.
Following the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization Supreme Court decision in 2022, some actors have begun to advocate for a national abortion ban. Given the Religious Right’s heavy emphasis on abortion, it is not surprising that Christian nationalism emerges as a strong predictor of support for a national abortion ban. This relationship is virtually identical for white, Black, and Latino respondents, providing strong evidence that Christian nationalism has no racialized effects on abortion (top-left panel, figure 4). What about attitudes related to LGBT issues, the other major culture-war issue (Castle Reference Castle2019; Hunter Reference Hunter1992)? Opposition to same-sex marriage and support for religious service exemptions increase with Christian nationalism support for all racial groups, and race does not influence Christian nationalism’s effects.
Figure 4 Effects of Christian Nationalism on Social Issue Attitudes, by Race
Source: September 2022 survey.
Notes: Full results are available in table A5 in the online appendix. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals. Weighted.
The story is a bit more nuanced for antidiscrimination policies that would protect LGBT people in the areas of employment, housing, and public accommodations. At low levels of Christian nationalism, white respondents are the most supportive of LGBT antidiscrimination policies, but their support drops with rising levels of Christian nationalism. Latinos’ support also drops, but not as steeply. Black support, on the other hand, is only slightly affected by Christian nationalism, something we attribute to the fact that antidiscrimination policies have historically been and remain important to Black civil rights activists (Rosenberg Reference Rosenberg2004). Black Americans have tended to be more receptive to other groups’ demands for antidiscrimination protection. Overall, then, we find little evidence that Christian nationalism’s effect on LGBT-related issues are racialized. As before, to the extent we observe a more contrary result, it emerges in the case of a policy area (protections from discrimination) that sits closer to traditional racial dynamics.
Finally, we examine two social issues unrelated to gender and sexual orientation: flag burning and background checks on gun purchases. Black respondents are less concerned about flag burning than white and Latino respondents, consistent with past research that shows that Black respondents do not see significant conflict between patriotism and criticism of the nation (Perry and Schleifer Reference Perry and Schleifer2023). Our flag-burning measure directly links opposition to flag burning as being rooted in the idea that the flag is a sacred symbol. Sacralization of national symbols is central to both the wider phenomenon of civil religion (Bellah Reference Bellah1967) and linked to Christian nationalism (Gorski and Perry Reference Gorski and Perry2022; Vegter, Lewis, and Bolin Reference Vegter, Lewis and Bolin2023), so it is unremarkable that opposition to flag burning increases with Christian nationalism. The effect of Christian nationalism is indistinguishable between the racial groups. However, opposition to flag burning is a bit lower for white respondents compared to the other two groups.
Of all the social issues we consider, attitudes on gun policy show the most racialized responses. Black respondents express significantly more support for background checks as their Christian nationalism rises. By contrast, Latino and white respondents express relatively similar attitudes about background checks on gun purchases—at low levels of Christian nationalism, white and Latino respondents support background checks, and their support wanes slightly with rising Christian nationalism. Interestingly, the differences between white and Latino responses never rise to statistical significance, either on their own or in their interaction with Christian nationalism.
The results for these social issues provide additional support for H3: Christian nationalism’s effect only varies by race when there are well-articulated group interests for the issue at hand—this is apparent in the case of LGBT discrimination and gun control (see, e.g., Filindra and Kaplan Reference Filindra and Kaplan2017). In most cases the effect of Christian nationalism is too similar among racial groups to draw meaningful contrasts. However, when we observe divergent effects, they are consistent with our theory that Christian nationalism will be leveraged in support of group interests when distinctive group interests exist (H3).
Discussion: Religious Group Threat and Protection
The previous patterns of results are consistent with the notion of Christian nationalism as an in-group protection worldview; our argument is that Christian nationalists are motivated by threat to seek protection that best serves their in-group. Still, one might reasonably want to see additional evidence for such a story, particularly as it relates to accompanying mechanisms of influence. Fortunately, other datasets provide such possibilities, which we explore in this penultimate section.
Evidence of Uniform Threat Perception
Why do we see many convergent Christian nationalism effects? One reason is that threat communication is coming from the same sources, and thus helps to link Christian nationalism and particular policy stances similarly across subgroups (see also Walker, Djupe, and Calfano Reference Walker, Djupe and Calfano2025). In 2020 we fielded a nationwide survey that included questions paralleling campaign communication; this instrument asked respondents, “Have you heard or read anyone making the following arguments in the past few months” (emphasis in the original)? The core battery included claims that “Christians will lose their religious freedom if Democrats control the federal government,” and evaluated several similar claims made by President Trump and others.Footnote 15 An important piece of evidence would come from finding that Christian nationalists were privy to these claims across racial groups, despite their many other differences (especially their well-known differences in partisanship).
We can also draw on an alternate conception of outside threat from the September 2022 survey used throughout this paper. Respondents were asked, “How much discrimination or unfair treatment do you think different groups face in the United States?” We draw on the option “Christians.” Much has been made of results from such questions—that white respondents downplay the discrimination faced by racial minorities compared to that experienced by Christians (e.g., Green Reference Green2017). But the converse—that nonwhite respondents downplay the discrimination faced by Christians—is not necessarily true. Our suspicion is that this may serve as a common denominator in supporting convergent public policy attitudes across racial groups.
The results in figure 5 show only minor differences in the link between Christian nationalism and perception of discrimination against, or persecution of, Christians by racial groups. The most ardent Christian nationalists of all racial groups report hearing about the coming persecution of Christians by a potential Democratic administration at almost identical rates (data from October 2020). It is worth noting that the rate of increase across the scale is almost uncannily similar, with a lag for Black respondents scoring low on the Christian nationalism scale.
Figure 5 Christian Nationalists See Threat to Christians at Equivalent Rates, by Race
Sources: October 2020 survey (left) and September 2022 survey (right).
Notes: Full results are available in table A6 in the online appendix. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals. Weighted.
The other measure, included in the September 2022 data, also highlights the common sense of threat posed by out-groups among Christian nationalists of all racial groups. Those scoring low on Christian nationalism report little discrimination (less than “some”), while those scoring high on the scale report levels between “a little” and “a lot.” Notably, Black respondents report more discrimination against Christians across the board, while white and Latino respondents report almost identical amounts at the high end of the Christian nationalism scale. Together, then, we see ample evidence across years and measures that Christian nationalists of these three racial groups are on the same page about out-group threat: for all of our respondents, Christian nationalism amplifies the sense that Christians are under threat. Put differently, Christian persecution narratives show no sign of simply being code for white racial threat.
Evidence of In-Group Protection as a Response
Our final test is designed to demonstrate more directly that Christian nationalists respond to threat with in-group protection. We have already shown that Christian nationalism’s effects vary most by racial group when racial group interests are associated with the issue in question. Here we attempt to generalize those results to feelings about groups more broadly.
First, we construct a measure of group loyalty with two items from the Moral Foundations index (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek Reference Graham, Haidt and Nosek2009); these assess the morality of group loyalty generally, and loyalty to country specifically. We included four such items in our 2022 survey. As a starting point, we see that Christian nationalism has a dramatic effect on group loyalties. Respondents high in Christian nationalism exhibit support for loyalty that is over twice as strong as that of respondents low in Christian nationalism. And this effect is consistent across racial groups. If anything, Christian nationalism may increase group loyalties more aggressively for Black and Latino respondents, though the difference is not statistically significant.
All this said, the key question is how far are Christian nationalists willing to go to protect their group? Our measure of group protection asks respondents about their support for and willingness to use violence to protect their group (the radicalism component of the Activism and Radical Intention Scale; see Moskalenko and McCauley Reference Moskalenko and McCauley2009). And, here again, Christian nationalism is a strong predictor, as moving from the lowest to the highest levels of Christian nationalism more than doubles support for violence (figure 6). Whether these rates are accurate point estimates for the public—or respondents are truly committed to violence—is debatable (see Kalmoe and Mason Reference Kalmoe and Mason2022; Westwood et al. Reference Westwood, Grimmer, Tyler and Nall2022). However, adjudicating such claims is not our goal; we care about the fact that the results reveal similar effects of Christian nationalism by race. Compared to white respondents, the effect of Christian nationalism is slightly weaker for Black respondents and slightly stronger for Latino respondents. But the key takeaways are these: For Christian nationalists—white, Black, or Latino—violence is a viable strategy to protect the in-group. And, for all respondents, Christian nationalism is associated with loyalty to the group, (perhaps) even to the point of violence.Footnote 16
Figure 6 Christian Nationalists Are Loyal to Their Groups, by Race
Source: September 2022 survey.
Notes: Full results are available in table A7 in the online appendix. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals. Weighted.
Conclusion: Christian Nationalism Is Not So Black and White
Is Christian nationalism largely a manifestation of America’s racialized religious and political system? Is it so embedded within racialized structures that valid conceptualization requires the use of race-based adjectives? We feel confident declaring that the terms “Christian nationalism” and “white Christian nationalism” should not be used interchangeably. Beyond this, our answer to questions like these is something to the effect of “It depends.”
By examining the effect of Christian nationalism (1) across a range of issues that vary in their degree of racialization and (2) in the context of large samples of white, Black, and Latino Christians, we conclude that Christian nationalism’s effects are selectively but systematically moderated by race. Christian nationalism’s effects vary the most on issues that are saturated with racial meaning and have racial implications (e.g., policing and voting rights). For less race-infused economic issues, Christian nationalism’s effects on attitudes show some distinctions, but, on the whole, are more similar for white, Black, and Latino respondents. By contrast, when it comes to culture-war issues that lack explicit racial references (e.g., abortion), Christian nationalism operates in a nearly identical fashion, regardless of the racial identification of the respondent.
We proposed a theory of “sacralized” in-group protection to help explain the scattered state of race and Christian nationalism findings in the US, and to push scholars to move beyond current treatments of “Black Christianity vis-à-vis white Christianity.” Based on the evidence presented, we contend that in-group protection evaluations are indeed at play. Given the distinctive religious and partisan traditions that have grown up around racial groups in the US, it is striking that a Christian nationalist worldview has swept across what are otherwise highly distinct and isolated groups. Only rare sets of circumstances—ones that accentuate out-group differences and threat in the context of considerable demographic and policy change—could promote such unity. One such example involves the remarkably effective deployment of narratives by conservative Christians: these promote the integration of Christianity and American government while sounding alarms about (real or imagined) anti-Christian persecution (e.g., Wilson and Djupe Reference Wilson and Djupe2020).
We would stress that there are not unbreakable bonds among Christian nationalists, and white antagonism for Black civil rights continues to be an impediment to pursuing a broader set of goals. That is, we see evidence that when Black, white, and Latino Christians have reached different conclusions on how group interests relate to public policy issues, they interpret God’s will for the nation in light of their racial group’s interests.
As we close, we wish to highlight several contributions this paper makes to existing literatures. First, we push the identity literature forward by considering the relative role of different identity categories. Our design demonstrates the need for and utility of robustly oversampling minority populations when studying religion and politics in the US, but this advice is applicable across contexts and applications. Decisions to isolate only white respondents in studies of Christian nationalism—or in any behavioral application—should be theoretically grounded and empirically justified. Second, our results suggest that racially demarcating different Christian nationalisms a priori is not always and perhaps only rarely appropriate. Instead, we should think of Christian nationalism as a preference for the enshrinement of religious interests in government and public policy, recognizing that in some cases those in-group interests will not vary across racial groups. Finally, and critically, we demonstrate the need for scholars to consider Christian nationalism’s effects across a broad range of issues before making declarations. Based on just such an analysis, our conclusion is that Christian nationalism is only sometimes raced.
Where do we go from here? Starting more broadly, we need to assess how the racial dynamics of Christian nationalism studied here compare to other identity groups. Our suspicion based on the few studies that have started this project is that race may be unique. Others are finding a failure of differentiation of Christian nationalism effects by LGB identity (Walker and Djupe Reference Walker and Djupe2025), gender identity (Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2019), and partisanship (Djupe, Lewis, and Sokhey Reference Djupe, Lewis and Sokhey2023; though see Perry and Grubbs Reference Perry and Grubbs2025), even on issues on which the group interests would appear to diverge from each other.
With regard to race and religion, there is much work to be done. First, we need a better, comparative sense of how identities are connected to issues—that is, of what the relative weight of different identity domains are on policy attitudes. Second, despite high levels of support for Christian nationalism, Black and especially Latino Christian populations remain understudied. To start, we need a much better understanding of these groups’ demands for public expressions of religion via government institutions and policy. In particular, while our theorization of Latinos is at this point more exploratory, more robust theorizing and empirical testing of Christian nationalism among Latinos could yield significant insights into the interactions of race and religion, given Latinos’ placement in America’s racial hierarchy. Third, and on this note, we would argue that religious communication is an important channel for shaping the public’s perceptions of what a Christian America should look like. As a scholarly community we have been largely unable to directly test this mechanism, so future work should prioritize the exploration of where and how Americans are exposed to Christian nationalist messages and how those messages link Christianity to political issues. Finally, we would be remiss if we did not circle back on a condition of our design: our decision to focus on Christians. Given that Christian nationalism is present and effectual among non-Christian populations (Stroope, Rackin, and Froese Reference Stroope, Rackin and Froese2021; Whitehead and Perry Reference Whitehead and Perry2020), subsequent research should also attempt to capture and give attention to the variation on this point both within and between racial groups.
Supplementary material
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592725102338.
Data Replication
Data replication sets are available in Harvard Dataverse at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YPPVFF
Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2023 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles.
Open access
