What determines the outcomes of negotiations is a central question in political science, and such negotiations are crucial in coalition systems where political parties distribute policy payoffs during coalition negotiations. In this paper, we argue that due to the combination of the non-separability of most public policies and the shared responsibility for policy outcomes under coalition governments, which policies a party manages to get included in a coalition agreement will reflect these policies’ popularity among the other governing coalition parties, rather than policy payoffs being driven by proportionality or relative salience. Using a unique dataset containing novel data on the budgetary impact of every measure proposed in election manifestos and coalition agreements over five government formations, we can directly observe the policy payoffs extracted by each party for participating in government, using a measure that is directly comparable across parties, policy areas, and time. The results have substantial implications for our understanding of the formation process and functioning of coalition governments.

Two interrelated trends have narrowed the class backgrounds of policymakers over the past decades: a decreasing share of working-class MPs and a parallel rise of highly educated ‘career politicians’ with little occupational experience outside politics. Although these trends risk aggravating representational inequality, we know little about their causes. Focusing on parties as the main gatekeepers to parliament, we analyse how the class background of political candidates influences the chances of being nominated in electorally safer positions. Based on original data on MPs’ backgrounds and the German GLES Candidate Study, we show that candidates with a working-class background have lower chances to be placed in safe positions, especially in center-right parties. Careerists, in contrast, enjoy systematic advantages in the nomination process, at least in left-wing parties. Lacking individual resources is thus not the only obstacle to working-class representation, but political parties are important actors in shaping the class composition of parliaments.

Subjective group relative deprivation (SGRD) is a powerful driver of political protest and support for radical parties. Yet, we lack insights into whether such subjective perceptions of disadvantage attack the very core of democratic legitimacy, that is, citizens’ support for democracy. Against this backdrop, we investigate how SGRD relates to diffuse democratic support. We argue that perceptions of being systematically disadvantaged fuel disaffection with and resentment against the prevailing democratic system, whereas authoritarian systems with their strongmen leadership appear appealing as they promise a stronger in-group protection and pursue more confrontational in-group-out-group relations, which both can be understood as coping strategies to overcome an unfair disadvantage. Employing original – cross-sectional and panel – survey data, we show that SGRD has the potential to undermine citizens’ support for democracy across six European countries in 2020–2022. Our study highlights the negative impact of subjective disadvantage on support for democracy by combining literature from political psychology and political economy.

Affective polarization among citizens is often attributed to the harsh rhetoric and personal attacks that politicians direct at one another. However, the influence of elite rhetoric on affective polarization may work in both directions. We theorize that politicians can reduce affective polarization by making positive or respectful statements about their political opponents. A preregistered survey experiment with 2,000 citizens provides strong support for this expectation. Politicians’ congenial messages about their opponents significantly reduce affective polarization on two distinct measures. Specifically, the experimental treatments reduce citizens’ negative emotions toward outpartisans, as well as their desire to socially distance themselves from such outpartisans. The depolarizing effect of such messages does not depend on the political alignment of either the politician or the citizen, nor does it necessarily require high levels of political trust.

Research indicates a lack of presence of lower socioeconomic status (SES) individuals in parliament, hindering their representation due to a lack of shared experiences between low SES citizens and representatives. Theorists argue that understanding low SES experiences depends not only on representatives’ own SES but also on those closest to them. However, little is known about whether elected representatives count lower SES citizens in their intimate network. Surveying 1,185 representatives across 13 Western countries, we examine the educational attainment and social class of their parents, partner, and two closest friends. In none of these countries do representatives’ ties mirror the share of lower SES citizens in the population. The results are only slightly better when we examine how many representatives have at least a single lower SES tie. We also find evidence for homophily. High SES representatives tend to associate with high SES individuals, and they tend to do that much more than high SES citizens associate with other high SES citizens. This shows that representatives who could benefit most from lower SES perspectives in their personal networks often lack them.

How do far-right actors influence mainstream parties over time? Previous research shows that mainstream parties contribute to the electoral success of far-right parties through coalitions or policy alliances. However, a long-term perspective on the influence of far-right actors, including parties, civil society organisations, and social movements, on mainstream parties’ communication is lacking. This article investigates how far-right actors and issues have influenced mainstream parties’ communication in Germany since the 1990s. Using automated text analysis, we analyse 520,408 articles from six newspapers. First, we semi-automatically collect far-right actors and mainstream parties and implement a structural topic model to analyse their issue agendas. Second, we use time-series analysis to examine agenda-setting effects and their drivers. The results show that far-right influence on mainstream parties’ communication has increased, particularly among opposition parties and around issues of Islam and migration. Notably, the agenda-setting effect cuts across party ideologies, indicating mainstream parties’ impact on the rise of the far right in democracies.

Rising inequalities have been described as fertile ground for populist parties across the world. In this article, we investigate the role that inequality perception plays in strengthening populist attitudes and increasing support for populist parties. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, we find that those who perceive greater inequality in society are more likely to support populist parties. To explore the causal relationship, we also conduct a survey experiment in Denmark, Germany, and Italy, randomly exposing participants to factual information about the wealth distribution. The results show that the perception of inequality can increase populist attitudes, but does not immediately affect the likelihood of voting for populist parties in this context. The findings speak to current debates on how inequalities and their perception became a pre-condition for the rise of populist parties all over Europe.

Under what conditions citizens accept public institutions as legitimate authorities is a key question in political science. Recent accounts suggest that populist citizens reject international organisations (IOs) as distant, elitist, and undemocratic. Conversely, technocratic citizens should favour IOs as they represent the pinnacle of depoliticised, expertise-driven decision-making. In this article, we provide the first joint analysis of technocratic and populist attitudes as drivers of attitudes towards IOs. We analyse a unique survey conducted in five European countries that covers four IOs and ask how individual populist and technocratic attitudes influence attitudes towards IOs. We find only conditional evidence for a structural association between technocratic and populist and IO attitudes, and credible evidence that country-specific experiences with populism in power moderate these associations. Our contribution has important implications for our understanding of citizen attitudes towards various forms of political representation and the legitimacy of IOs.

Research agrees that the importance voters ascribe to political issues, ie individual-level issue salience, affects political behaviour. However, due to measurement limitations, we lack research on who considers which issues important. Specifically, the often-used most-important-problem/issue question complicates between-individual comparisons of issue salience. Using a rarely employed measurement of issue salience and data from six Western European countries, this research note explores the salience of different issues across different socio-demographic groups. Our exploratory findings suggest that different socio-demographic variables affect different issues’ salience across and within individuals over time. Further, we find that predictors of individual-level issue salience and attitudes frequently differ – highlighting the importance of analysing them separately. We call for research on individual-level issue salience using measurements that enable the study of its determinants and analysing predictors of salience and attitudes separately.

For decades, party politics literature has argued that populist radical right (PRR) parties must distance themselves from their countries’ authoritarian pasts to achieve electoral relevance in a Sartorian sense. Yet, we now observe the growing success and influence of PRR parties that not only embrace nostalgia for this past but also maintain ties to it. The use of what we term ‘authoritarian nostalgia’ is not only becoming more widespread across politics but it has proven effective across diverse segments of the electorate. This study examines the extent to which (populist radical) right supporters approve of their countries’ authoritarian histories and view these past regimes favourably. Using original survey data fielded in Spain and Portugal and a novel set of survey items measuring authoritarian nostalgia, we find that supporters of VOX and Chega are more likely to express a broad sense of collective nostalgia, particularly through a longing for their country’s ‘old, glorious days’, but demonstrate strong nostalgia for Franco and Salazar’s authoritarian regimes more specifically. Furthermore, we observe similar affinities for the authoritarian past amongst traditional right-wing supporters, primarily among Partido Popular (PP) supporters in Spain, with weaker evidence for PPD/PSD supporters in Portugal. Our findings suggest that, rather than hindering electoral performance, authoritarian nostalgia can, in fact, stimulate (populist radical) right-wing electorates.

This study examines the role of political campaigns in reducing voter susceptibility to framing effects. The case chosen is the 2022 EU defence opt-out referendum in Denmark. Using a novel survey experiment design that exposed voters to arguments at the start and the end of the campaign, we were able to directly test the impact of a real-world campaign on voter susceptibility to frames. The findings reveal a notable reduction in framing effects. Initially, loss-related framed arguments swayed voters, but this impact waned at the campaign’s end. Our analysis suggests that the campaign provided voters with information and arguments that made them less susceptible to framing effects and instead empowered voters to make informed decisions on the referendum based on their own attitudes towards the EU. In the conclusions, we encourage further research on susceptibility to elite messages in real-world settings.

Combining key elements of classical and constructivist approaches to representation, this article suggests a novel reconceptualisation of political representation. Developed through participatory agency research with people in socio-economically difficult situations and anchored in people’s lived experiences and sense-making processes, the representative relationship is redefined as a pragmatic and solution-oriented partnership between representatives and the represented. Expanding the classical Pitkinian model, it enables representatives to be better informed about how to address peoples’ concerns. In doing so, it advances the notion of dynamic political representation, where the represented are not passive principals but active partners in decision-making. While we uphold the classical principle of acting in the interests of the represented, we reconceptualise these interests as dynamic and continuously evolving – a perspective consistent with constructivist thought. This research aligns with scholarly calls to rethink representation and revise the roles of the representatives and the represented, fostering meaningful and effective engagement. Our empirical findings highlight the urgency of reform for people in socio-economically difficult situations and underscores the broader relevance of these insights, in a context of increasing legitimacy deficits and rising discontent with current modes of representation in contemporary democracies.

Despite numerous studies demonstrating a winner–loser gap in voter satisfaction with democracy, the temporal dynamics of its initial emergence remain poorly understood. This study introduces a new framework, distinguishing between short- and long-term effects. Short-term effects refer to immediate attitudinal shifts among winners and losers triggered directly by the establishment of the result. Meanwhile, long-term effects unfold gradually thereafter, through processes like cue-taking and motivated reasoning, polarizing voter attitudes over an extended period following the election. Leveraging survey data coincidentally collected during elections, the empirical analysis provides evidence for both effects. However, it is the long-term mechanisms that predominantly explain the gap’s emergence. Notably, in elections where a government transition occurred, a new gap did not materialize until a few weeks after the outcome solidified. These findings illustrate the temporal complexity of voter reactions, carrying significant implications for addressing challenges related to system support during election periods.

The radical right succeeds when minorities challenge the societal standing of majorities. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), research often focuses on the political gains of ethnic minorities. We build on this work by differentiating among (1) types of representation; (2) minority mobilization versus ally advocacy; and (3) politically mobilized versus socially marginalized ethnic minorities. First, we introduce a novel measure of representation based on the power, influence, and prestige afforded to ethnic minorities at the executive (cabinet) level. Second, we evaluate whether legislative descriptive representation, ethnic minority party coalition participation, and ethnic minority cabinet-level prestige are associated with radical-right aggregate electoral success and individual-level radical-right vote choice. Cabinet-level prestige consistently predicts radical-right success; descriptive representation and coalition participation have less robust associations. Third, experiments in Romania and Slovakia highlight the mechanism, underscoring that representation – namely the substantive representation of politically mobilized minorities – causes resentment among ethnic majorities. In sum, majority-minority relations continue to structure CEE electoral politics, and the politicization of minority gains remains a viable strategy for mobilizing radical-right support.

Support for fundamental political rights is a defining feature of liberal democracy. Crises may undermine citizen support for these rights. Yet, existing research does not often distinguish support for ‘illiberal’ policies that encroach on fundamental political rights from other ‘intrusive’ crisis policy responses. By conducting a series of well-powered, preregistered conjoint and vignette experiments in the US and the UK during the height of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, we examine the extent to which citizens are willing to support policies that violate liberal democratic rights in a crisis as well as intrusive policies. Our results suggest that support for liberal democratic rights is quite robust, although endorsements by an in-group party or trusted expert can increase support for illiberal policies. Overall, we find noteworthy resistance to illiberal policy measures, such as postponing elections and banning protests, indicating popular commitment to liberal democratic norms.

We explore how honesty-humility and the other HEXACO personality traits relate to citizens’ nascent ambition and their recruitment to run for office. We extend previous work on virtue-related personality traits and political recruitment in two important ways: we go beyond North America and conduct a five-country cross-national study with nationally representative samples. More importantly, going beyond individual-level differences in nascent ambition, we also address how honesty-humility predicts the likelihood of being asked to and actually running for office. Based on data from Canada, Denmark, Israel, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, we demonstrate that citizens with lower levels of honesty-humility are more likely to have considered running, to deem themselves qualified to run, to have been asked to run, and to actually have run for a political office. From a ‘virtue ethics’ perspective, this is highly concerning: low honesty-humility predisposes individuals to engage in unethical behavior and decision-making. We discuss implications for the quality of political representation.

Voters are increasingly turning away from governing parties in parliamentary elections, with junior parties in coalition governments often bearing the brunt of the electorate’s dissatisfaction. Can the design of legislative institutions help parties mitigate the electoral costs of governing? We suggest that in systems with strong legislative committees, junior coalition parties are better positioned to protect their party’s policy brand from being eroded, which in turn helps insulate them from the electoral costs of governing. Analyzing data on legislative committees and party-level electoral outcomes in 36 European and OECD countries from 1990 to 2019, we find that stronger parliamentary committee systems are associated with harsher electoral costs for the prime minister’s party but reduced electoral costs for junior coalition parties. Our findings suggest that the structure of legislative institutions in parliamentary systems can have significant electoral implications, including relatively positive outcomes for smaller governing parties.