Hostname: page-component-68c7f8b79f-lvtpz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-12-18T03:14:23.239Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The 2025 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2025

Caroline E. Foster*
Affiliation:
Professor of Law, University of Auckland , Auckland, New Zealand
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The 2025 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change constitutes a diligent and reasoned exposition of the main bodies of international law on climate change. The Court read this law harmoniously and clearly identified States’ obligations as well as the legal consequences of breach. Under both treaty and customary international law, States must act with due diligence and do their utmost to mitigate climate change, including through action on fossil fuel production and consumption. The Court confirmed that the law of State responsibility applies if States fail to fulfil their obligations, and sketches a pathway for establishing causation of harm that would become relevant if reparation were sought.

This article examines the key dimensions of the Advisory Opinion, including the applicable law identified by the Court and its analysis of State responsibility, informing readers of the Court’s main findings and their consequences. It also puts forward a few reflections, including on the Advisory Opinion’s emphasis on international cooperation and finance flows, the Court’s views on sea-level rise and self-determination, the role of science in the Advisory Opinion and what the Court left for the future.

Information

Type
Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - ND
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0), which permits re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that no alterations are made and the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of British Institute of International and Comparative Law

1. Introduction

The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ, Court) adoption of an Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (Advisory Opinion) was, without a doubt, a landmark historical moment. The Court rose to the challenge of clarifying and concretising the full set of international legal expectations of States in the field of climate change. The unanimous Advisory Opinion is a direct, serious and frank wake-up call for governments and for the world, and can be expected to have significant effect as ‘an authoritative reference point in legal discourse’.Footnote 1

The Advisory Opinion was given at the request of the General Assembly (GA) of the United Nations (UN), which on 29 March 2023 adopted Resolution 77/276 requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ concerning ‘the obligations of States in respect of climate change’.Footnote 2 The Resolution asked:

Having particular regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the duty of due diligence, the rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of prevention of significant harm to the environment and the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment,

  1. (a) What are the obligations of States under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases for States and for present and future generations;

  2. (b) What are the legal consequences under these obligations for States where they, by their acts and omissions, have caused significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment, with respect to:

    1. (i) States, including, in particular, small island developing States, which due to their geographical circumstances and level of development, are injured or specially affected by or are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change?

    2. (ii) Peoples and individuals of the present and future generations affected by the adverse effects of climate change?Footnote 3

States’ high level of participation in the written and oral proceedings was notable, taking into account that the proceedings came about as a result of Vanuatu’s sustained, law student-initiated campaign, spearheaded diplomatically by the small island States of the Pacific and the Caribbean.Footnote 4 This participation underscores the Advisory Opinion’s significance. The Court’s unanimous response to the GA’s questions, that States are obligated under international law to ensure the protection of the climate system from greenhouse gases (GHGs), and that breaches of this obligation entail international responsibility, has been welcomed widely.

The UNGA is authorised under Article 96(2) of the UN Charter to request an advisory opinion from the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of its activities.Footnote 5 Article 65(1) of the Court’s Statute provides for the Court to do so.Footnote 6 Advisory opinions are advisory only, and non-binding in character, but frequently they clarify binding international law. This particular Advisory Opinion can also be expected to have further wide-ranging utility as an advocacy and policy-shaping tool, guiding legal argumentation and litigation strategies and the development of governmental and institutional climate policies. Advocates and litigants the world over seeking new climate policy breakthroughs will find support in the Court’s reasoning, and it will likewise be taken seriously by advisers to governments and international organisations.

The golden thread running through the Advisory Opinion is that States are obliged under international law to regulate the conduct of private actors.Footnote 7 The Court was specific about this in relation to the Paris Agreement,Footnote 8 as well as in respect of States’ customary international law due diligence obligation to prevent environmental harm, which includes regulation, enforcement and monitoring of public and private operators.Footnote 9 There is also particular mention of controlling private actors in the context of States’ human rights obligations.Footnote 10 The Court was clear, ultimately, that ‘a State may be responsible where, for example, it has failed to exercise due diligence by not taking the necessary regulatory and legislative measures to limit the quantity of emissions caused by private actors under its jurisdiction’.Footnote 11

This article probes the Advisory Opinion’s key dimensions, informing readers about the Court’s main findings and their consequences, and putting forward a few reflections. The article is structured around the aspects of the Advisory Opinion expected to attract most attention and interest, about which readers may be curious or wish to be knowledgeable. Section 2 begins by commenting on the applicable law identified by the Court in response to the UNGA’s first question. This includes the climate change treaties, customary international law, human rights law and the biodiversity, desertification and ozone treaties. Section 3 addresses the Court’s analysis of State responsibility in response to the UNGA’s second question. Section 4 deals with further matters including the Advisory Opinion’s emphasis on international cooperation and finance flows, the Court’s views on sea-level rise and self-determination, the role of science in the Advisory Opinion and what the Court left for later. Section 5 concludes.

2. Applicable law

2.1. Reading international law harmoniously

The Advisory Opinion’s finding that many relevant bodies of international law apply simultaneously and without contradiction will be of great benefit in addressing climate change. The Court did not accept the position put forward in submissions by a number of States that the Paris Agreement and/or climate change treaties are lex specialis, essentially determining all States’ climate obligations.Footnote 12 Further, the Court opted expressly for an approach that considered how the applicable bodies of international law may be read in light of one another: ‘it is a generally recognized principle that, when several rules bear on a single issue, they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations’.Footnote 13

Generally, the Court’s harmonious reading of rules from multiple sources and fields of international law, including the UN Charter itself, shows that these rules inform one another and are each to be taken into account when applying the others. On closer analysis, harmony is present in at least three distinct forms. The first is an intra-regime harmony, the second is harmony between customary international law and treaty law and the third is harmony across different treaty regimes applicable to the problem of climate change. Further, the Court explained that key principles of international environmental law also inform the various bodies of applicable law.

As to intra-regime harmony, the Court began by establishing that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),Footnote 14 the Kyoto ProtocolFootnote 15 and the Paris AgreementFootnote 16 complement each other.Footnote 17 They are not incompatible; and the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement provide greater specification to the UNFCCC.Footnote 18 Article 2 UNFCCC sets the ultimate objective: ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system …’,Footnote 19 and the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal then serves as a means for pursuing this overarching object and purpose.Footnote 20

As to harmony between customary international law and treaty law, the Court put the primary stake in the ground in identifying that States’ generally agreed recognition of the customary international law duty to prevent significant harm to the environment applies equally in respect of harm to the climate system.Footnote 21 From here, the Court observed that the various requirements applying in relation to States’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement are informed in part by this customary international law prevention obligation.Footnote 22 Critically, the Court considered that the concept of due diligence applies both in relation to the Paris Agreement obligations and under customary international law.Footnote 23 This means that due diligence becomes a central and unifying feature of the international law complex that governs climate change.

As to harmony across different treaty regimes, the Advisory Opinion embraces important obligations from other multilateral environmental agreements, including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),Footnote 24 the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD),Footnote 25 the ozone regime,Footnote 26 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)Footnote 27 and international human rights instruments,Footnote 28 addressing each one and demonstrating their relationship to climate change treaties and customary international law. The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion is, of course, subsequent to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS, the Tribunal) Advisory Opinion on Climate Change and International Law (ITLOS Advisory Opinion) of 21 May 2024, and endorses ITLOS’ findings throughout, with the Court taking the view that it should ascribe great weight to the Tribunal’s interpretations of UNCLOS with the aim of achieving clarity and consistency in international law, as well as legal security.Footnote 29 The Court also acknowledged the role played by the International Civil Aviation Organisation in regulating GHG emitting activities as well as the International Maritime Organization.Footnote 30

2.2. The UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement

At the heart of the Advisory Opinion lies the finding that limiting global average temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels is the agreed primary temperature goal of the parties to the Paris Agreement, consistent with the best available science.Footnote 31 This is significant because Article 2(1)(a) Paris Agreement incorporates two temperature goals and the Court focused clearly on 1.5°C,Footnote 32 taking into account also the commitment in Article 4(1) to the aim of reaching global peaking of GHG emissions as soon as possible so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs in the second half of this century.Footnote 33

By clarifying the role of the 1.5°C goal, the Court set the tone for worldwide efforts to combat climate change, emphasising that this target is scientifically necessary as well as legally pivotal. The Court built here directly on established science, as well as decisions taken at meetings of the parties to the Paris Agreement, viewing these as subsequent agreements in relation to its interpretation.Footnote 34 The Court emphasised the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal as a means for achieving the overall objective set in Article 2 UNFCCC of averting a dangerous concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere.Footnote 35 The irony is that Earth just experienced its warmest year on record, and its first year above the threshold of 1.5°C, according to the World Meteorological Organization’s State of the Global Climate report for 2024.Footnote 36

Consistent with the attention devoted to the 1.5°C goal, the Court focused on the mitigation of climate change, defined as involving human intervention to reduce GHG emissions or enhance carbon sinks, such as forests.Footnote 37 Perhaps the greatest surprise was the extent to which the Court explained clearly how fossil fuel activities fell within the scope of the Advisory Opinion,Footnote 38 noting that licensing of exploration, production, subsidising and consuming fossil fuels all constitute conduct that could be in breach of customary international law and conventional obligations.Footnote 39 This impliedly also includes the export of fossil fuels. Judges Bhandari and Cleveland considered that the Court should have taken an even more emphatic approach to ‘the reality that irreversible harm to the environment is inevitable if the current pace of fossil fuel production, licensing and subsidisation continues unchecked’.Footnote 40 As they put it, ‘global production of fossil fuels is on a collision course with the scientific consensus put forward for combatting climate change’.Footnote 41 Emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure will already take the planet over 1.5°C and no new fossil fuel extraction projects can be developed if it is to stay below this temperature.Footnote 42 Despite this, in 2030 States intend to produce more than double the amount of fossil fuels than would be consistent with 1.5°C.Footnote 43

Mitigation of climate change through emissions reduction is so central in the Advisory Opinion that the Paris Agreement’s other core objective of adaptation is defined in relationship with mitigation and as complementing mitigation obligations.Footnote 44 Further, the Court determined the main mitigation obligations to be obligations erga omnes partes among all parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.Footnote 45 Their counterpart customary international law obligations were also determined to be obligations erga omnes that are of concern to all States of the world under general international law.Footnote 46 This means that all States have a legal interest in their performance and any State may invoke responsibility for breaches of customary international law climate change mitigation obligations.Footnote 47 Scholars have observed that this latter determination is significant, as it is the first time that the Court has acknowledged that the status of obligations erga omnes is indeed such that any State may invoke responsibility for breach. This cements the position expressed in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).Footnote 48

Arguably, the real key to global mitigation efforts lies in Parties’ Paris Agreement obligations to prepare, communicate and maintain NDCs to international mitigation efforts every five years.Footnote 49 These are obligations of result, meaning that parties must actually implement these measures.Footnote 50 In contrast, the Court considered that requirements relating to the preparation of NDCs are obligations of conduct, or best effort obligations, to be executed to a standard of due diligence.Footnote 51 In this case, the standard is ‘stringent’ due diligence.Footnote 52 Stringent due diligence is an elevated standard of due diligence. The Court told us that this means each party has to do its utmost in ensuring its NDCs represent its highest possible ambition.Footnote 53 The Court’s most vital contribution here was the authoritative statement that the content of an NDC is not a matter that is simply at the discretion of a State Party, as some participants had argued.Footnote 54

The Court went on helpfully to clarify the status of the provision in Article 4(3) Paris Agreement that successive NDCs will represent a ‘progression’ beyond the party’s then current NDC and reflect its ‘highest possible ambition’.Footnote 55 The Court determined that these statements are ‘prescriptive’, meaning that they are requirements of NDCs. The Court also advised that the requirement for progression means that a State’s NDC ‘must become more demanding over time’;Footnote 56 and that ‘highest possible ambition’ requires that the content of an NDC must be ‘be capable of making an adequate contribution to the achievement of the temperature goal’.Footnote 57

The scholarly literature has previously emphasised that the expectation that each party’s NDC will represent a progression, when linked with a State’s highest possible ambition, creates a ‘potent normative tool’.Footnote 58 Looking forward, it will be interesting to see how successive NDCs are scrutinised to determine whether they incorporate ‘progression’ and ‘highest possible ambition’.Footnote 59 This may involve a range of reference points, including scope, coverage and inclusion of supplementary objectives as well as ‘headline’ numerical targets.Footnote 60 Certainly the concept of ambition is central,Footnote 61 and the Court tied individual State ambition specifically to the Paris Agreement’s ambitious and collective 1.5°C goal.Footnote 62

The Paris Agreement also specifies that NDCs must be informed by the outcomes of five-yearly Global Stocktakes, including the first Global Stocktake concluded by the parties in 2023.Footnote 63 The 2023 Global Stocktake recognised that ‘despite overall progress on mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support, Parties are not yet collectively on track towards achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement and its long-term goals’.Footnote 64 The significant contribution from the Court here was to add that States’ NDCs, when taken together, must be capable of achieving the temperature goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.Footnote 65 This obligation applies for all parties to the Paris Agreement, although the Court added that the due diligence it considers is required in setting NDCs varies in light of national circumstances.Footnote 66

As well as setting NDCs, States have a critically important obligation to pursue domestic measures with the aim of achieving their objectives.Footnote 67 There is no explicit obligation in the Paris Agreement for States to implement and achieve their NDCs although there is a good faith obligation that parties will aim and intend to do so.Footnote 68 The Court held that the obligation to pursue domestic measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of an NDC was also an obligation of conduct, requiring stringent due diligence.Footnote 69 This requires States to be proactive and pursue measures that are reasonably capable of achieving their NDCs.Footnote 70

The Court was attentive also to the Kyoto Protocol, both as an interpretive aid in relation to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and in its own right. Specifically, the Court observed that non-compliance with Kyoto Protocol emission reduction targets by an Annex B party might constitute a legally wrongful act.Footnote 71

These various findings are fascinating, and important. It is expected that parties will advance arguments in domestic and international climate advocacy and litigation mounted on the basis of the various administrative law style tests articulated by the Court in the Advisory Opinion, as such tests can help ensure accountability in the scrutiny of government action in domestic processes.Footnote 72 It has always made sense that there must be a relationship of coherence between domestic measures and their objectives, along the lines seen in other areas of international law, and the Court’s description of the implied nature of the relationship in these terms is to be welcomed,Footnote 73 as is the attention the Court gave to the content of NDCs and the required collective effect.

2.3. Customary international law

Customary international law, as the other major source of international law, played a role in the Advisory Opinion that was equally vital to that of the climate change treaties. Customary international law obligations apply to all States—unlike treaties, to which a State must be party to be bound. For instance, the United States (US) will continue to be bound by customary international law relating to climate change even when its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement takes effect. As the Court put it, ‘customary obligations are the same for all States and exist independently regardless of whether a State is party to the climate change treaty’.Footnote 74 This makes the Court’s pronouncements on customary international law particularly important. The Court articulated two customary international law duties on States: first, the duty to prevent significant harm to the environment; and, second, the duty to cooperate for the protection of the environment.

The Court was clear that the duty to prevent significant harm to the environment extends to the climate system, which is an integral and vitally important part of the environment to be protected for present and future generations.Footnote 75 The multifaceted and diffuse nature of human conduct contributing to climate change does not preclude the duty, which arises as a result of the general risk of significant harm,Footnote 76 noting that some harm has already been caused.Footnote 77 Indicators of such harm presently include temperature rise, sea-level rise, negative effects on ecosystems and biodiversity and extreme weather events.Footnote 78 The risks posed by current activities for the future, including in the long-term, must be taken into account and the probability/foreseeability and magnitude of these risks must be considered.Footnote 79 The higher the probability and seriousness of possible harm, the more demanding the standard of conduct attaching to the duty of prevention.Footnote 80 Cumulative effects must also be assessed.Footnote 81 Even ‘activity that is insignificant in isolation’ can give rise to the duty to prevent, although it is the sum of all activities that contribute to anthropogenic GHG emissions over time which produces the risk to the climate system.Footnote 82 States must avert this risk through a coordinated and cooperative response.Footnote 83

Drawing on prior jurisprudence, the Court confirmed that the required standard of conduct for the duty to prevent environmental harm is due diligence: States must ‘employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent [harm] so far as possible’.Footnote 84 In respect of climate change mitigation, the standard is ‘stringent’ due diligence.Footnote 85 Determining what due diligence requires in a particular situation involves taking into account a number of elements. First, the classic formulation of due diligence in respect of environmental harm calls for appropriate measures. This requires States to:

put in place a national system, including legislation, administrative procedures and an enforcement mechanism necessary to regulate the activities in question, and … exercise adequate vigilance to make such a system function effectively, with a view to achieving the intended objective.Footnote 86

Second, due diligence requires States to acquire and analyse scientific and technological information, and the Court added that States must ‘actively pursue’ the scientific information necessary for them to assess risks,Footnote 87 bearing in mind that new knowledge may raise the standard of due diligence required.Footnote 88

The third element determining due diligence is relevant international rules and standards,Footnote 89 and the fourth is States’ different capabilities. The Court emphasised that although a State’s capabilities are a factor, even a less well placed State is obliged to take all the means at its disposal to protect the climate system.Footnote 90 The fifth element is the precautionary principle or approach,Footnote 91 and the sixth is the procedural requirement for environmental impact assessment, which is also independently required as a general customary international law rule. Environmental impact assessments are important in relation to individual activities that are particularly significant. In such cases, potential specific climate related effects must be assessed at the level of the proposed individual activities, including to assess their downstream effects.Footnote 92 Judges Bhandari and Cleveland note that this means the combustion of fossil fuels has to be taken into account in decisions including production, licensing and subsidisation.Footnote 93 ‘Fossil fuels are produced in order to be burned’, the judges underline.Footnote 94 The Court further indicated that it may be reasonable for States to conduct high-level overview risk assessments of the risks caused by GHG emissions also by way of general procedures covering different forms of activity.Footnote 95 This is open to interpretation. For instance, a general policy or legal decision to reopen bids for oil and gas exploration nationally might qualify, but equally the Court may have had in mind more strategic environmental impact assessments to precede decision-making relating to an even broader range of diverse activities.

The seventh point in relation to due diligence is the need for notification and consultation, which will be ‘particularly warranted when an activity significantly affects collective efforts to reduce harm to the climate system’ or with respect to information necessary to meaningful cooperation.Footnote 96 Examples of situations where due diligence can call for notification and consultation include the implementation of policy changes in relation to the exploitation of resources linked to GHG emissions.Footnote 97 These pronouncements also appear to have direct relevance for government decisions to grant or decline permits, and for regulatory decisions in relation to oil and gas exploitation. Like environmental impact assessment, notification and consultation have previously been approached as an independent requirement under customary international law as well as an element of due diligence.

The second customary international law duty discussed by the Court, the duty to cooperate for the protection of the environment,Footnote 98 is all the more vital when a shared resource such as the climate system can only be protected through close cooperation.Footnote 99 Cooperation must be ‘sustained and continuous’ and must take account of the situations of other States.Footnote 100 While coordinated implementation of treaties forms a principal expression of cooperation, States are not required to conclude treaties—they are, however, ‘required to make good faith efforts to arrive at appropriate forms of collective action’.Footnote 101 Collective action in relation to climate change requires agreement on forms of bona fide cooperation. Specifically, ‘international law requires States to cooperate to achieve concrete emission reduction targets or a methodology for determining contributions of individual States’, including with respect to the fulfilment of agreed temperature goals.Footnote 102 This duty applies to all States although it varies according to their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.Footnote 103 It is founded on the recognition of States’ independence, requiring ‘efforts by States to continuously develop, maintain and implement a collective climate policy that is based on an equitable distribution of burdens’.Footnote 104

Importantly, States may find they have not discharged the duty to cooperate in relation to climate change only by concluding and implementing the climate treaties presently in existence.Footnote 105 There is a bigger picture, including to the point where, as the Court indicated, there may be a time when further treaty-based obligations are needed, with the increased urgency of the climate crisis. Here, the customary international legal obligations discussed earlier in this section constituted, in the Court’s view, a legal standard for assessing whether climate treaties continue to serve their purpose and whether further collective action has to be undertaken, including adopting further treaty obligations.Footnote 106

Readers will appreciate that customary international law and treaty obligations have a separate existence, though the Court interpreted them harmoniously. Indeed, the Court went so far as to suggest, in a carefully caveated manner, that:

at the present stage, compliance in full and in good faith by a State with the climate change treaties, as interpreted by the Court … suggests that this State substantially complies with the general customary duties to prevent significant environmental harm and to cooperate.Footnote 107

How should this statement be understood? Importantly, in saying this, the Court both leant on and lent weight to the existing treaty regime. Further, this statement enabled the Court to give clear guidance to non-party States. For non-parties, the Court:

considers that it is possible that a non-party State which cooperates with the community of State parties to the three climate change treaties in a way that is equivalent to that of a State party, may, in certain circumstances, be considered to fulfil its customary obligations through practice that comports with the required conduct of States under the climate change treaties.Footnote 108

Interestingly, the Court suggested that a non-party State not cooperating in such a way will have the full burden of demonstrating that its policies and practices are in compliance with its customary international law obligations.Footnote 109 One wonders whether the Court was signalling a potential reversal of the usual adjudicatory burden of proof?Footnote 110 At the same time, the Court was clear that its comments do not mean that customary obligations will be fulfilled simply by compliance with climate change treaties.Footnote 111

As far as due diligence is concerned, one point worth noting, for those who are interested in the regularity with which international courts and tribunals now distinguish between obligations of conduct and obligations of result, is that in its Paris Agreement analysis the Court implied directly that the standard of performance for any international law obligation of conduct is one of due diligence.Footnote 112 This is of course without prejudice to the possibility that a heightened due diligence standard may apply, including requirements for ‘stringent’ due diligence as seen both in this Advisory Opinion and in the ITLOS Advisory Opinion.Footnote 113 However, the point itself is new. Until now, the jurisprudence had been open to the possibility that there could be a variety of standards applying to the range of international law obligations that could be described as obligations of conduct. Inter alia, the Court’s statement would seem to consolidate due diligence’s emerging role as a global regulatory standard, being read widely into international law, including both treaty law and customary international law.Footnote 114 At the same time, there may be a hint of differing views within the Court on the utility of the ongoing distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of result. While employing these terms in a predictable fashion throughout the Advisory Opinion, the Court also stated that the distinction was not necessarily a strict one, that breach of either type of obligation may incur State responsibility,Footnote 115 and that such obligations may be interconnected and mutually supportive.Footnote 116

2.4. Human rights

The Court’s strong engagement with the right to life, the right to health, the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to privacy, family and home conveyed an important and clear message that the conduct leading to climate change is affecting these human rights. Indeed, the Court stated expressly that ‘the adverse effects of climate change may impair the effective enjoyment of human rights.’Footnote 117 Helpfully for future climate advocacy and litigation, the Court also specified that States must give due account to the protection of human rights in their climate standards and legislation and in the regulation of private activities.Footnote 118

As directed in the UNGA’s Resolution requesting an advisory opinion,Footnote 119 the Court applied a range of UN human rights instruments. Decisions of the Human Rights Committee also feature in support of the Court’s findings, including Teitiota v New Zealand and Daniel Billy and others v Australia. Footnote 120 The Court further observed, specifically, that the rights of women and children and the rights of indigenous peoples may be impaired, including in the context of severe weather events and heightened water scarcity,Footnote 121 and also encouraged States to ensure their consideration in the design of mitigation and adaptation measures so as to help to ensure non-discrimination and not undermine relevant rights.Footnote 122

Observers have discussed whether or not the Advisory Opinion recognised a human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.Footnote 123 This particular topic is not a straightforward one. By the time that the ICJ reached the end of its analysis, it had, indeed, recognised ‘the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment’ as ‘inherent in the enjoyment of other human rights’.Footnote 124 Significantly, though, this does not feature in the summary of the Court’s views at the end of the human rights section, and neither is it selected to feature in the dispositif at the end of the Advisory Opinion.

There are important nuances here. Regional human rights courts, applying their respective human rights instruments, have taken different views about reading in such a right.Footnote 125 The Court was clear, to begin with, that the protection of the environment is a precondition for the enjoyment of human rights.Footnote 126 The Court also clearly stated that, specifically, degradation of the climate system and other parts of the environment may impair the enjoyment of a range of established human rights protected under international law.Footnote 127 The Court then reasoned that ‘[th]e right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment results from the interdependence between human rights and the protection of the environment’, describing the new right in the first place only as a ‘right’ and not a ‘human right’.Footnote 128 The Court added that it is difficult to see how the human rights obligations already written into the law can be fulfilled without ensuring the protection of the human right to healthy environment ‘as a human right’.Footnote 129 The Court finally appeared then to deduce that a ‘human right’ to a healthy environment is inherent in the enjoyment of other human rights.Footnote 130 Indeed, Judge Aurescu’s remarks confirm that the Court did not explicitly find the right to be a norm of customary international law, although he himself believed that to be the case.Footnote 131

Perhaps the Court’s conclusion was thought inevitable based on the premises. At the same time, the Court’s view was bolstered by its reference to regional human rights instruments recognising a human right to a healthy environment,Footnote 132 its reported recognition in the constitutions or domestic legislation of over 100 StatesFootnote 133 and UNGA Resolution 76/300, adopted in 2022 with 161 votes in favour, no votes against and eight abstentions.Footnote 134 However, the Court did not seem to say that there is a basis for recognising the right as a matter of customary international law or treaty interpretation.Footnote 135

Significantly, the Court referred to the science when discussing States’ obligations under international human rights law,Footnote 136 as well as under other multilateral treaties including the UNCCD, where various intergovernmental scientific bodies play their part.Footnote 137 In relation to sea-level rise the science is crucial, with the Court noting that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had concluded with a high level of confidence that risks for coastal ecosystems, people and infrastructure will continue to increase.Footnote 138 This leads potentially, inter alia, to forced internal and external displacement of populations,Footnote 139 even provoking application of the principle of non-refoulement if there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm to the right to life.Footnote 140

2.5. The conventions on biological diversity, desertification and the ozone layer

Directly applicable law further included not only the climate change treaties and customary international law, the law of the sea and international human rights law, but also the CBD, the UNCCD and the Vienna Convention together with the Montreal Protocol (the ozone treaties).Footnote 141 The Court’s attention to these treaties is refreshing and forms a key part of the Advisory Opinion. The state of global conservation, as well as climate change’s impacts upon it, receives too little attention in major international legal fora and inter-State politics beyond specialised treaty regimes.

The Court found that the CBD, UNCCD and the ozone treaties all mutually inform the climate change treaties and customary international law, and that parties must take these environmental treaties into account when implementing the climate change treaties and customary international law, as well as vice versa.Footnote 142 The CBD merits particular attention, given the current extraordinary level of threat to biodiversity globally and the high level of species extinction accompanying human activities, to which attention has been drawn elsewhere.Footnote 143 The Court found that the biosphere is one of the components of the climate system,Footnote 144 and noted that the Kunming-Montreal Global Diversity Framework adopted by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD in 2022 specifically encourages parties to the CBD to minimise the impacts of climate change and ocean acidification on biodiversity.Footnote 145

The Court then highlighted a number of obligations within the CBD which relate closely back to those it had already identified in respect of climate change, potentially significantly heightening international legal awareness of relevant hard law obligations.Footnote 146 Article 3 CBD reflects the customary international law duty to prevent significant harm to the environment by providing that States parties have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond national jurisdiction. Article 5 CBD establishes the obligation of States Parties to cooperate for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction and on other matters of mutual interest. Again, this parallels customary international law and, in addition, duties to cooperate were also identified by the Court as principles within the climate treaty framework.Footnote 147 Article 7(c) CBD requires parties to identify and monitor activities that are likely to have significant adverse impacts on biodiversity. This flows into Article 8(l), which requires parties, where significant adverse effects have been identified under Article 7, to regulate or manage as far as possible relevant processes and categories of activities, including those which contribute to anthropogenic GHG emissions.Footnote 148

States also contribute to the protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment by complying with the UNCCD.Footnote 149 Intergovernmental scientific bodies have highlighted the links between desertification, land degradation, drought and climate change.Footnote 150 The physical connection is clear. Accordingly, the UNCCD requires States Parties to promote cooperation on environmental protection, land and water resource conservation as relating to desertification and drought.Footnote 151 The Court emphasised that States Parties must take account of climate change.Footnote 152 Further, the UNCCD requires that developed country parties must support affected developing country parties in combating desertification and mitigating drought, including by providing financial resources.Footnote 153 Additionally, the UNCCD specifically requires parties to encourage coordination of activities taken under it, the UNFCCC and the CBD.Footnote 154 As to the ozone treaties, the Court also found that the ozone layer is part of the atmosphere and that these obligations contribute to ensuring the protection of the climate system as a whole.Footnote 155

2.6. Principles of international environmental law

Importantly, the Court determined early in the Advisory Opinion that a number of interrelated principles familiar to international environmental lawyers form part of the applicable law for the purposes of the Advisory Opinion. These principles guide both the interpretation and application of treaties and the determination and application of customary international law obligations.Footnote 156 All of the applicable principles are also found specifically within the climate treaty regime.Footnote 157

The overarching principle of sustainable development is first on the list, noting that the Court adopted the articulation of this principle from the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case as concerning the ‘need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment’.Footnote 158 This juxtaposes with the often-cited formulation of sustainable development from the 1987 Brundtland Report as a process that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.Footnote 159 While the two formulations are reconcilable and complementary, the Court’s framing of the principle may ultimately be the less anthropocentric of the two phrasings.

Second on the list, and of real instrumentality in the climate change field, is the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). Differentiation among States based on the CBDR-RC principle has long been a feature of international environmental law, including climate change law, and it also features centrally in the climate change treaties.Footnote 160 The meaning of the CBDR-RC principle is a matter that is critical to the international climate change law edifice, both for the equity considerations involved and because both developed and developing country action on climate change will determine the success or failure of the regime. Indeed, the Court’s ruling on customary international law placed every State under the stringent due diligence obligation to use all the means at its disposal to protect the climate system, albeit in accordance with its CBDR-RC.Footnote 161

Here, matters became interesting. Key among the tensions during the advisory proceedings was the extent to which, in actuality, legal obligations in the climate sphere depend on a State’s blend of contributions to atmospheric GHG concentrations (historically and currently), and on States’ current capabilities and national circumstances as referred to in the Paris Agreement. National circumstances include a country’s level of economic and social development. The Court found that the CBDR-RC principle embraces all these dimensions. Further, the Court importantly observed that the status of individual countries is not static; rather, their national circumstances continue to change.Footnote 162 This means that countries are on a spectrum, rather than in two groups of developing and developed States. It also means that there is clear scope for an increasing level of obligation on a particular State. This has concrete, real-world implications. Most obviously, at present, although the Court did not mention it, China is poised to outpace the US as the major GHG contributor and also the European Union which has occupied second place until now, while China’s capacity to contribute to mitigation is also growing. It was of interest that Judge Xue disagreed with the Court’s view that States sit on a spectrum, considering that this description distorts the foundational structure of the climate change treaty regime.Footnote 163

The principle of CBDR-RC is a manifestation of the third principle, the principle of equity.Footnote 164 The Court remarked that equity is an emanation of the idea of justice, and the Court cited its own jurisprudence for the idea that when applying positive law it may choose the interpretation that appears in the circumstances of the case closest to the requirements of justice.Footnote 165 This raises certain issues. Interpretations of the law have effects going beyond individual cases. It is important to consider the extent to which a particular interpretation of the law can be considered to be confined to the case-specific circumstances before a judicial body. International lawyers will need to be mindful of the ongoing interplay between the importance of equity in the law, as revealed in the circumstances of particular cases, and the question of a legal rule’s overall objective substantive content, which will be binding on all relevant States.

Intergenerational equity is a related, fourth principle, as referred to in the preamble of the Paris Agreement and discussed in Section 2.7 with respect to the interests of future generations. Fifth, the precautionary approach or principle is also key, as referred to in Article 3(3) UNFCCC and addressed in Section 4.4 in relation to the role of science in the Advisory Opinion.Footnote 166 One of the interesting questions arising from the Advisory Opinion might be how, in due course, the precautionary principle could play into the determination of the temporal scope of international climate obligations.Footnote 167 For instance, should the time from which customary international law duties of prevention might run be decided by reference to when prudent States would have taken action, taking into account the precautionary principle’s tenet of acting rather than delaying action when faced with scientific uncertainty?

The sixth principle considered by the Court was the polluter pays principle. Uniquely among the general principles considered, it was determined not to be part of the applicable law, having not been specified in the treaty context.Footnote 168 This is an interesting conclusion because, if States are viewed as ‘the polluters’, the principle of CBDR-RC could be connected with ideas of the polluter paying because of how the CBDR-RC principle takes account of States’ historical emissions. However, the Court viewed the polluter pays principle as relating primarily to the conduct of private actors and to concepts of strict liability. The Court added that this does not preclude the possibility of international law developing to generate strict liability for acts that may not be internationally wrongful.Footnote 169 Ultimately, the Court’s view may assist in the development of the CBDR-RC principle on its own terms, keeping this distinct from the polluter pays principle.

Finally the customary international law duty to cooperate was also considered by the Court to be a guiding principle in the climate change treaty framework.Footnote 170 This duty was further elaborated elsewhere in the Advisory Opinion, as described in Section 2.3 of this article in relation to customary international law.Footnote 171 Several provisions of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement implement this principle in different ways.Footnote 172 Indeed, the duty to cooperate runs strongly throughout the Advisory Opinion and is addressed in Section 4.1 in connection with climate finance.

2.7. Intergenerational equity

A key contribution of the Advisory Opinion is the Court’s specific statement that the principle of intergenerational equity requires ‘due regard for the interests of future generations and the long-term implications of conduct’.Footnote 173 With ‘due regard’ emerging as a test for legal conduct in an increasingly wide variety of international legal fields, greater elaboration of what due regard comprises may begin to emerge in the near future.Footnote 174 For instance, there may be an important procedural dimension requiring the analysis of the interests of those to whom due regard is owed.Footnote 175 As the Court stated, the considerations in question ‘need to be taken into account where States contemplate, decide on and implement policies and measures in fulfilment of their obligations under the relevant treaties and customary international law’.Footnote 176 This is a valuable contribution to the general understandings in international law of the meaning of due regard, and provides a useful and concrete connection point between domestic and international law for invocation in the context of domestic and international policy development processes, negotiations and climate litigation.

The Court grounded the requirement of due regard for future generations in equity infra legem, with intergenerational equity being a manifestation of equity in a general sense, taking into account the added dimension that intergenerational equity is an expression of the idea that ‘present generations are trustees of humanity tasked with preserving dignified living conditions and transmitting them to future generations’.Footnote 177 As the IPCC has observed, many of the changes that continued emissions cause to major climate system components will be irreversible on time scales from the centennial to the millennial, such that ‘[w]ithout urgent, effective, and equitable mitigation and adaptation actions, climate change increasingly threatens ecosystems, biodiversity, and the livelihoods, health and well-being of current and future generations (high confidence)’.Footnote 178

Even with this hint of an international legal ‘turn to the future’,Footnote 179 there is room to suggest that the Court underplayed the matter of future generations’ interests. Additional arguments have been put forward in the literature. One argument is that future generations are ‘others’ whose interests it would be consistent to consider in accordance with the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use what is yours in such a way that you do not injure that of another).Footnote 180 This can be extended into an argument that the customary international law obligation of prevention of harm to the environment might be understood as protecting the interests of future generations. There might possibly also be associated substantive constraints on State conduct requiring avoidance of ‘manifestly excessive adverse impacts’ on the interests of future generations.Footnote 181 The Court’s approach to intergenerational equity does not preclude such findings in future. Judge Sebutinde considered that the Court should have affirmed that States owe customary international law obligations not only to present generations but also to future generations.Footnote 182

Elsewhere, the Court blended the matter of future generations’ interests subtly but foundationally into its consideration of human rights, observing at the outset of the human rights section of the Advisory Opinion that ‘[t]he environment is the foundation for human life, upon which the health and well-being of both present and future generations depend’.Footnote 183 However, the Court made the point when parsing the UNGA’s request that, because international law is a law among States, individuals by and large lack standing to bring claims against States in respect of fulfilment of their climate obligations, except as might be recognised in specific treaties, such as human rights treaties.Footnote 184 Certainly, there is blue sky between the Court’s view and that of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has recognised that human rights have collective dimensions in which they are owed to both present and future generations.Footnote 185

3. State responsibility

3.1. The applicability of the law on State responsibility

The Court decided to address the second question posed by the UNGA by setting out the general legal framework governing States’ responsibility for failure to comply with their obligations to protect the climate system. Importantly, the Court determined that the general international legal regime on State responsibility applies, and that the climate change treaties do not provide a lex specialis on responsibility, as some participants had argued.Footnote 186

3.2. Attribution and causation

The issues of attribution and causation were distinct and specific matters arising under the law on State responsibility. On attribution, failure of a State to fulfil a relevant obligation could constitute an attributable and internationally wrongful act. For greater clarity, the Court explained that, in the context of the obligations which apply in respect of mitigating climate change, the wrongful act was likely to take the form, not of the emission of GHGs per se, but of the breach of either treaty obligations or customary international law obligations on the protection of the climate system from significant harm resulting from anthropogenic emissions of such gases.Footnote 187 Thus, a State could be internationally legally responsible for its failure to exercise due diligence and take the necessary regulatory and legislative measures to limit private actors’ emitting activities.Footnote 188

Further, as the Court discussed, previously where there have been multiple causes of injury the Court itself has held that ‘responsibility for part of such injury should [be] allocated among [the] actors’.Footnote 189 This statement has been described as significant at the level of principle, though leaving much to be determined.Footnote 190 The Court also observed that States have contributed to the atmospheric concentration of GHGs in significantly different degrees.Footnote 191 Further, although it is the collective and aggregate effects of the GHGs emitted by all States as well as from natural sources that cause damage to the climate system,Footnote 192 the responsibility of a single State could be invoked without invoking the responsibility of all States that might be responsible.Footnote 193 This does appear to give rise to the point that, if contentious proceedings were to ensue, the Court might have to address objections to admissibility on the basis that proceedings could involve the determination of obligations of third parties not party to the proceedings. The extent to which the Monetary Gold principle—that the Court cannot decide a dispute which would involve the determination of a third party’s legal interestsFootnote 194—could pose an impediment might depend on the legal issues before the adjudicators.

That leaves the problem of causation. Reparation can only follow in relation to damage that has been caused by a State or States’ wrongful conduct. Causation has often been a thorny issue in relation to climate change. What, then, does the Advisory Opinion have to say about causation? The Court reiterated the established international law test developed in its own jurisprudence which requires ‘a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus’ between the wrongful act and the injury.Footnote 195 In the context of climate change, this has two elements: first, scientific evidence establishing that harm to the environment has been caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions and, second, the attribution to a particular State or group of States of the relevant conduct. The Advisory Opinion can be read as saying that scientific evidence before the Court considered that the first element of causation can be established by clearly linking observed increases in heat waves, flooding and drought to anthropogenic GHGs (although only at a general level and only in respect of the increases in these phenomena).Footnote 196 Additionally, in respect of the second element, the Court highlighted that it is possible to determine scientifically the amount of emissions that each State has contributed to the atmosphere (although not all of these emissions will be unlawful).Footnote 197 Thus, there is scope for a contentious case arguing that certain States’ conduct has caused increases in destructive weather. On the Court’s reasoning, it seems that causation in a general sense could be established. The physical consequences are, at least in part, a result of the conduct. There is thus a ‘core’ causative connection. As the Court stated:

the Court concludes that while the causal link between the wrongful actions or omissions of a State and the harm arising from climate change is more tenuous than in the case of local sources of pollution, this does not mean that the identification of a causal link is impossible in the climate change context; it merely means that the causal link must be established in each case through an in concreto assessment while taking into account the aforementioned elements outlined by the Court.Footnote 198

Finally the Court’s remarks on compensation must be considered. The Court commented, citing past jurisprudence, that ‘the absence of adequate evidence as to the extent of material damage will not, in all situations, preclude an award of compensation for that damage’.Footnote 199 Combined with what the Court had to say about causation, it appears that even if it is unclear how much of the material damage a State may have suffered is due to another State or States’ GHG emissions, and what the extent of that damage is, compensation may be possible, provided that there is a core causative link. It seems significant that, subsequently, when discussing reparation, the Court also highlighted that compensation in the form of what it has referred to as a ‘global sum’ may be possible, on an exceptional basis, where the exact extent of damage caused is uncertain, which the Court expected it would be in a climate change context.Footnote 200 This occurred in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), where the Democratic Republic of the Congo had sought some USD 13 billion in reparations with the Court ordering reparations of USD 325 million, i.e. about 2.5 per cent of the amount sought.Footnote 201 If only ‘core’ causality in the sense described can be established, then perhaps only the award of a global sum can potentially be contemplated.

3.3. Legal consequences

The Court was clear that State responsibility may ensue in the case of wrongful conduct.Footnote 202 State conduct precipitating State responsibility includes all wrongful acts. Concrete examples of wrongful acts under international law could include: the failure of a State in various ways to take appropriate action to protect the climate from GHG emissions, including through failure to regulate GHG emissions in accordance with the customary international law obligation of due diligence in the prevention of environmental harm; fossil fuel production; fossil fuel consumption; the granting of exploration licences; or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies.Footnote 203 Wrongful acts might also, for instance, take the form of parties’ failures to communicate and maintain NDCs under the Paris Agreement (around 170 parties to the Paris Agreement did not meet the February 2025 deadline for successive NDCs);Footnote 204 or failure to conduct environmental impact assessments.Footnote 205

The Court also made clear that the full panoply of legal consequences found in the law of State responsibility would be applicable,Footnote 206 in addition to the continued duty to perform relevant obligations.Footnote 207 These consequences would include the duties of cessation and non-repetition, with the additional duty to make reparation, assuming that causation of the damage suffered by the injured State, or suffered by individuals if there were a breach of international human rights law, was established.Footnote 208

A State has continuing primary duties to perform its obligations, despite having breached these obligations. Given the range of obligations concerned, many examples could be provided, but this might include, for instance, the continuing duty to preserve and improve reservoirs’ and sinks’ absorption capacity. Equally, a State that has set an NDC which is inadequate under the Paris Agreement would have a continuing duty to set an adequate NDC.Footnote 209 The duty of cessation will also apply. The Court specified that in the climate context, cessation might require a State that is not already doing so to employ all means at its disposal to reduce its GHG emissions.Footnote 210 It also might require a State ‘to revoke administrative, legislative and other measures that constitute an internationally wrongful act’.Footnote 211 For instance, a State could potentially be legally obliged to cancel oil and gas licences. Judge Bhandari suggested the Court could have been more specific that cessation in general requires discontinuing practices directly contributing to GHG emissions and adopting policies to facilitate deep and immediate emissions cuts.Footnote 212 Fulfilling such duties of cessation would naturally equally involve fulfilling a State’s continuing primary duties to perform its obligations.

Beyond the duty of cessation, the general law on State responsibility holds that States can be required to make reparation in three combined forms: satisfaction; restitution; and compensation. Satisfaction could take the form of expressions of regret, formal apologies, public acknowledgement or statements, education of society about climate change or a formal judicial declaration.Footnote 213 Judge Bhandari’s Separate Opinion suggested also recognition of States and communities as victims of climate change, commemorations and tributes to the affected as well as a trust fund to manage funds for beneficiaries and symbolic monetary awards for non-pecuniary damage.Footnote 214

Restitution might not be feasible for environmental harm, although the restoration of ecosystems and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure could be called for.Footnote 215 Judge Bhandari would have liked the Court to refer more specifically to reparation measures aimed at protecting, preserving and enhancing the absorption capacity of GHG reservoirs and sinks as well as, where feasible, returning lost territory or property.Footnote 216 Judge Sebutinde promoted reference also to reforestation, prevention of coastal erosion, infrastructural rebuilding and disaster or debt relief, as plead by certain countries including from the African continent.Footnote 217 Most importantly for certain States, Judge Aurescu took the view that restitution could embrace the continued recognition of the entitlement of States affected by sea-level rise to their prior maritime territories as well as of their continued statehood.Footnote 218

Compensation would correspond as per the law on State responsibility to financially assessable damage not made good by restitution, and the Court has previously confirmed that compensation can fall due for environmental damage.Footnote 219 This might include damage to the environment in and of itself, which might involve indemnification for impairment or loss of environmental goods and services, and also damage in the form of expenses incurred by injured States as a consequence of such damage.Footnote 220 Given the high number of potential claimants, Judge Bhandari made suggestions about institutional frameworks for delivery in the form of international claims commissions or a UN-administered compensation fund.Footnote 221 There is no reference in the Advisory Opinion to the matter of whether full reparation is affordable.

3.4. Conclusion on State responsibility

Hot on the heels of the Advisory Opinion came the BBC News headline ‘Top UN Court Says Countries Can Sue Each Other over Climate Change’.Footnote 222 Indeed, it is thought by many that the Advisory Opinion is likely to form part of a wider litigation strategy giving rise to contentious proceedings. However, even if there may be a State or States interested in undertaking contentious litigation internationally, a close reading of the Advisory Opinion implies that expectations should perhaps be calibrated down.Footnote 223 A particularly prudent reading might perhaps expect a declaratory remedy as satisfaction in respect of damage caused by the breach of obligations and/or potentially an inexact global sum award as reparation.

4. Further matters

4.1. Cooperation and climate finance

As the ICJ has accurately perceived, international cooperation is essential in relation to climate change. The Advisory Opinion has made a major contribution in highlighting this, with the theme of the duty to cooperate running right through the decision. Momentum has been building toward greater international recognition of international obligations of cooperation, including in the ILC, and the recognition of the customary international law duty on States to cooperate with each other in good faith to prevent significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment is a breakthrough moment.Footnote 224 Ultimately, as the Court said: ‘Climate change is a common concern. Co-operation is not a matter of choice for States but a pressing need and a legal obligation.’Footnote 225

The Court also made further important findings under treaty law in relation to international cooperation.Footnote 226 The climate change treaties address a global challenge, and States’ cooperation is a ‘paramount principle’ in solving global problems:Footnote 227 ‘it is by cooperating that the States concerned can jointly manage the risks of damage to the environment’, just as in a bilateral setting.Footnote 228 This includes cooperation in relation to reducing GHG emissions and mitigating the risk of climate change, adaptation, and also through financial assistance, technology transfer and capacity building. In addition to those in the Paris Agreement, there are a wide range of obligations relating to cooperation under the UNFCCC,Footnote 229 and the climate change treaties and customary international law are mutually informing when it comes to the duty to cooperate.Footnote 230 Meaningful cooperation may require the sharing of information, notification and consultation.Footnote 231 Additional cooperative duties feature in the CBD,Footnote 232 and the UNCCDFootnote 233 as well as in UNCLOS.Footnote 234 Further, when it comes to sea-level rise, the Advisory Opinion places a central emphasis on cooperation with a view to achieving equitable solutions.Footnote 235

The Court addressed climate finance, too, under the rubric of cooperation. Indeed, often the Advisory Opinion talks about ‘support’ and ‘cooperation’ rather than finance flows. By doing this, the Court was placing the accent on the aim and the obligation rather than monetary matters, perhaps making the discussion about climate finance more palatable. The topic was addressed first as part of the Court’s analysis of the requirements of the UNFCCC. Here, the Court observed that: ‘a case-by-case determination of the adequacy of current financial aid and technology transfer commitments is to be made by the application of the principle of good faith, which governs the duty of cooperation’.Footnote 236 This does imply that a State could be judged for its efforts in respect of finance, although the yardstick of good faith would perhaps only reveal conduct that was manifestly insufficient.

In general, the Court handled the question of climate finance adroitly although unemphatically. This is perhaps because the sums called for are vast, although the efforts the world must go to will be sorely needed. In international climate negotiations there is a distinction between provision of finance to assist developing countries with mitigation and adaptation, and finance for the loss and damage caused by climate change. Both have been challenging subjects of negotiation in the climate change treaty context. Slow progress on the latter especially was among the motivations for the campaign to request the Advisory Opinion. Progress has since been achieved at the COP to the UNFCCC, although there is a long way to go. This progress includes the agreement at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt, in 2022 to establish a fund on finance for loss and damage as part of a mosaic of funding arrangements and its formal operationalisation the following year.Footnote 237 As to finance to assist developing countries with mitigation and adaptation, the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance adopted at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 2024 is to comprise at least USD 300 billion per annum by 2035 from public and private sources, with up to USD 1.3 trillion coming primarily from private financing.Footnote 238

Finance features centrally in the analysis of mitigation obligations under the Paris Agreement, where the Court placed it squarely within the rubric of cooperation, alongside capacity building and technology transfer.Footnote 239 For developed countries, there is not only a binding obligation of financial assistance,Footnote 240 but also binding obligations to communicate in advance the projected finance, under Article 9.Footnote 241 The Court made the key point that the Paris Agreement does not specify the amount or level of financial support to be provided, but the relevant provisions are to be interpreted in light of other provisions, including the Article 2 temperature goal: ‘parties are to implement their obligations under Article 9 in a manner and at a level that allows for the achievement of the objectives listed in Article 2’.Footnote 242 This level of contribution can be evaluated on the basis of factors including developed States’ respective capacity and developing States’ respective needs. There are also important obligations to regularly communicate action taken, under Article 11(4), and to enhance capacity building activities through appropriate institutional arrangements, under Article 11(5).

These important observations from the Court about finance flows must be distinguished from later sections of the Advisory Opinion addressing the subject of the legal consequences where States’ conduct has caused significant harm to the climate system, including reparation. Cooperation’s overall importance is reflected in the general structure of the Advisory Opinion, addressing, in turn, mitigation, adaptation and ‘cooperation’.

4.2. Sea-level rise and self-determination

The Court dealt with sea-level rise in an attentive way, although the care it took not to overcommit itself may lead to complaints of reticence. Sea-level rise is an especially sensitive issue for small island States, particularly those who would lose maritime territory if the baselines of maritime zones recognised in the law of the sea were to shift landward and to undergo alteration in other respects. This is likely, given the normal baseline is the low tide mark and taking into account also the special archipelagic baselines regime. For certain States, the further possibility of losing the entirety of their land territory to the rising oceans by the end of the century is the spectre. Questions then arise about ongoing Statehood.Footnote 243 This is the most obvious of the potentially existential threats dealt with in the Advisory Opinion.

The Court validated such concerns, observing that the IPCC has described sea-level rise as unavoidable and has concluded with a high level of confidence that associated risks will continue to increase.Footnote 244 This may potentially lead to forced population displacement within or across borders and affect States’ territorial integrity and permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.Footnote 245 In respect of baselines, the Court made the specific finding that the provisions of UNCLOS ‘do not require States parties, in the context of physical changes resulting from climate-induced related sea level rise’, to update charts and coordinates showing either their maritime zone baselines or the outer limits of the maritime zones once established in accordance with UNCLOS.Footnote 246

This is significant as a win for small island States, but it is a somewhat minimalist finding. The Court did not state, for instance, that baselines are fixed as a matter of general international law, whereas Judge Aurescu calls for the fixed baseline solution to be recognised as established in customary international law.Footnote 247 The Court’s interpretive reasoning appeared to be based on the text of UNCLOS. The Court identified as relevant the views that many States and the ILC expressed in support of this interpretation, and customary international law arguments, but did not appear, interpretively, to rely greatly on either.Footnote 248 Time may be required here for customary international law to develop.

In respect of statehood, the Court was again minimalist, although importantly expressing the view that once a State is established, ‘the disappearance of one of its constituent elements would not necessarily entail the loss of its Statehood’.Footnote 249 This was a significant statement because it confirmed speculation that there may be room to accommodate the possibility that fulfilling the traditional criteria for statehood in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States on a continuing basis may not be essential to statehood in all cases (a defined territory, permanent population, government and the capacity to enter into relations with other States). Judge Tomka considered this remark deeply troubling, due to the possibility that it might give rise to readings of the Advisory Opinion as endorsing the deconstruction of statehood.Footnote 250

The Court also remarked that the potential effects of sea-level rise on the international legal principles of territorial integrity and permanent sovereignty over natural resources are closely connected with the right to self-determination and held that ‘sea level rise is not without consequences for the exercise of this right’.Footnote 251 This is a remark that could herald later legal arguments and developments. The Court was making the point that States’ GHG emissions might undermine the right to self-determination of the peoples of other States, a fundamental principle of international law.Footnote 252 The right to self-determination is both jus cogens and an obligation erga omnes, and this potential but preventable result would appear to be a serious breach of the right.

It seems that the scheme of responsibility in ARSIWA indicates that States would be obliged not to recognise the change in legal situation that resulted, for instance, from the disappearance of a State and its land territory.Footnote 253 This would be in addition to any secondary legal obligations to cooperate to bring such a serious breach to an end. It may be argued that these secondary legal obligations already apply today, if it can be scientifically predicted with relative certainty, that present-time GHG emitting conduct constitutes a breach that will undermine the right of self-determination in the future. Little consideration appears to have been given to this point.Footnote 254 These cooperative obligations would supplement those already recognised in primary law. In any event, the Court emphasised that States are obliged to cooperate in dealing with climate change-induced sea-level rise, a duty lying at the core of the UN Charter.Footnote 255

4.3. What the Court left for later

Throughout the Advisory Opinion, the Court discerned matters on which it might and might not be appropriate to give views. This applies both in relation to the primary law and also the Court’s response to the second part of the UNGA’s question relating to legal consequences. In many cases, the Court has approached the drawing of this line by noting that certain matters would call for assessment in concreto. This is a positive way of phrasing the matter; an alternative would have been to convey that the Court was unable to address certain matters in abstracto. The Court opted for a forward-looking tone, which assists in maintaining the Advisory Opinion’s affirmative energy. Another example of this approach is seen in relation to the setting of NDCs under the Paris Agreement, where the Court explained that the question of how the principle of CBDR-RC in light of national circumstances plays into the due diligence required of each State would need to be assessed in concreto.Footnote 256

The Court’s line-drawing was particularly apparent in relation to the requirements of customary international law. Matters that would call for assessment in concreto here include, centrally, the requirements of due diligence in a given case,Footnote 257 as well as whether any specific risk of harm or actual harm would constitute a relevant adverse effect of climate change,Footnote 258 and also the relevance of decisions of the COP as current standards for determining risk when assessing the due diligence required in a given case.Footnote 259 There are additionally other areas of the primary law where the Court took the view that the matter would need to be argued and determined based on specifics. This is the case, for instance, for the continuity of Statehood, which the Court left to be argued in caso.Footnote 260 In relation to the territorial scope of human rights treaties, the Court took the view that it need not determine the specific circumstances under which a State can be regarded as exercising its jurisdiction outside its own territory, since this will depend on the provisions of the particular treaty in question.Footnote 261

The Court also circumscribed the scope of what the Advisory Opinion can contribute when it comes to legal consequences, where the Court focused essentially on legal consequences under the law on State responsibility. First, the Court addressed the remaining primary law matter of the temporal scope of States’ obligations. The Court was clear that the assessment of the temporal scope of States’ obligations would need to be considered in concreto.Footnote 262 This issue could be crucial in contentious litigation and this was a matter that was fiercely argued in pleadings.Footnote 263 Perhaps the most distinct position was taken by Judge Nolte: that it was in the second half of 1980s that general understanding and recognition of risks associated with emissions came about, and so this is when customary international law became applicable and wrongful conduct could have begun to occur.Footnote 264

Based on the tenor of the Advisory Opinion, one might perhaps predict that in the future a point in history may indeed be identified when States had or should have had sufficient knowledge of the harm that atmospheric GHG concentrations cause to bring into play the customary international law obligations of prevention and cooperation. One interesting question is whether both duties would run from the same point in time. Claims in relation to these two distinct duties might have different aims. Findings around the point in time at which each could be considered to have been triggered might be needed more in relation to the preventive duty, where financial remedies of some description may be more likely.

The Court then came to matters of secondary law proper, considering that in concreto assessment would be needed in relation to the responsibility of individual States or groups of States.Footnote 265 As the Court reiterated several times, that is not a task the Court was asked to undertake and the determination of State responsibility was beyond the scope of the Advisory Opinion.Footnote 266 Among other matters, causality would need to be determined.Footnote 267 The Court was also not asked to indicate or quantify specified legal consequences in the sense of remedies.Footnote 268

The Court stated that the rules and principles governing injuries arising out of acts not prohibited by international law fell outside the scope of the questions before it, thus excluding consideration of reparation for harm caused by conduct that is not internationally legally wrongful.Footnote 269 On the other hand, Judge Yusuf noted that, first, the regime of State responsibility for wrongful acts and, second, the international legal principles or rules that may apply in relation to allocation of loss caused by conduct that is not wrongful, are intertwined.Footnote 270 Importantly, in the climate change context, if it is assumed that the temporal scope of obligations on which State responsibility for harm caused by climate change may one day be specified, emissions prior to that could be caught by the regime on allocation of loss. This regime could perhaps be considered still under development, although it has received sustained attention in the past from the ILC, leading most recently to the Principles on the Allocation of Loss.Footnote 271 Though valuable, these principles may not prove to be the end of the story. The international experience with climate change in the coming years might be a crucible for further development of the law in this respect.

4.4. The role of science in the Advisory Opinion

The Advisory Opinion is based on a smooth synthesis of the science and the law, as far as the engagement with science goes.Footnote 272 This engagement did not extend, for instance, to ascertaining scientific parameters for possible pathways towards the Paris Agreement’s 1.5ºC temperature goal, including, for instance, pathways without overshoot, with overshoot, without atmospheric carbon dioxide removal and with such removal. That said, the Advisory Opinion brings the science it relies on into clear focus from the outset, drawing primarily on the work of the IPCC as the best available science.Footnote 273 The Court’s pre-hearing meeting with groups of past and present authors from the IPCC, intended to enhance the Court’s understanding of the IPCC’s key scientific findings, is likely to have bolstered the Court’s confidence with the Advisory Opinion’s scientific content.

The Court observed, based on very high-confidence figures provided by the IPCC, that concentrations of the three main GHGs (carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide) are higher now than they have been in at least 800,000 years.Footnote 274 The Court left no doubt that ‘it is scientifically established that the increase in concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere is primarily due to human activities’, whether as a result of emissions or the weakening of carbon reservoirs and sinks including forests.Footnote 275 Further, the consequences are severe and far-reaching, affecting natural ecosystems as well as human populations.Footnote 276 They include rising temperatures, melting ice sheets, sea-level rise and unprecedented flooding for coastal communities, as well as the heightened frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, such as hurricanes, drought and heatwaves.Footnote 277 Impacts include devastation of agriculture, displacement of populations, exacerbation of water shortages and the disruption of natural habitats pushing certain species toward extinction, leading to irreversible biodiversity loss.Footnote 278 Importantly, too, the Court drew on the key understanding that the best available science is clear that the ‘[r]isks and projected adverse impacts and related losses and damages from climate change escalate with every increment of global warming’, as the IPCC had found, again with very high confidence.Footnote 279

In addition, the Advisory Opinion embraces the precautionary principle with thoroughness and care, providing valuable guidance on how precaution informs both treaty law and customary international law. Both science and the precautionary principle directly infuse the Court’s analysis under the Paris Agreement, customary international law and other applicable treaties. For instance, when reading in the requirement for due diligence in States’ fulfilment of their Paris Agreement obligations on the setting of NDCs and pursuit of domestic mitigation measures, the Court recalled that the due diligence standard varies according to the circumstances, including the level of scientific knowledge, the risk of harm and the urgency involved.Footnote 280

The role of science is also thoroughly interwoven with the Court’s analysis of the customary international law duty to prevent harm to the environment. The ‘best available science’ standard applies here again when determining the risk of significant harm,Footnote 281 and the state of scientific and technological information is one of the elements going to the standard of due diligence attaching to the harm prevention duty.Footnote 282 The science on both the probability and the seriousness of possible harm informs the required due diligence standard.Footnote 283 The Court was unequivocal in the view that, where there is scientific uncertainty, the precautionary principle also applies: ‘States should also not refrain from or delay taking actions of prevention in the face of scientific uncertainty’.Footnote 284

Indeed, States need to pursue knowledge sharing and cooperation initiatives due to the status of climate change as a matter of common concern and its scientific complexity.Footnote 285 Importantly, they must also share information to help minimise the possibility that a measure taken for purposes of adaptation or mitigation might in itself pose a significant risk of transboundary harm.Footnote 286 The Court went on to say that States are expected to act with ‘prudence and caution’ in relation to technologies for preventing or mitigating harm that pose further risks.Footnote 287 The Court was warning here against isolated unilateral action. This could include solar radiation management activities as well as terrestrial or marine sequestration of carbon. Depending on the situation, information sharing will be required where this may affect other States.Footnote 288

5. Conclusion

The Court’s measured approach will have been apparent throughout this brief tour of the main subjects addressed in the Advisory Opinion. The Court achieved the remarkable—a landmark decision that steps boldly into new territory while at the same time consistently featuring judicial restraint. This in itself shows that the topic of climate change is a highly demanding one for international law and will continue to push its boundaries. In the Advisory Opinion, the Court has done much valuable and potentially influential work in an exercise that has largely involved ‘bringing out the meaning’ of the law applicable to human-induced climate change.Footnote 289

As Sir Franklin Berman has written, the Court’s judicial activity exerts a powerful influence on international law—an international law that, by its nature, is in a constant state of development.Footnote 290 The Advisory Opinion has clear implications. There can be no mistaking the legal requirements for States to do their utmost, individually and collectively, to address climate change.Footnote 291 UNFCCC COP negotiations and decisions, and the part played by individual States in them, will be judged by the concrete contributions they make. There are also implications for States in setting and implementing their NDCs under the Paris Agreement, for instance, considerably greater attention to fossil fuel production-permitting policies may be called for.Footnote 292 In general, States can expect greater scrutiny of their NDCsFootnote 293 and, as Judges Bhandari and Cleveland have observed, all three branches of government will need to be involved in coordinated action.Footnote 294 At the same time, the Court itself eloquently underlined that international law makes only a particular contribution to far broader social and economic processes.Footnote 295

In closing it is important, though, to note that there has been a concern that the Advisory Opinion gives insufficient attention to the situation of the most vulnerable States,Footnote 296 as well as climate displaced populations,Footnote 297 and these criticisms may hold validity. Further, while the Advisory Opinion requires ‘due regard’ for the interests of future generations, it could also have paid greater attention to the legal position of future generations. In these and other respects, the Court may have been mindful of the fragility of the law. Nevertheless, the Advisory Opinion does much justice to the Court’s role in the international legal order.

Acknowledgements

Thank you for their comments to Professor Christina Voigt, University of Oslo, Professor Harro van Asselt, University of Cambridge, and the reviewers and editors.

References

1 J Paine, The Functions of International Adjudication and International Environmental Litigation (CUP 2024) 12, citing I Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists (OUP 2012) 63.

2 UNGA Res 77/276 (29 March 2023) UN Doc A/RES/77/276.

3 ibid.

4 See, e.g. Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), ‘Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General at the Reception for the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change’ (28 July 2025) <https://forumsec.org/publications/remarks-pif-sg-reception-icj-advisory-opinion-climate-change>.

5 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.

6 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 33 UNTS 933.

7 H van Asselt, ‘The Private Life of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Climate Change’ (Völkerrechtsblog, 15 August 2025) <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-private-life-of-the-icj-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change/>.

8 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (Advisory Opinion) (General List No 187, 23 July 2025) para 252.

9 ibid para 282.

10 ibid para 403.

11 ibid para 428.

12 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 163. See also P Okowa and S O’Reilly, ‘Arguing for Systemic Integration of the UN Climate Regime at the International Court of Justice’ (SDG Knowledge Hub, 12 March 2025) <https://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/guest-articles/arguing-for-systemic-integration-of-the-un-climate-regime-at-the-icj/>.

13 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 165, citing International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Conclusions of the work of the ILC Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, UNYBILC, vol II, Part Two (2006) UN Doc A/61/10, conclusion 4.

14 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCCC).

15 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 37 ILM (1998).

16 Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016) 3156 UNTS 79.

17 ibid para 120.

18 ibid para 195.

19 ibid para 225; UNFCCC (n 14) art 2.

20 Paris Agreement (n 16) art 2(1)(a). See also art 4(1).

21 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 132–134.

22 ibid paras 241–242.

23 See C Voigt, ‘The Paris Agreement: What is the Standard of Conduct for Parties?’ (2016) 26 QIL: Zoom-In 17.

24 Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 22 May 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 79.

25 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa (adopted 14 October 1994, entered into force 26 December 1996) 1954 UNTS 3 (UNCCD).

26 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (adopted 22 March 1985, entered into force 22 September 1998) 1513 UNTS 293; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (adopted 16 September 1987, entered into force 1 January 1989) 1522 UNTS 3.

27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS).

28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3; United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217A(III).

29 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 338; e.g. see paras 342–344 UNCLOS (n 27) art 192; and paras 347, 349 on UNCLOS art 194(1). See also para 351 on the point that the Paris Agreement does not release States from their distinct obligations under UNCLOS and para 353 on art 206 UNCLOS. Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (Advisory Opinion) (ITLOS, Case No 31, 21 May 2024) (ITLOS Advisory Opinion).

30 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 317, 367.

31 ibid para 224, 270, citing COP to the UNFCCC, ‘Glasgow Climate Pact’ (13 November 2021) UN Doc 1/CMA.3, para 6 <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Overarching_decision_1-CMA-3_1.pdf>.

32 Paris Agreement (n 16) art 2(1)(a): ‘Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.’

33 ibid art 4(1): ‘In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.’

34 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 224.

35 ibid para 225, referring to Paris Agreement (n 16) art 2.1.

36 World Meteorological Organization, ‘State of the Global Climate 2024’ (19 March 2025) <https://wmo.int/publication-series/state-of-global-climate-2024>.

37 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 230 referring to para 85.

38 C Payne, ‘Unpacking the ICJ’s Recent Opinion on Climate Change’ (Environmental Law Institute, 25 July 2025) <https://www.eli.org/vibrant-environment-blog/unpacking-icjs-recent-opinion-climate-change>.

39 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 94, 427; ibid (Joint Declaration of Judges Bhandari and Cleveland) paras 2, 4. See Section 3 on State responsibility.

40 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) (Joint Declaration of Judges Bhandari and Cleveland) paras 1–10.

41 ibid (Joint Declaration of Judges Bhandari and Cleveland) para 7.

42 ibid (Joint Declaration of Judges Bhandari and Cleveland) para 8, citing International Energy Agency, ‘Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector (Summary for Policymakers)’ (2021) 21.

43 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) (Joint Declaration of Judges Bhandari and Cleveland) para 8.

44 ibid paras 255, 259, citing Paris Agreement (n 16) art 7(4). For discussion, see ibid (Declaration of Judge Tladi) paras 34–37. See also P Urs, ‘Open the Floodgates: Standing for the Enforcement of Obligations Erga Omnes in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Climate Change’ (National University of Singapore Centre for International Law, 11 August 2025) <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/blogs/open-the-floodgates-standing-for-the-enforcement-of-obligations-erga-omnes-in-the-icjs-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change/>.

45 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 440–442.

46 ibid.

47 ibid paras 439–443. See further ibid (Declaration of Judge Tladi) para 34ff. The Court does not consider the legal consequences that may follow from the breach of obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes. Cf ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde) para 8. This will include an entitlement for all States with a legal interest to take countermeasures to help bring about the performance of obligations. CJ Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (CUP 2005).

48 F Paddeu and M Jackson, ‘State Responsibility in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Climate Change’ (EJIL:Talk!, 25 July 2025) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/state-responsibility-in-the-icjs-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change/>.

49 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 235, under arts 4(2) and 4(9) of the Paris Agreement. Parties must also account for and register their NDCs in accordance with arts 4(12) and 4(13).

50 ibid paras 235–236.

51 ibid paras 228–229, 245–248.

52 ibid paras 246, 254.

53 ibid para 246.

54 ibid paras 237–249.

55 Paris Agreement (n 16) art 4(3): ‘Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.’

56 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 241.

57 ibid paras 242, 457(3)(A)(e) (emphasis added).

58 C Voigt, ‘The Power of the Paris Agreement in International Climate Litigation’ (2023) 32 RECIEL 237, 240.

59 See further B Mayer ‘The “Highest Possible Ambition” on Climate Change Mitigation as a Legal Standard’ (2024) 73 ICLQ 285.

60 B Mayer, ‘Progression Requirements Applicable to State Action on Climate Change Mitigation under Nationally Determined Contributions” (2023) 23 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 293, 298.

61 L Duvic-Paoli, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Ambition’ (2023) 36 LJIL 233, 240.

62 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 245–246.

63 ibid paras 243, 270; Paris Agreement (n 16) art 14(9).

64 ibid para 243, citing COP to the UNFCCC, Decision CMA.5, ‘Outcome of the First Global Stocktake’ (13 December 2023) UN Doc FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/16/Add.1, para 2.

65 ibid paras 245, 249, 457(3)(A)(f).

66 ibid para 248. See Section 2.5 on principles of international environmental law.

67 Paris Agreement (n 16) art 4(2), second sentence: ‘Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.’

68 L Rajamani, ‘The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations’ (2016) 28 JEnvtlL 337, 354.

69 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 251–254.

70 ibid paras 253, 457 (3)(A)(g).

71 ibid para 221.

72 CE Foster and B Belcher, ‘International Law’s Administrative Law Turn and the Paris Agreement’ (Verfassungsblog, 11 September 2025) <https://verfassungsblog.de/international-laws-administrative-law-turn-and-the-paris-agreement/>.

73 CE Foster, Global Regulatory Standards in Environmental and Health Disputes: Regulatory Coherence, Due Regard and Due Diligence (OUP 2021) 24–27.

74 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 315.

75 ibid paras 134, 273, 457(3)(B)(a), citing Trail Smelter (United States of America/Canada) (11 March 1941) (1965) III RIAA 1905, para 272; Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 22; Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 242, para 29; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Merits) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, 56, para 101; Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Merits) [2015] ICJ Rep 665, 790, para 104.

76 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 279.

77 ibid para 274.

78 ibid para 278.

79 ibid para 275.

80 ibid.

81 ibid para 276.

82 ibid para 277.

83 ibid.

84 ibid para 135, citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, 221, para 430.

85 ibid para 138.

86 ibid paras 138, 281, citing Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (n 75) and ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n 29) 89, para 235.

87 ibid para 283.

88 ibid para 284.

89 ibid paras 287–289.

90 ibid paras 290–292.

91 ibid paras 293–294. See also para 294, recalling Responsibilities and Obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) [2011] ITLOS Rep 10, 46 [131].

92 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 298.

93 ibid (Joint Declaration of Judges Bhandari and Cleveland) paras 11, 17.

94 ibid (Joint Declaration of Judges Bhandari and Cleveland) para 14.

95 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 298.

96 ibid para 299.

97 ibid.

98 ibid para 457(3)(B)(b).

99 ibid paras 301–312.

100 ibid paras 304, 457(3)(B)(b).

101 ibid para 304.

102 ibid para 305.

103 ibid.

104 ibid para 306.

105 ibid para 304.

106 ibid para 307. See also CE Foster and M Romero De Medeiros, ‘The Customary International Law Obligation to Co-operate to Protect the Climate System and the WTO’ in J Nakagawa (ed), International Economic Law in 2050: Toward Mainstreaming Sustainability (Springer, forthcoming).

107 ibid para 314. See also ibid (Declaration of Judge Nolte) para 8, reasoning that treaties can be an important means of fulfilling States’ customary international law obligations, including because they enable States to coordinate their action in relation to a problem where each State’s action may depend on what other States will do.

108 ibid para 315.

109 ibid.

110 CE Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and Tribunals: Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality (CUP 2011) 240–77.

111 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 314.

112 ibid paras 251–252.

113 ITLOS Advisory Opinion (n 29) paras 241, 243, 256, 258, 398–400, 441(3)(c)–(d), 441(4)(c).

114 Foster (n 73).

115 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 207, 208.

116 ibid paras 204, 228.

117 ibid para 386.

118 ibid para 403.

119 UNGA Res 77/276 (n 2).

120 ibid para 377, citing Teitiota v New Zealand Communication No 2728/2016 (24 October 2019) UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016; para 381, citing Daniel Billy v Australia (Torres Strait Islanders Petition) Communication No 3624/2019 (21 July 2022) UN Doc CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019.

121 ibid paras 382, 384.

122 ibid paras 382–383. See also ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Charlesworth).

123 See, e.g. H Keller ‘A Right to a Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment: Or Perhaps Not (Yet)?’ (Volkerrechtsblog, 5 August 2025) <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/a-right-to-a-clean-healthy-and-sustainable-environment/>; R Perera ‘The ICJ’s Recognition of an Autonomous Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment’ (EJIL:Talk!, 19 August 2025) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icjs-recognition-of-an-autonomous-right-to-a-clean-and-healthy-environment/>; C Heri, ‘Human Rights in the ICJ’s Climate Opinion’ (Verfassungsblog, 1 August 2025) <https://verfassungsblog.de/human-rights-in-the-icjs-climate-opinion/>.

124 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 393. Discussing the procedural and substantive content of the right, see also (Separate Opinion of Judge Charlesworth) para 9.

125 Advisory Opinion on Human Rights and the Environment (Advisory Opinion) IACtHR Ser A No 23 (2017); cf Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v Switzerland (2024) EHRR 304, para 448.

126 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 373, 389, 393.

127 ibid paras 375, 386.

128 ibid para 393 (second sentence).

129 ibid (third sentence).

130 ibid (fourth sentence).

131 ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Aurescu) paras 27–46.

132 ibid para 390.

133 ibid para 391, citing Human Rights Council, ‘Right to a healthy environment: good practices, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment’ 30 December 2019, UN doc. A/HRC/43/53, Annex II.

134 ibid para 392, citing UNGA Resolution 76/300 (28 July 2022) UN Doc A/RES/76/300 para 1.

135 Cf ibid (Declaration of Judge Tladi) para 32. It is important to note that, as Judge Tladi observes, a number of States, including the United Kingdom, the US, New Zealand, Norway, India and Belarus rejected the existence of a customary international law right at the time of the UNGA Resolution. Although Judge Tladi himself nonetheless finds there to be a right in customary international law, it is not clear the Court shares his view. See also ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari) para 3, finding the Court insufficiently clear but considering the customary international law to recognise the right.

136 e.g. ibid para 375.

137 ibid para 331.

138 ibid para 356, citing ‘2023 Summary for Policymakers’ in IPCC ‘Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’, 15, B.2.2.

139 ibid para 357.

140 ibid para 378, citing Teitiota v New Zealand (n 120) para 9.11.

141 See nn 25-27.

142 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 335, referring also to paras 309–315.

143 Including in the work of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services <https://www.ipbes.net/>.

144 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 325.

145 ibid para 328, citing COP to the CBD, Decision 15/4 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (19 December 2022) UN doc CBD/COP/DEC/15/4, Annex, target 8.

146 ibid para 327, citing the CBD (n 24).

147 ibid.

148 ibid para 329.

149 ibid para 334.

150 ibid para 331.

151 UNCCD (n 25) art 4(2)(d).

152 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 333.

153 ibid para 333, citing UNCCD (n 25) art 6.

154 ibid, citing UNCCD (n 25) art 8.

155 ibid paras 319–324.

156 ibid para 161.

157 ibid para 178.

158 ibid para 147, citing Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Merits) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 78, para 140.

159Our Common Future” World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) 43.

160 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 178, 179.

161 ibid paras 291, 457(3)(B)(a).

162 ibid paras 150, 292. See C Voigt and F Ferreira, ‘“Dynamic Differentiation”: The Principles of CBDR-RC, Progression and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 5 TEL 285.

163 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) (Separate Opinion of Judge Xue) paras 62–64.

164 ibid para 151.

165 ibid para 152.

166 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 158.

167 See Section 4.3.

168 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 159–160.

169 ibid para 160.

170 ibid para 178.

171 ibid paras 140–142.

172 ibid para 183.

173 ibid para 157.

174 Foster (n 73).

175 ibid 89–99.

176 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 157. See also S Murase, ‘Sixth Report on the Protection of the Atmosphere’ (11 February 2020) UN Doc A/CN.4/736, 39, guideline 6.

177 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 156 and Verbatim Record CR 2024/49 (11 December 2024) 23 (Mr Justin Sobion for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). See also E Benvenisti, ‘Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders’ (2013) 107 AJIL 295.

178 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 156, citing ‘2023 Summary for Policymakers’ (n 138) 24, C.1.3.

179 J Rauber, ‘Custom, Entrenchment, Interpretation: How the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Climate Change Contributes to the International Law’s Turn toward the Future’ (Völkerrechtsblog, 5 August 2025) <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/custom-entrenchment-interpretation/>.

180 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4; CE Foster, ‘Due Regard for Future Generations? The No-Harm Rule and Sovereignty in the Advisory Opinions on Climate Change’ (2024) 13 TEL 588.

181 Foster (n 180) 590, 600.

182 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) (Separate Opinion of Vice-President Sebutinde) para 7, taking into account UN Summit of the Future, ‘Declaration on Future Generations’ (September 2024) <https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sotf-pact_for_the_future_adopted.pdf> as well as the ‘Maastricht Principles on the Human Rights of Future Generations’ (3 February 2023) <https://www.rightsoffuturegenerations.org/>.

183 ibid para 373, citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 75).

184 ibid para 111.

185 Opinión Consultiva OC-32/25 sobre Emergencia Climática y Derechos Humanos (Advisory Opinion) (IACtHR, 29 May 2025) para 272; Heri (n 124).

186 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 419–420.

187 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 427.

188 ibid para 428.

189 ibid para 430, quoting Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (Reparations) [2022] ICJ Rep 13, 49–50, para 98. See also Declaration of Judge Nolte para 30 and his reasoning that the quantum of compensation for collective acts would need to be distributed among all responsible.

190 Paddeu and Jackson (n 36).

191 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 441.

192 ibid para 429.

193 ibid para 431.

194 Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) [1954] ICJ Rep 19.

195 Obligations in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 436, 457(4)(c).

196 ibid para 437. Also known as ‘impact attribution’: K Sulyok, ‘On the Science-Coloured Glasses of the International Court of Justice: Harmfulness, Wrongfulness, and Climate Accountability’ (Völkerrechtsblog, 6 August 2025) <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/on-the-science-coloured-glasses-of-the-icj/>.

197 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 429, 437. Also known as ‘source attribution’: Sulyok (n 196).

198 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 438.

199 ibid para 453, citing Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Compensation) [2012] ICJ Rep 324, para 35.

200 ibid para 454, citing Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 189) 52, para 106.

201 R Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Cases’ (July 2023) MPEPIL, discussing Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (n 189).

202 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 457(4).

203 ibid para 427.

204 Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee, ‘Report of the 13th Meeting of the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee, 1–4 April 2025’ (4 April 2025) UN Doc PAICC/2025/M13/3.

205 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 444.

206 ibid paras 445, 457(4); hailed in M Wewerinke-Singh and J Viñuales, ‘The Great Reset: The ICJ Reframes the Conduct Responsible for Climate Change Through the Prism of Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (EJIL:Talk!, 4 August 2025) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-great-reset-the-icj-reframes-the-conduct-responsible-for-climate-change-through-the-prism-of-internationally-wrongful-acts/>.

207 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 446.

208 ibid para 449.

209 ibid para 446.

210 ibid para 448.

211 ibid para 447.

212 ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari) para 5.

213 ibid para 455.

214 ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari) para 9.

215 ibid para 451.

216 ibid. See also (Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari) para 6.

217 ibid (Separate Opinion of Vice-President Sebutinde) para 12.

218 ibid (Separate opinion of Aurescu) para 24. See also the discussion on obligations erga omnes in Section 4.2 on sea-level rise and self-determination.

219 ibid para 453, citing Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Compensation) [2018] ICJ Rep 15, paras 41–43.

220 ibid para 453.

221 ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari) para 8.

222 E Stallard and G Rannard, ‘Top UN Court Says Countries Can Sue Each Other over Climate Change’ BBC (24 July 2025) <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce379k4v3pwo>.

223 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) (Declaration of Judge Nolte) para 14.

224 See Section 2.2; Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 457(3)(B)(b).

225 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 308.

226 ibid para 457(3)(A)(c), finding that the parties to the UNFCCC are obliged to cooperate to achieve its objective; para 457(3)(A)(h), holding that States parties to the Paris Agreement have obligations of adaptation and cooperation, including through technology and financial transfers.

227 ibid para 261.

228 ibid, citing Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (n 75).

229 ibid paras 214–216.

230 ibid para 261.

231 ibid para 299.

232 ibid para 327, citing CBD (n 14) art 5.

233 ibid para 333, citing UNCCD (n 25) art 4(2)(d).

234 ibid paras 350, 351, citing UNCLOS (n 27) arts 197, 202 101.

235 ibid paras 364, 365.

236 ibid para 218.

237 COP to UNFCCC, Decision 1/CMA.4 on ‘Funding Arrangements for Responding to Loss and Damage associated with the Adverse Effects of Climate Change, including a Focus on Addressing Loss and Damage’ (19 November 2022) <https://unfccc.int/documents/624434>.

238 COP to UNFCCC, Decision 1/CMA.6 on ‘New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance’ (24 November 2024) <https://unfccc.int/cop29/auvs>.

239 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 262ff.

240 ibid para 264.

241 ibid.

242 ibid para 265.

243 See A Green and M Wewerinke-Singh, ‘State Continuity, Self-Determination and Sea-Level Rise’ (2025) 74 ICLQ 555.

244 ibid para 356, citing ‘2023 Summary for Policymakers’ (n 138) 15, B.2.2.

245 ibid para 357. See Section 2.3.

246 ibid para 362.

247 ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Aurescu) para 13, citing the PIF, ‘Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Change-Related Sea-Level Rise’ (2021); ‘Apia Commonwealth Ocean Declaration’ (26 October 2024) para 13; ‘Dhaka Glasgow Declaration of the Climate Vulnerable Forum’ (2 November 2021) 5.

248 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 360, 361, citing PIF Declaration (n 247) para 1, as supported by the Declaration of the Seventh Meeting of the Organisations of African, Caribbean and Pacific States Ministers in Charge of Fisheries and Aquaculture (8 April 2022) 8; UNGA, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Seventy-Sixth Session’ (9 June 2025) UN Doc A/80/10, annex I, ‘Final Report of the Study Group on Sea Level Rise in relation to International Law’, paras 30–31.

249 ibid para 363. See also PIF, ‘Declaration on the Continuity of Statehood and the Protection of Persons in the Face of Climate Change-Related Sea-Level Rise’ (9 November 2023). See also ILC, ‘Final Report of the Study Group on Sea Level Rise’ (n 247) paras 35ff.

250 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) (Declaration of Judge Tomka) paras 11–12. Cf ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Aurescu) paras 20–22, calling for more attention to the presumption of continued Statehood and taking the view that affected States would continue to be members of the UN and other international organisations.

251 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 357.

252 Considering the Court’s approach to baselines overly cautious, and calling for greater attention to the matter of self-determination, see ibid (Separate Opinion of Vice-President Sebutinde) para 8. For discussion, D Comar, ‘The ICJ’s Historic Nod to Self-Determination and Climate Change Impacts’ (Völkerrechtsblog, 7 August 2025) <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-icjs-historic-nod-to-self-determination-and-climate-change-impacts/>.

253 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ UNYBILC vol II, part Two (2001) arts 40, 41(2); cf Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, paras 88, 155, 156, 159, 163(3)(D); Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) (General List No 186, 19 July 2024) paras 232–243, 255–257 particularly paras 240–241, 273–279, 280, 285(7)–(8).

254 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 (Advisory Opinion) [2019] ICJ Rep 95, paras 180, 182.

255 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 364.

256 ibid para 247.

257 ibid para 137.

258 ibid para 278.

259 ibid.

260 ibid para 363.

261 ibid para 402. Opinión Consultiva OC-32/25 sobre Emergencia Climática y Derechos Humanos (n 185) para 277. Cf Duarte Agostinho v Portugal and Others App No 39371/20 (ECtHR, 9 April 2024) para 167.

262 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) paras 97, 423.

263 European Society of International Law Interest Group on International Courts and Tribunals, ‘Taking Stock – A Roundtable Discussion on the Public Hearing in the ICJ Climate Change Advisory Proceedings’ (16 December 2024) <https://esil-sedi.eu/ig-on-international-courts-and-tribunals-taking-stock-a-roundtable-discussion-on-the-public-hearing-in-the-icj-climate-change-advisory-proceedings/>.

264 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) (Separate Opinion of Judge Nolte) para 23.

265 ibid paras 106, 108, 109, 406.

266 ibid para 423.

267 ibid paras 437–438.

268 ibid paras 445, 451–452.

269 ibid para 405. As highlighted in (Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf) paras 41–48. See also (Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari) para 2; (Declaration of Judge Nolte) paras 15–17.

270 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) (Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf) para 42.

271 See ILC, ‘Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities’, UNYBILC vol II, part two (2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/SER/A/2006/Add.1(Part 2).

272 Sulyok (n 196).

273 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 72ff.

274 ibid para 80.

275 ibid para 72.

276 ibid para 73.

277 ibid.

278 ibid.

279 ibid para 254, citing ‘2023 Summary for Policymakers’ (n 138) 14, B.2.

280 ibid paras 246, 254.

281 ibid para 278.

282 ibid paras 283–284.

283 ibid paras 283, 293.

284 ibid para 293, quoting UNGA, ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ (12 August 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26(Vol I) principle 15. Emphasising and clarifying the role of the precautionary principle, and relating this to environmental impact assessment obligations, see ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Charlesworth) paras 2–7.

285 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) para 285.

286 ibid.

287 ibid para 286.

288 ibid para 285.

289 M Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (CUP 1997) 68.

290 F Berman, ‘The International Court of Justice as an Agent of Legal Development?’ in CJ Tams and J Sloan (eds), The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice (OUP 2013) 7, 20.

291 C Voigt, ‘“Doing the Utmost”: Due Diligence as the Standard of Conduct in International Climate Law’ (Verfassungsblog, 3 September 2025) <https://verfassungsblog.de/doing-the-utmost/>.

292 Foster and Belcher (n 72).

293 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) (Declaration of Judge Tladi).

294 ibid (Joint Declaration of Bhandari and Cleveland) para 29.

295 ibid para 456. See also GI Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (OUP 2014) 292.

296 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (n 8) (Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf) paras 3–10.

297 ibid (Separate Opinion of Judge Aurescu) paras 25–26. M Rao, ‘Climate Displacement in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion: Recognised but Not Resolved’ (Voelkerrechtsblog, 11 August 2025) <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/climate-displacement-in-the-icjs-advisory-opinion/>.