This article contends that anthropogenic sea-level rise seriously undermines the exercise of self-determination by peoples living in Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Moreover, it argues that the effects of this would be severely exacerbated if the international community were to reject the possibility of statehood enduring notwithstanding total submergence, the complete loss of inhabitable land or the mass exodus of extant populations. In support of the claims made by several SIDS themselves, this article provides an analysis focused upon the relationship between the law of State continuity, on the one hand, and the peremptory norm of self-determination on the other. Ultimately, this analysis advances an understanding of State continuity and sea-level rise that favours existential resilience, making any future losses of statehood contingent upon voluntary dissolution by affected States.

A key issue in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is jurisdiction, with a distinction drawn between ‘direct’ jurisdictional rules, which are applied by the court of origin at the time of initial adjudication, and ‘indirect’ rules applied by a court at the recognition and enforcement stage. While some commentators and national laws suggest that no jurisdictional ‘gap’ should exist between direct and indirect rules, in this article it is contended that, outside the context of a federal system or international convention with uniform rules, no compelling justification exists for eliminating the gap.

Law enforcement authorities (LEAs) increasingly need to obtain digital evidence that is stored or controlled across borders. As a result, States increasingly exercise enforcement jurisdiction extraterritorially by imposing investigative measures on service providers that possess or control data outside the territory, without the State’s LEAs physically entering another State’s territory. This exercise of ‘investigative jurisdiction’ seemingly conflicts with the longstanding prohibition of the exercise of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction in international law. This article argues that given the development of State practice, longstanding jurisdictional principles should adapt to global technologies. Consistent with the principle of comity, this article conceptualises a limited form of investigative jurisdiction that respects sovereignty and minimises conflicts of law.

Courts in England ordinarily grant anti-suit injunctions when proceedings are (or will soon be) initiated in a foreign court in breach of clauses which subject disputes to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts, or refer them to arbitration, in England. Would they, however, grant such relief in support of foreign dispute-resolution clauses? In UniCredit Bank v RusChemAlliance, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom answered this question in the affirmative, thus expanding the English courts’ power to issue anti-suit injunctions. This article seeks to assess the likely extent of this expansion and the future implications it could have for the law on anti-suit injunctions in England. The article also examines the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the other significant issue in the case concerning the law governing arbitration agreements and their potential effect following the enactment of the Arbitration Act 2025.

Since Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his support for a plan to recruit fighters from abroad to join the Russian army in early 2022, foreigners have fought in Ukraine as part of Russian forces. Many of these fighters are mercenaries in the commonly understood sense of that term. That is, they are fighters who have gone, intentionally, to fight for Russia in return for significant payment. Although these fighters have often found themselves in Ukraine with little to no training and without their promised salaries, this article is not primarily concerned with them. Instead, it is interested in those fighters who arrived in Russia without knowing that they would be sent to the conflict, or who did not know that they were going to Russia at all. The article argues that such ‘forced fighters’ who are misled or tricked into taking part in an armed conflict should be given protection beyond that given to other combatants, specifically that they should be offered repatriation to their countries of origin. It argues that international humanitarian law is unable to effectively capture the position of these fighters or provide adequate protection to them. It suggests, rather, that the law on modern slavery can provide a way to understand and reconceptualise the position of these fighters—as victims of servitude and human trafficking—and that this body of law can deliver the remedy of repatriation to them.

In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled not only that Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territory systematically violated international law, but also that Israel’s ‘continued presence’ (i.e. occupation) as such had become illegal, so that Israel was required to withdraw from the Occupied Palestinian Territories as rapidly as possible. The ICJ’s finding that Israel engaged in a sustained abuse of its position as an occupying power, through annexation of territory and frustration of Palestinian self-determination, was central to its reasoning, as was its holding that the legality of the occupation was to be judged against the jus ad bellum. This article unpacks the concept of an illegal occupation. It argues that, as matter of the jus ad bellum, it is only the right to self-defence that could, in theory, justify Israel’s continued occupation. Curiously, however, the Opinion does not mention self-defence, although it preoccupied many of the judges writing separately. The article argues that two approaches to the occupation’s ad bellum illegality are most persuasive: first, that the occupation could not meet the necessity and proportionality criteria of lawful self-defence; and, second, that even a valid self-defence claim can be vitiated by a predominant ulterior purpose.