Figures
Figure 2.1Average levels of democracy and the number of PTAs per country across seven regions.
Figure 2.2Average GDP per capita and the design of PTAs across seven regions.
Figure 2.3Percentage of agreements including trade-related and non-trade issues by LA.
Figure 3.1Mean preferences for trade partners among Latin American citizens.
Figure 3.4Mean preferences for trade partners among Latin American legislators.
Figure 4.1Gender provisions in trade agreements: regional trends.
Figure 6.3Climate policies in Latin America by policy area, 2000–2021.
Figure 6.7Digital and environmental provisions in PTAs among Latin American countries.
Figure 6.8Digital and environmental provisions in PTAs between Latin American and non-Latin American countries.
Figure 6.9Environmental and ICT product categories across HS sections.
Figure 8.5Word cloud 2 – Concepts in the news regarding PTA.
Figure 8.10Importance of PTAs for the green economy by respondents’ location.
Figure 9.1Women’s and men’s participation in the Chilean labor force (ILO estimates). 1990–2021.
Figure 9.2Women’s participation in the workforce. Selected Latin American economies (ILO estimates). 1990/2021*
Figure 9.3Women’s participation in the services sector, as a share of total women’s employment. Chile. 1991–2019.
Figure 9.4Gaps in women’s and men’s labor participation (total and services). 1990–2021.
Figure 9.5Synthetic control method results. (a) Women’s labor participation, (b) women’s services sector participation. (c) men’s labor participation, (d) men’s services sector participation, (e) gender gap in labor participation and (f) gender gap services’ sector participation.
Figure 10.8Warning labelling in Colombian law under Decree 810.
Figure 10.10Warning labelling in Colombian law under Decree 2492.
Figure 11.1IIAs signed by South American countries 1990–2022.
Figure 12.1Latin America as a median case among the EEs in terms of protectionist measures.
Figure 12.2Latin America exports and imports (1960–2019) in US$ trillions.
Figure 12.3The GVC participation index (% share in total gross exports, in 2015).
Figure 12.4Mexico’s export of intermediate, consumer capital goods between 2000 and 2018 (in thousands of dollars).
Figure 12.5Share of Mexico’s total exports affected by protectionism measures vs RoW exports to Mexico affected by protectionism measures (average 2009–2019).
Figure 12.6Number of protectionist measures towards Mexico by close and not close trading partners.
Figure 12.7Number of protectionist measures implemented by Mexico towards close and not close trading partners
Figure 12.8Share of Mexico’s exports impacted by GVC ties vs no GVCs ties.
Figure 12.9Share of non-transparent protectionist interventions by Mexico towards close and not close trading partners (average 2009–2019).
Figure 12.10Brazil’s export of intermediate, consumer, and capital goods between 2000 and 2018 (in thousand US$).
Figure 12.11Share of Brazil’s total exports affected vs world exports to Brazil affected by protectionist measures (average 2009–2019)
Figure 12.12Brazil’s number of protectionist measures implemented towards close and not close trading partners.
Figure 12.13Number of protectionist measures towards Brazil by close and not close trading partners.
Figure 12.14Share of protectionist interventions that use non-transparent measures by Brazil (MERCOSUR) towards close and not close trading partners (average 2009–2019).
Figure 12.15Share of protectionist interventions that use non-transparent measures towards Brazil (MERCOSUR) by close and not close trading partners (average 2009–2019).
Figure 13.1Brazil-China trade indicators. (a) Brazilian exports to and imports from China. (b) Export similarity index.
Figure 13.2Chinese import (left) and export (right) shocks per worker by Brazilian microregions.
Figure 13.3Average marginal effect of one-unit increase in import shock and export shock on the probability of seeing China as a risk.
Figure 13.A.1Scatter plot of import and export trade shocks in Costa et al. (2016). Dotted lines represent the top quartile threshold.
Figure 13.A.2Predicted probabilities for ChinaRisk and ChinaOpp from logistic models for import trade shocks conditioned on an individual?s perception of China as a competitor.
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