The Kable doctrine is, and has always been, a difficult legal principle to define. For over a decade, and despite much academic attention, it had little consequence for state power. Until recently, the High Court deftly avoided its application by employing a number of techniques. As the politics of law and order in the states have increased, state Parliaments have felt emboldened by these cases to test the outer limits of their legislative power. In such an environment, federal anti-terrorism measures, introduced as extraordinary responses necessary for the exceptional nature of terrorism, have crept into general state policing and expanded. It is in this arena that the Kable doctrine has emerged once again. The principle is now vital to understanding the very real limits of state power, particularly in the law and order arena. This article traces the Court's approach to the principle in three recent cases involving the states' anti-organised crime measures (International Finance Trust Co v New South Wales Crime Commission, South Australia v Totani, and Wainohu v New South Wales) before offering some conclusions about where the current jurisprudence leaves the states and their perpetual campaign to achieve law and order.

‘State courts’ can be understood in at least two ways. Their ‘attributes’ are the characteristics that define them as ‘courts’. Their ‘attribution’ is the extent to which they are regarded as emanations of a ‘state’ in its constitutional conception as a constituent unit of the federation. The principle first articulated in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 ensures the institutional integrity of state courts by protecting from legislative impairment their defining characteristics as ‘courts’. It therefore understands state courts almost exclusively by their ‘attributes’. This article examines the significance to the Kable principle of also understanding state courts by their ‘attribution‘. There are different conceptions of the proper attribution of state courts, coincident with different visions of how to accommodate simultaneous constitutional commitments to autonomous states and integrated courts. Those conceptions influence the content and application of the Kable principle in ways that are insufficiently appreciated. This insight permits a new perspective on the Kable principle as a doctrine of federalism, and its recent applications in International Finance Trust Co Ltd v NSW Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319; Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1; and Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181. It also prompts an analysis of a contemporaneous evolution in the constitutional policy of the Commonwealth, whose Attorney-General typically intervened in Kable cases in support of the states, until recently seeking to extend to them certain Chapter III limitations.

Political controversies in New South Wales and Canada recently have focused public attention on the constitutional practice of proroguing parliament. They have also shone a light on two lingering areas of uncertainty that surround its operation under the Commonwealth Constitution. This article seeks to clarify these two muddy areas of the law concerning prorogation. The first is the effect of prorogation on the Senate and its committees. Since Federation, the Senate has purported to authorise its committees to continue to function notwithstanding a prorogation of the Parliament. However, it is argued that this practice is unsupported by the provisions of the Constitution and the Senate has no such power. Second, the article examines the operation of the conventions that constrain the Governor-General's power to prorogue. Prorogation generally is exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister. However, this article contends that where a Prime Minister seeks to prorogue Parliament to avoid a vote of no confidence, the Governor-General will have a discretion to reject the advice. It may also be open to the Governor-General to reject an advice to prorogue where the purpose is to avoid scrutiny of a fundamental constitutional illegality. In Australia, the uncertainties that surround prorogation, coupled with the now precarious political landscape in Canberra, create the very real possibility of a prorogation crisis at the Commonwealth level. This article provides a response to these uncertainties. In doing so it offers a solution to how a prorogation crisis can be resolved, whilst maintaining the fine balance of power in our constitutional system.

Under section 128 of the Australian Constitution federal parliamentarians have the power to initiate constitutional amendments. This paper examines the justifications of politicians and public figures for proposing a referendum to introduce an Australian republic. From interviews conducted between 2008 and 2011, three important justifications for proposing change emerged: promoting a new national identity; success in passing a referendum and in re-election; and timeliness. An examination of these justifications raised additional questions, including: what reasons did politicians and public figures think were significant? How did their justifications form and develop? What were the reasons that inspired political action? The reasons for initiation of a referendum for a republic, and recognition of indigenous people in the Australian Constitution are also compared. The paper adds to the literature on formal constitutional change, and also offers a critique of the field.

This article provides an analysis of people smuggling prosecutions in Australia from 2008 to 2011. Based on the available case law, the article develops a profile of ‘typical’ people smuggling offenders, examines sentencing trends, and analyses the role of smuggled migrants. The article concludes that current prosecutorial and sentencing practice have had no success in deterring people smuggling and develops a number of recommendations for law reform and policy change.