The UK's Trade Remedies Authority (TRA) conducts economic assessments of the ramifications of trade remedies, the Economic Interest Test (EIT). Such assessments are not mandated by the World Trade Organization but are conducted by certain trade remedy investigating authorities, including those of Brazil, Canada, the European Union, and New Zealand. The EIT is a mandatory part of the UK trade remedy system and is arguably more transparent than similar interest tests conducted by other trade remedy investigating authorities. However, stakeholder participation remains a challenge and the TRA is working on ways to improve participation. To date, the TRA has completed 11 EITs in its trade remedy cases, with a further ten live cases. These cases cover different products, markets, and countries, across which the likely positive and negative impacts of trade remedy differ. This paper invites experts to review the TRA's EIT methodology.

Rules of Origin (RoO) are critical components of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). They are designed to stop products coming into a PTA through the partner that applies the lowest tariff – a phenomenon known as trade deflection. While RoO are necessary, complex RoO may undo the benefits of trade agreements. Using a novel database of RoO, this paper evaluates the incidence and restrictiveness of different types of Product-Specific Rules of Origin (PSRs) across 128 reciprocal PTAs for the period 1990–2015. Results, based on a structural gravity model controlling for confounding factors, display wide heterogeneity across different categories of PSRs attached to preferential margins, with more flexible PSRs associated with a significantly stronger trade effect compared to more restrictive ones where exporters do not have a choice among PSRs or have to satisfy multiple PSRs. A simulation exercise reveals that a radical simplification reform leading to the adoption of flexible PSRs providing alternative choices to prove origin would have increased global trade under PTAs on average by between 2.7 and 4% during the sample period.

The degree to which firms make use of preferences in exporting to a partner country under a Free Trade Agreement will in good part depend on the restrictiveness of the underlying Rules of Origin (ROOs). Focusing on the post-Brexit Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed by the United Kingdom and the European Union, we examine how access to zero preferential tariffs has been impacted by ROOs. We do so by constructing a ROO restrictiveness index which varies across products. We find that the TCA has an overall moderate degree of ROO restrictiveness. Using product-country level trade data, we find that preference utilization under the TCA has risen over time, and exhibits a positive correlation at the product level with the EU Common External Tariff. Regressions on the determinants of preference utilization indicate that more restrictive ROOs are associated with a lower degree of preference utilization by UK firms in the EU market and this effect is more evident for consumption goods. Preference utilization is also driven by the size of the preferential margin, the size of the trade flows, and the extent to which exports are undertaken by producers as opposed to distributors, as well as the degree of firms’ engagement in value chains.

We analyse the ‘indirect effects’ of Brexit on African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries’ exports that use the UK as a platform to access the EU market and vice versa. First, we use the EORA26 multi-region input–output database for 186 countries and 26 sectors to characterize the ACP domestic content embedded in bilateral trade between the UK and the EU. Second, we apply the GTAP-VA module to carry out a simulation of how the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement will impinge on 121 countries and 65 products. The results suggest that while ‘indirect effects’ on ACP countries’ exports may exist, their economic magnitude is small in aggregate because ACP countries supply only small amounts of inputs used in UK–EU bilateral trade. Our simulations also show that these effects may be offset by the likely increase in ACP domestic content in exports because of TCA friction, mainly towards the UK.

While the theory of economic policy offers a potential framework for thinking about the joint pursuit of economic objectives (EOs) and non-economic objectives (NEOs), over time the theory of economic policy was formalized in a way that considers NEOs as constraints that are given, rather than as goals that may themselves be endogenous alongside EOs. We examine the analytical treatment of NEOs as co-determined with EOs, revisiting some of the ground broken by Alan Winters in his analysis of NEOs. We review the place of NEOs in the theory of economic policy, discuss current practice in the representation of such objectives as exogenous constraints, and develop an argument for representation of NEOs as objectives in themselves.

Using trade policy to achieve foreign policy objectives, such as stable international relations, has a long history, from Kant to the founders of the GATT. Punishing enemies and rewarding ‘friends’ by granting or withholding market access is also not new, and sanctions or blockades are a venerable form of trade policy used as foreign policy. A more recent form is influencing the domestic policy of another country with non-commercial provisions in trade agreements. All these tools are based on linkage, on the assumption that a desired outcome can be achieved by interventions that would increase or decrease trade. The latest instance is so-called ‘friend-shoring’, which would in principle isolate enemies, although it will be difficult in practice and risks undermining multilateralism. The cost of these interventions is susceptible to economic analysis, even if the conclusion is that it is worth paying. Influenced by Alan Winters who referred to national security as a motivation for agriculture protection as a ‘so-called non-economic objective’ or SNO, I argue that using a trade policy tool for a foreign policy purpose as if there is no cost is a SNO job, an attempt to justify an intervention aimed at one objective by framing it as being valuable for another.

This article examines a significant question in navigating trade and climate tension: how to recognize another country as having equivalent climate regulations. Such equivalence forms a core component of many proposed models of so-called climate clubs. Establishing equivalence between distinct national climate regulation regimes poses a unique challenge that draws upon both trade and environmental international cooperation. Drawing on existing proposals, I examine prospects for country-based cooperation through three models: ETS-linking, benchmarking of shared methods and minimum standards, and benchmarking of outcome duties. The analysis concludes that all models necessitate some trade-offs between the goals of rigorous oversight of climate objectives, inclusivity, and WTO compliance. Benchmarking of shared methods and minimum standards seems most feasible, and would provide a deeper level of integration between trade and climate cooperation, but necessitates a shift in how countries, particularly the EU, oversee regulatory compliance.

Negotiations on ‘deeper’ trade agreements and estimates of tariff equivalents have increased the awareness that regulatory trade costs are (too) high. This paper discusses ways to effectively lower such costs, reviewing the potential role of trade agreements and international regulatory cooperation, and the approaches that have been taken in different world regions. Attention is also paid to cost reduction via global technical standardization. Key issues are how to reduce the prevalence of national standards setting and how to best promote international standards. In both dimensions, Europe is argued to play a frontrunner role.