Rulemaking in digital trade is proceeding apace. Many preferential trade agreements contain dedicated e-commerce or digital trade chapters and some states have entered into stand-alone digital economy agreements. This article seeks to establish whether, and to what extent, normative change is occurring in digital trade agreements, the nature of any changes, and identify which states are acting as norm entrepreneurs. We employ a new method of legal coding, systematically comparing the nature and prescriptiveness of digital provisions in 12 trade agreements concluded between 2019 and 2023. We find evidence of substantial policy innovation, and identify Singapore as the key norm entrepreneur. A new wave of ‘Singapore-led’ agreements substantially expands the scope of digital trade, to cover areas such as digital identities, e-invoicing and e-payments, the governance of AI, and regulation of new digital technologies. Commitments are typically couched as soft rather than hard law, reflecting the nascent stages of rulemaking. Norm entrepreneurship on the part of Singapore and its allies reflects a desire to position themselves as ‘digital hubs’ in the global economy, spur rulemaking in areas where innovation is ahead of regulation, and promote digital interconnectivity at time of regulatory divergence and geopolitical rivalry.

This article examines shifts towards onshoring pharmaceutical manufacturing, a response to the vulnerabilities exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic in global supply chains. It delves into how globalization, public policy, and geopolitical tensions have shaped pharmaceutical markets, compelling nations to seek solutions that ensure reliable medicine access and reduce dependency on foreign supplies. The study highlights disparities in regulatory oversight and geographic concentration of production, which contribute to frequent shortages, particularly of generic medicines. The pandemic intensified these issues, prompting increased state interventions and heightening concerns over geopolitical risks. As a result, onshoring efforts, often encapsulated in local content measures, have expanded, and are now driven by both economic motives and imperatives of national security and public health.

The US–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) introduced a new compliance institution for labor rights in trade agreements: the facility-specific Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (RRM). The RRM was developed to tackle one particular thorn in the side of North American integration – labor rights for Mexican workers – as it had had detrimental, long-term political–economic consequences for the US–Mexico trade relationship. This article reviews the unique political–economic moment in the United States and Mexico that prompted the creation of this tool. It describes how the RRM works and the considerable financial and human resources the US and Mexican governments deployed to operationalize it. The article then reports a number of stylized facts on how governments used the RRM during its first three years, largely in the auto sector. It proposes paths of potentially fruitful political–economic research to aid understanding of the full implications of the RRM and concludes with preliminary lessons as well as a discussion on the potential for policymakers to assess facility-specific mechanisms for labor or other issues, such as the environment, in future economic agreements.

The inception of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) constitutes a major advancement in Africa's economic integration process. Diverging from what appears to be the norm in contemporary trade treaties, the agreement adopts a conditional Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause hinged on the principle of reciprocity. Without the promise to reciprocate preferential treatment, the beneficiary state does not assume the right to demand MFN treatment. In broader discussions, this feature has been criticized for possessing the tendency to restrict trade. However, examining it in the context of Africa's trade paradigm, this paper argues that the non-automaticity of the AfCFTA's MFN clause is a cardinal feature safeguarding its existence.

Flanking policies – policies that aim to address potential negative effects of trade liberalization, and/or the concerns of domestic stakeholders regarding those negative effects, and that are either legally or factually linked to trade liberalization – have been a critical component of international trade policy since at least 1962. Over the years, however, flanking policies have changed. This Article argues that there is a heretofore unnoticed distinction between what I term first-generation flanking policies and second-generation flanking policies. Specifically, first-generation flanking policies target negative economic effects, or costs, of trade liberalization experienced within the enacting country. Trade adjustment assistance is the paradigmatic example. By contrast, second-generation flanking policies target non-economic costs that arise outside of the enacting country. Examples include the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, Deforestation-free Products Regulation, and the United States' Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. Because second-generation flanking policies directly target foreign activity, they often employ more trade-distorting policies – tariffs, imports bans, and associated administrative hurdles for imports – than first-generation flanking policies, which more often relied on domestic subsidies. Moreover, they reflect a significant reorientation of the limits of state authority in international trade law. Whereas authority to tax and regulate production in international economic law has historically been based primarily on a territorial link to productive activity, second-generation flanking policies target production but rely on a territorial nexus with consumption of goods and services.

A ‘smart city’ is a buzz term and concept. The ‘smart city’ has mainly been discussed in the scholarly literature on urban planning, architecture, and geography. While the ‘smart city’ has been under-analyzed in international trade law, the term ‘smart city’ is commonly used in Asian trade policies. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established the ‘ASEAN Smart Cities Network’ and the ‘smart city’ is now an important market opportunity for exporting smart technologies and services to ASEAN. Against this backdrop, this article addresses how smart cities can be regulated and governed by international trade law. The trade law perspective facilitates a broader understanding of smart city governance, which includes under-explored ‘global’ regulatory dimensions concerning the interaction between local governments and foreign firms. This article selects three relevant trade areas for discussions: (1) Internet of Things in the context of trade in goods and services; (2) international standard-setting activities; and (3) data governance. It further considers what kinds of regulatory issues international smart city projects can add to the current digital trade discourse. Drawing on the smart city literature, the article points out additional problems concerning security and privacy that have not yet been acknowledged in digital trade.

China has initiated three antidumping (AD) investigations against US feed products since 2010, despite clear mutual benefits from such exports from the US to China. This article provides a close examination of these investigations, what prompted them, how they were resolved, and the costs they imposed on importers and exporters. The article also describes the political economy around these investigations and how China's antidumping laws provide it with flexibility to manage these investigations. The article concludes that this flexibility makes China well-positioned to continue using AD investigations against some trade partners in the future, particularly if AD use continues to rise globally.

The global trading system has reached an inflection point. The future of the liberalized, rules-based global world order is in doubt as countries that have for decades preached and practiced policies, which can loosely be defined as embodying the ‘Washington Consensus’, have started to backtrack. Free and fair trade is no longer the mantra as governments embrace industrial policy, protectionism, national security, risk management, and managed trade. Perhaps the most surprising adherent of the reversal is the US, whose embrace of what has been termed a ‘modern American industrial strategy’ runs counter to traditional American views and norms. While David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage still holds true, it has certainly fallen out of fashion. Where it leads remains unknown – caveat emptor. This article analyses President Joe Biden's industrial policy and its implications as well as shifts that have occurred as a result of the pandemic, geopolitical competition, and other recent global events.

This article examines the rationales for addressing sustainability and social inclusion in trade policy and the tradeoffs among imperfect institutional choices in doing so through ‘flanking policies’. It examines three types of negative spillovers or externalities implicated by trade: material, moral, and social/political. Section 1 defines terms and sets forth the argument. Section 2 typologizes the three categories of negative externalities and then highlights the challenges posed for flanking measures given the reciprocal nature of externalities. It respectively addresses environmental harms and labor and social inclusion concerns. Section 3 assesses different institutional alternatives for addressing negative externalities, dividing them between domestic measures targeted at protecting domestic concerns and international ones, such as package treaties. Section 4 shows how the concept of a flanking measure can be flipped, so that environmental sustainability and social inclusion become the core and trade measures become the flanking policies. Section 5 concludes.

The post-World War II liberal international order coupled trade liberalization with a range of flanking measures, both outward-looking and inward-looking. This system, coupling domestic-level compensation with international-level flexibility, no longer functions as effectively as it once did. To consider how a renewed set of flanking policies might address, or even prevent, a backlash against trade liberalization, we explore why the earlier system (embedded liberalism plus temporarily tolerated relief) did not always function effectively. We note the challenges associated with generous domestic compensation schemes, especially in the face of capital mobility and fiscal pressures. We discuss the interstate tensions generated by the use of temporary relief measures, such as escape clauses and safeguards, and we also discuss how the expansion in membership of the multilateral trade system (and particularly the inclusion of countries with a greater array of economic institutions and factor endowments) exacerbates these challenges. Finally, we consider how the domestic politics of flanking policies could differ from those used in an earlier era.

Bryan Mercurio's brief accurately describes the inflection point of the global trading system as world governments retreat from free and fair trade. Chief among them is the United States, whose recent reversal is sending shockwaves throughout the rules-based economic world order. The United States' conflation of trade policy vis-à-vis China and national security, as well as the use of trade policy to garner political support from voters disenfranchised by the global trading system, have given way to industrial subsidies and protectionist tendencies. This article aims to build upon Mercurio's points and identify the underlying causes and long-term consequences of the current US direction. In addition, this piece differs from Dr Mercurio's assertions on three critical aspects of today's trade landscape. Firstly, industrial policy and economic security measures were first undertaken by China, and the United States and allied nations only followed suit. Secondly, the current US economic policy regarding China is severely constrained by today's political landscape, and the Biden administration's approach is moderate given these confines. Lastly, despite challenges, low-income countries can gain from the diversification movement as production shifts away from China.

This paper develops the concept of transience of (in)formality to refer to the intersection of formal and informal negotiating procedures in the WTO decision-making system. It argues that both formal and informal negotiating processes are essential for delivering negotiating outcomes in the WTO. Particularly, the article assesses how informal negotiating practices emerge within the WTO formal framework and align with it. The analysis highlights how negotiating practices (re)shape existing norms, both formal and informal, adapting the WTO to overcome challenges and meet current needs. It also disputes legal formalistic perspectives that permeate trade literature and offer limited accounts of Members' agency in the WTO. The paper uses the Joint Initiatives as a case study to illustrate the convergence between formality and informality and a possible way ahead for the WTO negotiations. By broadening the understanding of law-making, it contributes to the discussion on WTO reform. It provides alternatives that reflect the reality of WTO negotiations and underlines the institution's relevance.

The EU has introduced a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which extends its carbon prices to imported products in some sectors. Increasingly considered by other countries, such border carbon adjustments (BCAs) are facing a global backlash against the lack of consideration of the adverse impacts on developing countries and particularly, least developed countries (LDCs). This article first argues that small overall import volumes support the conclusion that exempting or lessening BCA requirements from LDCs would not undermine developed countries' climate-related objectives in practical terms. An economic analysis of EU and UK trade in relation to a CBAM supports this assertion. However, legally, such an exemption or development-based preferential treatment is difficult under existing multilateral trade rules and jurisprudence, owing to the legal characterization and objectives of BCAs; their interaction with existing special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions; and complexity of available policy options. We thus highlight the gap between normative aims of SDT provisions to support development, and current WTO law and jurisprudence which expose WTO members providing preferential treatment to allegations of discrimination. With increasing unilateral climate action, an inability to integrate SDT more meaningfully into WTO non-discrimination frameworks risks further weakening of international cooperation on climate and trade.

The TPP Agreement – now CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement) – is, by any measure, a central part of the emerging global trade policy framework. To the author's surprise, it survived the decision of the United States to withdraw after USTR Mike Froman had signed the Agreement in Auckland 2015 on behalf of the US. Today, it incorporates 12 economies including leading G20 economies such as Japan, Mexico, Canada, Australia, and the UK, its most recent entrant. Six other economies, including most importantly, China, the world's second largest economy, are now applying for membership. What began between Singapore and New Zealand – a conscious strategic decision on their part to try to incentivize precisely this process of Asia-Pacific regional integration in 1999 – is now clearly a major part of the global geopolitical chessboard.