The European Union provided a mixed response to the 2008 financial crisis. On the one hand, it refused to pursue fiscal integration through a common budget; on the other, it introduced significant transfers between countries that were designed to produce financial stabilization. The authors analyze this response as the outcome of democratic constraints on EU leaders. Given the EU’s current institutional structure, citizens’ preferences pose a binding constraint on what leaders can do as these preferences limit the scope of risk-pooling among members and the degree of political tolerance for different courses of action. The authors show that citizens’ preferences reflect differences in the geography of income, production regimes, and institutional organization. The heterogeneity of constituencies’ redistribution preferences combined with a diverse economic geography helps to explain why political constraints on national governments prevent them from engaging in further fiscal integration. By contrast, externalities among member states shift the preferences of citizens who may experience negative effects and make international redistribution politically feasible. The authors analyze these two mechanisms and present novel empirical results on the determinants of preferences for fiscal integration and international redistribution in the aftermath of the eurocrisis.

Arecent commentator has suggested that the value to political science of looking at new states is that “one is forced to deal with the most basic questions of politics—the entire set of questions involved in the creation and maintenance of political societies.” Certainly this appears to be true time and again. One is forced to look at the largest questions to the smallest, both because they are vivid and apparent, and because they are also urgent. The basic problem of obligation—why we do things we do not want to do, and allow unpleasant things to be done to us by political leaders, or why we accept the authority of power—is for us either a matter of analysis or of sociological inquiry. Clearly it is more than that in a new state. There the question is a living one, sometimes for a large minority, sometimes for many small sections or groups. The state and the nation are not, as yet, one. Rousseau or Hobbes have come to life.

What is the nature of religion and state relations in authoritarian regimes? How do religious and regime actors negotiate the terms of their relationship;what do the two sides want from one another; and how cooperative or conflictual are their interactions? To address these questions, the author compares religion-regime relations in contemporary Russia and China—two autocracies with long histories of religious repression, diverse religious profiles, and distinct relations between religion and the state. The article introduces a new theoretical framework anchored in interests and subnational authoritarian politics to explain how religious and political authorities negotiate their relationship and the constraints and opportunities that shape their interaction. Although there are many reasons to expect different types of religion-regime relations across Russia and China, the data demonstrate that subnational governments and diverse religious actors often forge innovative partnerships to govern more efficiently, gain access to resources, and safeguard their survival.

This article proposes that there be discussed with the Russians the establishment (for each of us, separately, and perhaps for other countries) of a Special Surveillance Force. Its function would be to observe the enemy's behavior, at the enemy's invitation, and to report home instantly through authentic channels. The purpose is to help tranquilize crises that threaten to erupt into general war, particularly crises aggravated by the instability of strategic deterrence—by the urgency, if general war seems imminent, of starting it before the enemy does.

Virtually all of the existing literature on modernization is concerned with the virtues of modernity. It focuses on the gains to be derived from modernization—industrialization, material progress, social welfare, political rationality, etc. But experience suggests that gains are usually achieved at some cost: the drive toward modernity seems invariably to produce new social and personal problems. In the USSR—perhaps the world's most developed underdeveloped country—the modernization process has been accompanied by massive social costs.

Frequently debated, infrequently resolved, but crucial to the study of international relations is the issue of the relative influence of personal factors and role factors in decision-making. Are national decision-makers so constrained by their roles that they have little individual freedom? Or, conversely, are their policies shaped in major ways by their own individual preferences

This paper develops a model of rational behavior that is found to be compatible with the evolution of China-U.S. relations from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. The authors introduce countervailing strategies that broaden our understanding of what is rational in a game-theoretic context. Countervailing behavior accommodates inertia and delay, as well as reactivity, and is shown to be involved in every equilibrium strategy. The terms of the interaction between the United States and China are identified in light of a countervailing model, and the payoff structure that supports the observed dynamic interaction is inferred. Prior to 1979, which marks the inception of Chinas open-door policy, the payoff structure found conforms to a little-known mixed-motive game, whereas the 1980s are characterized by a Prisoner's Dilemma. In the 1980s rational play involves positive reactivity on the part of each country, while prior to 1979 rational behavior on the part of the U.S. takes the form of an inverse response to Chinese initiatives, a behavior that draws its rationality from its ability to move China to a more cooperative stance despite a Deadlock-type payoff structure.

The Club of Rome was formed to publicize the contemporary human predicament—an unprecedented social pathology which, according to founder Aurelio Peccei, “is aggravated by the interrelatedness … of everything in the human system.” The Club has commissioned and accepted nine reports, the first and most famous of which is Limits to Growth (1972). This report's “Malthusian” viewpoint and popular format identified the Club with a controversial issue evidently unacceptable to many of its members, not to mention most economists and technologists. Subsequent reports, with one exception, have progressively retreated from that initial position by denying the predicament's resistance to serial solution. Instead, reports have taken refuge in conventional liberal nostrums and blindly asserted technological optimism. The debate on the future of industrial civilization brought to the fore by Limits deserves a better fate.

The term “political modernization” is of late encountered with increasing frequency in the literature of political science. Its antecedents are somewhat diffuse. In the most general sense, it seems to represent a specialized adaptation of scholars' long-standing concern with the question of whether the process of social change is determinate or variable, random or patterned, continuous or episodic, cyclic or evolutionary. Within this tradition “political modernization” is a concept opposed in tendency to the relativistic character of much modern scholarship in the field of politics. It would seem to be oriented more in the direction of a patterned and evolutionary—although not necessarily determinate or value-laden—interpretation of social change.

Foreign investment policy is an increasingly important part of overall foreign policy. The authors investigate the substance of U.S. outgoing foreign direct investment (OFDI) and incoming foreign direct investment (IFDI) policy in terms of a small set of policy values and process factors. The policy values are domestic prosperity, national autonomy, and national security. The process factors are ideological consonance, impact transparency, the diffusion and concentration of perceived costs and benefits, and the political capacity of groups and institutions. These considerations illuminate the relative stability in both areas of policy since World War II, and help to explain the changes that did take place. The paper concludes with a forecast that, despite the oft-heard prediction that economic nationalism is on the increase, U.S. policies toward foreign investment will remain much the same during the eighties as they have been Since World War II.

The study of international relations has been dominated by scholars working in the United States and has concentrated on questions that have been important to the U.S. as it emerged as the leading international power after 1945. These tendencies have limited the questions asked, the concepts generated, and the perspectives relevant to theory building. These limits can only be overcome by integrating the work of specialists from other countries. To this end, recent contributions by a number of French scholars are examined through a review of four publications. They provide a deeper sense of the options open to lesser states than is usually found in American contributions, a greater acceptance of flux and change in the international system, with less weight given to external influences on foreign policy formation and more to domestic politics and to personal relations among political leaders.

Based on documentation and in-depth interviews with 14 emigrants from China; this study traces changing perceptions of China's social structure by different urban social groups. Each group adopted a perspective that best served its own interests. In the fifties and sixties these images did not necessarily coincide with—but nonetheless were within—the bounds of the image propagated by the Chinese authorities. During and since the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, a new perception of society has been formulated particularly by people from the former middle classes: the issue centers on whether a new bureaucratic class has emerged in China. The article closes with a discussion of the authorities' recent attempts to redefine popular images of the social structure in response to a changed social reality and China's eagerness to modernize.

Soviet policies with regard to neutrality in postwar Western Europe have developed from largely unsuccessful influence attempts into more realistic and acquiescent lines seeking to find a balance between operative aims and actual leverage. There has been a change from ideologically motivated opposition toward conditional support and flexible search for areas of common interests, and from basically unrealistic grand designs to recognition of the status quo. The Soviet posture toward potentially neutral blocs and disparate neutralist trends in Western Europe has primarily been characterized by a wait-and-see attitude. In order to make Soviet policies and postures understandable, it is necessary to combine the concept of the U.S.S.R. as a rational bloc leader interested above all in weakening the opposite bloc with that of a world power interested mainly in international stability and prevention of war. The popular Western hypothesis that the Soviet union is acting on a design that would incrementally neutralize the whole of Western Europe is difficult to test; even if there were such a design in reserve or in the experimental stage, its degree of crystallization and internal integration would have to be low.

I don't know how many economists, teaching business fluctuations or the corn-hog cycle, have devoted an hour to the household thermostat; I know several. Cybernetics, I am told, drew attention to similarities between vacuum tubes and animal nerve cells, and made predictions about the human nervous system that were verified by surgery. An article on feedback related artillery fire-control and automatic oil-pipeline systems to the ecological complementarity of the lynx and the rabbit. Economists compare the closeness of election campaigns to the market forces that make two brands of cider taste much alike. Analysts of rumor, best sellers, and epidemic diseases have been led independently to the equation for the logistic curve; and the collapse of Batista has been compared to the collapse of a stock market. Individuals with conflicting internal values have been likened to a two-person committee with a complicated voting system; and recently the paradigm of the “prisoners' dilemma” has been used to characterize preemptive attack, cheating on a test ban, and Rousseau's illustration (five men cooperating in a stag hunt when one spies a hare) of the value of enforceable contract.

Whether political participation is positively related to economic equality is still a paradox. This paper explores the relations among political participation, economic equality, and economic development in Japan after World War II. There was little income bias in political participation in Japan during its period of rapid growth, partly because farmers who benefited inadequately from economic development participated more in politics. This rural bias in participation allowed significant redistribution of income from the urban to rural sector through the budgeting system, thus preventing the natural tendency of widening income inequality at the early stage of development. However, high rural participation did not undermine the rate of growth because it was supportive participation. Farmers overwhelmingly supported the incumbent Liberal Democratic Party, support that enhanced government's continuity and in turn nurtured growth.

Conventional alliance theory asserts that calculation, not sentiment, determines original combinations; thereafter, ideology, cultural ties, and common historical traditions may buttress the connection achieved. Moreover, interest governs the breakdown of alliances; cultural affinities can only be retarding factors. Since the national “parts” are postulated as greater than the alliance “whole,” the logic of egocentric interests had led some to predict nuclear fragmentation within contemporary alliance systems.

The post-World War II world has seen the transformation of the international system from a configuration with several rival great powers into one with two superpowers and a set of lesser but still substantial powers—second-tier states with democratic politics and mixed economies. One of the recurrent concerns of the latter has been to secure supplies of natural resources. We argue that postwar conditions point to eight elements of prudent resource policy for middle-level powers. Such states should: (i) avoid military means; (2) choose trade partners whose political interests overlap with their own and who enjoy political stability; (3) seek to create in supplier and transit countries a structure of economic interests that will make supply agreements self-enforcing; (4) diversify with respect to commodity dependence, supplier share, and transit bottlenecks; (5) tailor stockpiles to the urgency of demand; (6) exploit technology to reduce dependence and enhance bargaining advantages; (7) encourage the private sector and public enterprises to become intermediaries in the international resource trade; and (8) pursue strategic interdependence among consumer nations by creating multilateral stakes in the maintenance of normal commerce in resources.

What explains combat motivation in warfare? Scholars argue that monitoring, material rewards, and punishment alone are insufficient explanations. Further, competing ideological accounts of motivation are also problematic because ideas are difficult to operationalize and measure. To solve this puzzle, the authors combine extensive information from World War II about German soldiers’ combat performance with data about conditionally exogenous potential exposure to Nazi radio propaganda. They find evidence that soldiers with higher potential exposure to propaganda were more likely to be decorated for valor even after controlling for individual socioeconomic factors, home district characteristics like urbanization, and proxies for combat exposure.

This article reviews three recent books critical of America's new “imperial” foreign policy, examines whether the United States can properly be compared to empires of the past, and identifies three aspects of contemporary American policy that may well be called imperialist. It also addresses some of the main objections to recent U.S. foreign policy made by American realist scholars and argues that traditional interstate realism can no longer readily apply to the problem ofAmerican unipolar preponderance over an anarchical, nuclear-armed world.

Despite a vast literature on nationalism, theoretical investigations on the subject are rare. Historians generally are not interested in theory, although they use typologies. The most thoroughgoing typology has been produced by the sociologist Anthony D. Smith, who has constructed a matrix with 55 locations that allows categorization of both ancient and modern types of nationalism. Smith divides nationalist ideology into a core doctrine and its accretions, but he may underestimate the importance of language. Kedourie has produced a theory of the intellectual development of nationalism, but only Gellner has a theory of modernity in which nationalism plays a key role. Interest in ethnicity has given a new direction to studies of nationalism by stressing the function of group allegiance in achieving political ends. Finally, despite the sharpness of Smith's definitional insights, his theory itself is too narrow to establish the link he seeks between modernization and nationalism.