The current version of the Squire state court of last resort professionalization index is regularly used in studies of state courts. We have updated the index for 2019, producing a second and more recent index. Given the relative stability between this index and its predecessor, it is unlikely that many findings will change. During the 15 years that lapsed between the first index and the more recent one, little changed in most states, while reforms in a few places substantially shifted the relative standing of their court of last resort. It seems unlikely that the nation will experience any sweeping reform movements impacting state courts of last resort across the board. The more likely scenario is the sort of idiosyncratic changes impacting a few courts that were witnessed over the last decade and a half. Thus, looking to the future, it may be prudent to update the index every 5–10 years to capture any notable alterations.

Many studies of policy diffusion focus on what factors affect a policy’s adoption. Few studies specifically test the mechanism and two of the most common explanations – learning and emulation – have not been tested outside of legislatures. While judicial scholars have applied policy diffusion to several types of laws, we know little about the motivation behind why policies spread from court to court. One unexplored area is the relationship between courts. This short article analyzes the two mechanisms most likely to affect peer institutions: learning and emulation. Using network analysis methods on an original dataset of state supreme court citations from 1960 to 2010, I provide evidence that courts are learning from and not emulating each other, but the mechanism is policy-specific.

Scholars of comparative constitution-making and direct democracy agree that economic conditions affect public support for constitutional reform but disagree as to how. Prospect theory suggests both approaches may be correct, depending on the political and economic context in which voters operate. Fourteen states periodically ask their citizens whether to call a state constitutional convention, making this the oldest form of direct democracy in the United States. We test our theory in preelection polls in two of these states and a survey experiment. According to the results, negative perceptions of economic and government performance increase support for conventions when voters view them as opportunities to correct problems. On the other hand, if a convention represents a chance to improve on an acceptable status quo, voters with positive performance evaluations become more supportive. Our findings contribute to the heuristics literature and inform normative debates over direct democracy and popular constitutionalism.

Recently, scholars of the lawmaking process have urged their colleagues to devote more attention to the potential impact of bill content on legislative outcomes. Heeding their call, this paper builds an original dataset of over 5,000 pieces of state-level legislation addressing issues that span the ideological spectrum. It compares proposals that challenge the authority of the national government in a specific domain to proposals that lack federalism-related implications and finds that the former, all else being equal, make less legislative progress toward enactment. In addition, it categorizes the measures that resist national laws based on the specific nature of the challenge they pose. Its analysis finds that measures that are inconsistent with existing national law but work within the law’s legal framework make more legislative progress than measures that seek to nullify the national law or that vow not to cooperate with it. It also confirms that sponsor characteristics such as majority status, the number of cosponsors, institutional rules such as hearing requirements, and state-level factors like party control of the state legislature affect how much progress proposals make toward enactment. Thus, the paper demonstrates the importance of legislative content as an explanatory factor and sheds light on the nature of intergovernmental relations in the contemporary United States.

We examine whether the geographic distribution of a political party's electoral support affects the divisiveness of statewide primaries. In spite of V.O. Key, Jr.'s (1956) original insight that geography might be a relevant predictor of contested statewide primaries, this hypothesis has received little attention from political scientists. We test Key's hypothesis using data on gubernatorial and U.S. Senate elections to identify the effects of electoral geography on the structure of competition in primary elections. We contend that dispersed bases of electoral support greatly increase the costs associated with maintaining party cohesion. Our findings support the theory that a geographically dispersed electorate heightens the potential for intraparty factionalism. These results are robust across several measures of the dependent variable.

Policy representation requires legislators to advance the interests of their constituents. As a consequence, much research on representation examines the congruence between constituents' preferences and legislators' behaviors. This article argues it is more realistic to think of policy representation as listening—a process—than congruence—an outcome. Listening involves legislators monitoring constituent interests and using that information in making decisions. Using data from a survey of state legislators in 26 states, this research finds that monitoring contributes to using constituent information and offers a measure of listening based on these two behaviors. Furthermore, it finds that compared with the decisions of others, the decisions (measured as cosponsoring gay, lesbian, and bisexual [GLB] issue legislation) of legislators who listen are more strongly influenced by district preferences (measured as district votes on same-sex marriage ballot initiatives). This suggests that listening contributes to representation.

Why are statewide ballot initiatives used more frequently in some states relative to others? Using Gerber as a theoretical baseline, I argue that groups use initiatives in response to conditions surrounding representative government. Specifically, I argue that groups are best able to mobilize the resources necessary (i.e., citizens) to draft, qualify for the ballot, and pass an initiative when conditions surrounding representative government render it incapable of addressing citizens' policy preferences efficiently and effectively. Groups, that is, are best able to mobilize the resources necessary to pass initiatives as legislatures become insulated from citizens, or ineffective at digesting policy items. I extend the literature in this vein by finding strong evidence that initiatives are used in response to partisan conditions, which undermine legislatures' capacity to process legislation effectively. However, I find only limited empirical support for the argument that initiatives are used in response to legislative insulation.

Most research studying minority representation concludes that minorities enjoy better representation when they constitute a larger share of a constituency, but only through the partisanship and race/ethnicity of the representative. Other research finds that minorities receive worse representation when they constitute a larger share of a constituency. We argue that minority composition will have an independent effect on representation, but that this effect will differ depending on the representative's partisanship. We apply our theory to Latino composition and state legislative voting on immigration policy and find that Latino composition has no effect on voting among Democratic legislators, who are less likely to vote in a restrictive direction on immigration than Republicans regardless of the Latino composition in their district. However, Republicans are more likely to vote to restrict immigration as Latinos comprise a larger share of their district. Our findings suggest that scholars should consider the moderating effect of legislator partisanship when examining minority composition and representation.

Term limits provide a rare opportunity to employ pre- and post-intervention research designs to investigate the effects of turnover in legislatures. This article describes a study of term limits in Michigan that takes advantage of this opportunity. With eight states implementing term limits in 2002 or soon thereafter, there are opportunities for other scholars to replicate all or parts of the study described here. The payoffs for such projects in terms of generating systematic answers to the impacts of legislative turnover and term limits are considerable.

We examine how institutional selection procedures affect the ideology of state supreme court chief justices. We argue that institutional selection methods empower those charged with choosing chief justices to select court leaders who reflect their own preferences, and we test this theory using data from all 50 American states from 1970 to 2017. Our results show that states that use popular elections to select chief justices tend to produce court leaders whose preferences reflect the electorate, and states that use commission-assisted elite appointment tend to produce chief justices whose preferences mirror those of political elites. While we find that peer election systems produce leaders with preferences similar to median court preferences, court preferences are also associated with other methods of chief justice selection.

The American State Administrators Project is a half-century long research program surveying the attitudes and behavior of state agency leaders. The project has produced a voluminous number of publications and conference papers. At the same time it has also faced several difficulties in making its data more widely available to the scholarly community. This paper describes the Project, some of the data difficulties it has faced, and the portion of the data being distributed with this article.

Proposition 227, passed by California voters in 1998, aimed to dismantle bilingual programs in public schools and to replace them with English-only programs. Bilingual education, a long-standing program in California, involved mostly Hispanic students of limited English skills who were taught initially in their native language, and then were gradually transitioned into English-only classes. Using individual-level data from one southern California school district, I find that in 1998, before Proposition 227, limited-English-proficient (LEP) students enrolled in bilingual classes had lower scores in reading than LEP students who were not enrolled in bilingual classes, and who were, in general, more proficient in English. In math, bilingual students had test scores as good as those of non-bilingual LEPs. But in 1999, after Proposition 227, the same set of bilingual students had reading and math scores that were no worse than those of non-bilingual LEPs. Proposition 227, which interrupted bilingual programs and emphasized English instruction, did not set bilingual LEP students back relative to non-bilingual LEPs, and it may have even benefited them.

Little is known about the role of Spanish-language media in the representation of Latino constituencies in statehouses. In this article, I present analyses of elite-level data from the Media and Public Policy in the States: 2011 Survey, which reveal state legislators' attitudes and orientations toward the news media. Building on the view that Spanish-language media provide an important representational link between Hispanic constituents and their political representatives, I argue that the level of media sophistication or “media entrepreneurship” state legislators bring to their representative role is a function of legislators' Spanish media environments. Through statistical tests of the relationships between the Spanish-language media environment, state lawmakers' perceptions of the media's effectiveness, and their use of media tools, I find evidence that district-level Spanish-language media contexts influence lawmakers' level of engagement with the news media.

Fiorina (1992, 1994) argued that increased professionalism of state legislatures in the 1970s and 1980s increased Democratic control of those bodies. While some subsequent empirical studies have been consistent with this hypothesis, doubt remains about the causal connection of this relationship. Our review of Fiorina's theoretical argument leads us to add legislative district size as a conditioning element to the model. Using data from state legislatures in 1960-98, we find that such a model supports the claim that the empirical connection between legislative professionalism and Democratic electoral success is causal and not spurious.

Can legislation encouraging women’s political involvement impact women’s desire to run for elected office? Eleven states have passed legislation to promote equal gender representation on appointed government boards, and many argue this legislation will also develop a pipeline of women candidates to run for elected office. This paper is the first scholarly work to assess if gender balance legislation (GBL) increases the number of women candidates and women legislators within a state. I use a nonparametric generalization of the difference-in-differences estimator and find very little evidence that GBL significantly impacts women’s representation at the state level. Results are consistent across multiple outcome variables and different model specifications, including two-way fixed effects, generalized synthetic control, and synthetic control models. The insignificant impact of GBL speaks to the need to thoroughly investigate which institutional reforms adequately feed the female candidate pipeline.

We compare two widely publicized measures of state electoral integrity in the United States: the Electoral Integrity Project's 2016 U.S. Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Survey and the Pew 2014 Elections Performance Index. First, we review the theoretical and empirical differences between the two measures and find that they correlate at a surprisingly low level across the states. Second, given this low correlation, we examine the component parts of these indices and find that both are capturing multiple dimensions. Third, we examine how the components and the individual indicators that comprise each measure are linked to citizens' stated perceptions about electoral integrity. Throughout the article, we articulate a set of preemptive recommendations that urge researchers to be cautious and deliberate when choosing among measures of electoral integrity to use in future empirical studies.

Graduate schools develop research skills primarily by teaching future social scientists quantitative and qualitative research methods. A solid understanding of these methods is necessary for conducting reliable research. Yet, these skills are unusable if we cannot access data in the first place. The goal of this article is to help researchers reduce some of the barriers to collecting data by describing several methods for obtaining data from state and local agencies.

Former president Trump made hundreds of candidate endorsements in the 2022 Republican primaries. The state of Georgia garnered outsized attention because it was ground zero for Trump’s false accusations of a stolen 2020 presidential election. Trump endorsed several candidates in Georgia’s May 2022 GOP primary contests, including candidates challenging Governor Brian Kemp and Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, incumbents drawing Trump’s ire for upholding the 2020 outcome favoring Joe Biden. In a survey of likely Georgia GOP primary voters randomizing whether they are told which candidate Trump endorsed in five statewide races (governor, US Senate, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, and insurance commissioner), our analysis shows substantial variability in the influence of Trump’s endorsement. With scant prior information in low-profile contests (e.g., insurance commissioner), the Trump endorsement has a substantial impact, whereas it is rendered ineffectual in the most high-profile race for governor. Thus, the findings demonstrate the remarkable variability of a Trump endorsement, which is primarily contingent upon the salience of a specific race.

Do policymakers learn from the policy experiences of other governments, and if so, what do they learn? A long-established normative claim suggests that intergovernmental learning can and should occur among the US states, which serve as “laboratories of democracy” for the nation. We put this claim to a tough test, comparing the influences on the diffusion of instrumental Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws with that of more symbolic abortion regulation, from 1993 to 2016. We find evidence of substantive intergovernmental learning in policy diffusion even for abortion regulation—but only for instrumental abortion regulation. On symbolic abortion policy, states appear to learn mainly political lessons. Furthermore, proponents and opponents appear to learn different lessons in these diffusions, with loss aversion motivating opponents especially highly. Our results suggest that policymakers have a sophisticated understanding of the differences among policies’ goals and act strategically in pursuit of those goals.

State governments, often described as “laboratories of democracy,” design and implement many public policies, but this moniker also implies course correction when initial efforts fail. But how do states learn from failure? Existing hypotheses about policy learning and broad research capacity are insufficient. Using case studies of failed juvenile justice policies in Texas and Washington, I explore when failure acknowledgment occurs at all. I argue that a state’s bureaucratic capacity to gather data—distinct from its analytical capacity—is necessary for public officials to acknowledge failure, highlighting the impact of policy and institutional design on evidence-based policy making and policy corrections.