Understanding how people perceive the pros and cons of risky behaviors such as terrorism or violent extremism represents a first step in developing research testing rational choice theory aiming to explain and predict peoples’ intentions to engage in, or support, these behaviors. Accordingly, the present study provides a qualitative, exploratory analysis of a sample of 57 male youths’ perceptions of the benefits and drawbacks of: (a) accessing a violent extremist website, (b) joining a violent extremist group, and (c) leaving such a group. Youth perceived significantly more drawbacks than benefits of joining a violent extremist group (p = .001, d = .46) and accessing a violent extremist website (p = .001, d = .46). The perceived benefits of engagement referred to gaining knowledge/awareness, being part of a group/similar people, and fighting the enemy/for a cause. The drawbacks referred to being exposed to negative material and emotions, having violent/criminal beliefs and behaviors, and getting in trouble with the law. The perceived benefits of disengagement referred to no longer committing illegal acts, and regaining independence/not being manipulated. The drawbacks referred to exposing oneself to harm and reprisal. These findings provide an insight into how male youth think about (dis)engagement in violent extremism, and can inform future quantitative research designed to explain and predict (dis)engagement in violent extremism. Eventually, such research may inform the development of evidence-based prevention and intervention strategies.

When we make risky decisions for others, we tend to follow social norms about risks. This often results in making different decisions for others than we would make for ourselves in a similar situation (i.e., self-other discrepancies). In an experiment, we investigated self-other discrepancies in young adults’ decisions to purchase a vaccine against a sexually-transmitted virus for themselves or for another person (i.e., the target of the decision). When the target’s preferences were in line with social norms, surrogates showed large self-other discrepancies in line with these norms. When the target’s preferences were contrary to social norms, surrogates did not show self-other discrepancies in line with these preferences; instead they still followed social norms, F(1, 140) = 21.45, p < .001, ηp 2 = .13. Surrogates with lower numeracy, F(2, 128) = 3.44, p = .035, ηp 2 = .05, and higher empathy, F(2, 128) = 3.72, p = .027, ηp 2 = .06, showed self-other discrepancies more in line with the target’s preferences, even when these were contrary to the norm. Surrogates whose own risk attitudes were contrary to social norms showed larger self-other discrepancies, F(1, 128) = 5.38, p = .022, ηp 2 = .04. These results demonstrate that perceived social norms about risk can predict self-other discrepancies in risky decisions, even when the target’s preferences are known and at odds with the social norm. Further, the surrogates’ numeracy, empathy, and propensity to take risks influence the extent to which risky decisions for others resemble risky decisions for oneself.

The main aim of this research was to investigate the decision making process in risky situations. We studied how different types of feedback on risky driving behaviors modulate risk evaluation and risk-taking. For a set of risky traffic situations, participants had to make evaluative judgments (judge the situation as risky or not) and urgent decisions (brake or not). In Experiment 1, participants received feedback with and without negative emotional content when they made risky behaviors. In Experiment 2 we investigated the independent effects of feedback and negative emotional stimuli. The results showed three important findings: First, urgent decisions were faster [F(1, 92) = 6.76, p = .01] and more cautious [F(1, 92) = 17.16, p < .001] than evaluative judgments. These results suggest that evaluative judgments of risk and actual risk-taking may not always coincide, and that they seem to be controlled by two different processing systems as proposed by dual process theories. Second, feedback made participants’ responses even faster [F(1, 111) = 71.53, p < .001], allowing greater risk sensitivity [F(1, 111) = 22.12, p < .001] and skewing towards more cautious responses [F(1, 111) = 14.09, p < .001]. Finally, emotional stimuli had an effect only when they were presented as feedback. The results of this research increase our understanding of the processes involved in risky driving behavior and suggest efficient ways to control risk taking through the use of feedback.

In this paper we study consumers’ interest in acquiring and displaying expensive luxury products. Based on recent insights in consumer psychology, which build on developments in evolutionary biology, we consider luxury products as “costly signals”: wasteful and costly goods, whose purpose is to communicate one’s biological fitness, and social status, to others. In line with previous research, we show that experiences that trigger mate attraction goals (Study 1: Exposure to others in bathing outfit) or status display goals (Study 2: Experiencing a vicarious victory of one’s favorite sports team) can increase people’s interest in luxury products. However, we demonstrate that some individuals are predictably more responsive to those experiences than others. We used a physiological measure (the proportion of the length of the index finger and ring finger of the right hand, 2D:4D) as a proxy for individual differences in exposure to prenatal androgens (i.e., testosterone). This measure has been related to dominant and competitive behavior later in life. We predict and find that individuals with a low 2D:4D (i.e., high exposure to prenatal androgens) were more responsive to the status-relevant experiences: they became more interested in luxury goods after these experiences. This was not the case for high 2D:4D individuals.

We take the first steps towards a shot selection quality model in basketball that incorporates decisional cues that might be predictive, not only of proximal results (e.g., scoring), but also of distal results (e.g., winning/losing the match). 2976 jump-shots from 50 Euroleague matches were sampled, following systematic observation guidelines. The decisional cues under scrutiny were shooting opposition, distance and lateral angle, disposition to offensive rebound and disposition to defensive balance at the moment of shooting. A first set of regressions between decisional cues and proximal results showed higher opposition and distance to decrease the probability of scoring (OR = .81; p < .001 and OR = .89; p = .013); a better disposition towards rebound to increase the chances of catching rebound (OR = 1.57; p < .001); and better defensive balance disposition to decrease the probability of a fast break (OR = 1.27; p < .036). A second set of regressions between proximal and distal results showed shooting and offensive rebound effectiveness to predict total points scored (β = .62; p < .001 and β = .32; p < .001) and game result (winning/losing the game; OR = 1.12; p < .001 and OR = 1.05; p = .021). Finally, an analysis of the impact of decisional cues on distal results showed a positive relationship between likelihood of winning and average team’s disposition to offensive rebound (OR = 1.18; p = .018). These results cast light on the actual weights (validities) of the different cues involved in predicting outcomes of shooting decisions. This evidence could help coaches provide objective feedback about players’ shooting performance beyond hit percentages.

An estimated 1 in 4 elderly Americans need a surrogate to make decisions at least once in their lives. With an aging population, that number is almost certainly going to increase. This paper focuses on financial surrogate decision making. To illustrate some of the empirical and moral implications associated with financial surrogate decision making, two experiments suggest that default choice settings can predictably influence some surrogate financial decision making. Experiment 1 suggested that when making hypothetical financial decisions, surrogates tended to stay with default settings (OR = 4.37, 95% CI 1.52, 12.48). Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding suggesting that in a different context (OR = 2.27, 95% CI 1.1, 4.65). Experiment 2 also suggested that those who were more numerate were less likely to be influenced by default settings than the less numerate, but only when the decision is whether to “opt in” (p = .05). These data highlight the importance of a recent debate about “nudging.” Defaults are common methods to nudge people to make desirable choices while allowing the liberty to choose otherwise. Some of the ethics of using default settings to nudge surrogate decision makers are discussed.

Previous research suggests that social comparisons affect decision making under uncertainty. However, the role of the length of the social interaction for this relationship remains unknown. This experiment tests the effect of social comparisons on financial risk taking and how this effect is modulated by whether social encounters are sporadic or repeated. Participants carried out a computer task consisting of a series of binary choices between lotteries of varying profitability and risk, with real monetary stakes. After each decision, participants could compare their own payoff to that of a counterpart who made the same decision at the same time and whose choices/earnings did not affect the participants’ earnings. The design comprised three between-subjects treatments which differed in the nature of the social interaction: participants were informed that they would be matched with either (a) a different participant in each trial, (b) the same participant across all trials, or (c) a “virtual participant”, i.e., a computer algorithm. Compared to the non-social condition (c), subjects in both social conditions (a and b) chose lotteries with lower expected value (z = –3.10, p < .01) and higher outcome variance (z = 2.13, p = .03). However, no differences were found between the two social conditions (z = 1.15, p = .25 and z = 0.35, p = .73, respectively). These results indicate that social comparison information per se leads to poorer and riskier financial decisions, irrespective of whether or not the referent other is encountered repeatedly.

Participation in organizational decision-making has received considerable attention from scholars. Beyond the perspectives proposed in past studies, we offer a new account, based upon a communication perspective, to explain why and when participation in decision-making can influence job satisfaction. Drawing from social capital theory, we examine whether communication openness mediates the relationship between participation in decision-making and job satisfaction. We also investigate how information adequacy moderates this mediated process. Results from a sample of 184 employees in China showed that the four-factor model was the best fitting solution (CFI = .91, GFI = .90, RMSEA = .09). The analyses indicated that employees’ participation in decision-making positively affected their job satisfaction (β = .32, p < .001), and the effect was mediated by communication openness (direct effect became non-significant when communication openness was included: β = .06, n.s.). Results also found that decision-making information adequacy positively moderated the relationship between participation in decision-making and communication openness (β = .13, p < .05). Thus, open communication and the free flow of information within organizations should be encouraged.

Acute stress and decision making (DM) interact in life – although little is known about the role of ambiguity and risk in this interaction. The aim of this study is to clarify the effect of acute stress on DM under various conditions. Thirty-one young healthy men were randomly distributed into two groups: experimental and control. DM processes were evaluated before and after an experimental session. For the experimental group, the session consisted of an acute stress battery; and the protocol was similar for the control group but the instructions were designed to minimize acute stress. Cardiovascular variables were continuously recorded 30 minutes before the DM tasks and during the experimental session. Cortisol, glucose, mood responses, and personality factors were also assessed. Acute stress was found to enhance disadvantageous decisions under ambiguous conditions (F(1, 29) = 4.16, p = .05, η2 p = .13), and this was mainly explained by the stress induced cortisol response (26.1% of variance, F(1, 30) = 11.59, p = .002). While there were no significant effects under risky conditions, inhibition responses differed between groups (F(1, 29) = 4.21, p = .05, η2 p = .13) and these differences were explained by cardiovascular and psychological responses (39.1% of variance, F(3, 30) = 7.42, p < .001). Results suggest that DM tasks could compete with cognitive resources after acute stress and could have implications for intervention in acute stress effects on DM in contexts such as addiction or eating disorders.

The objective of this study was to apply a decision training programme, based on the use of video-feedback and questioning, in real game time, in order to improve decision-making in volleyball attack actions. A three-phase quasi-experimental design was implemented: Phase A (pre-test), Phase B (Intervention) and Phase C (Retention). The sample was made up of 8 female Under-16 volleyball players, who were divided into two groups: experimental group (n = 4) and control group (n = 4). The independent variable was the decision training program, which was applied for 11 weeks in a training context, more specifically in a 6x6 game situation. The player had to analyze the reasons and causes of the decision taken. The dependent variable was decision-making, which was assessed based on systematic observation, using the “Game Performance Assessment Instrument” (GPAI) (Oslin, Mitchell, & Griffin, 1998). Results showed that, after applying the decision training program, the experimental group showed a significantly higher average percentage of successful decisions than the control group F(1, 6) = 11.26; p = .015; η2 p = .652; 95% CI [056, 360]. These results highlight the need to complement the training process with cognitive tools such as video-feedback and questioning in order to improve athletes’ decision-making.