Ethics and psychology are apt to look askance at one another. The ethicist warns the psychologist that he cannot “ explain away ” the objective distinction between good and evil merely by describing the process by which we come to apprehend that distinction. Nor can he in any such manner show that moral obligation is illusory. On the other hand, some psychologists do claim that in exposing the psychological sources of moral experience they show that no objective distinction is involved in it.

The problem of ethics may arise in any circumstances, at all times and in all places. For it is an ever-present problem which confronts every individual at all stages of his career after the dawn of consciousness. It is not limited to any particular aspect or department of life; it concerns the whole life of every human being from the cradle to the grave. Its existence may not be consciously recognized, and generally the choice of right and wrong action is unaccompanied by reflection; but the problem begins to operate as soon as the development of character begins, and people are always deciding between good and evil, whether they look inside their minds or not. For the formation of character depends on the manner in which the problems of conduct or morals are solved by each individual for himself. If he solves them correctly, he becomes good;

If he solves them badly, he sows in himself the seeds of evil. The general problem, moreover, is essentially the same for all, though in each particular case its specific nature may vary according to particular circumstances.

A Student of ethics cannot but be struck by some fundamental difference of outlook in the ethics of the East and the West. This has a particular bearing on the problem of the relation of the individual to society. In practice this has given rise to a question of supreme importance to every thinking man: is an individual completely subservient to society, or is society completely subservient to the demands of individuality? I.e., is the moksha (salvation) of any individual impossible till all the needs of society have been completely satisfied, or is an individual free to use or not to use society as a field for his own spiritual expansion? There is no doubt a fundamental discrepancy in these outlooks as thus conceived, and the problem is : can we reconcile them ?

We may consider the possibility of man's freedom from two points of view: (i) From the point of view of the metaphysical problem of “ free-will “; (2) from the point of view of the meaning and conditions of felt freedom. The first point of view is the more familiar, and I propose to discuss it here only by way of preparing for a consideration of the second.

In the historical process by which our knowledge develops, new ideas and new experiences tend very naturally to define themselves by reference to the old. It is not merely that an original thinker must express his originality in terms of old modes of language and thought (which is true and important), but that the new idea, the new experience, being vague and indistinctly grasped, is apt to coin for its expression and propagation phrases in which the emphasis falls upon the difference or variation from what is familiar and concretely understood. In the history of practical developments like that of the theory of political organization this factor is both evident and momentous. In the transition to modern democracy, for example, the familiar distinction between the Sovereign and Subjects dictates the form in which the old order is challenged.