The article is concerned with contemporary changes in the spatialization of the Russian-Finnish borderland as an example of re-bordering politics. The main material is a long-term ethnographic study in the territory of former Finnish Karelia, ceded by Finland to the Soviet Union following World War II. By extending the historical context of bilateral relations between the USSR (later Russia) and Finland, the article questions the implications of changing international relations regimes for situational forms of borderwork. The article contributes to the debate on contemporary border practices and the contradictory effects of foreign diplomacy by combining institutional and situational approaches to border territoriality and by focusing on border memory and heritage as resources of local identity and instruments of soft power. Examining the successive shifts of de- and re-bordering regimes in the Russian-Finnish borderlands from the late Soviet period to the present, the article demonstrates the unforeseen impact of foreign relations on local life and memory.

This article explores the socio-political landscape of Donbas through a lens of post-colonial studies, revealing the Russian colonial past and neo-colonial ambition. By uncovering the interplay of cultural, political, and economic challenges the author identifies the key elements of the region’s identity and draws on historical analysis and personal reflections on the Russo-Ukrainian war. The article explores how Russia managed to dominate the discourse in Donbas, as well as the reasons why a significant part of the Donbas people accepted Russian dominance over the region and the creation of self-proclaimed states without great resistance. The study underscores the necessity to work on the decolonization of Donbas’ identity as the pivotal point for fostering reconciliation processes in the long-term occupied territories of Ukraine.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, pandemic-driven nationalism surged in China, exemplified by widespread mockery and disparagement of India’s handling of the crisis in Chinese cyberspace. Adopting a linguistically grounded approach, this study scrutinizes how India is discursively constructed as an inferior Other amid COVID-19. It conducts a linguistically informed discourse analysis of a highly viewed text on Zhihu (China’s largest online Q&A platform). Drawing mainly on Halliday’s transitivity theory, this study unpacks the linguistic features in the chosen text, which, within a discourse of modern medicine, depicts the Indian people as trapped between hopelessly passive and absurdly overactive in the face of the pandemic. The text also casts the Indian government as an impotent foil to the Chinese government, a representation situated within a discourse of strong-state pandemic governance. By interrogating the non-official social media text through a linguistic lens, this study contributes to understanding China’s representational politics of Othering the non-West within the intertextual nexus between official and non-official spheres. It also contributes to making sense of the multidimensionality and ambivalence underlying Chinese national identity-making as well as “Orientalism within the ‘Orient’” in the Chinese context.

Riga, the capital of Soviet Latvia, was the first city in the USSR where television was created outside the Slavic linguistic space. This presented Soviet television with a brand new challenge of tackling bilingualism in the only available television programme, bringing with it viewer frustration as reflected in letters addressed to the studio. To relieve the republican television studios and their only programmes from the issue of bilingualism, in 1960, the CPSU called for the creation of a second republican programme – the retransmission of Moscow’s Central Television. This article tracks the development of the issue, focusing on the case study of a western-orientated, non-Slavic Soviet republic where negotiations regarding the place of Russian in a given field of public life took fifteen years, involving stakeholders of various levels. Thus, the article offers an opportunity to study certain aspects of Soviet nationality policies in the Soviet Western periphery under Khrushchev and Brezhnev from the viewpoint of a single, specified problem.

This article links two borderlands: the Italo-Slovene and the Slovene-Hungarian in the aftermath of the First World War. It focuses on the wartime refugees from the hinterlands of Trieste who, in accordance with agrarian reform, which the Yugoslav state began in 1919, were settled as colonists on the new Hungarian-South Slav border in the early 1920s. By using memoir literature and “ego documents,” the article tackles several aspects, including the refugee experience and social assistance during the First World War, the political motivation of the land reform, and the lived experiences of the colonists. In Yugoslavia, the agrarian problem was considered to be one of the most important issues facing the new state. The land reform aimed to solve social and national problems more than to improve the agricultural production of the state. In the example of the Prekmurje region, this article aims to show that interwar colonization succeeded in impacting the Hungarian–Slovene language border but failed miserably to ensure social transformation and security for the impoverished population.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Georgia became a key destination for Russian migrants, who significantly influenced the local housing market. This article explores the impact of the influx of Russian migrants into Tbilisi, which caused a surge in rental prices and aroused feelings of social insecurity among Georgian citizens. Using qualitative methods, including social media analysis and semi-structured interviews, the study investigates the emergence of “informal sanctions” imposed by Georgian Airbnb and Booking.com hosts as a means of expressing political dissatisfaction with their own government and protecting national interests. This article identifies four patterns of informal sanctions, such as rejecting, discomforting, avoiding, and exploiting Russian tenants, which reflect a form of patriotism from below. We argue that these spontaneous, everyday practices of resistance lead to the politicization of mundane host-tenant relations and the collective stereotyping of a migrant group in a time of insecurity. The theoretical proposition here is that everyday nationalism is closely related to informality, which opens the possibility of examining grassroots responses to perceived threats and tactics of resistance, with implications for broader social dynamics in times of ongoing geopolitical conflict and wartime migration in Eastern Europe.

In the late nineteenth century, the orally transmitted Armenian legend about the folk hero David of Sassoun seemed doomed to oblivion when Ottoman Armenian clergyman Karekin Srvandzdiants published a tiny booklet containing the story that he had learned by chance. Srvandzdiants noted that he would be happy if the story could reach twenty people. Decades later, this hitherto little-known folk legend would be read, and its main heroes celebrated by tens of millions of citizens of the Soviet Union. Scores of variants of the epic were collected from all over the newly established Soviet Armenia; some of the most revered Soviet poets and linguists produced a collated text of the epic and translated it into dozens of languages. More importantly, David of Sassoun and other heroes of the epic cycle came to symbolize the newly forged Soviet Armenian national character in a vast totalitarian empire whose guiding ideology was inimical to various aspects of Armenian traditions. In this article, I examine the underlying messages of the epic, discuss how Soviet policies helped the epic captivate a large audience in a short period, and analyze the political calculations and ideological justifications behind the promotion of the epic.

This article examines the discursive contestation of Alash movement narratives in post-1991 Kazakhstan by studying overlapping and diverse official and non-official narratives. By surveying textual content and conducting interviews with those who carry these narratives, including textbook authors, the article reveals that while both official and unofficial narratives converge on the subject of statehood for the Alash movement, the non-official narratives and textbook authors use its legacy to express dissatisfaction with post-1991 developments in Kazakhstan. This study sheds light on the differing perspectives and debates surrounding the Alash movement’s legacy in shaping post–1991 Kazakhstani society and politics.

The article addresses the paradox of the Russian legislation on nonterritorial, aka “national-cultural” autonomy – the lack of utilitarian ends and functions combined with a high domestic public demand for it. The author seeks to explain the case as simulation, or activities for the sake of demonstrating activities without definite substantive purposes. The analysis reveals that the relevant law’s goals and justifications voiced by the stakeholders were merely a combination of socially acceptable opinions unrelated to result-oriented action. These opinions were part of a common-sense worldview based on group-centric and essentialist vision of ethnicity and on neoliberal postulates, such as the need to foster bottom-up initiative and self-organization, the rejection of governmental social obligations, and the need for strict regulatory mechanisms securing fair relationships among the players. A brief comparison with a similar case in Europe reveals that simulation can take place in other contexts related to nonterritorial autonomy. Thus, a focus on simulative action must be a promising approach for research concerning the imaginaries of groups as entities and actors.

The rise of antagonism between the German and Czech nationalist activists in the mid-19th century has been neither clearly explained nor convincingly dated. Although this is a topic closely linked to the history of nationalism, the state of research has paradoxically been misguided by the nationalist approach adopted by historians analyzing it. The reason is that nationalism was not the cause but just one response to a greater phenomenon. The aim of the article is therefore to clarify the German-Czech relationship in the broader context of European history and the history of international relations using the perspective of geopolitics and security. As it claims, it was not cultural, linguistic, or constitutional issues but the fear of external threats that caused the mutual distrust of political activists that led to hostility and conflicting policies. Under the impact of international events and within the context of their relations to other international actors this process originated in 1839 by the latest. During subsequent years it developed rapidly and became obvious during the 1848 revolutions. The article thus reveals that this year did not represent the beginning but merely another chapter in a process that had begun nearly a decade earlier.