Two years ago when McDonald (JRS LVII (1967), 1–8) discussed the strategic aspects of the treaty of Apamea in its ‘territorial clause’ (Polyb. XXI, 43, 5–6; Livy XXXVIII, 38, 4–5) he was concerned to define the ‘Taurus line’, in its general significance with relation to Antiochus' position in Cilicia. This involved the text of the clause as well as topographical study of central and southern Asia Minor. He did not go on to treat how Antiochus might use naval transport and ‘combined operations’ at coastal landing points to turn the ‘Taurus line’ against Rhodes and Pergamum, and return to the Aegean.
The ‘naval clauses’ of the treaty represent Rome's decision to block any such move, however unlikely, by reducing Antiochus' strength at sea and imposing geographical limits on where the craft permitted to him might sail (Polyb. XXI, 43, 13–14 ; Livy XXXVIII, 38, 8–9).