For at least the past three decades, injuries have been recognized as an important public health problem in the United States. In 2001, there were approximately 157,000 deaths due to injuries in the US. There were also almost 30 million non-fatal injury incidents.

Injuries have been defined as: “…any unintentional or intentional damage to the body resulting from acute exposure to thermal, mechanical, electrical, or chemical energy or from the absence of such essentials as heat or oxygen”. Within public health, the field of injury prevention and control is dedicated to reducing the burden of injuries on the lives of people around the world.

Injury prevention seeks to reduce injuries by: 1) identifying risk factors, 2) designing interventions to address the risk factors, 3) implementing those interventions, 4) evaluating their effectiveness, and 5) replicating those that work. As with many other public health problems, interventions can target factors associated with the human or host, vehicle or vector, and the physical or social environment.

To a Western audience the terms “people” and “people's perspective” could appear somewhat perplexing. Technically, every person belongs to the class of “people”; hence, to talk of “people's perspective” seems to make an artificial division within one monolithic group. This ostensibly artificial division reflects a reality that necessitates it. In a Third World context, the term “people” has a fairly distinct connotation. It is not just a majority which is governed by a system that gives all people a minimal quality of life and allows them a meaningful participation in the political process. In a Third World context “people” are a “mass”—a faceless body of massive energy to be manipulated and kept domesticated in the interest of the powerelite. It is a power-bloc that is threatening as well as inescapable.

Recently, due to a number of converging factors, there have been significant shifts in public policy regarding the legitimacy of treating chronic pain with opioids. Traditional tenets handed down in medical, dental, nursing, and pharmacy education created a distinct reluctance on the part of practitioners to prescribe opioids on a continual basis. Much has been written about the reasons for these attitudes. One of the barriers that is very consistently reported by prescribers is the fear of regulatory and legal repercussions to ongoing prescription of this class of medications. It is in this arena that sentinel changes have occurred, the most recent of which is the promulgation of a document prepared by the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB), which suggests a set of guidelines meant to be endorsed or adopted by individual medical licensing boards on how to approach this particular aspect of practice. These guidelines, representing a broad consensus from a wide constituency, were developed in a relatively open forum and detail a balanced approach to the prescription of opioids for chronic pain.

We critically evaluate arguments in a recent Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics article by Svoboda, Adler, and Van Howe disputing the 2012 affirmative infant male circumcision policy recommendations of the American Academy of Pediatrics. We provide detailed evidence in explaining why the extensive claims by these opponents are not supported by the current strong scientific evidence. We furthermore show why their legal and ethical arguments are contradicted by a reasonable interpretation of current U.S. and international law and ethics. After all considerations are taken into account it would be logical to conclude that failure to recommend male circumcision early in infancy may be viewed as akin to failure to recommend childhood vaccination to parents. In each case, parental consent is required and the intervention is not compulsory. Our evaluation leads us to dismiss the arguments by Svoboda et al. Instead, based on the evidence, infant male circumcision is both ethical and lawful.

On April 16, 2007, Cho Seung-Hui used two semiautomatic handguns to kill 32 persons and then himself at Virginia Tech University in the largest campus shooting in U.S. history. Mr. Cho purchased his handguns from a pawnshop and a gun store in Virginia, where under state law a background check was conducted to determine whether he had any disqualifying criminal or mental health history. The paperwork for the background check was completed at the gun store, and the check itself was conducted through an “instant” system facilitated by a toll-free telephone number. The entire transaction took approximately 20 minutes. At no point was Mr. Cho asked why he wished to purchase the guns. And although he had been deemed a potential danger to himself by a state magistrate in 2005 – which should have disqualified his purchase of a gun under federal law – this information never reached those conducting the background check.

In most countries, the alcohol industry enjoys considerable freedom to market its products. Where government regulation is proposed or enacted, the alcohol industry has often deployed legal arguments and used legal forums to challenge regulation. Governments considering marketing regulation must be cognizant of relevant legal constraints and be prepared to defend their policies against industry legal challenges.

Biobank-based research is not specifically addressed in Indian statutory law and therefore Indian Council for Medical Research guidelines are the primary regulators of biobank research in India. The guidelines allow for broad consent and for any level of identification of specimens. Although privacy is a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution, courts have limited this right when it conflicts with other rights or with the public interest. Furthermore, there is no established privacy test or actionable privacy right in the common law of India. In order to facilitate biobank-based research, both of these lacunae should be addressed by statutory law specifically addressing biobanking and more directly addressing the accompanying privacy concerns. A biobank-specific law should be written with international guidelines in mind, but harmonization with other laws should not be attempted until after India has created a law addressing biobank research within the unique legal and cultural environment of India.

There are a number of considerations, including ethical and clinical or diagnostic factors, in utilizing the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in criminal proceedings. The reliability and validity of the diagnosis may be questioned. Legal precedent may consider extant diagnostic criteria for PTSD and comorbid diagnoses. However, these diagnostic criteria are often in flux considering new research findings. For example, the introduction of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association, includes some changes in the PTSD diagnostic criteria. How will this affect interpretation of past legal judgments? Moreover, PTSD has significant psychiatric comorbidity, e.g., substance abuse, which in itself may influence violent behavior and its consequences. Some of these comorbid diagnoses also have changes in their diagnostic criteria. The introduction of biological tests in the assessment of PTSD will likely facilitate more objective diagnosis.

Because research involving human subjects exposes people to risk not always for their own potential benefit, the question arises as to how best ensure that: (1) research participants are protected and benefited according to the highest ethical standards, while, on the other hand, (2) researchers are protected and free to do research that will produce clinical advances for both research participants and society as a whole.

The balancing of the risk to research participants versus the benefits derived from the research is performed in many counrries by a system for the protection of human research participants that is laid out in national laws and regulations. In the United States, this system is based on principles emanating from the Nuremberg Code, the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki,and the report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the Belmont Rept).

An inordinate number of low wage workers in essential industries are Black, Hispanic, or Latino, immigrants or refugees — groups beset by centuries of discrimination and burdened with disproportionate but preventable harms during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Last April, 23 year-old Rudy Linares disconnected his 15-month-old comatose son, Sammy, from the mechanical ventilator that was maintaining the infant's life. He then used a gun to keep hospital staff from interfering while he withdrew the machine, allowing his son to die of acute respiratory failure. The death of this infant stirred great controversy among doctors, nurses, lawyers and ethicists. It also generated much discussion in the news media. The clearest common denominator of this discussion has been the willingness of commentators to advance opinions and interpretations without knowledge of the facts of the case. Some of the opinions have been critical of the hospital, the doctors, and/or the nurses. The present report is not intended to answer such criticism. The report will simply provide the facts and legal opinions as to the case. To the extent this information leads the reader to understand or agree with the management of the case the report will serve as a defense of these actions. To the extent it leads to rejection or criticism of the management, the report will support the detractors.

“Acceptability research” is a term first coined to describe inquiries into individuals’ responses to family planning and contraceptive technology. As defined by WHO, “acceptability” is a “quality which makes an object, person, event, or idea attractive, satisfactory, pleasing or welcome.” In fact, the word “acceptable” in English is distinct from other issues that are also encompassed within “acceptability research.” “Acceptable,” to many, connotes faint praise. It may mean that something is tolerable only to the point of not being protested. On the other hand, the attributes “desirable” and “preferable” are more positive. In fact, all of these qualities are examined within the meaning of “acceptability research” as currently used by the Population Council.

Acceptability of a product or a medical procedure is most commonly studied in terms of patients or clients. Do those who will undergo the procedure or be the subjects of the technology find its use acceptable? But, in fact, acceptability can also be tested in relation to the providers of the technologies (i.e., the medical professionals), to the program managers or to policymakers.

This article returns to a war waged for the better part of this century-between the theories of punishment and rehabilitation in impeding the drug epidemic. Today, the terms of the war are recast as supply-side policies based upon law enforcement, destroying crops in source countries, interdiction and increased sentencing, and demand reduction based upon prevention, education and treatment.

The war on drugs has reached a feverish pitch. New policies and statutes have tightened the grip of supply-side policies, with images of battle and hate-mongering which go beyond the vilified drug lords and governments which harbor them, to the middle men, the dealers, and even the users. The in-vogue policies of user accountability and zero tolerance make it acceptable to direct the state's formidable powers at drug dependent persons themselves. Drug dependent persons have profound physical and psychological problems, and are primarily concentrated in poor, minority urban areas.

Virtually every state gives psychiatrists’ patients a broad statutory privilege to prevent the disclosure in legal proceedings of information about their diagnosis and treatment. Although the precise scope of the privilege varies from state to state, and a variety of exceptions are widely recognized, the contents of therapy sessions—and hence of psychiatrists’ written records of therapy sessions—are ordinarily protected by the privilege. Patients thus are gmerally entitled to prevent the courts and other government authorities from using their coercive evidencr-gathering powers to obtain psychiatric records or testimony about therapy. In conjunction with psychiatrists’ ethical and legal duties of confidentiality toward their patients outside legal proceedings, the privilege renders the privacy of the psychiatric relationship to a large degree sacrosanct.

The cloak of secrecy around the psychiatrist-patient relationship, however, must inevitably be lifted to some extent when third parties pay for psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. Any third-party payer, be it a private insurer or a government agency (such as Medicaid or Medicare), must be able to obtain enough information about psychiatric services to determine the propriety of claims for payment for those services.

Should Medicaid pay for supportive housing for homeless persons? After describing current limits on how states can use Medicaid funds to support housing, this article considers whether justice requires treating Medicaid recipients residing in nursing homes and Medicaid recipients needing supportive housing similarly.

Active shooter incidents (ASI) have unfortunately become a common occurrence the world over. There is no country, city, or venue that is safe from these tragedies, and healthcare institutions are no exception. Healthcare facilities have been the targets of active shooters over the last several decades, with increasing incidents occurring over the last decade. People who work in healthcare have a professional and moral obligation to help patients. As concerns about the possibility of such incidents increase, how should healthcare institutions and healthcare professionals understand their responsibilities in preparation for and during ASI?

Let us start with a conclusion that seems not to be in dispute: that in April of 1989 Samuel Linares had little or no interest in living. He had been competently diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state, by then eight months long. The cause was clearly prolonged asphyxiation, so that whatever uncertainty exists in cases of unknown etiology was not a factor. It could also be claimed that he had little interest in dying, in that he was probably incapable of suffering from prolonged treatment. But few advocate prolonged intensive care for preservation of mere vegetative functions. Nor is there serious argument that patients or surrogates who request discontinuation of treatment in such circumstances, when it serves no interest of the patient, are acting immorally. Even the vitalist federal Baby Doe regulations concede that life-sustaining treatment may be discontinued when the patient is permanently comatose.